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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1904.

THE BIAS OF PATRIOTISM.

I.

Bias is that attribute of the mind which causes it to accept as true, on relatively slight evidence, that which agrees with its sympathies, and to reject or minimise that which is opposed to its sympathies, although the evidence be relatively strong. Of all the characteristics of the human mind, this is, perhaps, the most constant; and yet, striking as it is in others, of its existence in ourselves we are but faintly conscious. Each individual may be said to enter the world obliquely; he is the center or meeting point of forces, all tending to distort his outlook upon the universe of which he is part. First, there are those strongest and most comprehensive of all forms of bias, the bias of self and the bias of sex. On the social side there are the sympathies which draw the individual towards a certain class; which identify his interests with those of a certain profession or trade, a certain family, town, district, or country. On the intellectual side he is impelled towards certain forms of education, certain schools of thought, certain ideals of culture, certain political or social creeds. On the religious side he may accept with the utmost avidity everything which favours a certain belief or doctrine, or may have a strong natural bent towards some phase of agnosticism. And so on through all branches of literature and art.

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No one would contend for a moment that these leanings were in themselves bad. It may be safely asserted that without them we should have no enthusiasm, no heroism, possibly, also, very little character. If we were to eliminate bias, we should at the same time destroy the element which gives piquancy and zest to life, for it is the tendency to see things wrongly, and not as they really are, which is one of the prime causes of interest. In the views of strongly biased people, there is always something picturesque and charming. It is thus that personality reveals itself. A man's emotions are allowed to emphasise, to colour his case, without exciting in us any repugnance; we are content to listen and enjoy. We may say, then, that inasmuch as bias gives variety to life, it is good. It quickens the intelligence, fires the imagination, calls forth unsuspected powers.

It is only when we approach the problem of the value and function of truth, that the really mischievous side of bias comes into view. Few would assert that to know the exact truth, under all circumstances, is either desirable, or would be conducive to the greatest happiness. To see things and people precisely as they are is happily not possible to understandings such as ours; but if it were, it is clear that some of the greatest joys of life would be gone. How far happiness depends upon the purest illusion is a perfectly legitimate subject of philosophic inquiry. But ignorance, even if sometimes conducive to bliss, is far oftener the cause of innumerable forms of suffering; and for the purpose of the present inquiry, it must be assumed that it is in the direction of greater knowledge that we must look for the true development and happiness of mankind. Now the sum of truths that it is possible for the individual to discover for himself, is relatively very small. In the vast majority of cases, they are limited to the ordinary facts of everyday life. The truths which relate to other lives, other things and times, pass into his experience through the minds of other men. Human life being at best a mere flash, and the sum of knowledge practically infinite, the utmost that any single mind can accomplish is to make a hasty selection. Now if all knowledge

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could be reduced to the condition of science, the effect of bias would be no more serious than the production of an army of specialists, each with an exaggerated view of the importance of his own department, but each disseminating some small portion of recognized truth. But the knowledge which is *not* "reasoned and classified," and the conclusions which are waiting for verification, form, and will probably always form, the main object of interest to the ordinary mind. In every department of thought we are confronted with opinions having all the weight of an ill-defined authority, which are greatly divergent, and often diametrically opposed. The position of the lay mind is thus one of difficulty and responsibility. Consciously or unconsciously it will select, and it is of much importance to determine on what principle this selection is to be made. Are we honestly desirous of getting hold of the truth—or what must correspond to the truth in this world in which the absolute is unattainable; or is the acquisition of truth to be regarded as subordinate to the agreeable process of having our existing beliefs confirmed? It is owing to the baneful influences of bias, that the essential difference of these two positions is not clearly seen. As a consequence the progress of knowledge, despite the more perfect arrangement for its dissemination, is retarded. Brilliantly expressed errors, cunning appeals to the affections, mistaken zeal, make a long fight against a prosaic truth. Energy is wasted in endless correction, and unwelcome discoveries are ignored or suppressed.

Bias is an affair of feeling, and it would be absurd to expect, even in an ideal society, an invariable enthusiasm for pure truth. As a practical question, all that may be hoped for is to bring home to the average mind a more or less clear *consciousness* of bias. Under ordinary circumstances, this quickened consciousness is manifested by a certain difference in attitude towards supposed authority on debatable questions. It is recognized that here also bias is at work. The conclusions towards which the sympathies of the teacher lead him are subjected to close scrutiny, and conversely the admissions made with evident reluctance are freely accepted.

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The exposition is taken in strict connection with the interests, experience, and character of the expositor. This, of course, is what everyone feels to be the common-sense view, and yet there are probably few more frequent sources of error and confusion than just this failure to consider the precise strength and direction of the feeling of the individual teacher, and how far it will be likely to carry him. Apart from this consideration, the testimony is of little value. In the elucidation of truth, evidence and personality cannot be separated. It is only thus that there may be felt the necessity of some standard in which the element of bias is absent, in which a *consensus* of those familiar with the evidence takes the place of personal opinion. With a keener watchfulness as to the workings of bias, there arises a higher appreciation of the judicial faculty and a corresponding depreciation of simple advocacy; it is seen that in order to establish a truth, it is not necessary to over-state it, that a right judgment is more likely to be obtained from attempts at impartial treatment, than from intentionally one-sided views.

The question as to how far all knowledge is relative is, of course, beyond the range of this paper. It must be here assumed that to those sufficiently in earnest, and having the necessary opportunities, the truth is attainable. Our immediate concern, therefore, is not with truth itself, but with the mental attitude in regard to it. Given a community the members of which are from various causes indifferent in this respect, and all the enthusiasm and skill of which they are capable will serve but to glorify error, and obscure the benefits of more accurate knowledge

But bias is not only individual, but collective; it is in the *group* that its most characteristic features are observed. The larger the group, the less conscious is it of its peculiar bias. Let us readily admit the inspiration that proceeds from numbers. There is no type of mind, however cold or unsympathetic, which is not largely sustained by the encouragement of kindred minds; as an influence in the lives of teachers and reformers, its power may scarcely be over-estimated. But let us not fall into the error of supposing that there is an

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absolutely necessary connection between numbers and infallibility. We cannot get at the truth by a mere process of counting heads. The most that can be said is that the beliefs of groups are more likely to have in them an element of truth than the beliefs of the individuals of which the group is composed. But there is still to be taken into account the beliefs outside the group. The result of the bringing together of individuals having similar opinions is to augment feeling, to enhance rather than dispel prejudice, to encourage rather than remove bias. If the individuals of the group are, in the main, right, the feeling of sympathy will cause them to push their principles to an unwarrantable extreme. If in the main they are wrong, the same feeling will cause them to insist upon the least assailable points of their own creed, and enlarge upon the weaknesses of beliefs to which they are opposed. Sympathy is often stronger than truth. The path of error is easy by way of companionship. There is no opinion or belief, however unjustifiable, which is not strengthened by the discovery that it is shared by another mind; and ideas which the individual would be afraid, or even ashamed to express, have quite a different aspect when presented boldly in a new form.

Thus the part played by the more impulsive spirits of a group is quite out of proportion to the value of their counsel. The process is familiar enough. The man who knows the least is the most easily convinced. For him the golden mean has no charms. He has little sympathy with the attitude of those who confess to uncertainty from lack of data, still less with those who candidly admit a change of belief. What he requires are clear, simple, decided views, warmly and pointedly expressed. This man of little knowledge and strong convictions will almost invariably be found in the ranks of the most demonstrative, setting the emotional pace of the group—a pace which so often ends in sharp reaction. He it is who offers the strongest temptation to over-statement, to unfairness, and to all the weaknesses associated with the element of personality. Thus do we realise the important part played by numbers. The bias of the individual is patent

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to many; that of the group may be seen with equal clearness only by those outside it.

Now the group with which the present investigation is concerned is almost the largest, and certainly the most important of all the groups composing modern civilised society. Its bias is the most unconscious, and therefore the most difficult to appraise, the most difficult to attack. If no man is free from bias, from this form he is least likely of all to be free. Hence on such a subject there can never be any approach to finality, the knowledge of those within and those without the group varies too widely. In the very nature of the case we look in vain for any safe guide, any fixed standard of what, under the circumstances is true or false, right or wrong. Why, then, it may be asked, should we essay a task which presents so many elements of uncertainty, whose results cannot be either definite or conclusive? I think here, as in the case of so many of the deeper problems of life, the end is of less importance than the means. In the most fundamental of all beliefs there is an element of indefiniteness, if not of contradiction, yet it is just these beliefs which have most profoundly influenced human conduct in all ages. Thus the absence of fixed criteria is no valid objection to our enquiry. In order to know a thing, it is not necessary to measure it; the mere recognition that it exists, that it has certain broadly marked characteristics, that its influence is felt in certain directions is knowledge often of vital importance.

II.

What is patriotism? The apparently simple love of the fatherland is really a very complex sentiment. There is first the simple affection for the native speech. Whether or not we agree with Freeman and Max Nordau that language may be taken as a rough test of nationality, it is obvious that by no other means is the sense of kinship so strongly brought home, whilst a difference in speech amongst an otherwise united people can only be overcome by a community of interests which, however powerful, is never absolute. It is not

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that a people *deliberately* loves its speech as the result of a conscious choice in which their own mode of expression is known to be superior to that of others. To the vast majority of mankind such a process is altogether unknown. The affection must be classed with the special instincts, and it has all the force of a purely natural impulse. Playing a leading part in the acquisition of all that belongs to the thought of a people, both past and present, language is thus the distinctive feature which, in any process of absorption, is the last to disappear. The joys, sorrows, struggles, and triumphs of a people are indissolubly associated with its native speech, which in this way becomes invested with a magic power, giving its possessors a certain reserve of strength as against the rest of the world.

There is next the affection for the purely physical surroundings. In its most primitive form, the feeling does not reach much beyond the immediate district in which a man has been brought up, every detail of which is so interwoven with his experience as to enter into his personality. The sentiment undergoes modification with the increase in the facilities for locomotion, particularly amongst town-dwellers, the affection for the native district giving place to a similar sentiment towards more remote localities, which from various causes become more attractive. This love of the soil, of the native climate, mountains, rivers, fields, lanes, trees, flowers, and so forth, remains a sentiment at once real and lasting, affecting one's judgment regarding the physical features of other lands.

Thirdly, there is the affection inspired by history. Emerging from the mists of tradition, we find amongst every people carefully preserved records of national achievements. As until comparatively recent times, the only way in which a people could distinguish itself was in war, the prominent feature in all these records is prowess in arms. Being in the main the work of native chroniclers, the deeds are set forth with a loving thoroughness which appeals strongly to the national temper. Accordingly, whatever the actual course of a people's history may have been, they always find

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in it abundant material for exciting their admiration and sympathy. Also largely inspired by history, we have that phase of the patriotic sentiment which is called forth by the institutions, laws, and customs of a country—social, political, and religious. In the evolution of these the best energy of a people is absorbed. In this way is brought home to a race its obligation to past generations, and thus arises that continuity of sentiment, which marks the growth of national thought and character.

Finally there is the affection inspired by great men—warriors, statesmen, poets, philosophers, and artists. Whatever view may be taken of the "great man" theory of history, it must be recognised that in its great men the genius of a race finds its most striking and adequate expression. Amongst the different peoples of the world there is the widest difference of ideals; there is a very wide difference in the ideals of the same people in different ages. But whatever standard is observed we have, in the attribute of greatness, the best that the race has to offer. It follows, therefore, that the admiration always evoked by the display of exceptional gifts, will become reflected in the people amongst whom they appear as a feeling of national gratification or pride. In the mind of each individual there is a vague consciousness that he is entitled to some share of the credit in producing the great ones of his own country. He feels that the possibilities of the race have a new significance for him. In this way does he become bound to the race by a sentiment which appeals to some of the best faculties of his nature. Through great men the love of kindred is intensified; it is also refined and elevated, and may thus claim a justification on grounds other than those pertaining to mere geographical position or purely instinctive feeling.

In all these ways then is the sentiment of patriotism manifested. It is not, of course, suggested that in all countries the part played by these various emotions is of the same relative importance. For instance, the love of physical surroundings—the *pays*—is very fully developed in France, whilst in England and America—the great traveling nations

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—the sentiment is comparatively weak. Similarly in England, the feeling inspired by institutions is relatively much stronger than in Germany, where militarism and closely allied officialism is the dominating feature. It is obvious also that at different periods of a country's history, the strength of the different forces varies greatly. But wherever the patriotic feeling exists it may, I think, be resolved into some such elements as are here indicated. Thus do we find ourselves face to face with a highly complex sentiment. Directly or indirectly, it has to take into account innumerable facts of the most diverse kind, ranging over a very wide area. The ideas, feelings, acts of many individuals are bound up in it. Social movements, presenting problems of great intricacy, and demanding judgment of a high order are based upon it. It is, therefore, unquestionable that in the resulting conduct, there is the fullest scope for error and wrongdoing; and the apparently simple and straightforward nature of the patriotic impulse should not deter us from subjecting it to the closest scrutiny.

III.

But before passing to a closer examination of the bias in question, it will be necessary to recall for the moment, certain features of the development of European civilisation, of which modern patriotism is the outcome. Patriotism, as we understand it to-day, is a sentiment of comparatively recent growth. The feeling corresponding to it, for instance, in Greece and Rome was real enough, but the vast difference in the social conditions both within and without these states, is fatal to the drawing of any analogy that would be helpful at the present time. The conditions which succeeded the decline of the Empire were highly unfavorable to the growth of patriotism. For many centuries, the young and vigorous races of the north strove together for the territories which had been more or less completely subject to Rome. In due course the civilised parts of the continent became parcelled out into duchies, kingdoms, and even empires. But the divisions thus formed were, in the main,

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geographical. The unity that existed among confederations of states was little more than a recognition of spheres of influence. Boundaries were ill-defined, languages were unsettled, the races readily transferred their allegiance from one ruler to another. Throughout the feudal period, the ideas, no less than the interests of the people could scarcely have risen above the purely local. On the other hand, there were certain influences at work which tended in a certain sense to unify the whole of the civilised continent; such, for instance, as the use of a common language by the learned of all countries, and the recognition of a common religion, of which latter, the great movement of the Crusades is the most striking manifestation. We seem to recognise the germ of the principle of nationality in the elevation of the local tongues into literary languages; but this was an extremely slow process, occupying in every country several centuries, and then only affecting a section of the people.

When at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Machiavelli declares that he prefers his country to the safety of his soul, we are conscious of an entirely new note in European history. Quite apart from the value of the Machiavellian ideal, we recognise that here is something for which some personal sacrifice may be made. It is evident that certain definite groups of men, with ideas and traditions in common, and associated with certain districts have been formed, and that they are conscious of having a character and destiny apart from the rest of the world. But patriotism is still of slow growth. True there has always been the stimulus derived from the fighting instinct, which caused the inhabitants of different countries to band together against a common foe; and there can be no doubt that this tended greatly to encourage the feeling of nationality, of which, perhaps, the long wars waged between France and England are the best illustration. But it will be seen that patriotism as here understood, though largely influenced by pure antagonism to alien people, embraces much more, and it is this love of country in the fuller sense which was reserved for the nineteenth century.

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The nineteenth is pre-eminently the century of nationality. Since 1815 many new races have sprung up, proclaiming through their various tongues their right to recognition as distinct people. From the ruins of the Turkish power in Europe have emerged half a dozen nationalities, Greece, Roumania, Servia, Bulgaria, and others whose independence cannot long be delayed. Hungary has obtained autonomy from Austria. Italy has become a united people. Belgium has separated from Holland. And most important of all, from a political point of view, from thirty-two states, we now hear the single voice of the races of Germany. In other parts of the world, we have the striking advent of America as a world-power, and the rise of Japan. Now this national movement is in a great measure democratic. It is directed not so much against alien people, as against alien governments; it is the assertion by races of the right to work out their own destiny in their own way. In such stages of the national movement, it is obvious that patriotism of the higher kind will be called forth. The feeling at such times is at least co-extensive with the love of freedom, and commands equal admiration. But it is in the later stages of national existence that patriotism shows a tendency to run riot, and here we are met by a curious anomaly.

The great increase in the means of human intercourse that has taken place during the last fifty years, has not been followed by any appreciably better feeling between the nations. Though war is, perhaps, less frequent, we have in its place an animosity which is both chronic and intensely articulate, the far-reaching evils of which are hardly less than those attending actual bloodshed. On the part of all the older states, there is the fear that their existence, or prosperity, or development is imperilled by the aggressive feeling of their neighbors; and the policy of the governing forces in each country is thus to keep alive those evidences of international hostility which, unhappily, it is never difficult to find. Clearly, there is something fundamentally wrong in this phase of the development of modern civilisation. Side by side with an unparalleled advance in all the forms of knowledge which stand

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for moral progress, with a marked improvement in the education of the people and a quickening of the general intellect, with a keener appreciation of art and letters, with a softening of manners, and with, at all events, a formal recognition of a higher ethical standard; we have the great groups of mankind known as nations still clinging to the barbarous law that might is right, that the well-being of one group may only be obtained at the expense of another, that the natural relation is one not of amity, but of enmity. The explanation of this strange association of degeneration and development must be sought in the old direction The arch-enemy of mankind is ignorance, and it is to this sinister influence that all forms of international ill-will, suspicion, and even jealousy, are in the main traceable. In other words, the general progress of mankind is being retarded by the bias of a crude and short-sighted patriotism.

IV.

Now let us look this idea of patriotism squarely in the face. Let us give to it, as a force in individual and social development, all the credit to which it is entitled, but let no fear of hard names turn us aside from an attempt to arrive at a fair estimate of its value. Perhaps the least questionable of all the uses of patriotism is its service to art. Under this influence the æsthetic faculties are stimulated, an entirely distinct sphere is revealed for the exercise of creative thought. It is mainly to this stimulus that we owe all the many forms of national poetry, painting, sculpture; in music, oratory, and imaginative prose writing its influence has been incalculably great. It has been the cause of much æsthetic inspiration, and of still more æsthetic appreciation. It thus introduces a special form of happiness to millions whose thought, apparently, would otherwise have been in this respect torpid. This is a great boon; let it be recorded with due prominence.

Patriotism, also, is one of the strongest incentives to self-sacrifice. For reasons which will be noticed presently, the ground here is not quite so safe, but the proposition as stated

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is doubtless substantially true. As a direct cause of the exhibition of physical courage, patriotism, probably, should be accorded the first place. Without enquiring too closely into the nature of this quality, or offering any comparison between the physical and moral varieties of it, we must ungrudgingly concede that it is, to an eminent degree, admirable. In the courage that leads to the sacrifice of life itself, there is something which stirs the soul to its depths. None will deny that such valour must be ranked high among the nobler attributes of human nature.

Admirable, also, is that other form of sacrifice which is chronicled not as death, but as life devoted to the welfare of one's country. With a second caution that the admiration may be qualified by other considerations, we note here the approach of the purest of all forms of patriotism; but it is significant that it is also the least characteristic, and therefore the least aggressive In ordinary estimation, the greatest patriot would be he who devoted himself most exclusively to his own country, and was indifferent or hostile to others. But it is by no means necessary so to restrict the meaning of the word. The patriotism here spoken of may be only half conscious of the existence of other countries, or may even include their wellbeing in its own. But it is clear that when this stage is reached, we are introducing an entirely new element into the case.

Next may be noted the use of patriotism as a promoter of human sympathy. The consciousness of kindred origin, interests, and aims is a unifying principle of the utmost potency. It is undoubtedly a great corrective of many subtle forms of egoism, lifting the individual out of his immediate circle, and introducing an entirely new set of interests. The individual consciousness thus becomes fuller, richer, more complex; it ascends to a higher plane in the scale of being. There is, of course, no more fundamental emotion of human nature than that of sympathy; to it we owe that *common*-sense—the sense of the common interest—which is the source of some of the strongest enthusiasms and also some of the greatest social pleasures. With certain inevitable reserva-

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tions, we may say that anything which stimulates sympathy between the units of society is good; and to this extent the services rendered by patriotism are quite beyond question.

Finally must be acknowledged the function of patriotism as a means of encouraging emulation and rivalry. Where the national reputation is at stake, men and communities are spurred to make efforts which, under ordinary conditions they would regard as futile. Thus is the best of which they are capable brought out; the native talent is specialised and quickened. There is hardly any branch of human activity which may not be affected in this way. It is not necessary to dwell upon the importance of this feature of competition. Other things being equal, the keener it is, the greater the results from the point of view of evolution. It has played a great part in the past, it is destined to play a far greater part in the future, and there seems to be every reason for regarding this international feeling of emulation as, in itself, a strong factor in the progress of civilisation.

Now underlying the view that the influence of patriotism is, in these several ways beneficial, there is one great assumption: that the influence is not opposed to those fundamental principles of right and wrong which are the basis of all ethical truth. Thus, it is only on a most rigorous interpretation of the principle of art for art's sake, that the æsthetic uses of the patriotic spirit may be placed beyond suspicion. None will deny that under the influence of this spirit, the artists of all countries are constantly producing work which, however faithful an expression of their own ideas, is false in fact, base in feeling, and unjust in sentiment. The physical courage in support of one's own country compels admiration, but if the cause happens to be a bad one, the admiration descends sharply to a lower plane—such, for instance, as is evoked by blind obedience, or the sense of unreasoned duty. Lifelong services to one's country may be characterised by habits of deceit, unfairness, or deliberate wrong-doing. The sense of unity of interest may have its inspiration, not so much in mutual well-being, as in common enmity to others. Or the spirit of emulation may be confined to the grosser

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instincts of the race, and may thus tend, not towards development, but towards degeneration.

It seems impossible to escape from the conclusion that the problem of the function of patriotism is, at the bottom, a moral problem. It is the moral view, and not the intellectual or the æsthetic, which on an ultimate analysis, will be found to determine the legitimate limits of the patriotic feeling. The only patriotism which may hope to withstand the criticism of the future is that which gives an ever-increasing prominence to the broad principles of ethical truth.

Considering the important part played by patriotism in the history of society, it is remarkable that no serious attempt has been made to define its position. Is it, as is commonly thought, a virtue? Virtue itself is hard to define. There are still to be found some who believe in a sort of unconscious virtue—that it is possible to show moral strength, where there is no temptation against which this strength is exercised. On this view every man could claim unbounded credit for the non-commission of sins to which he had ceased to have, or never had, the slightest inclination. Holding such a belief it is impossible for an individual to get even the roughest measure of his own culpability, whilst of that of his fellows, he cannot form the faintest idea. The only rational view would appear to be that virtue is the moral power which resists temptation to do wrong. Some such conception is necessary to explain the different degrees of culpability of men in different places and at different times, and of the same men at different periods of life and under different circumstances. Temptation and virtue are inseparable.

Now if this principle or anything resembling it be admitted, it is clear that patriotism cannot make good its claim to be ranked among the virtues. Under ordinary conditions, the temptations are all in the opposite direction. There is surely nothing particularly meritorious in cherishing a love for one's native land. Such a feeling is to a great extent instinctive. It may be regarded in most essentials as an extension of that family affection which forms the basis of

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all society. The feeling is perfectly normal and natural. It is remarkable only in its absence.

But, it may be urged, it is not so much the sentiment that is in question, as the conduct resulting from it. How shall we describe the conduct of those who have sacrificed their own interests to the good of their country, who have laid down their lives for it? If this is not virtue, where, indeed, are we to look for it? The question is by no means a simple one. It leaves out of account the existence of a possible motive higher than the immediate interest, or good of the country to which one happens to belong. The man who, believing his country to be engaged in a bad cause, yet voluntarily gives his life in its support, may be in some sort a hero, but on strictly moral grounds his conduct cannot be defended. On the other hand, he who sacrifices himself, believing his country to be in the right, is acting under the influence of a motive which is independent of all nationality —the cause of justice. This distinction seems to be vital. How far the purely moral motive is quickened and humanised by the love of country is a psychological question into which it is not necessary to enter. It may even be granted that it is this passion which, in the vast majority of cases, supplies the incentive; but the point to be noted is, that regarded strictly from the ethical point of view, this love is not the determining factor. No matter how weak the national cause may be, resistance to an enemy is always founded upon so-called *rights;* an appeal solely to the love of country would at once excite suspicion, and would be effective only where reason had been quite eclipsed by passion.

The suggestion, therefore, is, that there is no reason to dissociate patriotism from other forms of love; it is simply an emotion. In a great number of cases it never gets beyond the emotional stage. It is often a mere habit of mind which affects our sentiments, gives warmth to our opinions, and excites our interest, but it is not necessarily translated into conduct. When it is so translated, the conduct may be highly virtuous, for there is no limit to the personal sacrifice which may be called forth; but it may be

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almost equally vicious, for in the name of patriotism are constantly committed injustice, bloodshed, and oppression. It cannot be too clearly understood that the point of importance is not the possession of the patriotic feeling, but the uses that are made of it.

It follows from the foregoing line of argument that the principle, "My country, right or wrong," is one of pure expediency. It pertains to the gentle art of quarreling. When an appeal to force is once made it is better for everybody—spectators as well as belligerents—to get through with the business as speedily as possible. To try to make war and peace at the same time is foolish; to show two minds to an enemy is to court disaster. Accordingly a nation having once pronounced for war it is expedient that dissentients should be passive or, in the case of extremity, even actively hostile to an enemy. We need not discuss how far such an equivocal proceeding would be necessary in a more perfect state of society; we have simply to admit that, at the present stage of development of human nature in most civilised countries, any greater freedom allowed to opponents of the national policy at such times would add many fresh evils to those already existing.

But this doctrine of "My country, right or wrong" applied to other times than those of actual warfare is irrational and pernicious. Who speaks in the name of the country? The statesmen? History is one long confession of their mistakes. The Governments? The autocratic ones are clearly disqualified; the democratic speak with widely different voices, a few thousand votes converting the yea into nay. The newspaper press? Even in the most democratic countries it is hard to say how far it is disinterested, moreover it works at high pressure, and is content to satisfy the demands of the moment. The people? They are easily carried away by passion; their judgment is but too often hasty and superficial. There is obviously nothing particularly sacred in these interpreters of the nation's needs at critical periods of its history. Taken together they may represent the prevalent opinion, but the loudest voice in

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each or all may prove to be wrong. Against all the force of such authority the right of private judgment remains as strong as ever.

The only sense in which "my" country can truly be mine, is that of personal conviction. At such moments it is not a material but an ideal country; it stands for my countrymen, not at their worst, but at their best; not for what they are, but for what I conceive they may be, and ought to be. "My" country is that part of it of which I am proud. If it is to be articulate, it must be so in the persons of those men—irrespective of their number—in whose insight and judgment I have faith. It is the country whose genius I wish to see asserting itself along the lines of its higher evolution; whose conduct should be most in harmony with the best traditions of the race, most likely to be justified by the verdict of an impartial posterity. It is clear that in all this, there is room for the utmost difference of opinion; to no two persons will the best and worst features of national character appear the same. From which it follows that it is both illogical and unjust to set up one ideal of conduct as essentially patriotic, and another, claiming to be founded on the same affection, as essentially the reverse. One fact should be at least evident: opinions formed at the expense of popular favour must have a strong personal foundation. They may, of course, be wrong; but they have been tested. They are at least honest, and represent conscious judgment in the face of difficulty. At times of national excitement there is little hope of such opinion making itself heard, but under normal conditions it furnishes a body of counsel which, in the long run, is to no nation an element of weakness, but of strength.

V.

There can be little doubt that the excessive bias of modern patriotism is in the main due to the backward state of knowledge in certain directions. It is not, of course, suggested that the feeling of patriotism is in itself bad, still less that it is due to ignorance. Patriotism, like all other affections, is largely an affair of temperament, and is clearly

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compatible with knowledge of other nations both extensive and profound. But such patriotism is eminently sane, discriminative and chastened; it is the reasonable form of the sentiment which is destined to survive the test of time.

But if ignorance is not the cause of patriotism, it is directly responsible for those obtrusive and uncontrollable forms of it, which set up causes of needless irritation and rancour between different races. The most complete misconceptions still prevail in all civilised countries respecting the feelings, aims, and temperament of the people of other lands. Where ignorance is rife, the imagination is active. Intelligent and otherwise well-informed writers soberly discuss possible developments, which have no relation to real people, but to races having all manner of fictitious characteristics. Unfortunately, also, the ignorance respecting other countries keeps alive that of one's own. A nation can truly know itself, only by knowing others; for it is only by comparison that any sound or lasting standard can be formed.

A keen sense of the virtues of the race to which he belongs comes to the child with his earliest impressions. He grows up in the belief in its innate excellence. If his race is not powerful or great, it is because of the rapacity of other races more barbarous or designing; if it is powerful or great, it is clearly the will of Providence that it should pay an increasing disregard to the feelings of smaller races. That all the means for the acquisition of knowledge are present does not further matters in the least; the machinery may as easily be employed for the propagation of every form of error and prejudice. It is only with extreme slowness that the individual comes to recognise the admirable qualities possessed by other races than that to which he belongs; it is rare indeed that he surrenders the belief that it possesses the largest share of the virtues of humanity.

This racial ignorance is blocking the march of civilisation. What manner of people are these against whom each country is closing the doors of its national life and thought? What do we really know of those whose lives, at the cost of incalculable treasure, we are ceaselessly planning to take. We

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know, alas! a good deal of the governments; we know still more of the press; and of a small number of prominent and great men. But of the people themselves, the people who are the real sufferers through all forms of racial enmity, we know absurdly little. Hence the people of all countries are led into the mistake of deducing the character of the foreigner from particular cases, of generalising the inhabitants of a great nation—nearly always composed of several sub-races, differing most widely among themselves—from the people of a particular city or district; of accepting without question the brilliant word-pictures of obviously biased writers.

In spite of the periodical outbursts with which we are familiar, there is really no evidence to prove that between the different people themselves there exists anything akin to mortal hatred. Probably the most that could be established would be a settled dislike of foreigners and foreign ways. Assuming that this is based upon actual knowledge, the explanation cannot lie much deeper than the conservatism natural to groups of people, accustomed for many generations to certain habits of thought and conduct. In this sense the dislike of the foreigner will probably endure as long as national character. But dislike founded upon a constitutional preference is one thing, hatred is another. In order to express one's dislike of people, it is not necessary to shoot them. It is here suggested, as a reasonable hypothesis, that the antipathy existing between the more civilised people at the present day does not normally go beyond this. They wish to live their lives in their own way unmolested, and they have no wish to molest others. If this assumption be even approximately correct, it follows that a general knowledge of it would go far to neutralize the influence of those forces, personal and impersonal, whose interest it is to emphasise the differences that exist.

The remarkable extent to which the bias of patriotism is unconscious is one of the greatest difficulties in the way of its removal. Modesty in the individual is already beginning to be regarded as a quaint and antique virtue; modesty in a

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nation seems to have become almost extinct. Where everyone is proclaiming his superiority, he who shouts the loudest has the best chance of being heard. Accordingly to each it appears perfectly natural that the virtues of his own country should be duly extolled, and the shortcomings of others placed in due relief. To those accustomed to the weighing of evidence it is astonishing what can be absorbed in this way, apparently without exciting the least suspicion that anything is wrong. When, under the influence of patriotic fervor it is felt that the bounds of truth and fairness really are being overstepped, the protests are usually of the mildest form, coupled with an expression of belief in the "good intentions" of the author. If the sense of proportion is not quite rudimentary there is, in these manifestations of bias a strong element of the ridiculous, but unfortunately the process does not end thus lightly. The forces which are dependent upon the support of public opinion are not slow to take advantage of this feature of national character. *Les absents ont toujours tort.* From the platform or in the senate, an orator may always rely upon striking in many places a sympathetic note when painting the foreigner in dark colours.

Still more striking is the case of the press, for popular favor is here the one absolute essential. At times of crisis the temptations of the press to give the people what they want, are, indeed, well-nigh irresistible. It is to be feared that few make allowance for this, or recognise the great sacrifice incurred by the adoption of a more moderate tone. Even under ordinary conditions, the press of the various countries seems ever on the alert to "score off" the little ways of the foreigner. There is a serious side to all this. With the growth of the national sentiment, there seems to be an increase of the national sensitiveness to criticism. The little pleasantries and sharp reflections at the expense of other countries are, no doubt, chiefly intended for home consumption, but their influence cannot now be so restricted. The people concerned see the matter in a different light. Much of the feeling thus expressed is duly recorded as evi-

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dence of ill-will, and when the relations of the countries become strained, go to swell the hundred misunderstandings that make for war, with all the attendant suffering and demoralisation, both to victors and vanquished, that war brings in its train.

Of course if the disputes between nations could be settled in the same way as those between individuals, that is on a basis of law and equity, the more or less permanent dislike of foreigners would have far less significance; but owing to the anomalous conditions already referred to, which allow international ethics to remain centuries behind the ethics recognised within the states themselves, this racial antipathy becomes one of the gravest features of our civilisation.

Considering the issues at stake, considering how vitally the happiness of millions of human beings depends upon international friendliness, it seems strange that no systematic attempt is made to diffuse a clearer knowledge of national thought and character. What seems to be needed is more men of the type of Mr. Hammerton, who did so much to make the real France known to English-speaking people. For such work the "smart" journalist is entirely out of place. We require sober writers with long experience of different parts of the country of which they speak, and of all the grades of society, men who are able to give a truthful account of what the people are really thinking and doing, and what is the true state of their knowledge regarding the country to which the enquirer belongs. The better class of reviews and periodicals of all countries should be more readily thrown open to foreign writers, not politicians or diplomatists, but men able to present subjects of current interest from the point of view of their race, men of sufficient imagination and breadth of view to make allowance for racial prejudice and susceptibility. Where sufficient command of the language had been obtained, still greater good would result from frequent visits of such men, charged with a mission to remove existing misunderstandings, and discover points of common interest and agreement. Under such conditions, the absurd sensitiveness to foreign criticism, which so often sees an insult

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in every unfavourable comment, would tend to disappear. With greater knowledge, with a surer conviction of honesty of intention, there would arise a wider toleration, a desire to profit by the right suggestion, irrespective of its origin; there would be formed a body of sound opinion of immense service to the nation in preventing hasty and ill-considered action.

VI.

We arrive finally at the stage in our enquiry at which we recognise that the question of the bias of patriotism is ultimately one of ideals. Is it to the advantage, to the ultimate as well as the immediate good, of a people, that it should be more wrapped up in itself, more exclusively mindful of its own feelings, interests, institutions? Or is it to its ultimate good to become keenly alive to the fact that there are other peoples who, on closer acquaintance, may also be found to be interesting; peoples who in all the more fundamental concerns of life have the same feelings, who also have their ideas equally characteristic, their long experience equally valuable, their traditions equally cherished? All the charges of anti-patriotism are traceable to an imperfect appreciation of the importance of some such questions as these; there is always the implication that certain immediate and palpable interests of a particular country are necessarily its most vital interests, and that to be opposed to these is to be deficient in patriotic feeling.

Admitting for a moment that it were desirable for each country to foster every form of national idiosyncrasy, that everything foreign being more or less objectionable, it were better that this influence should decrease, that each country should become more and more in the fullest sense, self-contained. However desirable such a state might be, it is no longer possible. In a sense quite peculiar to the development of the last half century, *the foreigner has come to stay.* Whether they like it or not, for an indefinitely lengthy period, the people at present constituting the great nations of the world are to be, in an ever fuller sense, neighbors. Through commerce, through politics, through literature, the

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sense of actual contact will become keener. This is amongst the few absolute certainties of the future. Therefore, even on this ground, is it not in the highest degree unwise to accentuate the differences that exist? Proximity without sympathy is intolerable. Under such conditions, the national life is embittered; there is an ever-present source of unrest. Foreign influence being now a permanent factor in the daily existence of each country, it is obviously to the interest of the people to mould it to their needs. Friction in this case means the dissipation of an indefinite amount of moral and intellectual energy.

But if it were possible for the nations to be isolated and self-sufficient, it is to a last degree undesirable. The analogy of the individual holds with striking force: it is no more good for a nation, than for a man, to live alone. Isolation and stagnation are closely allied. It is not only to the interest of humanity at large, but to the interest of each of the races, that they should be more and more mutually dependent, more and more bound to each other by all the ties that help towards fellowship The tendency of political ideals to dominate the whole field of national thought and character is pernicious. To this we trace the notion that the highest national interests are founded upon mutual antagonisms, that the gain of one people is necessarily the loss of another. Prosperity on this view is a limited store from which each nation draws at the expense of the rest. Except in the restricted sphere of physical force and its abuse this is a pure fiction. Except in the grossest and most material sense, no people can ultimately profit by needless suffering or injury inflicted on another. The sources of energy upon which national prosperity, in the best sense, depends, are inexhaustible. The drafts of each nation, so far from depriving others of their share, act as a direct cause on their part, of similar renewals of strength. It is not to the disadvantage, but enormously to the advantage of nations, to have as neighbors powerful people, fertile in resource, with essentially different ways of thought, and eager to exchange no less their ideas than their goods.

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The conception of humanity as an organism offers sound guidance in estimating the forces which make for true development. In proportion as the organism is low in the scale of life, its parts are independent, their injury is not serious to the individual, the organs being readily repaired or renewed. With each advance in complexity, the welfare of the parts becomes more and more necessary to the well-being of the whole. The same is true of nations; from the unsettled life of the nomad with its few needs, perfect self-sufficiency, and utter ignorance of or indifference to the life of other peoples, to the highly civilised life of modern races, with its multifarious needs, material and spiritual, satisfied from every part of the globe, and its vital interest in the welfare of even small and remote communities.

It is hardly necessary to dwell on the fact that imperiousness, or indifference to foreign influence, cramps the life and thought of a people. In numberless ways, this bias conceals the results of discovery, and prevents the diffusion of ideas. The growing complexity of the problems of individual and social life has called into existence an army of thinkers in every civilised country. Subdivision and specialisation goes on apace, and the national genius of many peoples is attacking these problems, each in its own way. The best that humanity can produce may be acquired only by a comparison of these results. It is surely absurd that any considerations of geography, or language, or race, should limit the benefits to be derived from the highest culture of the time. It is only thus that the highest type can be evolved. The race which is the most assimilative of the best thought of other races, will be the best able to develop its own. Other things being equal, it will be the more vigorous, the better fitted for every phase of the struggle for existence.

The fear that the national character would thus be in danger of disappearing in a formless cosmopolitanism is, of course, quite groundless. The only features of it likely to disappear would be those based on narrow prejudice, and unreasoning custom—the concrete expression of ideas that

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are dead. As the individual personalises his knowledge into a characteristic whole, so the genius of the race is expressed in its institutions, its literature, and its conduct. Knowledge is great, but the mystery of personality, individual and national, must ever assert itself.

On the purely moral side, the claims of an ideal of closer union between nations are incomparably strong. If, on the one hand, it is necessary that we should be on our guard lest the lofty conception of human brotherhood blind us to the innate differences that must always exist, it seems equally necessary on the other, to decline to accept the view that all the existing evils are based upon an inexorable and unchangeable "human nature." Human nature represents something so profoundly complex, that any dogmatism regarding it, beyond the merest essentials, offers an easy method of begging the whole question. On such grounds, every weakness or vice may be excused or in a measure justified, for there is hardly an attribute of human nature which does not vary within the widest limits, according to time and place. To say that enmity is stronger than amity, is to ignore the most obvious lesson of the history of society. It is one thing to admit that, so far as we are able to perceive, disagreements must ever characterise human intercourse; it is quite another to believe that reconciliation or settlement must always be brought about by the primitive method of purely physical force. To argue thus shows an absurdly weak faith in those fundamental instincts of human nature, upon the strength of which its development depends.

The plain truth is that those responsible for national conduct have never given to the question of a possible union of races through the cultivation of their sympathies, the attention it deserves. They have accepted as a matter of course the evidence of hostility; of the evidence of friendship, they have been sceptical. This represents incalculable injury to the cause of humanity. With the way in which ill-feeling begets ill-feeling, each country apparently striving to surpass the other, we are, unfortunately, too familiar We are apt to forget that good-feeling is equally cumulative.

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The *rapprochement* now happily existing between England and France, is but a faint indication of what may be done when nations are really in earnest in the cause of peace.

It would seem to devolve upon all interested in the progress of the higher culture, to protest against the assertion of any patriotism which does not take advantage of the best influences exerted by humanity at large. Any patriotism which regards the interests of a people as questions solely of physical power, or territory, or trade, is narrow and confining. Important as such interests are, and demanding as they do sagacity of a high order, they are, on a final analysis, but a means to an end. The ultimate mission of an advanced people should be the cultivation of a national character which is strong, worthy, and resourceful, and the patriotism, however blatantly proclaimed, which is opposed to this, is false and misleading.

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MORAL INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOLS.

(*Continued from July number.*)

In my first article I endeavored to shadow forth the conception in the teacher's mind of a system of moral instruction which would be generally accepted as being consonant with the higher ideals of our people. Of such a conception how shall we proceed to secure a faithful Reflection? So far as direct instruction is concerned, we have seen that we must graduate our teaching to the age of the pupils. I suggest that in such age-differentiation we may conveniently distinguish three stages.

First Stage. The children are too young to be taught very much about the reasons of why some things are good and others not good. Nevertheless it is for the teacher to train them into the habit of doing that which is right. The obvious resort is to precept and exhortation. But precept can be most powerfully reinforced by familiarising the children with pictures of what is good. Hence the "moral tale" which has always been recognised as one of the teacher's aids. But the moral tale has often been used in a rather slipshod way without the teacher's having definitely set before himself exactly what qualities it is that he wishes to foster in his pupils, and which of these moral tales will impress these particular qualities most effectively on the mind. The conception in the teacher's mind has in fact been defective. Attempts have indeed often been made to put together collections of tales with more definite aim. Some of these may probably be usefully used. But the teacher must in every case see that the moral scheme to be enforced precisely corresponds to the scheme of instruction he has in his own mind. These tales are after all only of the nature of illustrations. Instances may be selected from them to suit your necessity; but to frame your scheme of moral instruction to coincide with a series of illustrations that some one else (possibly with quite a different scheme in his head) has put together, is obviously putting the cart before

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the horse. The selection, the order, and the emphasis laid on each of the illustrations must be the teacher's own.

The teacher then must adapt any such series of stories to his own mental scheme, selecting what he requires, eliminating what he does not, and arranging all in the order most suited to his purpose. Almost any teacher would find in such a little book as the late Miss Charlotte Yonge's "Book of Golden Deeds," a certain amount of material suitable for his purpose; but the fact is that every teacher will have mentally to compile his own "Book of Golden Deeds." He will choose them from his whole literary knowledge and experience, as well as from any incidents occurring in the little world most familiar to his pupils; these when they take place, are more effective as illustrations than perhaps any others. The stories too are better told than read, and the teacher will be careful, whilst telling his tale vividly, to avoid stilted language, or words or phrases that are not simple enough for his pupils to understand.

In this first stage, as in the second and third, there should be exercised the greatest care in arranging the moral environment, and it will have to be thought out with as much detail and as much definiteness as the direct moral instruction itself, and as faithfully express the conception in the teacher's mind. Important aids to environment may sometimes be found in unexpected quarters. If, for example, it is desired to imbue the mind with the idea of interdependence and the necessity of self-effacement for the sake of a combined purpose, I know of no way in which such lessons so irresistibly enter the mind as through the practice of choral music (always supposing the art of choir singing to be well taught). The same lessons are enforced by certain sports: by rowing in an eight, by a football team playing well together: but choral singing has the advantage over these that (except in a few instances) the object to be obtained is not ultimately to score points over a rival choir (as in the other instances it is to score advantage over other crews or other teams), but merely to add to the world's wealth by the production of a beautiful and ordered result. The test too in the case of music is more delicate, and it cultivates greater sensitiveness and refinement.

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The principles that must govern "environment" are the same, whatever the stage of instruction or the age of the pupil, though doubtless as age advances more subtle influences can be brought to bear. But having indicated the general lines on which this part of the scheme may be thought out, I need not recur, I think, to this part of the subject in connection with the further stages of instruction. But I have still to deal with direct instruction in the second and third stages.

Second Stage. The children are now of an age when they can begin to learn not only what it is right to do, but *why* it is right that they should do certain things. There will be an admixture of theoretical with practical instruction. What the theory is that the teacher will desire to enforce has already been rendered tolerably clear when we have been considering the conception that is to be formed in the teacher's mind at this stage. What is likely to be questioned is the feasibility of transferring effectively this conception to the minds of the pupils. That to do so *is* perfectly feasible I firmly believe, and I know of no better way of illustrating how it may be done than by giving a concrete example of just such a definite piece of instruction. The writer for a period of months gave lessons to a class of boys in a Truant School who had arrived at an age, and a stage of mental development, which seemed advanced enough to be susceptible to this kind of teaching. I propose to give the notes here of some of the lessons that I gave to these boys. The advantages of citing a scheme of lessons that has actually been tested in the school-room are obvious and on the whole outweigh, I think, some serious disadvantage in the danger involved of misunderstanding. Against such misunderstanding I think I can guard by a few words of caution. No concrete example of instruction that can be given must be supposed to be of general application; the lessons here cited were designed for lads in very depressing mental circumstances, children many of whom had bad parents, most of whom were exceedingly poor, and on practically all of whom the world was bearing very hardly. Contrast these boys with a class of the same age at one of our great Public Schools; is it not clear that the lessons suited for the one

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would be quite unsuited to the other? In the one case the child is almost cowed by circumstances; he has little self-confidence; it hardly occurs to him that what he does or does not do matters at all to anyone but himself; he is familiar with degrading surroundings; he habitually uses language that has low associations, and he is in imminent danger of falling into low habits,—drunkenness, or what not. The very first thing to do with such a boy as this is to foster self-respect, to persuade him by every means in your power that he is not an insignificant but a very important citizen of the world. It is obvious that with the average English Public School boy such persuasions would be superfluous. This point illustrates that the lessons, the notes of which are given here, are not contemplated as being of general applicability, but are merely an example of a particular scheme of instruction designed for a particular set of children. Every scheme of instruction in fact must be considered in relation to the particular children who are to be taught, and adjusted to their characters and circumstances.

The notes that follow are of course in language very different from that which I actually employed in talking to these lads. They are merely the words I set down for my own guidance as expressing to me shortly the points I wished not to overlook. In translating these notes to the boys they were greatly amplified; what I said to them I said in the simplest possible language, with this exception, that in each lesson I dwelt particularly on the meaning of one or two words probably hitherto unfamiliar to them, but which it was desirable they should add to their vocabulary as the symbols and suggestions of ideas that ought to be part of their mental equipment: such words, for example, were "sympathy," "relationship," "important." For the rest I tried to make the "lessons" as little stiff as possible; I frequently asked them questions, and, as far as the size of a rather large class would allow, encouraged them to ask questions, and even to talk to me and the others. If anything humorous came to the surface I did not check their having a hearty laugh over it so long as it was not prolonged in a silly way. The mental vigor of a few of the boys was below the normal, and these I failed to interest,

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but *almost* all of them were alert, and, so to speak, actively co-operating with me in the work of the lesson. My troubles with discipline were very slight. At the conclusion of a lesson I would often give them some pithy saying which expressed its main thought in a form of words they were likely to remember. The following is a condensed syllabus of what I taught them:

LESSON I. ON MUTUAL DEPENDENCE.

The isolated life a miserable one. Setting aside actual torture, solitary confinement perhaps the most terrible of all punishments. The horror of solitude and pining for companionship experienced by Robinson Crusoe after fifteen years on his island. [Here I read passages after the incident of the wreck; when in the morning light Crusoe sees in the distance what he believes to be either the sail or the hull of a ship, but the evidences of life on board observed during the night (firing of guns, etc.) are not repeated:—

"I cannot explain by any possible Energy of Words what a strange longing or hankering of Desires I felt in my Soul upon this Sight; breaking out sometimes thus; O that there had been, but one or two; nay, or but one Soul sav'd out of this Ship, to have escap'd to me, that I might but have had one Companion, one Fellow-Creature, to have spoken to me & to have convers'd with! In all the Time of my solitary Life, I never felt so earnest, so strong a Desire after the Society of my Fellow-Creatures, or so deep a Regret at the want of it. . . ."

"Such were these earnest Wishings, That but one Man had been sav'd! *O that it had been but One!* I believe I repeated the Words, *O that it had been but One!* a thousand Times, and the Desires were so mov'd by it, that when I spoke the Words, my Hands would clinch together, & my Fingers press the Palms of my Hands, that if I had had any soft Thing in my Hand, it would have crusht it involuntarily; and my Teeth in my Head wo'd strike together, and set against one another so strong, that for some time I cou'd not part them again. . . ."

"It was now calm, and I had a great mind to venture out in my Boat to this Wreck; not doubting but I might find something on board, that might be useful to me; but that did not altogether press me so much, as the Possibility that there might be yet some living Creature on board, whose Life I might not only save, but might by saving that Life, comfort my own to the last Degree; and this Thought so clung to my Heart, that I could not be quiet, Night or Day, but I must venture out in my Boat on board this Wreck."

In contrast with the terrific tragedy of these passages I read another later in the book after Crusoe had fallen in with Man Friday.]

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Meaning of the word "relationship." A glove is in relationship to a hand, a bucket to a well. Human "relationships." Relationship in common parlance means kinship. But there are all sorts of other human relationships. That between the members of a football team playing well together, or between pupil and teacher, or between schoolfellows, or doctor and patient, or buyer and seller, or between members of Coöperative Societies, Trades Unions, or Friendly Societies; or even between the inhabitants of town and country, or between those of one country and another.

There are in fact a great many kinds of ties which bind man to man, so that to some degree we feel for, and with, others as if they were part of ourselves. A football team or a fire-brigade is like one animal each part of which is conscious of the thoughts, the sensations, and the wishes of each other part.

Meaning of "*sympathy*," i. e., feeling with.

An important instance of the coördination and mutual dependence of which this lesson treats is Citizenship. Difference between bad Citizenship (examples, hiding food in a besieged town, wantonly destroying public property) and good Citizenship (example, story of the Dutch boy who stopped the leak in the dike for a whole night with his arm).

[The boys themselves to give further examples, both of bad and of good Citizenship.]

Mutual dependence, coördination and coöperation brushed aside by the man who says, "I care for nobody and nobody cares for me," but inculcated by such sayings as, "Put yourself in his place," "Do as you would be done by," "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

Lesson II. On Self-Respect, and Respect for the Individual in Others.

Such maxims as conclude Lesson I should not rest on the authority of the teacher alone. You should *convince yourselves* that they are such as ought to be followed. If you think the matter out, to what conclusion will you come?

(1) One obligation for altruism rests on utilitarian grounds. We gain for others, and we receive from others, more than we give up for ourselves; the sum total of human welfare is therefore increased.

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Æsop's fable of the bundle of Sticks. "Union is strength" whether in a family or in fulfilling any of the other human relationships.

But (2) apart from this, the individual reaps his reward for unselfishness in the comfort and satisfaction that follow the performance of an unselfish act.

Conversely, selfish action is followed by inward discomfort and a feeling of solitude. One is out of sympathy with the world and feels something akin to the miseries of the prisoner in solitary confinement.

Extreme selfishness often actually amounts to wickedness. This is sometimes followed by the anguish we call "remorse."

It is the existence of these inward feelings, feelings that as we see in the extreme instances of ecstacy and remorse are capable of becoming superlatively acute, that makes it impossible that we should with benefit to ourselves accept all the advantages of *others'* practicing a system of mutual aid, whilst we ourselves play a traitorous part. Any attempt to share without contributing to the benefits of human solidarity is punished by moral solitude. It is a not uncommon thing for men not only to fulfill the obligations placed upon them by human society, but voluntarily to devote themselves to pain and disadvantage. In rare instances this amounts to heroic self-sacrifice. Story of Sir Philip Sidney at Zutphen. How can we explain his preferring to endure the torments of thirst suffered by a wounded soldier unless there were some strong inward reward? "The secret pleasure of a generous act is a great mind's great bribe." [1]

Comparison between the coördination existing between the members of a human group and that existing between the different parts of a machine. In the latter case one weak link in a chain, or one faulty wheel, wrecks the whole. Not so with a human group. We can to some extent make good each other's deficiencies.

But there is nevertheless some degree of similarity, because failure on the part of any individual must do injury to many others besides himself, whereas a personality duly performing his part spreads a beneficent influence around him.

The individual is then immensely important. No child or

[1] This line of Dryden's is quoted in Mr. Fredk. W. Hackwood's "Notes of Lessons on Moral Subjects."

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person can think of himself as inherently a mean thing. He is of very great consequence both to others and himself. He may indeed degrade himself by mean actions, but even so, the fact that one of us has committed a mean action does not justify a mean estimate of the individual. Almost everyone has sometimes done things he should be sorry for. Almost everyone too, has sometimes done that which he feels to be good. If we persist in evil courses we shall no doubt become low, mean, degraded. But young boys are still at the beginning of things. They cannot yet be *committed* to a downward course. They are just now especially at a time when they must *choose* for themselves whether they will follow what is good or what is evil. The matter rests with themselves.

We begin then to recognize the responsibility with which each one is faced. Is he going to set himself to work to realise those latent possibilities that dwell within each one of us and so become a blessing to himself and all those with whom he comes into contact? That is the great choice.

Crystalize the teaching of this lesson in Locke's words, "not to think meanly of ourselves, and not to think meanly of others."

Then followed a series of lessons on Building up the Individual. The first of these was

Lesson III. Cruelty as Opposed to Kindness and Benevolence.

Just as an engineer, when constructing a machine, has to see to it that every wheel and every crank is sound and strong, so in a human group, and ultimately in the whole of human society, we have to strive to bring it about that each individual shall be sound and strong; otherwise mischief will follow.

How shall we set about building up such individuals? What should they be like?

Well first we may ask ourselves what they should *not* be like. Perhaps the most hateful of all qualities is cruelty. How it arises. Cruelty through ignorance; cruelty through want of thought or wantonness [boys throw stones at squirrels; boys tie tin-kettle to dog's tail; compare the sensations of the dog with those of the victim in the regimental punishment known as "running the gauntlet"]; cruelty through temper and passion [general question of intemperance and loss of self-control];

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cruelty (the worst form of all) through actual delight in witnessing pain [Nero and the martyrs].

The opposite to all this is active kindness. Kindled largely through the cultivation of sympathy. [Read the Hubert and Arthur scene from "King John" (Act IV, Scene I)].

Sympathy, if it is to become active, often requires Courage. Examples of Courage. Story of Grace Darling. Story of E. B. [This was a story the circumstances of which were local and therefore well known to many of the boys. A little boy having fallen into a canal, a girl twelve years old knelt on a floating plank, and though in constant danger of herself capsizing and finding herself in the water, contrived to maintain her balance in that position and at the same time hold the child's head out of the water for a period of several minutes till help arrived. For this act she was presented with the medal of the Royal Humane Society by the mayor of the town in the presence of her schoolfellows.]

The above are examples of physical courage. Moral Courage. Examples: Bearing pain for the sake of others; confessing a fault; owning an unpopular opinion; Courage under misfortune [story of how Henry Fawcett behaved after the accident that deprived him of sight]; courage to persevere in the right even though seduced by evil influences.

Self-Sacrifice [story of Father Damien].

Generosity.

Good Manners important because they are the outside symbol of the kindness that ought to exist within. The rules of courtesy are not arbitrary and stereotyped, as the books of etiquette would have us believe.

Bad language to be avoided because low words are associated with low deeds.

"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

The notes of the above three lessons are probably sufficient to indicate the lines on which the course was given without my analysing fully those that followed. The subject of the building up of the individual is, of course, only begun in Lesson III. There it is treated from one point of view, but it would remain to regard it from several others. Thus my fourth lesson dealt with the necessity in mutual aid of ingenuity, alertness, and

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ability, and consequently of self-development. The way was thrown open for introducing the consideration of all the qualities, moral and mental, and even physical, that one wished to inculcate. And further, one could examine the position and relative importance of each in the whole scheme; for example, one could consider together the qualities of generosity and justice, and in what relation they stood each to each, thus paving the way for the problems to be introduced to the pupil's notice in the next stage of instruction.

Third Stage. We have now arrived at that period of advancement in our scheme of Moral Instruction when we can no longer treat the moral problems of the world as if each presented a simple issue between right and wrong. Vain as would be the attempt to bring up children in total ignorance of the existence of evil, it would be almost equally vain to disguise from the older ones that apart from positive evil there is comparative right and comparative wrong; that we not only have to prepare ourselves for the battle between the right and the wrong, but that we shall be faced with conflicting obligations and be drawn in contrary directions by duties which clash the one with the other. In the ground we have already traversed ample occasion has been offered for such conflicts; for example, self-development and self-abnegation must often be opposed to each other, and we have to determine in what degree each shall concede to the other. Again the conflict that often exists between the individual and the society that surrounds him brings before us the question which is one of the most persistent in mature life, namely what the claims of compromise upon us are, how far they should be resisted, how far conceded. It will be perceived that the intellectual foundation on which moral action is to be based has become much more subtle, much more difficult to determine. At the same time when once determined the moral force necessary to carry out the decisions arrived at by the intellect is often quite as great as that required in what I have called the "simple" conflicts between good and evil. The very difficulty of arriving at right intellectual conclusions is a source of moral weakness; a new weapon is placed in the hands of the Evil One, for in the hour

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of temptation he can always raise the question anew, "Is your intellectual foundation right?"

At this stage of our subject too we are faced with another serious source of difficulty. Different teachers may provide different intellectual solutions to the problems set before them, and from these different intellectual conclusions differing moral courses may be prescribed. The child may therefore find himself instructed differently by for example his schoolmaster and his parent.

These difficulties which are at once obvious and serious, seem to have frightened off the great mass of instructors of youth from attempting at any rate this part of the subject at all. And yet great as the difficulties are, they may surely be faced with more hope of success by the mature and experienced than by those who are only just emerging from childhood. Is it fair to leave such "to fight it out amongst themselves," and to evolve their own ideas of the comparative right and the comparative wrong, with scarcely an effort to succour them by the light that collective human experience throws on many a moral tangle? Moral instruction at this stage will probably be accompanied by the disadvantages which I have indicated, but are they not far less grave than those which accompany its neglect?

It will be perceived that when I have said that the First Stage of Moral Instruction should be devoted to practical exemplification and acquirement of habit, whilst the Second and Third Stages should deal also with the theory of the subject; and also when I have said that the First and Second Stages should concern themselves with simple problems of conduct, the complex ones being reserved for the Third Stage, I have not meant that perfectly rigid boundaries shall be erected confining these different kinds of instruction absolutely within these limits. Much must necessarily depend on the circumstances in individual cases; but I think it will remain true to say that, whilst there will be a large amount of overflowing as it were of a particular kind of instruction from the stage that is principally devoted to it, the different kinds of instruction I have indicated as suitable for the several stages of child

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development should at least *mainly* characterise those several stages.

Now having sketched what appears to me to be a perfectly feasible scheme of moral instruction divorced from supernaturalism, I want to compare the results at which we have arrived with those attained by moral instruction wedded to "religion." And first let us take the "undenominational" Bible Lesson given in accordance with such a syllabus as that issued by the typical School Board or Education Committee.

Gradation according to age is carried out in the Bible Syllabus, but on what is the gradation based? Not I venture to think on a careful consideration of the psychological possibilities of a child's mind at different stages of its growth, but merely on the relative simplicity and complexity of phrase and idea characteristic of various passages. In other words, it is the gradation of the teacher of reading or of the object-lesson teacher, not the gradation of the moral instructor at all. I of course do not suggest that the gradation as far as it goes is useless; it is a necessary instrument for any instruction that children shall be given words and have ideas presented to them of a difficulty suited to their years; but my contention is that though the presentation of the subject is graded, the subject-matter itself is not. Whilst all the collection of literature that we call the Bible is accepted as being of equal authority, and whilst the system of morality to be inculcated is based on that heterogeneous mass, to ask that there should be any such grading of the subject as is comparatively easy to introduce into a rationalistic system of ethics, is probably demanding the impossible.

Such grading can only be carried out in a system of instruction that is consistent with itself, and that steadily keeps in view throughout its course the ends ultimately aimed at. In a moral system these ends are embodied in an ideal, and if the moral system is welded to one that is theological, the ideal finds its expression in the conception of the Deity. It follows that for such a system to be capable of being taught reasonably the conceptions of the Deity put forward must be consistent with each other. But the conceptions of the Deity presented

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in different parts of the Bible are not only inconsistent with, they are violently antagonistic to each other. Part of the Scriptures puts before us the beautiful conception that "God is love." In other parts we read that He is jealous, cruel, vindictive, capable of dealing out the punishments of a petty minded, arbitrary tyrant.

What are we to say when we enter a class-room filled with five-year old babies who are being diligently instructed to recite:

"I the Lord thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."

To the writer, such an experience is in the literal sense of the word *shocking;* it as it were pulls one up with a jerk and makes one ask one's self what strange conceptions can dominate us when we find worthy people fervently believing that it is for the welfare of these little mites that they shall be made to prattle forth this hard cruelty, so that they may be provided with a foundation on which to build the ideal to which they are to look up through life! Nor is the doctrine that "God is Cruelty and Vindictiveness" allowed to rest on the authority of one of the Commandments. There are plenty of Old Testament stories to illustrate the same text.

I have heard an unfortunate teacher (an exceedingly able man) struggling with the hopeless difficulties of a lesson prescribed to him by his sessional syllabus, part of which had to be given on the story of the mocking of Elisha by the children of Bethel:

"And he went up from thence unto Bethel; and as he was going up by the way, there came forth little children out of the city, and mocked him, and said unto him, Go up, thou bald head; go up, thou bald head.

"And he turned back, and looked on them, and cursed them in the name of the Lord. And there came forth two she bears out of the wood, and tare forty and two children of them."

We bring up our children on stories like this, and then wonder at the interested but stolid indifference with which they will witness some scene of street cruelty without its occurring to them for a moment that it is anything to be resisted or

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remonstrated about. Such things come to the average boy as part of the pageant of the day's adventure and are accepted with the same equanimity as they are taught to exercise towards some of the Bible stories that match them.

The rest of the lesson, I remember, was devoted to the story of the curing of Naaman the Leper and of Gehazi's dishonesty and untruthfulness punished by the leprosy's being transferred to him to cleave *to him and to his seed forever* (II Kings 5). What is the ethical value of these stories? Elisha's prescription of the seven dips in Jordan seems to have the fanciful arbitrariness characteristic of the whims of tyrants, whilst the punishment of Gehazi is as savagely vindictive and cruel as that of the children of Bethel.

About the same time that I heard the lesson recounted above, I heard others, for I was anxious to acquaint myself with the kind of Scripture lessons given in a group of Board Schools of which I happened to be a manager.

At one school I heard a class of boys being taught the story of the call of Samuel, and it appeared to me that the result must be ethical puzzlement.

At another I heard the Scripture lesson given to a class of girls. It was on the incidents preceding the crucifixon. The children had previously read the story in Matthew and Mark, and were now going through it in Luke. The lesson was given rather well I thought, without undue formality. If the object were merely to instil the Scripture story into the children's minds, it ought to have had its effect; but the teacher complained that it was always "the same hands up," and not very many of them. How was it that the majority of the class failed to be interested? I believe that if an ethical basis had been taken for the lesson instead of a quasi-historical one the result would have been different.

In another girls' school I heard the lesson given to the eight-year-old children. Here too there was a good deal of life and intelligence in the teaching. The previous day they had been told the story of the wise and foolish virgins, and they now had to retell it in response to interrogation. The children got on well enough as long as what they had to rehearse

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was merely anecdotal. I think they would have got on quite well too if they had been given a simple ethical interpretation such as that they must be vigilant in well doing and always prepared, for they knew not when the hour of trial might arise. Much more recondite symbolism had however been attempted, and the children at this part of the interrogation for the most part (as well they might), lost confidence; so that the teacher had herself to rehearse her interpretation. She began by saying that a good stock of oil symbolised continual striving after good living, and one wished she had stopped there. But her general conclusion was that Christ would come again on the Last Day in order to take those who are prepared, to heaven, whilst those unprepared would be shut out and would knock at the gates in vain. Doctrinal enough! But not consistent I submit with that other doctrine that "God is Love."

In such a system of Bible Lessons as I have depicted there is no clear conception of the Ideal in the teacher's mind; there can be none, for he is called upon to instil several ideals that are in conflict with one another. Under these circumstances it is hardly a matter of wonder that it has never occurred to anyone to arrange the subject-matter of instruction in anything better than an unformulated, disordered mass. The reflection in the pupils' minds of this conception cannot be more perfect than the conception itself. A beautiful story here and there like that of the Good Samaritan may have its isolated effect, but it can hardly be said that Bible Lessons given on such a plan constitute an ordered attempt at ethical instruction at all.

Poor as is such a system of instruction as this from the ethical point of view, it is probably the best of those current amongst the theologians. We need not I think stop to consider the strange device of reading the Bible "without note or comment." Fortunately the plan is not a very common one; it is pretty obvious that to introduce young readers to the Scriptures in this way is as futile, or pretty nearly so, as the old plan of reading the Bible to adult hearers in church in a language they did not understand.

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But there is that other system of instruction which attempts more, not less, than the "undenominationalists"—that of the Sectarians, who wish to teach their own particular creeds.

Of these courses of moral instruction the best known in this country is the Cathechism contained in the Prayer Book of the Church of England. Comparing its teaching with the Bible Instruction we have been considering above, one notices more attempt at obtaining a reasoned and ordered whole. On the other hand, the subject-matter that has to be dealt with is far more hopeless than in the other case. The most incomprehensible of the orthodox doctrines are put in the forefront of the battle array, and are stated with a certain subtle exactitude and emphasis from which the undenominationalist shrinks. This, rather than the fact that certain differences on minor points concerning the sacraments and what not, exist, is probably the reason that undenominationalism has a far greater popularity amongst average good citizens than this system which they consider quite unsuited for the young.

Another consideration is not without weight. The Church of England is one of the great bulwarks that aid wealth and respectability to withstand democracy. The preservation of this tradition is a very distinct note of church religious instruction. The child is taught to submit himself to all his governors, teachers, spiritual pastors, and masters: to order himself lowly and reverently to all his betters: to do his duty in that state of life to which it has pleased God to call him.

On the whole, then, I conclude that these theological instruction systems are very little suited for imbueing moral instruction. That moral instruction is partly present in the minds of those who advocate and use them I do not deny, but they have always failed to adapt themselves to a well-ordered, well-reasoned ethical system. Moreover moral instruction is not their only end; often it is not their chief end. We see mingled with this object others; such as fetish worship of the Bible (which finds its most astonishing embodiment in the teaching "without note or comment"); or we find anxiety to instil respect for the priesthood, or for the wealthy and respectable classes. In all this it is not simply that much that

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is taught is irrelevant to the direct purpose of ethical teaching, there is, as we have seen, much more that fundamentally clashes with such teaching.

I will not go so far as to assert that this is necessarily the case with any theological system. Between pure Theism, consistently holding up a God of Love as the ideal, and rationalistic ethics, I (unlike John Stuart Mill) can see but little antagonism. The chief difficulty that would have to be faced were an attempt made to weld them together, would be the explanation of the existence of evil under a beneficent Deity. But however we approach it, the problem of evil is one of extreme difficulty in ethics for the young (or for the old either, for that matter).

There are of course other reasons why Theism should not be taught in the schools: so far as it is true that some of the parents of the children are not believers in the existence of God, such teaching trespasses against religious liberty. But even if non-theological moral teaching were universally adopted it would still be important to notice that there is no real antagonism between it and a belief in what are called the fundamental doctrines of the existence of God, and of eternal life. So far as we can see, belief in these doctrines is likely to be widespread for a very long time to come, and it would render the hope of introducing ethical teaching on a non-supernatural basis in our schools far more distant than it may now be if all such teaching of children were fundamentally at variance with the teaching that the same children received at home. There is a great distinction between the professed belief in the recondite doctrines of the churches and the real faith in these supposed "fundamentals." Amongst the mass of the people the one is of the lips, the other in the heart, so that whilst a clashing of the school teaching with the first is not a matter of the first importance, with the second it would be. Indeed as has been shown, the clashing of rationalistic ethical teaching with the orthodox creeds amounts to no more than the orthodox are perfectly accustomed to, and therefore presumably, quite prepared to put up with, for it results from the very same points of difference that have been pointed out as

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existing between one part and another part of the orthodox religious teaching itself.

No doubt the claim to base a system of morals otherwise than on a foundation of supernaturalism would raise antagonism amongst the theologians, but the theologians who would really care very much about this are not a very important part of the people; the attack would be rather on a profession than on any deep-seated sentiment in the hearts of the race. What most people want is for their children to be taught to lead the virtuous, the beneficent, the kindly life. There is abundant proof that the theological systems of instruction largely fail to accomplish this, and the heart of the people will not revolt from trying a non-theological basis, if there seems to be a prospect of its being accompanied with greater success.

The whole of my argument it will be perceived, culminates in a plea for the introduction into our schools of moral instruction on a non-theological basis. But it may be asked, suppose this were conceded would it necessarily follow that religious instruction would be expelled from the schools? Might not the two forms of instruction go on side by side concurrently? Mr. F. J. Gould, who has I suppose done more than any other living Englishman to persuade his countrymen to adopt non-theological moral instruction in schools, has urged that it shall be in substitution of the present religious instruction. Rather however than that it should not be introduced at all he has been willing to accept its introduction concurrently with the religious teaching. My own position would be the same. The effect of the ethical instruction would, no doubt, be injured, if side by side with it were taught non-ethical creeds such as the doctrine of the Atonement.[2] It would be injured by Biblical lessons that held up alternately a God of Mercy and a God of Revenge as ideals; it would *not,* I think, be materially injured by the teaching of Theism if the God taught were always the God of Love, nor by the teaching of

[2] "Vicarious expiation, the judicial punishment of the innocent, and the appeasement of an angry God, are surely now recognisable as savage inventions."—Sir Oliver Lodge's article, entitled "Suggestions towards the Reinterpretation of Christian Doctrine," in the *Hibbert Journal,* July, 1904.

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the expectation of a future life, if unaccompanied by the horrible doctrine of everlasting torment for a large proportion of our brothers.

"Would you, then," it may be asked, "expel the Bible from the school altogether?" Here we are reminded of the plea of the parent who wishes the Bible to be taught "as literature." There is, I am persuaded, a want of reality about this plea that if it were not generally so completely unconscious, would tempt one to characterise it harshly. You cannot treat a book merely as literature, and at the same time as being sacred and above criticism. If the Bible were indeed taught as literature, it might be a valuable manual of ethical instruction; the story of the devouring of the children of Bethel by the she-bears, for example, might be used to illustrate the terrible excesses into which men may be led by overweening pride.[3] But so long as the Bible is accepted as a sacred book the action of Elisha on this occasion is identified with the will of the Almighty, and therefore not only placed above criticism, but held up to admiration. My answer therefore would be at present that we cannot afford to teach all the Bible as literature; for children at any rate it is less disastrous that they should be ignorant of that particular part of literature than that their moral sense should be undermined or corrupted. But there is of course much in the Bible that is beautiful and elevating; there is no reason why these portions should not be freely drawn upon in common with other records of the world's great deeds and noble thoughts in the moral instruction lesson itself. If relegated to a separate "religious" lesson concurrent but apart, no doubt larger portions would become available, for there would be no effort to avoid those parts that rest on supernaturalism, but my plea would still be that whatever syllabus is adopted it should be one that would retain only what it is ethically good for the children to hear.

Surely in this time of embittered strife about the comparative non-essentials in controversy between one set of orthodox

[3] I am for the moment setting aside the question of the propriety of teaching children stories which rest on a miraculous basis.

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people and another, it is not inopportune to make an appeal to the parents of the land and ask them to consider whether *they* have not something to say in this matter? Whether it is not true to say that what they really desire for their children is effective moral instruction, and whether they conceive that any of the theologians at present offer them such.

That a serviceable and logical system can be built up on a non-theological basis it has been the attempt of this paper to show. That many of the teachers in our schools are equipped for imparting such a system to their pupils I am encouraged to believe. If they can grapple manfully with the almost overwhelming difficulties of the present religious instruction, one may fairly hope that the simpler task laid upon them of merely ethical instruction, would be accomplished very much more effectively. And the present religious instruction is in many instances I believe given with considerable ability; for example, out of the five lessons that I refer to earlier in this paper, taken as they were quite at random from amongst fifty-four different school departments, of four at any rate it would be true to say that they were given better rather than worse than one would expect to hear an ordinary secular lesson given in an elementary school. And it is to be remembered that the standard of efficiency demanded of teachers by educational authorities is (if we are to take past experience as a criterion of what will continue to take place) continually being raised.

Surely everything points to the great public's clarifying its opinions on this matter. We are faced with the fact that one of the subjects in the curriculum is taught in a haphazard, ineffective way, which would not be tolerated in any other nay, more than haphazard and ineffective—in a manner that involves self-contradiction. How long shall we rest contented with the reply that morals cannot be taught as other subjects are, because they are of such infinitely greater importance than any other subject? Such a plea is remarkable for the fecundity of its paradox.

HERBERT M. THOMPSON.

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MUSIC AND MORALITY.

There are two points concerning music that cannot fail to attract the attention of any one interested in a comparative study of this art. They are worth our notice here as they have a very considerable bearing upon the problem of the relation of music to morality. In the first place, music in some form is a language that is universal in its appeal. Men of every nation and of every degree of culture, to a greater or a less extent, appreciate its message and respond to its power. Then again, as an art its adaptability to the various needs of man is a conspicuous fact. Its varied use in our present day civilisation is to the inquisitive mind an inquiry as to its real character. Even the most enthusiastic devotee of other forms of art would scarcely deny that there is to-day a wider and perhaps a more intelligent appreciation of music than of sculpture or of painting.

The explanation of these facts leads us to inquire into the essential nature of music considered as a form of art. The present popularity of this art cannot be accounted for by any whim of changing fancy nor by any temporal or fleeting cause. Its explanation lies deeper and must be found in the nature of music itself and in the trend of the development of the art-consciousness of the race. In the three great periods of creative art, Sculpture in ancient Greece, Painting in the middle ages, and Music in recent years, there is, broadly speaking, a constant tendency to advance from formal objective types of beauty to ideals that are more subjective and expressive of the inner life. Symmetry and proportion as the essentials of sculpture are replaced by ideals that lay a greater stress upon the mental experience of the individual.

Painting marked an important step in this subjective tendency of artistic thought. As an art it was more pliable than sculpture and greatly increased the range of ideas considered suitable for art portrayal. This increase was in the direction of the emotional life. In the golden age of this art its object was not to express mere beauty of form so much as to depict

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the human emotions after being awakened by some religious truth.

Music marks the latest step in this subjective trend of art ideas. Here the objective factor as the incentive to art expression is of little or no importance. Sculpture and painting genetically arose from a desire to copy or reproduce external forms. And even in their highest development their dependence upon objective forms is not wanting. Even the masters had their models. Music is not external or imitative in this same way. Though we have descriptive music this fact does not explain why we have music at all. In its beginning music was little more than a succession of sounds at regular intervals. Rhythm more than any other factor explains the essence of early music and never ceases to be the one indispensable element. The real source of music then is within and wholly so. It does not arise from the imitative instinct of human nature, but its primary cause is a desire to express or perhaps to communicate an emotional state of consciousness. The frenzied war-dance of the savage or the funeral march of the composer are primarily emotional states of mind. The significance of this fact will appear as we proceed.

The first point mentioned above scarcely needs confirming. The characterisation sometimes given to music as a "universal language" calls attention to man's natural response to rhythmical, musical sound. Because it is born from the inner emotional life it finds a response in every listener. It strikes a responsive note in every mind. The term, therefore, is warranted by the nature of music and its relation to the individual. It rightly emphasises the important truth that music is the most natural, most direct, and most appropriate expression of this side of our mental life. In the undeveloped savage music is little more than this impulse toward rhythmic sound; in the composer it is an expression of a more refined emotional state through the more complex language of our musical notation.

The other point, the wonderful adaptability of music to the various needs of man, has even a more important ethical bearing. In every form of social life, as well as in the life of the individual, music has come to fill so important a place that

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its moral import cannot be denied. In the home, in the school, in the theater, in martial life, and in the church we find evidence of its adaptability to human needs. Religion without music would lose one-half its power. Not, however, because religion is less strong, but because religious worship demands just that attitude of heart and mind which is best attained through the influence of certain kinds of music. Amid this striking diversity of uses, a diversity that extends from the services of the church and religion to the services of the devil, to put the matter in an expressive way, there is one common function, which is not the presentation of some immortal truth, or an ideal of beauty, but that it brings the hearer to that mental attitude or mood which the composition is meant to express. In social life its power is due to the fact that it leads all to one common meeting ground of temper and prepares the minds of all for unanimity of thought and action by a unanimity of feeling. More than any other art it soothes or it animates, it calms or it arouses, it stills or it fires the various emotions of humanity. This direct and powerful influence over the feeling life of man is the fact that explains its power and opens the way for a true understanding of its possibilities as a means of ethical development.

An art that touches so directly and so potently the whole gamut of man's emotional life must have great possibilities as a means of culture and no little importance even from the ethical point of view. Just what this influence is, or how far music can permanently promote the growth of character, are problems that have received far less consideration than their importance deserves. That it has an influence on the moral nature is tacitly conceded, but what this influence really is or how far it may be utilised as an ethical educator is still an open question.

When we speak of music and morality we are at once reminded by numerous examples that while they may be compatible they are not always concomitants. So prominent have been the examples of artists and musicians of undoubted genius who were not only morally weak but morally depraved, that such cases come into the foreground whenever the ques-

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tion is raised of the relation of art and ethics. Among musicians especially cases of this kind are so frequent, and the inference seems so manifest that some have contended that excellence in this art is gained at the expense of moral integrity. They have asserted that there is, as it were, some incompatibility between musical genius and an upright moral life. There is a disposition to make the musician's genius an excuse for his depravity. Such a conclusion, however, is not a valid one. The induction is not warranted by the examples that can be cited in its support, nor does an analysis of such cases go to establish this assertion. What they do prove is the fact that æsthetic genius does not always imply a corresponding degree of ethical attainment. And more important still, they present certain facts which a true theory of the relation of music to morality must recognise and harmonise. They help to define our problem, for a theory which does not allow such facts, and does not offer some explanation of why they are possible, is an untenable one.

Some have attempted to explain the immoral effects of certain kinds of music by peculiar forms of melody or of time. For example, it has been affirmed that the peculiar accent and syncopated time of the popular "ragtime" has a disintegrating effect upon nerve tissue and a similar result upon moral integrity. "The result," it is said, "is that the entire being is thrown into a succession of jumps or musical contortions whose irregular character excites unhealthy immoral tendencies." Certain forms of melody also have been condemned by those who have found in them the secret of the deleterious effects of some music upon the moral welfare of the individual. Such explanations, however, are inadequate. They are interesting, and to a certain extent suggestive, but they do not suffice to explain the frequency of immorality in those who live exclusively in the world of music. Music in itself, however sensuous, is neither moral nor immoral. We can properly speak of its moral value only after it has been assimilated, as it were, and become an integral part of character, or when we consider it as a stimulus that excites passions that lead to immoral practices. At best, explanations like the above only

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affect the latter point which does not go deep enough to make clear the influence of music upon character. They are attempts to explain the moral value of music without any consideration of man's ethical nature and its relation to æsthetic culture. There is a lack of an analysis of the emotions music produces, and a failure to correlate these with fundamental truths of the ethical consciousness.

As has been tacitly assumed throughout, the problem of the relation of music to morality is best approached through the analytic or psychological method, using this term for a perfectly natural though subjective method of investigation. Examples of artists and musicians,—some good, some bad, more both good and bad,—are too conflicting to give definite conclusions as to the real value of music as a means of ethical discipline. We shall endeavor, therefore, to determine the character of music considered as a mental phenomenon, and to define its relation to our ethical nature. In this way, as far as our analysis is correct, we may hope for some results of value.

Music considered as a state of consciousness is primarily and predominantly emotional. Though some have contended that it is essentially intellectual in its nature, and even that the pleasure it produces arises from the exercise of the intellectual faculties, the argument for such an assertion is not convincing. The affirmation is too radical to express an exact truth. A recent writer has even gone so far as to say that one who does not understand music in this cognitive, critical way cannot appreciate or enjoy it. No one would deny that a thorough understanding of the principles of music will increase one's appreciation and to some extent his enjoyment. But to make music primarily intellectual, and one's enjoyment to depend upon a critical understanding of its principles, is to maintain an untenable theory of this art, and to flaunt an assertion in the face of facts. One of the essential characteristics of music is just this, that it makes its appeal to the emotions without the medium of any definite train of cognitive thought.

Rhythm, the *sine qua non* of all musical expression, is an

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emotional rather than an intellectual element. A simple periodic division of time without a melodic accompaniment produces in itself an emotional affection of the mind. Quicken the beat and the pulse of the emotional life responds. Were music primarily intellectual a change of *tempo* should tend to affect our comprehension of the selection, not to change the feeling state. Such, however, is not the case. The immediate and the invariable effect of an Andante, or an Adagio, or a Scherzo, or an Allegro is a certain mood, or emotional state, a higher or a lower life—potential, we may say. This difference in the mental attitude under the stimulus of different movements, so subtle, so direct, cannot be accounted for in any way except to attribute to this element of music a direct emotional significance. A more subtle example of the effect of time over the emotional life can be found in the compositions of Brahms. Much of the peculiar effect of his music arises from his combination of bars in different time, preserving, however, the same beat to the measure. So delicate is the response of our emotions to such changes that we often feel what we cannot understand.

The best means of determining the relative proportion of intellectual and emotional elements in music, however, is to contrast the attitude of mind when engaged in some scientific work and when listening to a musical composition or enjoying some other work of art. In the former case the mind is active, self-impelled, creative, and critical. The end of its activity is the determination of truth. With this end in view it deliberately marshals its forces, and applies itself to overcome the obstacles that impede its purpose. It looks for inconsistencies and contradictions and passes judgment on every point. In brief, under such conditions the whole energies of the mind are centered in doing something. There is an active energising of the mind that embraces all its faculties.

In the other case, when engaged in the contemplation of some work of art, the mental attitude is quite different. The dominant purpose is not *to do* but *to receive*. The conception was made complete in the artist's brain and we have only to

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receive what he has thus expressed. Here we give over, as it were, our minds to live for the time in the thought and beauty created for us. The attitude is not that of a conscious agent pursuing its own purposes, but the whole state of mind is contemplative and passive. The secret of art appreciation is the ability to see what is presented to us, to so interpret the language of the artist as to enter heartily into his conception, to see its beauty and to experience the shades of thought and the play of the emotions that inspired the artist to create this particular work of art. Though there is necessarily activity of mind, this activity is not centrally initiated but is due to suggestion rather than to purpose.

This passivity of mind in art contemplation means a preponderance of feeling over cognitive elements. There is, as Aristotle and Spinoza well knew, but a minimum of passion or emotion in reflection or in scientific investigation. Their systems of philosophy were founded on this fact. And even in poetry, an art better fitted than any other to express intellectual truth, we can understand the undying pleasure which some poems give, only by attributing it to the mood which the reading of them brings. In reading Lycidas, for example, our delight does not arise from an unfathomable store of intellectual truth, but from the presentation of a complete emotional picture. By its rhythm and its imagery it leads us through the richest paths of our emotional life, leaving us at the end in the calm serenity of contentment. The true secret of its perfection is that it touches so delicately the deeper chords of feeling and leaves at the end contentment in our sorrow. Its figures of speech, its wonderful rhythm, its changing imagery all subserve this purpose. Art is primarily the language of the emotional life, and its distinctive purpose is to present in suitable forms of beauty, ideals that appeal to this richer, warmer side of life. Its function is to nourish and to educate a part of our nature that does not receive a proper cultivation in the more practical affairs of the intellectual life.

While it is true that music is primarily and predominantly an expression of man's emotional life, we would not contend

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that it is wholly so. As far as a psychological analysis goes it serves to show that no mental state is altogether emotional or cognitive or volitional. Elements of these three forms of mental activity enter into all the functionings of the mind. All that we can say is that now one aspect is predominant, now another. This is true of music as of every form of art. There are certain indispensable intellectual elements in every art. Art criticism is only warranted by this fact. *De gustibus non disputandum* is an old and, in the proper sense, a worthy adage. But there are certain principles underlying every art which the successful artist must regard. These principles are cognitive facts, and the critic's work is to form logical conclusions based upon these fundamental truths of art expression. He is justified, if he has mastered these, in pointing out where the artist has failed and how far he has succeeded. So, too, there are certain intellectual faculties that are always active in the enjoyment of a work of art. However, it is forever true that art does not exist for the sake of criticism, but criticism for the sake of art. There is a far grander, a far nobler use of art than to give employ to the critic's pen. In other words, art does not exist for the sake of the intellectual discipline it yields to the artist or to the beholder, but because through a language peculiar to itself it appeals to man's emotional nature as no other language can. Music is an art because it does just this; it is the latest developed, and, we may say, the most perfect art, because it speaks through a language more direct and more powerful than any other art the world has known. It does not present a particular truth in a syllogistic way, but it speaks in a tongue that all can understand, and to which all respond. Music, then, we conclude, is an inspiration to the emotional life more than to man's cognitive or volitional nature. Whatever moral value it may have must arise from its influence upon this side of our mental life. Whatever limitations this fact imposes upon its ethical significance must also be accepted as absolute.

There is one further step in our analysis before the full significance of the preceding will be clear. The emotional life is too comprehensive for us to stop with the conclusions

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we have just deduced. Some distinctions must be introduced to make our point more evident. Music is an æsthetic phenomenon. Our problem is to ascertain its ethical significance. We must briefly note, therefore, the distinguishing marks of these two classes of emotions and it will enable us to see their mutual relationship.

The distinguishing mark of the ethical feelings is their personal nature, the authority they possess, and the obligation they enjoin to obey their commands. Their right to primacy in matters of conduct is a part of their reality. They do not advise, they do not persuade, but they summarily and dogmatically dictate what we ought to do. They accept no excuse if they are not obeyed, but unequivocally pronounce us guilty. Interpreted for our present purposes, this means that the ethical feelings are all accompanied by a strong motor element, a factor that has a direct influence in the formation of character and of moral action. The command is *to do* or *to inhibit* action. The feeling of justice includes the command, "Be thou just," and the feeling of mercy enjoins us to be merciful. Throughout the whole category of the ethical sentiments there is always present this sense of obligation to let the feeling bear fruit in some ethical deed.

The emotions which beauty, whether in musical form or in any other work of art, awakens, lack this personal, imperative nature. We recognise certain principles of art as more perfect than others, but they are not binding in the same uncompromising way as ethical laws. It is more a lack than a fault if we do not appreciate what is in accord with the educated taste in regard to matters pertaining to beauty. The sense of binding obligation and the accompanying impulse to action are not present in the æsthetic emotions. The mind is not self-centered, but contemplative. If we find the artist's thought, and see the beauty of his conception, his object is attained, and we have received that for which his work was done. The application to conduct of the truth he has expressed is not present to any appreciable degree. This object was beside the artist's purpose, and is never vital in any masterpiece of art. Hence, while there is in æsthetic culture the most intense

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pleasure that mortals know, and unbounded room for development and the expression of immortal truth, as a means of ethical culture, its utility is restricted by certain fundamental limitations. Music is too æsthetic ever to be didactically ethical. In a musical education alone there is a failure to discipline those mental traits which are so essential for a tried and a seasoned moral character. The volitional element in music is too weak to let the development of this one side of our mental endowment suffice for our moral nature.

We have now come to the place where the different points in our analysis begin to converge toward a conclusion. The emotional character of music prevents it from imparting to the hearer a principle or a definite conclusion. By nature it is ill-fitted to be didactic. As an art it is least able to present to the hearer a definite train of logical thought. Its mission lies in a different field. Though a certain *tempo* expresses a certain mood or state of feeling, and though we allow a *motif* for certain ideas to an unlimited degree, the language is still too vague, too general, to define in any exact way what the listener's thought will be. Musical appreciation depends too much upon the mental response of the hearer to allow it to present any one particular thought, and demand that it mean nothing else. Only by the aid of words in song can it attain to such a degree of exactness as to serve for an expression of concrete ideas. It is the excellence of music that it exerts so direct and so powerful an influence upon the emotional life, not that it can present cognitive truth in an impressive or even in an interesting way. This excellence is gained at the expense of a definite sequence of intellectual ideas. Pure music is so truly a language of the emotional life that it must go afield to fill out the picture with definite forms and shapes. If these are not present they are left to the mind of the hearer to create. Wagner's innovation in music had to do with just this point. He attempted to supply by the union of poetry and music that definite content of ideas which the uncultivated ear fails to create for itself. The libretto is an undoubted gain to many in helping them to understand what were otherwise but a confusion of sounds accompanying a spectacular display. To

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those who cannot interpret Beethoven, Wagner may well be the greatest musician of all time. But there are some who resent even the limitations of his poems, and who would sometimes rise to heights never attained even in the Neibelungenlied. There is music so great that to attempt to define it with words is to defame it. For those who, from their own experience, are unable to find this sublimity such music must forever remain a sealed book. Music presents an ideal of beauty to the listener, but like all objects of sensuous perception it must be augmented and enriched by elements added from the mind of the listener. All music worth the name demands from the hearer an intelligent response to the stimulus of its sounds if it be to him anything more than a mere enjoyable sensuous perception.

Just what the mental response of the listener shall be to music is determined by two factors, the character of the music and the character of the individual. The former by controlling the mood or the emotional state of the hearer determines the general character of his thought. The particular ideas, the imagery, the ideals that rise to consciousness, depend upon the mental increment of the individual rather than upon the music. The ideas that swell to the forefront of mental life under the quickening stimulus of a musical composition thus depend upon the ideas and the ideals which the individual by nature and education has at his command. It is impossible that the response of one who has deadened his higher sensibilities by negligence, or by a more positively destructive course of living, should be as elevated and as noble as that of one who has seen and valued and loved the noble and the true. The import of this truth is evident and most important.

The ethical value of music does not arise from its presentation of a particular or a definite moral truth. A moral as the conclusion of a musical composition is an addendum and a most unfortunate one. Music is an æsthetic fact, and no magic can make it anything else. Its moral value must result from its influence over the emotions, not from its impressive emphasis of some ethical maxim. All that it can do is to bring the mind into harmony with right action and with noble thoughts,

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and to suggest by its ideal of beauty a like perfection in conduct. To do this, to harmonise man's spirit with the best ideals of life there is no power so strong or so directly potent as this wonderful art of the present day. It is no criticism of music to say that it is primarily emotional. Rather this fact increases its importance, for it holds a place in our civilisation that is not supplied by any other art.

Music of this higher, better kind makes the mind appreciative of the best ideals of life. Those who appreciate music of this class can see the beauty and the value of other forms of art. The heart is opened by musical culture for that undefined spirit of truth where lie the best and the noblest conceptions of beauty and of virtue. Though such experience is not directly ethical it has a humanising influence that is of great value in the development of the higher, better life. Such experience has undoubtedly been the salvation of many a life from the unemotional plainness of business and professional routine. It has too, as we believe, often pointed to ideals that are recognised as incomplete until the moral life is brought into harmony with the beauty and perfection of such æsthetic ideals. In this way music has great possibilities for promoting a broader culture and for enriching life which to-day is all too practical and too scientific. If this broader culture comes, the moral element will not be left behind. However, music is not the germ whence virtue springs. Rather it is the sunshine and the rain under which such germs can grow and blossom in their perfection. It is not a discipline for his intellectual or his moral nature, but it is an inspiration to his emotional life whose influence permeates and shapes and promotes his entire mental development. As a moral force it has its limitations, but in its own place and way it gives what is indispensable for the best conceptions of human nature and for the perfect man. In this broader sense its moral value is only beginning to be appreciated and utilised as its worth deserves.

Another more subtle source of moral value in music arises from the close relation of the æsthetic and the ethical ideals. While they never become quite identical the relationship is always so close that they are mutually supporting. An analysis

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reveals many common elements. Moral virtue demands certain elements that explain our approval of beauty, and beauty has factors that are primarily of ethical significance. Some of these have been admirably noted by Professor Palmer in his excellent little work, "The Field of Ethics." So important are these common attributes that the step from the ideal of beauty to the ideal of virtue is a narrow if not an inevitable one. The destruction of the one ideal irreparably disfigures the other.

The cultivation of one's æsthetic nature alone, however, will not insure a strong, well-balanced character. The ideals which music cultivates or implies will not suffice for the demands of our social and political life. To satisfy the requirements of society as well as to attain to the highest development of which our natures are capable, a greater variety of interests is demanded than can be found in any one art or in any one profession. Man was not made to live on bread alone. His mental endowment demands an education of the intellect and of the will as well as of the emotions. In order to generate moral force the volitional nature must receive a more direct, a more heroic discipline than comes from the suggestion of moral virtue in æsthetic culture and in beauty. Moral strength of character is a growth as much as any other form of mental attainment, only with the difference that it is more difficult, more subtle, and more complex than any other form of discipline. Faculties unused or undeveloped lose their vigor, and their strength accrues to those that are exercised. The man engaged exclusively in intellectual pursuits loses the active functioning of his æsthetic nature. While his perceptive powers may be acute, his eye trained to see what to another is obscure, his imagination quick to conceive of a plausible hypothesis to account for accumulating phenomena, there will be but a sluggish response to the other aspects of nature and of life. The beauty of the world, the suggestiveness of art will be unobserved and unappreciated. To such a man music in its higher forms can have but little meaning. He may yet respond to the primal accents of rhythm, but the beauty of musical harmony, the shades of finer feeling that mark the touch of genius will all be lost to him. Darwin's confession is

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a notable example of this kind. The man who lives in the realm of the emotions as exclusively as the musician often does, may fail to cultivate those mental traits which alone will give a strong moral character. Unless there is a broader development than music alone will give there is an ill-balance of mental powers that is not conducive to moral strength. As we have already shown there is in such culture but a minimum of volitional elements, while it is with these especially that morality has to do. The man whose life is controlled by his emotions is a creature of circumstances. For moral strength there is no substitute for a well-determined, closely followed conception of *duty*.

The cases mentioned above of musicians and artists who had strong claims to genius, but who were weak or even depraved from the moral point of view, can now be understood. Genius in art is not antithetic to virtue. There is no contradiction or even incompatibility between musical genius and an upright moral life, more than there is between a masterful proficency in different fields of science. In truth, there is far less, for while this latter requires an expenditure of time and energy, moral character is a growth that comes with one's habitual mode of life, resulting more from silent inner processes of thought than from the external forces of life. On the other hand, other things being equal, the greater musician is he whose mind is responsive to the uplift of moral sentiment as well as to the inspiring emotions that come from the contemplation and creation of artistic beauty. Such a union of qualities cannot fail to reveal itself in the musician's work by giving a richer content to his thought, a firmer grasp upon the distinctively human emotions, and a closer and a deeper relation to life than if he had only experienced those sentiments that spring from æsthetic beauty. If the musician express in his artistic way his own conceptions of life and its ideals, his language must in some subtle way contain a richer, fuller truth when these elements are present in his own experience.

There are, however, certain difficulties in the musician's life which tend to impede his moral development. His time is given over almost entirely to his art where, as we have shown,

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there is but a feeble accompaniment of ethical elements. Especially does the life of one who lives so largely under the inspiration of the æsthetic emotions lack that personal ethical element which is such an important factor in the formation of character. There is a freedom from obligation in music which in the absence of a more directly moral discipline easily grows to license. So impulsive is the life of the musical artist that there is a tendency to let his varied powers be consumed in the fires of his genius—to sacrifice his humanity to his art. This, however, is not the rule and by no means the necessary outcome. Examples might be multiplied of musicians of the highest rank who yet maintained that mental equipoise which made them esteemed and loved as well as renowned. The man of genius who retains control of his faculties and develops them harmoniously is a man of greater caliber and character, in the psychological sense a greater man, than one whose only claim to greatness is his title to artistic renown.

Though music has its limitations as a means of ethical discipline in the more technical sense, in the broader meaning of that term its utility is not so restricted. While there is a type of morality characterised by stern austerity and a contempt for aught except an uncompromising obedience to ethical law, the present trend of thought is away from the puritanic conception of virtue and what constitutes the virtuous life. It is no criticism of music to say that it cannot be our monitor in morality in this sterner sense. The present tendency is toward a more comprehensive ideal of life, an ideal that recognises the utility of all our faculties when harmoniously developed and judiciously restrained. Under such a conception as this music has a place as a moral force which, because of its universal appeal to man and its adaptability to his many modes of thought, is unique. Music is not all-sufficient, and it is well to realise that the development of this one aspect of our nature may leave us ill-fitted to take our place in a society that is increasingly broadening its social ideal. But as one factor in the proper education of the individual, for weaning him from low ideals to higher conceptions of life, for enlarging his sympathies and promoting a broader culture, and for deepening

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and intensifying the emotional life, music is a power whose potency has never been properly utilised.

This growing importance of music as evinced by the number of musical organizations devoted exclusively to high class music, and even more significantly by the increasing stress laid upon music as a part of a liberal education, augurs well for the culture of to-day. A genuine appreciation of this higher conception of music signifies a mental development that easily lends itself to an appreciation of beauty under any form of nature or of art. The step from this to an approval of moral excellence is an easy and a logical one. Such an education of the emotional nature cannot fail to react—through the moral sentiments—in an approval of what is ethically right, though the individual may not have the strength of purpose to make actual what is recognised as ideal. It is just at this point that æsthetic factors must be confirmed and supplemented by ethical discipline, if they are to bear palpable results in moral growth. It does not suffice merely to love the beautiful. It is the tragedy of life that we know the beautiful and the true and so often fail to reveal such knowledge in our conduct. However, it is true that the highest development, even from the moral point of view, demands just that sort of cultivation of the emotional nature which music in its better forms promotes. The man whose character we would emulate loves beauty in its various forms, not merely because of its æsthetic value, but because an appreciation of this element in life gives a trend to his thought that is logically and potently moral.

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TRUTH AND IMAGINATION IN RELIGION.

The content of the religious experience is best understood when regarded as closely analogous to one's belief in the disposition toward himself of men or communities. In the case of religion this disposition is attributed to the more or less vaguely conceived residual environment that is recognised as lying outside the familiar natural and social relations. After the rise of science this residual environment tends to be conceived as a unity which is ultimate or fundamental, but for the religious consciousness it is more commonly regarded as a general source of influence that is practically worthy of consideration. Such a belief, like all beliefs, is practically manifested, with such emphasis upon action, feeling or intellection as temperament and mood may determine. There will, furthermore, be two groups of special characters possessed by religious belief: those peculiar to belief in the favorable or unfavorable attitude of another will, and those which are peculiar to the momentousness of the issue in the special case of a divine will.[1]

But if the psychology of belief be the proper starting point for a description of the religious experience, it is none the less suggestive of the fact that religion, just because it *is* belief, is not wholly a matter for psychology. For religion *means to be true,* and thus submits itself to evaluation as a case of knowledge. The present psychological interest has already justified itself by its fruits, but it is misleading when regarded as replacing philosophical criticism. What the religious man wants is sanity and not sanitation. He takes his religion not as a narcotic, but as an enlightenment. Its subjective worth is due at any rate in part to the supposition of its objective worth. As in any case of insight, that which warms the heart must have satisfied the mind. The religious experience purports to be the part of wisdom, and to afford only such happiness as increasing wisdom would confirm. But the charm of truth cannot survive its truthfulness. Hence, though religion may

[1] *Cf,* the writer's discussion of "The Religious Experience," in the *Monist* for October, 1904.

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be described, it cannot be justified, from the standpoint of therapeutics. Were such the case it would be the real problem of religious leaders to find a drug capable of giving a constantly pleasant tone to their patient's experience. There would be no difference between priests and physicians who make a specialty of nervous diseases, except that the former would aim at a more fundamental and perpetual suggestion of serenity. Now no man wants to be even a blessed fool. He does not want to dwell constantly in a fictitious world even if it be after his own heart. He may from the cynical point of view actually do so, but if he be religious he thinks it is reality, and is satisfied only in so far as he thinks so. He regards the man who has said in his heart that there is no God as the fool, and not because he may have to suffer for it, but because he is cognitively blind to the real nature of things. Piety, on the other hand, he regards as the standard experience, the most veracious life. Hence, it is not an accident that religion has had its creeds and its controversies, its wars with science, and its appeals to philosophy. The history of these affairs shows that religion commonly fails to understand the scope of its own demand for truth; but they have issued from the deep conviction that one's religion is, implicitly, at least, in the field of truth; that there are theoretical judgments whose truth would justify or contradict it.

This general fact being admitted, there remains the task to which the present discussion addresses itself, that of defining the kind of theoretical judgment implied in religion, and the relation to this central cognitive stem of its efflorescences of myth, theology, and ritual. It is impossible to separate the stem and the efflorescence, or to determine the precise spot at which destruction of the tissue would prove fatal to the plant, but it is possible to obtain some idea of the relative vitality of the parts.

The difficulty of reaching a definite statement in this matter is due to the fact that the truth in which any religious experience centers is a practical and not a scientific truth. A practical truth does not commit itself to any single scientific statement, and can often survive the overthrow of that scientific

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statement in which at any given time it has found expression. In other words an indefinite number of scientific truths are compatible with a single practical truth. An instance of this is the consistency with my expectation of the alternation of day and night, of either the Ptolemaic or Copernican formulation of the solar system. Now expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow is an excellent analogue of my religious belief. Celestial mechanics is as relevant to the one as metaphysics to the other. Neither is overthrown until a central practical judgment is discredited, and either could remain true through a very considerable alteration of logical definition; but neither is on this account exempt from theoretical responsibility. In so far as religion deliberately enters the field of science, and defines its formularies with the historical or metaphysical method, this difficulty does not, of course, exist. Grant that the years of Methuselah's life, or the precise place and manner of the temptation of Jesus, or the definition of Christ in the terms of the Athanasian Creed are constitutive of Christianity, and the survival of that religion will be determined by the solution of ordinary problems of historical or metaphysical research. But the Christian will very properly claim that his religion is only externally and accidentally related to such propositions, since they are never or very rarely intended in his experience. As religious he is occupied with Christ as his saviour or with God as his protector and judge. The history of Jesus or the metaphysics of God essentially concern him only in so far as they may or may not invalidate this relationship. He cares only for the power and disposition of the divine, and these are affected by history and metaphysics only in so far as he has definitely put them to such proof. For my religion is my sense of a practical situation, and only when that has been proved to be folly has my religion become untrue.

In the light of this fact one may understand the ambiguity that attaches to such propositions as affirm that there is no God. "Hath a nation changed her gods, which yet are no gods?" asks Jeremiah. We are brought at once to the fact that the term *god* connotes no fixed conception of which the predicate of existence may be affirmed or denied. Generically God sig-

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nifies the bearing upon life of its residual or total environment. He is indeed a fool who has said in his heart that there is no God. For either his religious consciousness has suffered atrophy and he has ceased to consider the universal setting of his life, or he has confused God with some individual deity whom his experience has discredited. Such a special interpretation of God would signify some particular adjustment of life to what are supposed to be its most general conditions. Now although any such adjustment may be mistaken, *some* such adjustment must be true. Hence though God certainly lives, I may be worshipping a false god.

But, true or false, my god is my practical faith, my plan of salvation. My religion is overthrown if I am convinced that I have misconceived the situation and mistaken what I should do to be saved. The conception of God is very simple practically, and very complex theoretically, a fact that confirms its practical genesis. My conception of God contains *an idea of my own interests, an idea of the disposition of the universe toward my interests,* and *some working plan for the reconciliation of these two terms.* These three elements form a practical unity, but each is capable of emphasis, and a religion may be transformed through the modification of any one of them. It appears, then, as has always been somewhat vaguely recognised, that the truth of religion is ethical as well as metaphysical or scientific. My religion will be altered by a change in my conception of what constitutes my real interest, a change in my conception of the fundamental causes of reality, or a change in my conception of the manner in which my will may or may not affect these causes. God cannot be either an entity or an ideal, but is always a relation of entity to ideal *reality regarded from the standpoint of its favorableness or unfavorableness to human life, and prescribing for the latter the propriety of a certain attitude.*

The range of historical examples [2] is limitless, but certain of

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[2] A striking analogue of false religion is to be found in paranoia. A case of this reported recently in New York is peculiarly in point. Upon examination the patient was found to be wound in rubber hose so as

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these are especially calculated to emphasise the application of a criterion to religion. Such is the case with Elijah's encounter with the prophets of Baal, as narrated in the Old Testament.

"And Elijah came near unto all the people, and said, How long halt ye between two opinions If Yahweh be God, follow him: but if Baal, then follow him. . . . And call ye on the name of your god, and I will call on the name of Yahweh: and the God that answereth by fire, let him be God. . . . And Elijah said unto the prophets of Baal, Choose you one bullock for yourselves, and dress it first; for ye are many; and call on the name of your god, but put no fire under. And they took the bullock which was given them, and they dressed it, and called on the name of Baal from morning even until noon, saying, O Baal, hear us. But there was no voice, nor any that answered. . . . And it came to pass at noon, that Elijah mocked them, and said, Cry aloud: for he is a god; either he is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is in a journey, or peradventure he sleepeth, and must be awaked. And thy cried aloud, and cut themselves after their manner with knives and lances, till the blood gushed out upon them. . . . But there was neither voice, nor any to answer, nor any that regarded."[3]

The religion of the followers of Baal consists in a belief in the practical virtue of a mode of address and form of ritual associated with the traditions and customs of a certain social group. The prophets of this cult agree to regard the test proposed by Elijah as an *experimentum crucis*, and that which is disproved from its failure is a *modus operandi*. These prophets relied upon the presence of a certain motivity, from which a definite response could be evoked by an appeal which they were peculiarly able to make; but though "they prophesied until the

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to cover nearly his entire body. This he explained by accusing the New York Academy of Science of vindictively seeking to injure him with an electrical machine. He believed the rubber hose to be a necessary and effective means of insulation. From our critical point of view this man was mistaken because he took wrong precautions against an imaginary danger. His folly did not consist in his lack of scientific knowledge, but in the fact that his expectations and his prudence were not rational in view of the actual situation. His false god was a hostile unseen power from which he could protect his bodily welfare with the aid of a rubber insulator. It is worth while to add that his conduct would also have been irrational had he not conceived his bodily welfare to be his real interest, even had the rest of his belief been warranted.

[3] Quoted with some omissions from I Kings, ch. 18, vs. 21-29. The Hebrew term Yahweh, the name of the national deity, has been substituted for the English translation, "the Lord."

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time of the offering of the evening oblation," there was none that regarded.

An equally familiar and more instructive example is the refutation of the Greek national religion by Lucretius. The conception of life which Lucretius finds unwarranted is best depicted in Homer. There we hear of a society composed of gods and men. Though the gods, on the one hand, have their own history, their affairs are never sharply sundered from those of men, who, on the other hand, must constantly reckon with them, gauge their attitude, and seek their favor by paying tribute to their individual humors and preferences. In the Ninth Book of the Iliad, Phœnix addresses himself to the recalcitrant Achilles as follows:

"It fits not one that moves
The hearts of all, to live unmov'd, and succour hates for loves.
The Gods themselves are flexible; whose virtues, honours, pow'rs,
Are more than thine, yet they will bend their breasts as we bend ours.
Perfumes, benign devotions, savours of offerings burn'd,
And holy rites, the engines are with which their hearts are turn'd,
By men that pray to them."[4]

Here is a general recognition of that which makes sacrifice rational. It is because he conceives this presupposition to be mistaken, that Lucretius declares the practices and fears which are founded upon it to be folly. It is the same with all that is practically based upon the expectation of a life beyond the grave. The correction of the popular religion is due in his opinion to that true view of the world taught by Epicurus, whose memory Lucretius thus invokes at the opening of the Third Book of the *De Rerum Natura*:

"Thee, who first wast able amid such thick darkness to raise on high so bright a beacon and shed a light on the true interests of life, thee I follow, glory of the Greek race, and plant now my footsteps firmly fixed in thy imprinted marks. . . . For as soon as thy philosophy issuing from a godlike intellect has begun with loud voice to proclaim the nature of things, the terrors of the mind are dispelled, the walls of the world part asunder, I see things in operation throughout the whole void: the divinity of the gods is revealed and their tranquil abodes which neither winds do shake nor clouds drench with rains nor snow congealed by

[4] Iliad, Book IX, lines 467 *sq.* Translation by Chapman.

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sharp frost harms with hoary fall; an ever cloudless ether o'er canopies them, and they laugh with light shed largely round. Nature too supplies all their wants and nothing ever impairs their peace of mind. But on the other hand the Acherusian quarters[5] are nowhere to be seen. though earth is no bar to all things being descried, which are in operation underneath our feet throughout the void."[6]

In another passage, after describing the Phrygian worship of Cybele, he comments as follows:

"All which, well and beautifully as it is set forth and told, is yet widely removed from true reason. For the nature of gods must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose, far removed and withdrawn from our concerns; since exempt from every pain, exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger. . . . The earth however is at all time without feeling, and because it receives into it the first-beginnings of many things, it brings them forth in many ways into the light of the sun."[7]

If the teaching of Epicurus be true it is evident that those who offered hecatombs with the idea that they were thereby mitigating anger or securing special dispensation, were playing the fool. They were appealing to a fictitious motivity, one not grounded in "the nature of things." To one for whom the walls of the world had parted asunder, such a procedure was no longer possible; though he might choose to "call the sea Neptune" and reverence the earth as "mother of the gods."

Plato's criticism of the popular religion forms a very interesting contrast.[8] He complains not of the conception of a divine interest in human life, but of the representation of that interest as morally indeterminate. The popular conception of the gods is ignoble, reflecting as it does the disorder of common moral opinion instead of the philosophical knowledge of the ideal. The correction which Plato would offer is therefore more fundamental. He would have man first gain moral insight, and then find his religion in the contemplation of the eternal and absolute good. The Greek of Homer and Hesiod

[5] The supposed abode of departed spirits.

[6] Lucretius: *De Rerum Natura*, Book III, lines 1 *sq.* Translated by Munro.

[7] *Cp. cit.*, Book II, lines 644 *sq.*

[8] *Cf.* Plato's *Republic*, Book II, 377 *sq.*

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reads his moral confusion into nature, thus forming conceptions that are not merely anthropomorphic, but based upon an improper ideal of human nature. And to Plato the Epicurean would seem scarcely wiser, since in the realm of truth he only substitutes moral indifference for moral confusion. Both have misconceived the relation of universal interests to their own.

The history of religion contains no more impressive and dramatic chapter than that which records the development of the religion of the Jews. Passing over its obscure beginnings in the primitive Semitic cult, we find this religion first clearly defined as tribal self-interest sanctioned by Yahweh. God's interest in his chosen people determines the prosperity of him who practices the social virtues.

"The name of Yahweh is a strong tower: the righteous runneth into it, and is safe." [9]

"He that is stedfast in righteousness shall attain unto life." [10]

"To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to Yahweh than sacrifice." [11]

But in time it is evident to the believer that his experience does not bear out this expectation. Neither as a Jew nor as a righteous man does he prosper more than his neighbor. He comes, therefore, to distrust the virtue of his wisdom.

"Then I saw that wisdom excelleth folly as far as light excelleth darkness. The wise man's eyes are in his head, and the fool walketh in darkness: and yet I perceive that one event happeneth to them all. Then said I in my heart, As it happeneth to the fool, so will it happen even to me; and why was I then more wise? Then I said in my heart, that this also was vanity. For of the wise man, even as of the fool, there is no remembrance forever; seeing that in the days to come all will have been already forgotten. And how doth the wise man die even as the fool? So I hated life; because the work that is wrought under the sun was grievous unto me: for all is vanity and a striving after wind." [12]

It is evident that he who expects the favor of fortune in return for his observance of precept is mistaken. The "work

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[9] Proverbs 18: 10.
[10] Proverbs 11: 19.
[11] Proverbs 21: 3.
[12] Ecclesiastes 2: 13 *sq.*

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that is wrought under the sun" makes no special provision for him during his life time. Unless the cry of vanity is to be the last word there must be a reinterpretation of the promise of God. This appears in the new ideal of patient submission, and the chastened faith that expects only the love of God. And those whom God loves he will not forsake. They will come to their own, if not here, then beyond, according to His inscrutable but unswerving plan.

"The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." [13]

"I dwell with him that is of a contrite and humble spirit." [14]

In this faith Judaism merges into Christianity.[15] In the whole course of this evolution God is regarded as the friend of his people, but his people learn to find a new significance in his friendship. That which is altered is the conduct which that friendship requires, and the expectation which it determines. The practical ideal which the relationship sanctions, changes gradually from that of prudence to that of goodness for its own sake. God, once an instrument relevant to human temporal welfare, has come to be an object of disinterested service.

No such transformation as this was absolutely realised during the period covered by the writings of the Old Testament, nor has it even yet been realised in the development of Christianity. But the evolution of both Judaism and Christianity has taken this direction. The criterion of this evolution is manifestly both ethical and metaphysical. A Christian avows that he rates purity of character above worldly prosperity, so that the former cannot properly be prized for the sake of the latter. Furthermore, he shares more or less unconsciously such philosophical and scientific opinions as deny truth to the conception of special interferences and dispensations from a supernatural agency. Therefore, he looks for no fire from heaven to consume his sacrifice. But his religion is neverthe-

[13] Psalms 51 : 17.

[14] Isaiah 57 : 15.

[15] In this discussion of Judaism I am much indebted to Matthew Arnold's "Literature and Dogma," especially Chapters 1 and 2.

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less a practical expectation. He believes that God is good, and that God loves him and sustains him. He believes that there obtains between himself, in so far as good, and the universe *sub specie eternitatis,* a real sympathy and reciprocal reinforcement. He believes that he secures through the profoundly potent forces of the universe that which he regards as of most worth; and that somewhat is added to these forces by virtue of his consecration. The God of the Christians cannot be defined short of some such account as this, inclusive of an ideal, an attitude, and an expectation. In other words the God of the Christians is to be known only in terms of the Christlike outlook upon life, in which the disciple is taught to emulate the master. When moral and intellectual development shall have discredited either its scale of values, or its conviction that cosmical events are determined in accordance with that scale of values, then Christianity must either be transformed, or be untenable for the wise man. If we have conceived the essence of Christianity too broadly or vaguely, it does not much matter for our present purposes. Its essence is, at any rate, some such inwardness of life resolving ideality and reality into one, and drawing upon objective truth only to the extent required for the confirming of that relation. And if Christianity be the same yesterday and to-day, whether dogmatic, mystical, evangelical, pietistic, ritualistic, or iconoclastic, it is on account of the perpetuation of something no less subtle theoretically nor less simple practically than an attitude. "J' affirme donc," says Sabatier, "non seulement que le christianisme a le Christ pour auteur, mais qu'il a, dans le vie interieure du Christ, son premier germe, et que la s'est faite tout d'abord la revelation divine qui, se repetant ensuite de proche en proche, a eclaire et vivifie toute l'humanite." [16]

We conclude, then, our attempt to emphasise the cognitive factor in religion, with the thesis that every religion centers in a practical secret of the universe. *To be religious is to believe that a certain correlation of forces, moral and factual, is in reality operative, and that it determines the propriety and*

[16] Auguste Sabatier: *Esquisse d'une philosophie de la religion.*

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effectiveness of a certain type of living. Whatever demonstrates the futility, vanity, or self-deception of this living, discredits the religion. And, per contra, except as it define or refute such practical truth, religion is not essentially concerned with judgments of truth.

But neither religion nor any other human interest consists in essentials. Such a practical conviction as that which has been defined inevitably flowers into a marvelous complexity, and taps for its nourishment every spontaneity of human nature. If it be said that only the practical conviction is essential, this is not the same as to say that all else is superfluous. There may be no single utterance that my religion could not have spared, and yet were I to be altogether dumb, my religion would, indeed, be as nothing. For if I believe, I accept a presence in my world, which as I live at all, will figure in my dreams, or in my thoughts, or in my habits. And each of these expressions of myself will have a truth if they do but bear out my practical acceptance of that presence. But the language of religion like that of daily life, is not the language of science except it take it upon itself to be so. There is scarcely a sentence which I utter in my daily intercourse with men which is not guilty of transgressions against the canons of accurate and definitive thinking. Yet if I deceive neither myself nor another, I am held to be truthful, even though my language deal with chance and accident, material purposes and spiritual causes, and though I vow that the sun smiles or the moon lets down her hair into the sea. Science is a special interest in the discovery of unequivocal and fixed conceptions, and employs its terms with an unalterable connotation. But no such algebra of thought is indispensable to life or conversation, and its lack is no proof of error.

Such is the case also with that eminently living affair religion. I may if I choose, and I will if my reasoning powers be at all awakened, be a theologian. But theology, like science, is a special intellectual spontaneity. St. Thomas the master-theologian did not glide unwittingly from prayer into the *quaestiones* of the *Summa Theologiae,* but turned to them as to a fresh adventure. Theology is inevitable, because humanly

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speaking adventure is inevitable. For man with his intellectual spontaneity, every object is a problem; and did he not seek sooner or later to define salvation, there would be good reason to believe that he did not practically reckon with any. But this is similarly and independently true of the imagination, the most familiar means with which man clothes and vivifies his convictons, the exuberance with which he plays about them and delights to confess them. The imagination of religion, contributing what Matthew Arnold called its "poetry and eloquence," does not submit itself to such canons as are binding upon theology or science, but exists and flourishes in its own right.

The indispensableness to religion of the imagination is due to that faculty's power of realizing what is not perceptually present. Religion is not interested in the apparent, but in the secret essence or the transcendent universal. And yet this interest is a practical one. Imagination may introduce one into the vivid presence of the secret or the transcendent. It is evident that the religious imagination here coincides with poetry. It is at least one of the interests of poetry to cultivate and satisfy a sense for the universal; to obtain an immediate experience or appreciation that shall have the vividness without the particularism of ordinary perception. This is mysticism, but not a mysticism that offers itself as a theoretical principle. It does not claim that its peculiar experience is superior in cognitive worth to discursive thinking; but deliberately elects to so view the world, whether for better or for worse so far as the interest of knowledge is concerned. And where as a poet he chooses to do so, we allow him as a poet the privilege, and judge him by the standards to which he submits himself. That upon which we pass judgment is the *fitness of his expression.* This expression is not, except in the case of the theoretical mystic, regarded as constituting the most valid form of the idea, but is appreciated expressly for its fulfilment of the condition of immediacy.

The same sort of critical attitude is in order with the fruits of the religious imagination. These may or may not fulfil enough of the requirements of that art to be properly de-

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nominated poetry; but like poetry they are the translation of ideas into a specific language. They must not, therefore, be judged as though they claimed to excel in point of validity, but only in point of consistency with the context of that language. And *the language of religion is the language of the practical life.* Such translation is as essential to an idea that is to enter into the religious experience, as translation into terms of immediacy is essential to an idea that is to enter into the appreciative consciousness of the poet. No object can find a place in my religion until it is conjoined with my purposes and hopes; until it is taken for granted and acted upon, like the love of my friends, or the courses of the stars, or the stretches of the sea. The religious imagination, then, is to be understood and justified as that which brings the objects of religion within the range of my living.

The central religious object, as has been seen, is an *attitude* of the residuum or totality of things. To be religious one must have a sense for the *presence of an attitude,* like his sense for the presence of his human fellows, with all the added appreciation that is proper in the case of an object so unique in its mystery or in its majesty.

The presence of one's fellows is in part the perceptual experience of their bodies. To this there corresponds in religion some extraordinary or subtle appearance. The gods may in visions or dreams be met with in their own proper embodiments; or, as is more common, they may be regarded as present for practical purposes: in some inanimate object, as in the case of the fetish; in some animal species, as in the case of the totem; in some place, as in the case of the shrine; or even in some human being, as in the case of the inspired prophet and miracle-worker. In more refined and highly developed religions the medium of God's presence is less specific. He is perceived with

> "—a sense sublime
> "Of something far more deeply interfused,
> "Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> "And the round ocean and the living air,
> "And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."

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God is here found in an interpretation of the common and the natural, rather than in any individual and peculiar embodiment. And here the poet's appreciation, if not his art, is peculiarly indispensable.

But, furthermore, his fellows are inmates of "the household of man" in that he knows their history. They belong to the context of actions and events. Similarly, the gods must be historical. The sacred traditions or books of religion are largely occupied with this history. The more individual and anthropomorphic the gods, the more local and episodic will be the account of their affairs. In the so-called higher religions the acts of God are few and momentous, such as creation or special providence; or they are identical with the events of nature and human history when these are *construed* as divine. To find God in this latter way requires an interpretation of the course of events in terms of some moral consistency, a faith that sees some purpose in their evident destination.

There is still another and a more significant way in which men recognise one another: the way of address and conversation. And men have invariably held a similar intercourse with their gods. To this category belong communion and prayer, with all their varieties of expression. I have no god until I address him. This will be the most direct evidence of what is at least from my point of view a social relation. There can be no general definition of the form which this address will take. There may be as many special languages, as many attitudes, and as much playfulness and subtlety of symbolism as in human intercourse. But, on the other hand, there are certain utterances that are peculiarly appropriate to religion. In so far as he regards his object as endowed with both power and goodness the worshipper will use the language of adoration; and the sense of his dependence will speak in terms of consecration and thanksgiving.

"O God, thou art my God; early will I seek thee:
"My soul thirsteth for thee, my flesh longeth for thee,
"In a dry and weary land, where no water is.
"So have I looked upon thee in the sanctuary,
"To see thy power and thy glory.

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"For thy loving kindness is better than life;
"My lips shall praise thee."

These are expressions of a hopeful faith; but, on the other hand, God may be addressed in terms of hatred and distrust. In either case there may be an indefinite degree of hyperbole. The language of love and hate, of confidence and despair, is not the language of description. In this strain of the religious consciousness there is occasion for whatever eloquence man can feel, and whatever rhetorical luxuriance he can utter.

Such considerations as these serve to account for the exercise and certain of the fruits of the religious imagination, and to designate the general criterion governing its propriety. But *how is one to determine the boundary between the imaginative and the cognitive?* It is commonly agreed that what religion says and does is not all intended literally. But when is expression of religion only poetry and eloquence, and when is it matter of conviction? If we revert again to the cognitive aspect of religion, it is evident that there is but one test to apply: *whatever either fortifies or misleads the will is conviction.* This test cannot be applied absolutely, because it can be properly applied only to the intention of an individual experience. However I may express my religion, that which I express, is, we have seen, an expectation. The degree to which I literally mean what I say is then the degree to which it determines my expectations. Whatever adds no item to these expectations, but only recognises and vitalises them, is pure imagination. But it follows that it is entirely impossible from its internal meaning to define any given *expression* of religious experience as myth, or to define the degree to which it is myth. It submits to such distinctions only when viewed from the standpoint of the concrete religious experience which it expresses. Any such given expression could easily be all imagination to one, and all conviction to another. Consider the passage which follows:

"And I saw the heaven opened; and behold, a white horse, and he that sat thereon, called Faithful and True; and in righteousness he doth judge and make war. And his eyes are a flame of fire, and upon his head are many diadems; and he hath a name written, which no one

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knoweth but he himself. And he is arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood; and his name is called The Word of God." [17]

Is this all rhapsody, or is it in part true report? There is evidently no answer to the question so conceived. But if it were to express my own religious feeling it would have some specific proportion of literal and metaphorical significance, according to the degree to which its detail contributes different practical values to me. It might be then my guide-book to the heavens, or only my testimony to the dignity and mystery of the function of Christ.

The development of religion bears in a very important way upon this last problem. The factor of imagination has undoubtedly come to have a more clearly recognized role in religion. There can be no doubt that what we now call myths were once beliefs, and that what we now call poetry was once history. If we go back sufficiently far we come to a time when the literal and the metaphorical were scarcely distinguishable, and this because science had not emerged from the early animistic extension of social relations. Men *meant* to address their gods as they addressed their fellows, and expected them to hear and respond, as they looked for such reactions within the narrower circle of ordinary intercourse. The advance of science has brought into vogue a description of nature that inhibits such expectations. The result has been that men, continuing to use the same terms, essentially expressive, as they are, of a practical relationship, have come to regard them as only a general expression of their attitude. The differences of content that are in excess of factors of expectation remain as poetry and myth. On the other hand, it is equally possible, if not equally common, for that which was once imagined to come to be believed. Such a transformation is, perhaps, normally the case when the inspired utterance passes from its author to the cult. The prophets and sweet singers are likely to possess an exuberance of imagination not appreciated by their followers; and for this reason almost certainly misunderstood. For these reasons it is manifestly absurd to fasten the name of

[17] Revelations.

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myth or the name of creed upon any religious utterance whatsoever, unless it be so regarded from the standpoint of the personal religion which it originally expressed, or unless one means by so doing to define it as an expression of his own religion. He who defines "the myth of creation" or "the poetical story of Samson" as parts of the pre-Christian Judaic religion, exhibits a total loss of historical sense. The distinction between cognition and fancy does not exist among objects, but only in the *intending* experience; hence, for me to attach my own distinction to any inidividual case of belief, viewed apart from the believer, is an utterly confusing projection of my own personality into the field of my study.

Only after such considerations as these are we qualified to attack that much-vexed question as to whether religion deals invariably with a personal god. This question is often treated as though "personal god" were, as well as "god," a definite conceptual entity with a generally recognized meaning, its existence alone being problematical. This is doubly false to the religious employment of such an object. If it be true that in religion we mean by God a practical interpretation of the world, *whatsoever be its nature,* then the personality of God must be a derivative of this attitude, and not the attribute of a metaphysical substance. Given the practical outlook upon life, there is no definable world that cannot be construed under the form of God. My god is my world practically recognized in respect of its fundamental or ultimate attitude to my ideals. In the sense, then, conveyed by this term *attitude* my will invariably possess the characters of personality. But the degree to which these characters will coincide with the characters which I assign to human persons, or the terms of any logical conception of personality, cannot be absolutely defined. Anthropomorphisms may be imagination, or they may be literal convictions. This will depend, as above maintained, upon the degree to which they determine my expectations. Suppose the world to be theoretically conceived as governed by laws that are indiffernt to all human interests. The practical expression of this conception appears in the naturalism of Lucretius, or Diogenes, or Omar Khayyam. Living in the vivid presence

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of an indifferent world, I may picture my gods as leading their own lives in some remote realm which is inaccessible to my petitions, or as regarding me with sinister and contemptuous cruelty. In the latter case I may shrink and cower, or return them contempt for contempt. I mean this literally only if I look for consequences following directly from the emotional coloring which I have bestowed upon them. It may well be that I mean merely to regard myself *sub specie eternitatis,* in which case I am *personifying* in the sense of free imagination. In the religion of enlightenment personality tends to belong to the poetry and eloquence of religion rather than to its cognitive intent. This is equally true of optimistic and idealistic religon. The love and providence of God have largely ceased to consist in the expectation of special and arbitrary favors, and have come more and more to mean the play of my own feeling about the general central conviction of the favorableness of the cosmos to my deeper or moral concerns. But the factor of personality cannot possibly be entirely eliminated, for the religious consciousness *creates* a social relationship between man and the universe. Such an interpretation of life is not a case of the pathetic fallacy, unless it incorrectly *reckons with* the inner feeling which it attributes to the universe. It is an obvious practical truth that the total or residual environment is significant for life. Grant this and you make rational a recognition of that significance, or a more or less constant sense of coincidence or conflict with cosmical forces. Permit this consciousness to stand, and you make some expression of it inevitable. Such an expression may, furthermore, with perfect propriety and in fulfilment of human nature, set forth and transfigure this central belief until it may enter into the context of immediacy.

Such considerations as these justify religion in general, even if its anthropomorphisms be regarded as inevitable. There is no religion, however, that does not virtually make a more definite claim upon the nature of things, and this entirely independently of its theology, or explicit attempt to define itself. Every religion, even in the very living of it, is naturalistic, or dualistic, or pluralistic, or optimistic, or idealistic, or pessim-

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istic. And there is in the realm of truth that which justifies or refutes these definite practical ways of construing the universe. But no historical religion is ever so vague even as this in its philosophical implications. Indeed, we shall always be brought eventually to the inner meaning of some individual religious experience, where no general criticism can be certainly valid.

There is, then, a place in religion for that which is not directly answerable to philosophical or scientific standards. But there is always, on the other hand, an element of hope which conceives the nature of the world, and means to be grounded in reality. In respect of that element, philosophy is indispensable to religion. The meaning of religion is, in fact, the central problem of philosophy. There is a virtue in religion like that which Emerson ascribes to poetry. "The poet is in the right attitude; he is believing; the philosopher, after some struggle, having only reasons for believing." But whatever may be said to the disparagement of its dialectic, philosophy is the justification of religion, and of religions. To it must be asssigned the task of so refining and criticising positive religion as to contribute to the perpetual establishment of true religion. And to philosophy, with religion, belongs the task of holding fast to the idea of the universe. There is no religion except before you begin, or after you have rested from your philosophical speculation. But in the universe they have a common object. As philosophy is the articulation and vindication of religion, so is religion the realisation of philosophy. In philosophy thought is brought up to the elevation of life, and in religion philsophy, as the sum of wisdom, enters into life.

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HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE.

I wish to state some reasons for thinking that the belief in human pre-existence is a more probable doctrine than any other form of the belief in immortality, and then to consider what would be the practical value of such immortality as it can promise us.

The most effective way of proving that the doctrine of pre-existence was more probable than other doctrines of immortality would be to prove directly that the doctrine of pre-existence was true. But it is, unfortunately, quite impracticable even to attempt this in a short paper. Few things, I think, would be more useful to the world than a comparatively simple demonstration of some doctrine of immortality. But such a demonstration, so far as I can see, is quite impossible. I do not see how it can be founded on anything short of a detailed and demonstrated theory of the relation of man to the Absolute. And such a theory can only come at the end of a complete system of metaphysics.

I must content myself with stating in a more general manner my grounds for believing that there is a much better chance of proving immortality with the addition of pre-existence than without it. There are two ways in which a proof of immortality may be attempted. The first is the directly metaphysical way. We may attempt to show that the nature of man is such that he cannot cease to exist while the universe continues to exist; or that his nature is eternal, and that an eternal nature cannot have an end in time; or pursue some similar line of thought.

In this case, as it seems to me, immortality would almost necessarily stand or fall with pre-existence. I do not see how existence in future time could be shown to be necessary in the case of any being whose existence in past time is admitted not to be necessary. If the universe got on without me a hundred years ago, what reason could be given for denying that it might get on without me a hundred years hence? Or if my eternal nature is compatible with its temporal manifestation having begun at some point of time,

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could we find any reason for supposing it to be inconsistent with that nature that its temporal manifestation should cease at some point in time?

I do not see of what nature such a reason could be. It is true that the significance of order in time as a manifestation of the eternal has been but little considered. Attention to it might show us that the future stood in a different position from the past in this respect, and that, in consequence, ending stood in a different position from beginning. But no one, I believe, has yet attempted to show this.

There is another way in which attempts have been made to prove immortality. This consists in first demonstrating that the universe is the work of a benevolent creator, or has a purpose harmonious with our ideals of morality, and then saying that the absence of immortality would be inconsistent with the benevolence of such a creator, or with such a moral purpose. With such an argument as this, unending future life is in a stronger position than pre-existence. No wrong can be done to the non-existent, and it could scarcely be held as a reproach to the goodness of the universe that it had waited a long time before it produced a particular person. But, once produced, any person has certain moral claims, and if it could be shown that his annihilation was inconsistent with those claims, we could argue from the goodness of the universe to the impossibility of his annihilation.

But arguments for the goodness of the universe to the impossibility of a particular evil are always very doubtful. For it cannot be denied that some evil does exist. The ultimate nature of reality, then, is not incompatible with the existence of some evil. And when this is once admitted, it seems impossible to give an *à priori* proof that any particular evil is too bad to be consistent with the nature of the universe. We may be able to prove that a particular evil is not real, but we cannot, as far as I can see, ever prove it from the fact that it is evil.

So we are forced back on the purely metaphysical argument, and here we seem able to make no distinction between past and future. My conclusion is, then, that any demon-

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stration of immortality is likely to show that each of us exists through all time—past as well as future—whether time be held to be finite or infinite.

There are some considerations which, to a certain extent, support such a view. They do not, indeed, give any reason for supposing that we have existed through all past time, but they do very strongly suggest that we existed before the formation of our present bodies.

In the first place, even the best men are not, when they die, in such a condition of intellectual and moral perfection as would fit them to enter heaven immediately—if heaven is to be taken as a state of perfection which renders all further improvement unnecessary and impossible. This fact is generally recognised, and one of two alternatives is commonly adopted to meet it. The first is that some tremendous improvement—an improvement out of all proportion to that which can ever be observed in life—is effected at the moment of death, at any rate in the case of those who die under certain conditions. For this there are, so far as I know, no arguments. The other more probable alternative is that the process of gradual improvement can go on in each of us after the death of our present bodies.

If we adopt this view, it seems to be only reasonable to take one more step, and to hold that this life will be followed by other lives like it, each separated from its predecessor and its successor by death and re-birth. For otherwise we should be limited to the hypothesis that a process begun in a single short earthly life—I use this expression for brevity to denote any life bounded by birth and death—should then be continued in one indefinitely long life, not divided by death and birth at all. And to suppose, without any reason, such a sudden change from the order of our present experience, seems unjustifiable.

Our lives, too, are not only incomplete in their results, but also very fragmentary in their nature. We continually find that a process is cut short by death—that a life holds a fault without a retribution, a preparation without an achievement, while in other cases, where the life has lasted longer,

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the process is complete between birth and death. Surely the more probable conclusion is that the process which is worked out in an earthly life in the one case, will be worked out in an earthly life in the other case, even though death has intervened. Such problems as these have never been put with more force than by Browning. Both in "Rabbi Ben Ezra" and in "Evelyn Hope" he adopts, at any rate for dramatic purposes, the hypothesis of a plurality of earthly lives.

Such arguments, indeed, only lead directly to a belief in our subsequent earthly lives, and not to a belief in pre-existence. But the two beliefs are very closely connected. For if a plurality of earthly lives is once granted, it would be gratuitous to suppose that this was the first of the long chain. And since even the lowest man is high above many living beings, there would be a strong reason for believing that it was in previous lives that we had gained this relative superiority.

But there are other considerations which are more important in themselves, and which bear more directly on the reality of previous earthly lives. As a man grows up certain tendencies and qualities make themselves manifest in him. They cannot be entirely due to his environment, for they are often very different in people whose environment has been very similar. We call these the man's natural character, and assume that he came into existence with it.

Now when we look at these differentiations, which we call the natural characters of men, we find that they have a very great resemblance to those differentiations which we learn by direct experience can be produced in the course of a single life. One man seems to start with an impotence to resist some particular temptation which exactly resembles the impotence which has been produced in another man by continual yielding to the same temptation. One man, again, has through life a calm and serene virtue which another gains only by years of strenuous effort. Others again have instinctive powers of judging nice and difficult questions of quality, in pictures, for example, or in wine, which place them, soon

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after they have turned their attention to the subject, in a position to which less fortunate men can attain, if at all, only by the experience of years.

A still more striking instance is to be found in personal relations. Two people who have seen but little of each other are often drawn together by a force equal to that which could be generated by years of mutual trust and mutual assistance. The significance of this fact has been, I think, very much underrated. As a rule, the only case of it which is considered is the case—by no means the only one—when the attraction is between people of different sexes, and the inexplicability is then rather hastily explained as due to the irrationality of sexual desire.

Here, then, we have characteristics which are born with us, which are not acquired in our present lives, and which are strikingly like characteristics which, in other cases, we know to be due to the condensed results of experience. Is it not probable that the innate characteristics are also due to the condensed results of experience—in this case, of experience in an earlier life?

I have now done all that the limits of my paper permit me to do in the way of proof. We must pass to a question which, though it ought not to be allowed to influence our beliefs, even to the smallest extent, is nevertheless of great importance. If pre-existence is true, is it desirable? How much, from the point of view of the interests of mankind, would such an immortality as this be worth?

The most serious objection relates to memory. We do not now remember anything of any previous life. If, nevertheless, we have lived previously, there seems no reason to expect that we shall be able to remember our present life during subsquent lives. Now an existence that is cut up into separate lives, in none of which can memory extend to a previous life, may be thought to have no practical value. We might as well be mortal, it may be maintained, as be immortal without a memory beyond the present life.

This objection is sometimes carried as far as the assertion that such a state of things would not be immortality at all.

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Without memory of my present life, it is said, my future life would not be mine. If memory ceases at the death of the body, I cease with it, and I am not immortal.

If each life had no continuity with its successors, and no effect on them, then indeed there would be little meaning, if any, in calling them lives of the same person. But we cannot suppose that this could be the case. If the same self passes through different lives, then any change which happens to it at any time must affect its state in the time immediately subsequent, and, through this, in all future time. Death and re-birth, no doubt, are of sufficient importance to modify a character considerably, but they could only work on what was already present, and the nature with which each individual starts in any life would be moulded by his experiences and actions in the past.

Moreover, any theory which found a place for individual immortality at all, would have, I think, to regard the universe as embodying an end, and would have to regard each immortal individual as forming part of that end. In that case, all the successive lives of each individual would have to be regarded as united by final causality. They would all be stages or factors in the realisation of one determining end. Such a process would form a unity which was more than nominal.

The further objection has been made that the re-birth of a self without a memory of its previous life would be exactly equivalent to the annihilation of itself and the creation of a new self of similar character. Now, it is argued, I should not regard myself as immortal, if I knew that I were to be annihilated at death, even if I knew that an exactly similar individual would then be created. And therefore, it is urged, re-birth without memory cannot be considered as real immortality of the self.

But the objection supposes an impossibility. There could not be another self of exactly similar character to me. For the self is not a Thing-in-Itself, whose existence is independent of its qualities. The self is a substance with attributes, and the self has no nature except to express itself in its

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attributes. If, therefore, the attributes were exactly the same, the substance also would be the same, and I should not be annihilated at all. But if there were a new self, the difference of self must be expressed by some difference in the attributes. Then the new self would not be exactly similar to me, and the parallel to re-birth would fail, since with re-birth there is no interruption whatever in the continuity of the attributes. Thus the continuity of the attributes is always sufficient to preserve personal identity, not because it would be sufficient if the substance changed, but because it proves that the substance remains unchanged.

But, granted that immortality would have some meaning without memory, the question would still arise whether it would have any value. Whatever be gained in one life must necessarily, it might be said, be left completely behind us in death, for death would not only remove us from the fields of our activity, but would deprive us of all memory of what we had done. We should have to start fresh in each life, and there could be no reason to hope that our future existence would on the whole be better and happier than our present existence.

Even if this were true, immortality might still be of some value. If we hold—and I think it would be the general view—that life on the whole, as we see it around us now, was worth living, then immortality would, I suppose, be judged good, since it would give us more of life. Nor need we, then, be so much influenced in our judgment of life by the unevenness with which good and evil are distributed in it, since there would be a possibility, at least, that the inequality would disappear when all the lives of each man are taken into account. But the chief reason, no doubt, of our desire for immortality is not that it will give us more life like this, but that it will give us a better life as time goes on. We can scarcely hope that it will do this unless we can carry something of value from the present to the future.

We are not discussing the value of immortality in itself, but only the relative value of that immortality which excludes persistence of memory. We must ask, therefore, what ele-

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ments of value are carried on by memory from the present to the future. And then we must consider whether they can be carried on without memory.

All questions of value are in the last resort questions of ultimate judgment as to which argument is impossible. But I think I shall be in agreement with most people when I say that memory is chiefly of value in our lives in three ways. In the first place, it may make us wiser. The events which we have seen, and the conclusions at which we have arrived, are preserved in memory, and add to our present knowledge. In the second place, it may make us morally better. The memory of a temptation, whether it has been resisted or successful, may under various circumstances help us in resisting present temptation. In the third place, it may tell us that people with whom we are now related are the people whom we loved in the past, and this may enter as an element into our present love of them.

The value of memory, then, is that by its means the past may serve the wisdom, the virtue, and the love of the present. If the past could help the present in a like manner without the aid of memory, the absence of memory need not remove the value from a succession of lives.

Let us consider wisdom first. Can we be wiser by reason of something which we have forgotten? Unquestionably we can. Wisdom is not merely, or chiefly, amassed facts, or even recorded judgments. It depends primarily on a mind competent to deal with facts, and to form judgments. Now the acquisition of knowledge and experience, if wisely conducted, may strengthen the mind. Of that we have sufficient evidence in this life. And so a man who dies after acquiring knowledge—and all men acquire some—might enter his new life, deprived, indeed, of his knowledge, but not deprived of the increased strength and delicacy of mind which he had gained in acquiring the knowlege. And, if so, he will be wiser in the second life, because of what has happened in the first. Progress, therefore, has not perished with memory.

Of course, in losing the actual knowledge he loses something. But it is sufficient if he does not lose all. Most

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progress is like the advance of a tide, whose waves advance and retreat, but do not retreat as far as they advanced. And is not even this loss a gain in disguise? For the mere accumulation of knowledge, if memory never ceased, would soon become overwhelming and worse than useless. What better fate could we wish for than to leave such accumulations behind us, preserving their greatest value in the mental faculties which have been strengthened by their acquisition?

So, again, with virtue. And here the point is perhaps clearer. For it is obvious that the memory of moral vicissitudes is of no moral value except in so far as it helps to form the moral character, and that, if this is done, the memory could be discarded without loss. Now we cannot doubt that a character may remain determined by an event which has been forgotten. I have forgotten the greater number of the good and evil acts which I have done in this life. And yet each must have left a trace on my character. And so, if a man carries over into his next life the dispositions and tendencies which he has gained by the moral contests of this life, the value of those contests has not been destroyed by the death which has destroyed the memory of them.

There remains love. And here the problem is, I admit, more difficult. Firstly, because it is more important, for it is here, and not in wisdom or virtue, that I think we find, not only the supreme value of life, but also the sole reality of life, and, indeed, of the universe. And then particular loves do not submit to be taken as means, in the same way as particular cases of cognition or volition do. To forget an act of past virtue does not diminish virtue, and here, as we have seen, the loss of memory may cause no evil at all. To forget a truth does diminish wisdom, and here the loss of memory does mean an evil, but an evil which may be more than compensated by future gains—gains to which that loss may be, as we have seen, a necessary means. With love it is different. Love lost for one person can never be replaced by love felt for some one else. Every man is individual and unique, and so is the love which one man feels for another. And it is in this uniqueness—and not in any common quality

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—that the value lies. I may well be consoled for forgetting in death all the truths I have known, if I believe that in my next life I shall learn others, and be better fitted to learn them. But if I am to lose the friend I have now, I shall not be consoled by the belief that I shall find fresh friends. It would be better to look forward to annihilation for both of us, than to be forced into a view which would add squalor to misery.

But if we look further we shall find, I think, that what is uniquely valuable is the relation to each particular person, and not the particular acts and feelings in which that relation is expressed. The latter, indeed, are not durable under any circumstances. Like all other events, they are continually passing away. Nor do we, I think, attach any unique value to the remembrance of them after they have passed away. Much has been forgotten in any friendship which has lasted for several years within the limits of a single life—many confidences, many services, many hours of happiness. But we do not feel that they have been lost, and that we are no better off than if they had never happened; for we know that, though they have passed out of consciousness, they have contributed to form and strengthen the living relation of the present, which is in consciousness.

We shall, if my theory is right, have many lives, perhaps many millions of lives. In each of these lives we shall meet many people, in most of them—to judge from experience—we shall love several people. Now, if the fact that I loved a person in this life gave me no reason to suppose that I should love him in any other, then the whole significance of love would be as much confined to a single life as if there were no immortality. And in that case it might, perhaps, be said that the significance of life was equally confined, and that immortality, though real, was worthless.

The chance of two people loving one another in any future life, who have loved one another in the past, must depend primarily on the conditions which determine where and how they are born in the future life. For people cannot love one another in any life unless they have met in that life. If the

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conditions which determine the circumstances of birth, and through them the juxtapositions throughout life, were themselves determined by chance, or by some merely mechanical law of necessity, the probability of meeting our friends in another life must be too small to be regarded.

But such a view of the conditions would be quite unjustifiable. If we were to hold that the world was determined by mere chance, or by mechanical necessity, we should have no reason for believing in immortality at all. For neither Scepticism nor Materialism leaves any room for immortality. It can only be defended on the basis of Idealism.

If we are immortal, then, it must involve that Spirit is the dominant reality of the universe. And, if so, all that is significant and important for Spirit is significant and important for the universe. I will not here inquire whether anything has ultimate significance for Spirit except love. But it will scarcely be denied—least of all by those who feel the difficulties which I am now considering—that the significance of love for Spirit is very great. And, if this is so, then the emotional relations which exist between people must be highly significant of their real positions towards one another in the scheme of the universe.

In other words, people who love one another cannot be dependent for their proximity to each other—and consequently for the possibility of their love—on some chance or mechanical arrangement whose recurrence we could have no reason to expect. Their love is not the effect of proximity, but its cause. For their love is the expression of the ultimate fact that each of them is more closely connected with the other than he is with people in general. And proximity in a particular life, like everything else, is the effect—or, rather, the manifestation under particular circumstances—of those relations which make up the eternal nature of the universe.

If, therefore, two people love one another in this life, we have, on the assumption that they are immortal, good reason for believing that their lives are bound up with one another, not for one life only, but for ever. This would not involve their meeting in every life, any more than it would involve

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that they should meet every day of each life. Love can survive occasional absences, and is often even stronger for them. And the universe is on a large scale, and might admit or require long absences. What we are entitled to believe is that, while time remains, their eternal nearness must continually find its temporal expression in proximity.

And, if friends are not to be separated, then certainly the love of one life is not wasted because there is no memory of it in the next. If by means of it we make our relations—speaking *sub specie temporis*—stronger and finer, then they will be stronger and finer at the next meeting. What more do we want? The past is not preserved separately in memory, but it exists, concentrated and united, in the present. Death is thus the most perfect example of the "collapse into immediacy"—that mysterious phrase of Hegel's—where all that was before a mass of hard-won acquisitions has been merged in the unity of a developed character. If we still think that the past is lost, let us ask ourselves, as I suggested before, whether we regard as lost all those incidents in a friendship which, even before death, are forgotten.

I do not deny that in each particular life the prospect of the loss of memory at the end of it will *appear* to some extent a loss and a breach of continuity. In losing memory we lose that in which we have found great value. Arguments may convince us—as I have said, I think that they ought to convince us—that we do not lose all the value, or any of the highest value, but only the comparatively worthless form, a form which the lapse of years would change to a positive evil. But no doubt we shall always have a tendency to shrink from the loss of memory. Yet I believe that, as we come to understand life better, we shall shrink from it less and less.

If what I have said be true, we may, perhaps, fairly conclude that the value of immortality would not be lessened by the truth of pre-existence. For the loss of memory that it renders probable is, I think, the only ground on which the value of such immortality has been seriously questioned.

It is true that the prospect of a great number of lives—perhaps an infinite number, though this is not a necessary

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part of the theory—gives us the prospect of many dangers, many conflicts, many griefs, in an indefinite future. Death is not a haven of rest. It is a starting point for fresh labours. But if the evils are extended, so also is the recompense. All the good that our folly has missed in this life, all the good from which we have been debarred by circumstances, or which we had to sacrifice when a choice between incompatible goods became necessary—for all of it we shall have another chance. And for our failures and sins there will be another chance—a chance not only of pardon, but of trying again. The conflict between good and evil in the self is never on equal ground, for the good satisfies more and more, the evil less and less, as they become better known. And so either success or failure in this life may start us in the next better fitted to succeed.

The way is long, but it can be no more wearisome than a single life can be. For with death we leave behind us memory, and old age, and fatigue. And surely death acquires a new and deeper significance when we regard it no longer as a single and unexplained break in an unending life, but as part of the continually recurring rhythm of progress—as inevitable, as natural, and as benevolent as sleep. We have only left youth behind us as we have left, this evening, the sunrise. They will both come back, and they do not grow old.

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A JAPANESE VIEW OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONISM.

Kipling, in his *Kim,* has told of "the wheel." Now the cycle of the wheel is from the fixed to the frenzied. Only in the middle poise does the part live the whole. Planets, nations, men, alternate between torpor and fury. The sun is flame; the moon is flint; the earth is now one, now the other. Only in infinitesimal islands do the heavens afford men; only in fitful moments do men attain reason. Apparently the most difficult of all cosmic feats is to balance on two legs comprehendingly. Only the perfect soul is forever poised and fully lives. To seek this *pulse* and *poise* is the only natural right of man.

Earth has nowhere yet reached this perfection; this perpetual union of comprehending and living; this sane union of religion and politics. China is, in both, asleep. In religion, if we credit Professor James's evidence, Christendom itself is still between the throes of crass and of effervescent extremes; he has combed history for "varieties of religious experience," and finds only catalepsy and hysteria, stoicism and ecstasy; the religion and enthusiasm of wholesome everyday sanity is not mentioned in his pages. The anti-imperialist finds the politics of Christendom less wholesome than its religion.

Nevertheless, there is here a sounder religion and politics than ever on earth before; a spirit that will make even of the smoke of chimneys a wholesome and worshiping incense. The earth turns on a celestial axis forward—even China—and while in darkness men see it not. Strangely it is midnight in the East and morning in the West, yet because of this morning *somewhere,* the whole world steadies to a fuller dawn; the example of America spreads refulgent across the Pacific.

The recent coal strike momentously examples America's yet partially hysterical cosmology. For a day it fumed with the crude fury of a sun spot. Nevertheless, its electric storm-center swirled deeper into the natural rights of man than ever in history; and he who best gauges its abiding illumination within the minds of men, best gauges present civilisation; he who best fixes it there, most helps mankind.

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Fundamental rights are those concerned—the soul and structure of the day:

"We have the *right* to stand for a living wage! to deny this is to crush mankind!"

"*We* have the right to hire whom we can! to deny this is to crush industry!"

"We have the right to work where we can! to deny this is to crush liberty!"

"We have the right to sell for what we can get! to deny this is to crush trade!"

"We the people have the right to the coal! to deny this is to stultify the purpose of all government!"

Yet, under present conditions, not one of these rights can be unreservedly realised and any other one of them survive. The fingers of each, in the world's circling chain-gang, has the throat of the next in death-grip; one clutches and all strangle. Thus stand the respective hordes over the abyss of inaction (industries' hell) like fighting brutes; each paralysed by the common danger and stumped for his next aggression. Not *all* thus! In no weak measure is the simile as unjust as it is repulsive; and the most substantial evidence of Western civilisation is that, behind the snapping and snarling of those actually bitten in the fray, the bone and sinew of its people are soberly studying how the intricacies of the situation may be intelligently mastered.

The core of these industrial flames may be cooled and resolved by considering the nature of "rights" in general. And to make the study telling, let us examine what at first sight appears to be the most impressive and invincible statement called forth by the coal strike episode; that in which the report of its commission may be said to culminate:

> "Our language is the language of a free people, and fails to furnish any form of speech by which the right of a citizen to work when he pleases, for whom he pleases, and on what terms he pleases can be successfully denied. . . . This seems all too plain for argument. Common sense and common law alike denounce the conduct of those who interfere with this fundamental right of the citizen."

The misfortune of these eloquent words is, as Augustine

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Birrell says of the arguments that Milton put into the mouth of his Almighty, "the common intelligence of to-day refutes them"; or, as has been said of Burke's letter on deep-ploughing, "it is magnificent, but is not farming." In Patrick Henry's day, when the problem was to fight together rather than to live together, these would have been ringing phrases. But in modern industrial economy they are fusty; they are neither true in fact nor in principle; they illumine nothing and obscure everything; they are nocuous rather than stabilitate. When this is everywhere understood, the strike problem will be half solved.

No man in America can legally work when he pleases. He cannot work on Sunday. No child can work more than a restricted number of hours a day; nor without certain weeks of schooling. In the federal service no man may work longer than eight hours a day, save exceptionally. Everywhere laws dictate hours and holidays in ways that establish both the fact and the principle that no man has any "fundamental right" to work save when common welfare prescribes; none to pull in earth's harness in any way that balks the most perfect action of the team. The strike-breaker has rights that I will presently define. But the notion, that he or any man has a right to work when he pleases and with which "no law may interfere," is as crude as the other notion, ballooning the heads of some labor organizations, that they have a right to work *only* when they please. Hurled from the teeth, both these "rights" are blind and inflammatory. If general welfare may set hours and holidays, it has the same "fundamental right" and duty to set all the occasions when men shall not work *and when they shall work*. The future is likely to furnish as many occasions when this principle must be enforced in the one way as in the other. Yet it cannot be enforced either way, unless it be established as a general principle working both ways.

Nor may any American work for *whom* he pleases. No man may sell himself into slavery, whether he will or not. No man may practice law, nor medicine, nor peddle in the street, nor work under unsanitary conditions, nor in New York be a barber, save under prescribed conditions, either for whom he

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pleases nor for one who may please to have him. The laws are full of these restrictions on man from working for any of the powers of ignorance or of evil. And soon he may work as little for the powers of confusion and of strife.

Nor may any man *hire whom he can:* he cannot bring an alien to this country under contract; he cannot bring a Chinaman at all.

Not one of these things can be reconciled with the pretended right of a citizen "to work when he pleases, for whom he pleases, or on what terms he pleases." On the contrary they declare that man shall work for wisdom alone, when she pleases, and on what terms she pleases—in short, for common welfare.

Here we swing back into "torpor" and commonplace, unless we "poise" this maxim till it clear the atmosphere of blinding chaff and irritating fume.

The secret is that originally and under their enacting conditions each one of these rights expressed some common welfare. These conditions have changed. The people do not comprehend this. Therefore they contend for these "rights" after they have become evils.

Originally the tadpole enjoyed a tail and had a right to it. And the judge on his bench, who now profoundly proclaims "the native and inalienable right of a man to work when he pleases" commits a scarcely less ludicrous anachronism than would a bullfrog, on his bog, maintaining the right of his fellows still to exercise their "native and constitutional appendages." In 1776 employment was simple. To-day it is complicated. The anatomy of a man's right to work at all has been as profoundly changed as that of the tadpole—and much in the same fashion.

Before saying more about "the right to work" it will be instructive to note the metmorphosis of certain other rights. The feudal lord owned all the land; no smaller holding could maintain itself in those marauding times. With peace came private ownership in perpetual entail; having sloughed brigandage, the earth was gripped in permanent inheritance. In England, to-day, only crown lands can be so entailed. In



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America, a man's will cannot control land beyond two generations. In cities, the laws are now full of building restrictions; the rights of all more and more enrich the rights of each. In certain parts of Boston a man may not build higher than ninety feet; this is æsthetic evolution. In Germany a man may not build a "spite fence"; this is moral evolution. In Ireland an owner may not set the rental on his own property; this is fundamental revolution, and regarding it the Lord High Chancellor declares that it "revolutionises the legal conception of the right of private ownership throughout Great Britain." According to this enlightened conception private ownership has no rights save such as subserve general welfare. Not that the abstract principle of private rights as subservient to general welfare has in reality been at all changed, but the conditions of general welfare have been revolutionised, and therefore the conditions of individual welfare. So long as conditions were simple private ownership was simple. Now that general welfare is very complicated private ownership is enhanced by greater and greater subservience to the new conditions of general welfare. Nor does privacy dwell less sequestered when greater bounty covers the whole land.

Next as to the rights of trade. Recently they burst to attention, through this same coal strike, with a flame that for a moment dazed the continent. It flared from the empty grate with more than solar fury. It lashed the sky, roaring, "Roast the Trusts!" The politicians lighted the auto-da-fe, with joyful expectancy of its campaigning utility. The Sherman Act furnished the pyre. The Northern Securities decision was the heralded celebration. The devil was at last scorched; the country saved.

No shock ever more suddenly brought civilisation to realise its transformed anatomy. In pronouncing judgment the Court prophetically tempered its severity. Within a night it was widely appreciated that the principle of merger has become so ingrained into the working structure of every industry, that to persue the threatened policy consistently would disrupt the established warp and woof of the land; that by blindly reveng-

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ing the transitory evils of merger America would but cripple its might and foul its splendor.

This she will not do. Already she is comprehending, already is conscious, that nature is in deeper "conspiracy" than man. She has quit croaking about her tadpole "rights of trade" and set to discovering how her myriad-footed metamorphosis may be exercised in feats of harmonious performance. Merger is no longer dreaded. This change of public front was slow in maturing, quick in crystalising, and is perceived to be accomplished by those who observe.

The Titans are astir. Their thunder is for "rights." If welfare result, depends on whether or not the sons of Uranus have yet evolved into men, men capable of self-government—of that team-work of heaven whence spring all "rights." The "poise" of calm comprehension is its secret. When not comprehended rights soon become again forces of chaos: grievances that crowd to mælstroms of strife; class-passions that corrode and cause subterraneous eruptions; fake enthusiasms that rush to engulfing quicksands. But let it be understood that every right springs from some definite condition; that no right outlives its condition; that every right of industry has been transformed, in the gigantic growth of the times, beyond the power of any one man to comprehend it; that under these vastly changed conditions there can no longer be talk of the customary rights of any man, but only of what is now right for all; let the people of America now show that they comprehend this and are capable of patiently, wisely debating all phases of these new circumstances upon the simple principle of honor and good-faith, and it will inded be proven that in this land prosperity establishes her richest ideal and time his fullest stature of men.

Not rights but what is right is the sole question. This maxim alone will not settle any problems; but it will banish false issues and concentrate attention on real ones. Let us apply it to pressing cases.

One of these concerns the right of labor organisations to dictate terms and wages. This involves the counter right of employers to hire whom they can on their own terms. Both

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are impregnably entrenched in law. The circumstances however are these: under unrestrained competition wages inevitably trend to a starvation minimum. In proportion as employment becomes concentrated in the hands of a few this trend becomes dangerous. The organization of labor to resist it is the only possible remedy, and is absolutely essential against the degradation of mankind. Moreover it *will* organize to this end; and to recognize the *just* demands of such organization is equally indispensable to all future peace and prosperity. Recent occurrences have brought this home to the public so conclusively that hereafter it can scarcely be a matter of debate. Recognition of the unions is right, if their demands are right; right is paramount to the legal rights of any one; and the sole question now is: Are the demands and aims of the unions right?

I have said that if this maxim be accepted the real issues will appear. Let us examine some of these.

Labor organizations are among the giant forces of the times. They have come to stay. They will become more and more dominant. They are subject to human frailties as well as to reason. Already they betray tendencies only one remove less dangerous than those the unions would surmount; and these tendencies should be brought to the forefront of public recognition and debate for correction, rather than let them develop and fester while public attention is vehemently directed to false issues.

Most of these dangerous tendencies spring from real difficulties that are not easily surmounted without the hearty cooperation of employers; and they have some excuse so long as the entire efforts of the unions must be spent in fighting for their bare existence. But let this fighting cease, and let the employers and the public come forward with hearty good faith not only to remedy these evils but honorably to adjust those difficulties to which they are incident, and both objects will speedily find their accomplishment.

Let me instance some of these evils and the conditions under which they originate and thrive. At this moment a union is being formed among the janitors of Chicago. Under its rules

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no one of them is to be permitted to case a door, mend a window cord, set a pane of glass, file a key, lay a stroke of paint, fix a stop-cock, clean a trap, or do any other small job that infringes on any one of "the trades." If a landlord calls a regular workman to do any of these jobs, rules are already prescribed by each particular union. A plumber must bring his assistant if it be only to solder a leak in a pipe. A mason must have a hodcarrier if it is only to carry two bricks to the roof. Trade rules are full of these tyrannies against economy and common sense. Yet they have had a certain and perhaps justifiable excuse. So long as these unions were forced to fight for their existence and recognition they were compelled to resort to every possible legal weapon of warfare. Continue to deny the unions what is right and this method of warfare with its wrongs will continue.

Let the employers and public opinion once lift the problem to the level of honor and justice and the unions themselves will be forced to the same high plane. No such silly tyrannies ever did or ever can continue in face of a public opinion that is resolved to have justice done equally and alike for all.

Again certain trade rules restrict the amount that a clever workman shall do in a day, and stipulate equal pay for good and bad workmen alike. This makes for depravity among the workmen, for deterioration of their spirit and skill, for disorganisation of good business management, against the supremacy of American industries, and against the welfare of all successful men of fortune. Yet it has its explanation with the other tyrannical rules—and the same remedy. These organisations are composed of men like other men. Continue to fight them, either blindly or unscrupulously, and these evils will continue. Recognise the unions, encourage their manhood, raise their issues to the plane of intelligent and fair debate, and the unions will respond on the same plane. There never was a body of intelligent men able to withstand continuously the invitation of public opinion to deal with them on the highest terms of manhood and honor—least of all, any body of Americans such as these unions comprise.

Another issue obscured under the blind frenzy about

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"rights" is that regarding wages. Next to the establishment of their organization, the increase of wages has occupied the chief efforts of the unions. Yet, upon careful consideration, it is evident that this is a misdirected effort that works for the laboring man more harm than good. If wages rise the cost of living rises accordingly. It does not lie in the power of labor unions to prevent this. Some particular trade gets a temporary advantage which all the other trades pay for. And in the end the capitalist reaps the sole advantage; and reaps it for three reasons: first, because he always adds the same old percentage of profits to the new scale of wages; second, because every general increase of wages is slow and difficult of accomplishment, while the price of goods is easily and instantly increased; therefore, in every seesaw between wages and price the laboring purchaser always gets the worst of it; and, third, the constant change of wages and price creates a risk and uncertainty to business which capital always makes the laboring purchaser pay for. It is true that, in America, wages are higher in proportion to cost of living than in any other land, and higher now than fifty years ago. But the unions make a vast mistake if they credit this to their efforts to *raise* wages. Rather it is due to America's increased standard of living. In so far as the efforts of the unions have prevented wages from *falling* they have conduced to this increase in the standard of living. Yet this should not obscure the fact that this standard is chiefly due to the general advance of civilisation and industrial prosperity in a new and free country; that this prosperity will be greatest when its business conditions are both most just and most stabler; that increase of *daily* wages does not and cannot secure the end the unions have in view, but works with full force directly against it—unsettles business and chiefly harms the workman whose wages change less quickly than the price of goods.

One of the most serious faults of unionism at present is, that each trade thinks only of having *its* wages raised. This cannot be remedied until a federation of unions be formed having a common purpose for all. The sound purpose of all the unions should be to reduce the share that goes to private capital. This

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can be accomplished only in one of two ways: in reducing its percentage of the profits, or in transforming private capital into public ownership. Every share of watered stock on which the laboring man must earn an unjust dividend is just so much money cheated from his wages. It may safely be said that, for the present, the chief efforts of the unions should be directed to the correction of this most gigantic of American evils; and in this task the unions will have the whole force of public opinion with them. But even here they must act carefully and wisely. For so long as the conduct of industry is in the hands of private capital, it must be granted a fair and stimulating profit.

No great permanent good can come to the unions in the future unless they have a common object. Public ownership, wisely and honestly administered, undoubtedly is the sole condition under which the profits of labor can be wholly secured to labor. But here there are two obstacles: the intelligence of the laboring man, and the lack of common, everyday honesty everywhere. Not that the amount of intelligence required of the average man for public ownership is very great. All that is required of him is enough to see that public ownership and his welfare are impossible so long as the enthusiasm of the mass of laboring men for honest administration is not sufficiently strong to enforce it. The power to secure their welfare is in their hands alone. Let the unions rise in their might for honesty everywhere, and against dishonesty anywhere—in the unions and out of them—let them make this the one main issue and the intelligence of the world will be at their service in securing and administering public ownership, and they will accomplish more than by a thousand years of manouverings for a deceptive rise of wages.

Next, in order of effort, the unions have endeavored to secure shorter hours of labor. Yet how much wiser it would be to contend for shorter *years* of labor. Forty-eight hours a week, certainly are few enough for any able-bodied and thrifty man to work. Rather than to shorten these the unions should aim to have their old men retired on a pension, and their children given more years of education and training, and the best

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that earth can afford. This, continued from generation to generation, can alone raise the laboring man to such intelligence and equality as mankind is capable of, and give him that qualification for self-government, for economic independence, and for looking after his own welfare, upon which his prosperity must ever depend. Not shorter hours but shorter years of service for the great body of workingmen who constitute the main army of life; a perfected youth, a vigorous manhood, an enjoyed old age, this indicates the proper method of curtailing the over-production of machinery and of securing its advantages through equality of opportunity for the uplifting of all.

An actual incident may now bring this lesson in natural rights to forceful application. At the height of the strike frenzy, and at the moment when blood and devastation were very imminent, quite a number of well-intending people proclaimed the scab a hero. Plainly these people thought, in a narrow way, of the legal right involved, and gave but little consideration to what was morally right under the actual situation. The unions demanded recognition and arbitration. The coal powers refused both, with the avowed purpose of breaking the strength of the unions. As to recognition, the unions, under present conditions of competition, are indispensable—as much so to general welfare as to the laboring classes—and since their efficiency depends on recognition, their recognition is right. As to arbitration, the legal right of both parties not to yield was perfect, there was no legal means for resolving the deadlock, the whole land was in dire distress—arbitration was the only possible way of relief. Under such conditions for any citizen to fail to support the demand for arbitration by every moral influence in his power indicates either a deeply perverted moral sense or the lack of any at all.

But if so, how about the scab as a hero? Since the unions are indispensable to general welfare, every workman ought to join his proper union as part of his civic duty. He should do all in his power to make its deliberations sober and wise; all in his power to raise unionism to that high plane that can be and must be the bulwark of mankind. To fail to do this is as shameful as to fail in any other great and momentous civic

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duty. Should his union vote a wrong he should do what is right. Should it vote an unjust strike he should stand by his employer and job; and here he would rightly be a hero. Should it vote a just strike, he should stand by it to the last extremity; to do less would make him a traitor to his fellows, to his duty and to his manhood. For the non-union man there should be little sympathy. If the unions are bad he should join and make them good.

The unions must be recognised and elevated. The full force of public opinion must be brought to bear upon this and upon every subsequent issue according to its merits—according to what is right. Since arbitration is the sole solution of a legal deadlock, willingness to arbitrate must be made the first criterion in every case. Violence must be suppressed, if need be with the whole federal army. Yet as to violence it must be confessed that the unions stand on a higher plane than does average public opinion. It is now undeniable that the unions as unions inculcate restraint and obedience to law, in season and out of season, as the most vital principle of their success. They have learned this lesson well. And could public opinion but sympathetically appreciate how difficult it is to hold the sort of men which the labor leaders have to control up to this principle, when stung by gross injustice, they would make the air ring with approval at every effort to this end. Frank acknowledgment by public opinion that this *is* now the honest effort of the unions, and enthusiastic applause for it will do more than the entire American army ever can do. It will make these vast hordes feel that they are men, are men of honor and to be recognised and treated on this high plane.

So, also, regarding the union tyrannies, rules, and debasing evils of which I have spoken. The greatest crisis in history now approaches. Its two gravest dangers are: on the one hand, that the unions may now defeat their end by tyranny and folly, as formerly they did by violence; on the other hand, that the so-called upper classes remain blind to the vast changes of the times and to the need of encouraging the sense of honor and of manhood in all classes, themselves included. It is natural for those who feel first to think first. To an un-

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prejudiced observer it is indubitably apparent that the working classes, as represented by their unions, are comprehending the problems of the day in advance of their more comfortably conditioned brothers. It is the highest possible evidence of the exalted stature of American civilisation that this should be so, and that the unions are found ringing strong and true against all violence. No one witnessing this can doubt for a moment that with the fight for recognition ended, the unions will rise to complete the claim that they most truly represent America's greatness, by now transcending the tyranny of their power as they have already transcended its violence. On the other hand, no one can as little doubt that the upper classes, whom the prick of circumstance has awakened more slowly, will not prove less men than their fellows.

In sinking all questions of natural rights to sober consideration of what is right; in generating a universal sentiment for honesty, poise, and sterling worth, a sentiment that shall crown these above all other distinctions, that shall put an end to all dishonesty, insincerity, avarice, gilded pretence or aught else that tarnishes, discourages, or obscures the highest human excellence—in accomplishing this lies America's supreme opportunity. Her past warrants that she will fulfill this destiny.

HOITO ITO.

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ENGLISH PRISONS AND THEIR METHODS.

Some little time back there appeared in a popular English magazine an article on "Some French Prisons," by the Governor of one of H. M. Convict Prisons. In the course of the article the writer remarked: "The necessary difficulty which exists in obtaining access to a prison (except as a malefactor) will account for the feeling of awe, tempered by curiosity, with which such institutions are regarded by the general public. It is seldom that that feeling is aroused into anything approaching animation. On occasions, however, when the administration of English prisons is criticised, whether by well-meaning philanthropists or by men who have had personal though enforced experience of its arrangements, a certain amount of active interest is aroused."

I am not a philanthropist—a "well-meaning philanthropist" is, I may observe, a tautological absurdity. I happen to be one of the other class of persons alluded to by the writer of the article in question—a man who has had "personal though enforced experience" of English prison administration, and who, in the course of that experience, has formed opinions and come to conclusions with regard thereto. I believe, despite the writer's remarks, that the public is largely and keenly interested in prison administration, and that its interest therein would be even more animated than it is were it enabled to arrive at any satisfactory opinion in respect to the same. The public is unfortunately bewildered by conflicting statements on this important matter. On the one hand it is assured by prison officials that the English prison system is as nearly perfect as anything can be in this imperfect world. On the other hand, the occasional prisoner whose statements on the subject from time to time find their way into print portrays English prisons as veritable Infernos. What is the public to believe? How can it arrive at any correct conclusions on this important matter?

I do not, of course, propose to deal with the details of French prison administration given by the writer of the article already referred to. I am only concerned with one

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point in the article, viz.: the conclusions of the writer that "we have nothing to learn" from other countries in the matter of prison administration and that "it is very doubtful if the present system could be improved." What is the present English system and what is the result of it? Some writers in the press assert that the present system is a coddling one and "Coddled Criminals" has more than once done duty in print as a headline for a purely imaginary depicture of English prison life. The enticing alliteration rather than the facts beneath it probably was the cause of the particular headline in question, but it is quite certain that a large number of people really do believe that an English convict prison is far from being an uncomfortable place. Some little time back I read an article which was published in a popular London magazine purporting to be a veracious account of life within the walls of a convict prison of which I had had that "personal experience" already referred to. Any reader of the article in question would certainly have had no hesitation in returning a very decided answer in the affirmative to any inquiry in respect to criminals being "coddled." The picture drawn by the writer of the article was most decidedly a pleasing one, but it possessed one grave defect, it was absolutely idealistic. The premises upon which the readers of the article doubtless jumped to the conclusion that criminals were coddled were absolutely false. Nevertheless, as many persons still labor under that delusion, it seems to be advisable to undeceive them. I certainly possess one qualification in which the writer of the aforesaid article and the writers of similar articles were deficient. I have, as I have, said, had practical experience of penal servitude, and, accordingly, am not dependent for my facts on information derived from prison officials or from a superficial and imperfect study of prison life from the outside. I am about to treat of matters within my personal knowledge, and I shall, I imagine, have no difficulty in showing that a very decided negative should be given to this question of coddling. Before I deal with the matter on its merits I think it right to say that my remarks must not be taken as, since they are not intended to be, an attack on English prison officials as a body.

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Many of them, I feel sure, are most excellent men performing highly distasteful though necessary duties. They are bound to carry out the prison regulations, and they have no dispensing power with regard thereto. For the most part, therefore, my attack will be levelled against the system and not the administrators of it. At the same time there are, I think, comparatively few men who are capable of being entrusted with the great power over their fellow-creatures possessed by prison officials. Many of them are devotees of the system as it exists and either cannot see or, if they see, will not admit that it is capable of improvement. The result is precisely what might be expected. Prison officials become more or less a caste and regard the prisoner from that standpoint. This is the inevitable result of all cast-iron systems, all disciplinary services, when publicity and effective criticism are practically wanting as checks upon them. I think it right to say that I make no charge against the writer of the article before referred to, or against writers of similar articles. He and they no doubt wrote in perfectly good faith, but they were largely dependent for their facts on information received from prison officials, and they were not afforded any opportunity of viewing what I may term the seamy side of prison life. Their description thereof was, accordingly, precisely what might have been expected, not a veracious account, but simply a caricature.

I am not aware what may be the precise meaning the word "coddled" conveys to the ordinary reader. As I have said the alliteration rather than the exact signification of the term has led to its use in connection with criminals. But if "coddled" be taken to mean that the criminal undergoing sentence is pampered and lives in comfort, not to say luxury, I beg leave to remark that such an idea is not merely erroneous, it is absolutely and essentially false. It may astonish some persons to learn that so far from the criminal being coddled the convict of to-day is far worse off than he was when transportation was in vogue, and in almost every respect his lot compares unfavorably with that of a convict in any other civilised country. Take, for example, the case of a man sentenced to penal servitude for life in Great Britain and the man receiving

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a similar sentence in Russia. In the latter country the criminal would be sent to Siberia and after a certain period of probation he would be released and within certain limits would be at liberty to lead his own life with more or less of freedom, very much as was the case in the old days of transportation from this country. Compare his life with the English convict receiving the same sentence. The latter has to undergo twenty years of actual imprisonment before any application for his release on a ticket-of-leave is considered. During the whole of those twenty years he leads exactly the same life and receives exactly the same treatment. His food remains the same throughout his sentence. Every day of it he is confined, when not at work, within a diminutive white-washed cell. His dress is always the same. During his entire sentence his intercourse with the world is confined to a visit from a friend or relation for the space of half an hour once in two months, and the receipt and despatch of one letter in the same period. He gets up every morning at ten minutes past five, and goes to bed every night at eight o'clock. Throughout those twenty years he is, when out of his cell, never permitted to be out of sight of a prison official, not even when obeying the ordinary calls of nature. If he wilfully gets out of sight even for a minute he commits what is considered a very heinous prison offence. During the twenty years the convict so sentenced would never see a newspaper, and in the language of the prison rules he is "not permitted to be acquainted with public events." Now all this treatment may be right or it may be wrong, but it is difficult to understand how it can be termed "coddling." The coddled criminal has no existence, in fact, in England at any rate. I quite admit that imprisonment as it is carried out in that country fails to punish the old gaol bird adequately. It does not, in my opinion, make him feel his punishment sufficiently. While admitting that, it is simply nonsense to refer to him as being "coddled." Any man who has partaken of prison pork soup, suet pudding, brown bread, and other prison comestibles will rub his eyes when he learns on discharge that for some years he has been undergoing a coddling process. The prisoner who has the slightest pretence to refinement and who is not blessed

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with an appetite, stomach, and digestion all of an abnormal kind will find prison life as it is to-day a veritable hell upon earth. Every meal will prove a nauseating effort to take something which looks as detestable as it tastes. A man cannot help concluding that his fellow prisoners are villainous, because they certainly look so, and he will find it difficult to avoid coming to the conclusion that, arrayed in a garb which must have been designed to make men look villainous, even if they be not, he, too, is one of them. Moreover the costume is extremely hot in summer and excessively cold in winter. As regards clothes, therefore, where does the coddling process come in? I have stood on parade at 7.30 on a December morning when there were fifteen degrees of frost, with my teeth chattering, my feet benumbed, my hands lifeless. When I felt myself in this unpleasant physical condition I might have been amused or annoyed had I known that the British public was being constantly told, and a large section of it believed that I was being "coddled" in gaol.

I have no intention, and it would be obviously impossible within the limits of this article, to enter in any detail into the various degradations, deprivations, and indignities to which a prisoner undergoing a sentence of penal servitude is subjected. I may, however, in passing, state that every convict is searched from four to six times daily, that he is stripped of his clothes at least once a month and his clothes and body examined to ascertain if he has any pins, pencils or such like contraband articles in his possession, that twice a month a warder in his absence "makes hay" in his cell, that is to say everything movable therein, bedding, books, letters, etc., is tossed about the cell floor to ascertain if he possesses anything not allowed. A leaf of a plant or a flower pressed between the pages of a prayer book, a note on a letter from perhaps his wife as to the date at which it was received is sufficient to qualify the convict to undergo a diet of bread and water. I myself have been "run in" for "committing a nuisance," viz.: placing some crumbs outside my cell window for the sparrows who came there in expectation of a meal. On another occasion because my tooth brush which had been long in use had become

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rather attenuated and I sought to have it changed, I was arraigned on a charge of damaging government property. On neither of these occasions did it dawn on me that I was being "coddled."

Prisons, of course, exist for the purpose of punishment, and this purpose should undoubtedly be kept prominently in view. That English prisons at present somewhat fail in this purpose, in regard to the gaol bird class, I have already stated. Every person is treated alike, that is the popular prison theory, and accordingly everyone feels his punishment not alike, but quite differently. To one man it is a living death, to another it is merely a temporary inconvenience. But in regard to any prisoner, whether gaol bird or not, it is simply nonsense to talk of him as being "coddled." One day of a convict's life would, I imagine, be quite enough, rather too much in fact, for the journalist who glibly decides on an intricate matter respecting which he possesses merely that little knowledge which is proverbially dangerous. The curse of the present English prison system, in my humble opinion, is that it lends to what I may term reproduction, or, in other words, that when it catches a man who has, perhaps, in a weak moment or for some reason or other fallen, been found out and convicted, the treatment of that man in many cases results in his becoming a recruit for the criminal class. In other words, the present prison system is not reformatory. It manufactures criminals and it never succeeds in leading back the professional criminal to the paths of virtue, and does not even attempt it. It is a mistake, a crucial error, to imagine, as many right-minded people do, that the professional criminal is a man who loves crime for its own sake. This is a sheer delusion. The man is a criminal by force of circumstances. He moves in the orbit of his crime simply because no other motion is possible. He must either move there or disappear from the face of the earth. It is, surely, time the public ceased to entertain erroneous ideas on this head. It is certainly time that the would-be instructors of the public on this matter ceased to talk cant and write rhodomontade in regard thereto. The professional criminal loathes his career just as the professional prostitute does, and would

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just as soon be quit of it. Unfortunately in each case well-meaning people make the return to the paths of virtue difficult if not impossible. They want it done in a certain way, and through certain channels. They have failed to discover what I believe to be a great truth, that so-called charitable societies can perform no effective work. Individual effort, the personal equation, is, and must remain, the leading factor in any charitable work. The fallen man or woman needs personal sympathy as well as material aid, and the first can never be provided or manipulated by the machinery of any society.

The public of Great Britain I believe to be the most humane, the most charitable, and, on the whole, the most conscientious of any in the world. It is, however, liable to be led away by catch words, and it does not invariably think for itself. It has read somewhere and often that its criminals are coddled in gaol, and has accordingly lulled itself into a state of apathy in regard to these persons. That public should, I contend, clearly understand the precise position and the actual treatment of its gaol population. When it does, it will, I venture to believe, quickly determine that there is need—urgent need—of drastic reformation. At the present time it expends £650,000 annually in maintaining a few thousand prisoners who are employed in unremunerative labor and are discharged from prison in every way unfitted to lead an honest life. Every penny of the aforesaid sum is, I contend, absolutely wasted. There is room for the economist here, still more ample room for the reformer. As the world is, it is, perhaps, impossible to look forward to the time when prisons will be no longer necessary, but it certainly is possible to look forward to the time when prisons will be self-supporting and the inmates thereof will be taught in a practical and effective manner that the completion of their punishment will be the expiation of their crime against the community and that on their return to the world they will not find every door closed in their face and, as is now the case, a reversion to crime too frequently the only alternative to starvation.

I have endeavored, I hope successfully, within the space at my disposal to show that no attention should be paid to the

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rhodomontade which from time to time appears in the British press in regard to the "coddling" of criminals. Writers like the governor of the prison referred to do not, of course, make such insane assertions. They know better. They are perfectly aware that the English prison system to-day is a distasteful and degrading punishment. They desire that it shall remain so because, as I think, they fail to see that a prison should aim at being something other or rather something more than a vindictive or retributive institution. In my humble opinion the primary object of such a place should be the emendation of the culprit, and that until such object is recognised, and not only recognised but given practical effect to, English prisons will remain as, I believe in my soul they are to-day, forcing houses for criminals, paupers, and lunatics.

H. J. B. MONTGOMERY.

LONDON.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE EVOLUTION OF THEOLOGY IN THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS. The Gifford Lectures for 1900-1901 and 1901-1902 delivered in the University of Glasgow. By Edward Caird, LL. D., D. C. L., etc. 2 Vols. Glasgow: J. MacLehose & Sons, 1904.

The ostensible aim of these volumes is to give a connected history of Greek reflection regarding the relation of man's life to the ultimate principle of reality. But partly because it is hardly possible to separate this problem from other philosophical discussions, partly because the questions of Logic, Ethics, and Psychology themselves throw light on the chief topic of the lectures, Dr. Caird widens the scope of his subject considerably beyond the main issue. The lectures are thus found in point of fact to cover the whole field of Greek philosophy. The primary purpose of the lectures makes it impossible to give equal prominence to all the philosophers of Greece, or to all the subjects dealt with by those philosophers discussed. But within these limits these lectures may be fairly regarded as a systematic exposition of the fundamental ideas in Greek philosophy from Xenophanes to Plotinus. Its special importance lies in the skilful way in which the various schools are shown to be successive attempts to answer the same question, a method of exposition which gives a peculiar value and interest to the treatment of this inexhaustible subject.

The point of view from which Dr. Caird proceeds is one which he had previously adopted in the lectures on "The Evolution of Religion." He naturally begins, therefore, by explaining the relation of Religion to Theology. To this he devotes the first lecture. Theology is to religion what interpretation is to fact. The peculiarity of the relation in this case is due to the special nature of religious facts. Religion is a conscious unity of man's finite mind with the Absolute; and being universal rests on certain universal principles. Theology is likewise a conscious process, a process, namely, of reflection. Thus the difference between the two must lie in the kind of conscious attitude in each case. This Dr. Caird expresses by saying that religion relates man to the Absolute by principles of which the religious mind as such is not, at least is not necessarily, conscious; while theology seeks to bring these principles to clear consciousness; so that theology is the self-consciousness of religion. Theology does not create religion, it

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presupposes religion; and while there must inevitably be a reaction of theological interpretations on religious experience, at the very best theology can never create a religion, it can merely construe it into general and, in that sense, abstract conceptions to suit the medium of thought in which its analysis is carried on.

There is, of course, always a difficulty in distinguishing phases of conscious life which seem so closely allied. For it is clear on the one hand that religion does proceed by certain ideas of which it is well aware, and yet it is equally clear that to make religion a practical deduction or "application" of ideas becomes perilously akin to evolving experience from principles previously known, evolving, in short, religion from theological ideas, since the ideas of religion are not in content different from the ideas of theology. The terms used by Dr. Caird to express the difference are not always uniformly the same in meaning. At one time he says religion is certainly not the outcome of the "activity of conscious reason," Vol. I (p. 3); the difference is that in religion we have unconscious reason, in theology conscious reason (ibid). Again the difference is between what is intuitive and what is reflective, conscious and self-conscious (ibid.), between immediate experience and reflection (p. 11). Yet a religion may be both, for he distinguishes (p. 25) between a religion which is reflective, and one which is not, and points out that the former is higher than the latter. No doubt the main principle he wishes to establish is clear enough: it is simply that there are grades of conscious life, and what is conscious at one stage may be unconscious at another, either in the history of the individual or of a society. Hence we can speak of religion being unconsciously what theology expresses consciously, or being consciously what theology expresses self-consciously, while still holding, as we must, that both theology and religion belong to the sphere of self-conscious or rational life. But it should be stated that the distinctions are always relative to one another, and to a certain stage of experience with which we are dealing. And it seems important to notice that if both religion and the philosophy of religion (or theology) belong to the self-conscious life of man, it is not altogether sufficient to say that theology is religious life made self-conscious, though this may still be true in a certain sense.

The second lecture is devoted to indicating the three stages through which theological opinion has passed in European civilization. These are the Greek and Roman period, that of the

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Christian era and the Reformation, and the modern period. These are what we may call the stages in the evolution of theology as a whole. Dr. Caird deals here with the first stage, and would lay every one under a debt of gratitude if he could find time to complete the survey.

Lectures III to IX are devoted to the antecedents and stages in the development of the Theology of Plato, the first systematic theologian. They consist in the main in historical exposition and running criticism on Plato's ideal theory. The ninth lecture on the later idealism of Plato is particularly valuable.

Lectures X to XIV deal in a similar way with Aristotle.

Lecture XV is devoted to the general character of post-Aristotelian philosophy, and prepares the way for the statement of Stoicism in Lectures XVI-XIX. The transition from Stoicism to Neo-Platonism and a discussion of Philo make up the two following lectures, while the remainder of the work, Lectures XXII-XXVII, expounds the philosophy and theology of Plotinus and his relation to succeeding theological thought,—Gnosticism and Christian theology.

There is little in the subject-matter of the lectures which bears directly on ethics, and it would be out of place in this JOURNAL to consider theological problems. Such discussion of ethics as we find is introduced primarily to throw light on theological issues, and the theological views of the various systems expounded. One of the few ethical questions of general interest taken up in the lectures is that of the primacy of the practical reason discussed in Lecture XIII, where an instructive comparison is drawn between Aristotle's view of reason and that of Kant. This chapter is of special value at the present time in view of the tendency towards "pragmatism" which characterises so much current philosophical speculation. Dr. Caird's solution of the difficulty, and one which he adopts generally to solve the chief fundamental difficulties into which Greek thought was led, is to point out that the initial assumption of a sharp opposition between mind and object, on which the separation of theory from practice rests, is essentially false. The mind comes to be mind through relation to an objective world, and the world only is a world through relation to mind. The two ways in which this relation is established may be spoken of as theory and practice, but the same identity is implied and worked out in both, the identity, namely, between mind and an objective world.

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"Theoretical and practical consciousness are in continuity with each other" (p. 371). This certainly gets over the extreme opposition between theory and practice often asserted. But it does not either get rid of actual opposition between them in daily life, or solve the question as to which is prior for finite activity. The identity between the two is, indeed, found in the experiences of religion, or again of philosophy, in Aristotle's sense of θεωρία. But the fully realized identity is a limiting case, which is only known in certain experiences of man and, we may assume, in the active experience of a Divine Life. Between these two lie the contrasts and conflicts which make up the process of finite life and which appear in the distinctions, so characteristic of finite experiences, between suggestion and affirmation, hypothesis and law, approximate and complete truth, abstract and applicable ideas, etc. And it is here most of all that the difference between theory and practice is felt, and it is to this that the question of the primacy of the one over the other applies most pointedly.

This leads to the general remark that the way in which Dr. Caird proposes to overcome the radical dualism which characterises Greek Philosophy from first to last is, at least, not free from ambiguity. The dualism in its extreme form is that between thought and sense, man and nature, mind and "matter." It was to connect these elements coherently that formed the task of Greek thought, and which incessantly urged it to new modes of explanation, thus giving continuity to the subject-matter and the purpose of its whole history. The difference between these two in their various forms, Dr. Caird urges, rests on and presupposes an ultimate identity, a unity in which man and nature appear as diverse manifestations, a spiritual unity of which all forms of experience are revelations, and in which all oppositions, therefore, find their reconcilation. This is the identity asserted in the religious life, and the identity which philosophy seeks to bring to self-consciousness.

The ambiguity referred to lies here. On the one hand, these two, mind and object (express the differense as we may), are to begin with opposed and sharply opposed, while the unity in which they are reconciled seems to do justice to one of these elements (mind, self-consciousness) at the expense of the other. Dr. Caird urges that mind and object are inseparable, that the one is through the other. If so, the unity cannot straightway be described as a spiritual or self-conscious unity, which clearly holds more

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of one side than the other. Either that must be asserted or else to begin with the two are not on such a level as to justify us in saying that one is merely through the other—a position which makes the one as little (or as much) important as the other. It may be observed that it was just the insistence on the difference in value between mind and nature, subject and object, which constituted Hegel's peculiar position.

Regarding the general interpretation of Greek Philosophy which Dr. Caird adopts, many may find some difficulty in accepting his view that Plotinus' mysticism was not an expression of the despair of Greek Philosophy or the collapse of the speculative Greek spirit, but the genuine development of the philosophical tendencies at work in Plato and Aristotle and an advance upon the spiritualistic monism of preceding thought. It seems a little strange to say that the transcendence of knowledge and the renunciation of clearly conceived systematic reflection should constitute an advance in knowledge and a higher stage of philosophical insight. One feels that a similar objection should hold against the author's attempts to treat scepticism as an advance on preceding philosophy. And when Dr. Caird says (II, p. 10) that "a system of philosophy may be less rich and comprehensive and less stringent in method, and yet indicate an advance"; that "there may be a dialectic value in the absence of dialetic," this is surely optimism at any price. It is not easy to allow that confused thinking or bad thinking or no thinking at all is a "dialetical advance" on coherent reflection merely because it succeeds it in time.

The saying attributed to Goethe on p. 4, Vol. I, is Schiller's; it occurs in the poem entitled "Die Weltweisen."

J. B. Baillie.

University of Aberdeen.

The Theology and Ethics of the Hebrews. By Archibald Duff, Professor of Old Testament Theology in the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford, England. New York: Charles Scribner's Son's, 1902, pp. xvii, 304.

This volume in the "Semitic Series" edited by Professor Craig, of the University of Michigan, is intended to supplement the sketches of Hebrew history, government, and social life given by Professor Paton, Professor McCurdy, and Mr. Day by furnishing a description of the religious and moral life of the Hebrews.

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The author is well known as a thoughtful and independent representative of the critical school. His larger work on "Old Testament Theology" had prepared him for the more difficult task of presenting a brief outline in popular language; and no reader will peruse his book without profit and pleasure. Nevertheless, it is not in every respect what one had a right to expect. The need of a lucid discussion of the character and worth of the religious and ethical ideas of the Hebrews is so great, and the ability of the author to place himself intelligently and sympathetically into the world of thought of the ancient Hebrews is so marked, that one cannot but regret that he has devoted only a small part of his work to the special purpose for which it was written. Any treatment of a historical subject, not based upon a critical study of the records, is always to be deplored. Professor Duff may certainly with propriety have assumed an acquaintance with the main results of criticism, and confined himself to a consideration of the ideas that appear in the different strata of the national literature. Many will indeed be grateful for the pains he has taken to set the stories of the early folk-books, the oracles of the prophets, and the injunctions of the law-codes in their historic setting, and particularly for the appended analysis of the Yahwistic, Elohistic, and Deuteronomistic documents occupying sixty-six pages at the end of the work. In fact, so good a service is this, that it would have been worth the while to add under each paragraph a reference to the passages summarized, in order to facilitate a reading of the entire sections in the Bible. But the question cannot quite be suppressed, whether this volume was really the place even for such a valuable exhibit. Besides, Professor Duff's strength does not lie in historical research. He possesses a rare insight into character, but does not have to the same degree the gift of divining historic probability, and seems to have no sense of the sacredness of a date. In his book events generally occur "about" a certain time, even when a more precise statement could have been made; too often dates are given wrongly, when an error was absolutely unnecessary. The Scythians, whom we know to have been friends and allies of the Assyrians, are said to have overwhelmed the city of Nineveh in 640 B. C. There is not the slightest evidence of any such event. The exile is placed at 590 once, and another time at 588. Both dates are wrong. Buddha is said to have been born "about 480," which is the probable year of his death. No patient seeker after

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chronological accuracy could have drawn up the list on page 165 or concluded his work with the group of wrong dates on pages 217, 218. The author does not seem to appreciate the ethical value of chronological correctness. On the other hand, he has a most commendable freedom from prejudice, and openness of mind. No cry of radicalism frightens him, and he learns from all scholars. He gives up the "patriarchs" and abandons the legends of a return under Cyrus; and in an analysis of Isaiah and Jeremiah he follows Cheyne and Duhm. His conception of Moses is peculiar. He was an Egyptian, who as a lad had seen "the level sunlight across the low growth" on the Sinaitic peninsula while tending his sheep in that region, later became a Levi, or Gentile attaché and camp-follower, when the Hebrews marched away from Goshen; and a leader, when, upon the death of the king's first-born, there had been a general slaying of the first-born throughout the land "after a manner common among semi-barbarous peoples." There is no evidence in the etymology of "Levite" for this supposed Egyptian nationality of Moses. If it means "attaché" the analogy of the Sabean term would suggest that "attaché" of a sanctuary is the meaning; but that is doubtful. Professor Duff thinks that two rites came from Egypt, that of "circumcision, which was practiced by the father-in-law on a bridegroom," and that of Passover, which was a celebration of the intercalary days needed to square the so-called lunar with the solar year. Again there is no evidence that circumcision was practised by the father-in-law on the bridegroom in Egypt. Rather does it seem to have been restricted to the priesthood, at least to historic times. And the leap-feast was probably so called from the gamboling of the young at the time when the first born were offered. In Egypt there is no trace of such a growing feast of intercalary days; but it seems to have existed in Babylonia in later times. A very infelicitous etymological attempt is the explanation of Messiah as a frequentative passion meaning "One who is constantly anointed." How could the Aramaic *meshicha* be a frequentative passion? Lay readers who find in the index a name Adham below that of our long-suffering ancestor Adam should be warned against supposing that there were two different persons. Most other names are left in their English form. Only "Remal Yah" suggested the legitimate question whether theophonous names should not be treated uniformly.

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It is to be supposed that Professor Craig intends to supplement this volume with one treating the Theology and Ethics of post-exilic Israel. The chapter in this volume dealing with "The Exile, 500 B. C. onward" is wholly inadequate. It is scarcely conceivable that after the careful attention bestowed by Professor Duff on the Yahwists and Eloists, the ethically most important work that has come down to us from Hebrew antiquity, the book of Job, is thus to be dismissed in a few words.

The plan was probably that Professor Duff should stop with the Exile. While it is somewhat difficult to gain a real conception of the growth of Israel's religious life and its ethical development from this volume, and occasionally there is an evident apologetic strain, as when the Yahwists are praised for "silently regretting and condemning" certain immoral practices, it should be gratefully acknowledged that, in his interpretation of the earliest Hebrew folk-lore, the prophetic and the pre-exilic legislation, Professor Duff has succeeded, to a remarkable degree, in discovering individual peculiarities, spiritual tendencies, and ethical ideals.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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ASPECTS OF THE VEDANTA. Madras: Natesan & Co., 1904, pp. 168.

This valuable little book contains seven essays by five Hindu scholars to which is added a reprint of a short article by the late Prof. Max Muller. I am inclined to think that the most interesting to Western readers will be the first essay, "The Vedanta in Outline" (Pandit Sitanath Tattvabhushan). In it there is given a very clear account of the difference between the three schools of Vedantic philosophy. Sankara taught that absolute Monism which is the only form of Vedantic philosophy which is well-known in the West—a fact to be accounted for, probably, by the greater number of his disciples. A less extreme form is that of Ramanuja whose theory of the relation of God and the world, as here expounded, seems to have a striking resemblance to that of Lotze. The school of Madhva, again, is frankly dualistic on this question.

The same author has a very interesting essay on "The Vedantic Doctrine of Future Life," in which the theory of pre-existence is defended with great skill.

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The two essays of the late Mr. M. V. Aiyar deal with "Some Reasons for the Study of the Vedanta" and "The Ethics of the Vedanta." On page 76 Mr. Aiyar has an interesting discussion on the relation of morality to the rejection of the personality of God by the school of Sankara.

Prof. Rangachariyar writes on "The Vedanta Religion," and Swami Saradananda on the "Theory and Practice of the Vedanta." These essays necessarily cover, more or less, the same ground as those previously mentioned, but the discussion of the same subjects from a slightly different point of view assists the reader to form more definite conceptions.

On page 121 a parable is given from the Vedas, "Two birds of bright golden plumage, inseparable companions of each other, are sitting on the same tree, the one on the higher and the other on the lower branches of it. The upper bird, not caring to taste the sweet and bitter fruits of the tree, sits majestic in his own glory, and sees the lower one tasting the fruits. As the lower bird gets the taste of the bitter fruit of the tree, he grows disgusted and looks up to the splendid vision above him of the upper bird, and draws himself nearer to him. . . . So on he advances till at last when he reaches the upper bird the whole vision changes, and he finds himself to be the upper bird who was sitting in all splendor and majesty all the time." This has a most remarkable resemblance to the main idea of Attar's poem, translated by Fitzgerald as "The Bird Parliament." And yet it seems impossible that a Mohammedan of the thirteenth century could have known the Vedas.

The last essay in the book—"The Vedanta for the World," by Swami Vivekananda—consists mainly of practical advice to the Hindu population of India. The whole book is worthy of careful study by everyone interested in theology or philosophy.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

Primitive Love and Love-Stories. By Henry T. Finck. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. xvii, 851.

Seventeen years ago the distinguished musical critic of the New York *Evening Post* published a volume entitled "Romantic Love and Personal Beauty." In this work he propounded the theory that unselfish, supersensual love is a distinctly modern sen-

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timent, the result of a long development of man's sexual relations. The book was received in many quarters with strong expressions of disapproval, supercilious sneers, or good-natured banter. If some construed it into an attack upon holy matrimony, an institution honorable among all men and divinely ordained in the state of man's innocence, others were disposed not to take the author seriously. Surely, love must be as old as the human race. Admirers of classical antiquity deemed it sufficient to mention the names of Leander and Hero, Ulysses and Penelope, Hector and Andromache, to put a quietus upon this preposterous theory. The Indian dramatists were brought into the field. Weapons were drawn from the Bible, especially from the Song of Songs, to ward off this invasion of a new field by the dreaded evolutionist. There were those cruel enough to suggest that the theory had not even the merit of being new, seeing that Hegel had long ago presented it in his "Æsthetics."

The present work is devoted to a refutation of such criticisms and a further defense of the theory. It is a serious study of a most important question. An enormous amount of material has been collected and examined. Various aspects of the problem have been carefully considered, and numerous works dealing with the growth of the institution of marriage have been consulted. The whole subject is treated with much frankness, yet with such delicacy of touch that the book can be heartily recommended to all classes of readers.

It is, of course, impossible, even for the best equipped and most indefatigable student, to gain such a mastery of all the data upon which judgment must be passed in this case as to carry conviction to every mind. No man possesses so wide an acquaintance with all extant literatures, even through translations, that he can speak with absolute authority of what they contain. The subtlest of all things most easily evaporates in a version. There is no telling what treasures may be still buried under ground. Since this book was published, the oldest law code in the world has been brought to light, revealing the legal rights of a woman in Babylonia, about 2250 B. C., to divorce an undesirable husband or, when divorced herself, to marry "the man of her heart." What may be known through literary documents is, after all, but a small part of the life lived by the countless millions that have peopled the earth. Our competence to deny well nigh all of these the experiences of mental, sentimental, altruistic, super-

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sensual love may be seriously questioned. But the author deserves much credit for his manifest effort at comprehensiveness. One might wish that he had pursued some historical or geographical method, allowing the reader to survey the successive epochs of history and the different regions of the world in orderly manner and to watch the growth of the modern sentiment in its incipient stages. As it is, Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and barbarians, different races and different ages jostle one another on his pages. It is not easy to discover where the author draws his line, when he thinks that the new type of love began among men. Wise Saadi is said to have understood its nature, but it is suggested that he derived the secret from the Arabs, who themselves learned it from the Franks. To Christianity the author devotes no attention, and the existence of this kind of love in Judaism or in the Græco-Roman world is strenuously denied. Where then did it originate? The topical arrangement is decidedly disadvantageous in a historical investigation.

The practices and sentiments of savages and barbarians are known to us chiefly through the reports of missionaries, soldiers, sailors, traveling merchants or scientists. Critical ability of a high order is demanded for the sifting of such testimony. In this the author excels. Yet one has an uneasy feeling that he is too sparing with his Attic salt when these persons generalize as to the low moral condition of the heathen, and too sceptical when they relate things that look like love of a good and noble quality. So ingeniously fault-finding is sometimes his criticism of an ancient love-story that one falls to wondering how the noblest tale of modern conjugal affection would fare at his hands, were it by a mistake understood as coming from antiquity.

There can be no question that, for substance of doctrine, Mr. Finck is right. In love, as in everything else, that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is carnal. There has been a gradual evolution, and it is far from having reached its goal yet. But the beginnings of altruistic, supersensual, sentimental love are probably much older than the author seems to think and more closely bound up with the physical relation. Too intent upon proving the modernity of this sentiment, he has not always been able to do full justice to the instances quoted against his theory In spite of all the sensuality of "Canticles," there can be no doubt as to the spiritual nature of the sentiment expressed in the words, "Set me as a seal on thy heart, for love is stronger than death,"

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and "he who would buy love would be utterly contemned." The love that cannot be bought, seeks not its own, and gives itself freely, may exist in the worst form of marriage and may suffer in the best. It tends, as the author has finely shown, to create a type of marital union, wisely and tenderly considerate of the character and welfare of coming generations.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

CHRISTIAN SOCIALISM IN ENGLAND. By Arthur V. Woodworth, Ph. D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1903, pp. viii, 208.

This book has as its purpose to supplement, from the records of the Socialist movement which have their initiative from the religious side, such studies as already exist of the more purely economic tendencies toward coöperation. Taking as his point of departure Kingsley's address to the Chartists in 1848, Mr. Woodworth traces the subsequent growth of the teaching of Kingsley and Maurice, and the actual foundation of the movement in the Working Men's College, the Coöperative Movement, the Guild of St. Matthew, and the Christian Social Union. This history fills a chink in that of labor co-partnership and the moralisation of industrial conditions which it was certainly desirable to have filled: and there can be only praise for the thoroughness with which the facts regarding these institutions have been sought for, and their principles expounded. One or two deficiencies, however, strike anyone who looks further back than 1848. Mr. Woodworth's account has not been attached to the economic conditions then prevailing, so much as to the political agitation and demands of the Chartists; and something might have been said of the earlier Socialists whose influence was not negligible on the later movement. There are, further, two lines of thought which have not been developed, although their omission may have been purposeful. In the first place, the literary development is only scantily referred to, although many persons would hold that Ruskin's view of the economists, or Kingsley's novels, or Carlyle's denunciations, or even some of George Eliot's work, was peculiarly relevant, and, perhaps, the most vivid side of the history as a whole. At any rate, there is much matter there which would have considerably relieved the plain facts of historical institutions. In the second place, while the author has traced on one hand the

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growth of working institutions, and on the other the growth of those which rather exist for study, such as the Christian Social Union, he has given inadequate attention to the most modern endeavors to bridge this gap, such, for instance, as the University and College Settlements, or the efforts to make the personal service of educated people effective in leavening the more dangerous tendencies of aggressive Socialism. These things may have been considered outside Mr. Woodworth's scope. But this concise history would gain by being interwoven with the threads of literary or "practicable" socialism.

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THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL SCIENCE, an Essay by the Rev. Walter McDonald, D. D., Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment, St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Dublin: Browne & Nolan, pp. xi, 230.

This is an attempt on the part of a professed Roman Catholic to set forth the fundamental principles of Ethics as seen from that standpoint. The attempt is carried out with a good deal of acuteness, common-sense, and a refreshing naiveté which makes it possible for the writer to admit his perplexities frankly. And owing to the theological position a curious side-light is thrown upon more than one of the deeper problems. Indeed, both the interest and weakness of the book seem largely due to an unquestioning acceptance of this position.

"Good" is taken as "a notion too simple to be capable of definition"; "moral good" as applicable to those actions which are capable of being directed by intelligent will. Such actions are said to be in accordance with "natural law," that is to say, they *are* right and good to perform—and this rightness holds whatever opinion men or Man may or may not entertain. On this point Dr. McDonald lays the utmost stress, and this belief in an absolute standard seems the pivot of his work, just as it is the mainstay of the whole Roman Catholic system. But he goes on to state that the natural law is "supported at every point by the divine law," and further that no sense can be attached to the word "*ought*" unless we assume the relation of an inferior to a superior who gives commands. The relation of this "divine law" to the "natural law" is not made clear, and the reader longs to put the Socratic question: "Does God command a thing because

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it is holy; or is it holy because God commands it?" In any case Dr. McDonald does not seem afraid of the strange position that while it is possible for an atheist to say, "This is good to do," he cannot go on to say, "This is what I ought to do." Elsewhere he insists on free-will as justifying the *"ought"*; "ought" implying that the act is good and that the man is free to do it. Common-sense would consider this justification enough.

The content of morality is discovered, though in no way determined, by Intuition. It is through Intuition that we learn, for instance, that we ought to obey God because he is our creator, that we ought on no account to lie, that punishment should be given for certain sins, as a restoration of "order," whether it has any further use or not. The mere statement of such dicta is sufficient to bring out the startling discrepancy between the intuitions that different men hold, or believe themselves to hold. Whatever the truth about the intuitive method, this discrepancy must give us pause, if it does not make us uncomfortable.

The book contains slight, but so far as they go, shrewd criticisms of Mill and Kant. The second half consists of lengthy and not very fruitful discussions on the relations of will, motive, intention, and act, and the right line of conduct in cases of ignorance or doubt. Here the technical jargon of "Probabilism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabiliorism" make us almost long once more for the Utilitarian's "felicific" and "self-regarding" virtues.

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

Methods of Social Advance: Short Studies in Social Practice. By Various Authors. Edited by C. S. Loch, B. A. London and New York: Macmillan & Co., 1904, pp. 192.

Professor Loch has collected together a series of short papers which served as subjects for discussion at special meetings of the Council of the Charity Organization Society. The papers are of unequal and not very high merit. They are not careful scientific or statistical studies of social conditions or of the effects of different attempts to remedy social evils, but are chiefly made up of suggestions for improving social conditions which are put forward rather vaguely. Thus Mr. H. Rider Haggard is most anxious to keep people on the land or to bring town people to the land. Amongst other suggestions he proposes to board out young

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people in selected cottages in selected villages (in order to give them an agricultural training). He then adds, "This is merely an idea that has struck me. It may have been put into practice for aught I know, but while I was thinking over these things last night, it occurred to me for the first time. Say you take one thousand lads (and they must be young) and put them with respectable people—board them out and pay for their living at first until they learn something—you might then at any rate get a proportion of good results." It is not difficult to collect plenty of "ideas" such as this, but it is difficult to work out carefully designed schemes and to test their results. Mr. Haggard's paper is, perhaps, the worst in the book. Colonel Dale's paper on "Physical Education" advocates the teaching of military drill as part of a secondary system of continuation education. But he does not work out in detail the moral and physical effects of drill. Thousands of men in the country have been drilled while at school. How much benefit did they obtain from it? Colonel Dale asserts that it attracts young people. It does, no doubt, attract some, but it repels others, and in some schools "extra drill" is a well recognised punishment. But this again is not one of the best papers. Of the better papers that on the "Work of a Hospital Almoner" and that on "Apprenticeship" may be selected as examples; but even these are not of a very high level. Thus in the former paper we get the statement "out of twenty out-patient books *taken at random* from the shelf . . . etc.;" here clearly there was a mass of statistics which might have been instructive, but which were not utilised. How much better it would have been to have used all the material instead of a random group. The paper on "Apprenticeship" is fairly argued, but the authors do not seem to realise how many Trade Unions have rules restricting the number of apprentices, and how often the apprentice is taken as a source of profit by unscrupulous employers.

This book is a specimen of that class of modern books composed of a series of short papers by different persons without much continuous argument or development. Such a collection must lack unity, and must be unequal. This book is not better nor worse than many others of its class, but the class is a bad one. Often and often, we hear the tit-bits style of newspaper condemned; the patch-work book is little better.

C. P. SANGER.

LONDON.

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THE RELIGION OF A GENTLEMAN. By Charles F. Dole. New York: Thomes Y. Crowell & Company, 1900, pp. xvi, 219.

The religion of Mr. Dole is attractive and commands respect. It is the expression of a clear mind and a noble heart. His outlook upon life is sane and sympathetic. His plea for what Burke called the "spirit of the gentleman" is fine. By a gentleman he understands a man "who loves man, who serves man, whose sympathies over-arch the world." And he wants him to have a civilised religion, free from superstition, full of reverence, active in good works. Will the civilised man pray? Mr. Dole answers in the affirmative. But he seems to mean by prayer a quiet meditation in view of the universal life. The need of such moments of spiritual refreshment cannot be too strongly emphasised. Mr. Dole does not discuss the moral influence of public prayer, so strongly condemned by Jesus as a breach of the modesty of the soul, or of the petitioning for things, even spiritual things, from without that can only come by effort from within. The frequent references to the lives of truly great men, and especially the free and reverent use of the life of Jesus, add immeasurably to the value of the little volume. No one will read without comfort the chapter entitled "*Memento mori*," whatever his views may be in respect to the future. Nothing in the book, however, is so interesting as the glimpses it affords of the inner life of an earnest seeker after truth and a simple follower of the truth he sees.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

PROPHETIC IDEAS AND IDEALS. A series of short studies in the prophetic literature of the Hebrew people. By W. G. Jordan, D. D., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Literature in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. London and New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1902, pp. 363.

The aim of this volume is expository rather than critical or apologetic. It gives specimens of popular expositions based upon recent study, but as free as possible from technical discussion. All the prophets except Daniel are represented. Since the second century of our era it has been customary to leave him out of the prophetic canon, and in Hebrew Bibles he is printed in the third collection. The order is chronological, and itself

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shows that the author is dominated, to a considerable extent, by the views of the critical school. His method is to draw out the leading thought of a certain section, set it forth in its immediate historic meaning, and then to seek for the permanent applications of the truth proclaimed.

The work is done in an admirable spirit, and the book deserves to be read as an example of good sermonizing on the basis of critical study. While nobly urging the Christian ministry to magnify its calling, the author still feels that there was something unique in the ancient prophet, entitling us to use the name only in a secondary sense of our noblest men. This uniqueness seems to him "in part to consist in the fact that they were divinely appointed interpreters of a nation's destiny and guides of its life."

Perhaps the power will return, if it has not already come, when the doctrine of a special divine inspiration and appointment of men in the past, different from and higher than anything possible for men to experience to-day, shall have passed away. The author feels that "our reformers and noblest leaders have come very near" to the position of the prophets and that "it shades off by almost imperceptible degrees into a broader prophetic life which we by divine grace may hope to share," and urges us to take "the prophets' treatment of social questions as a tonic which will save us from a shallow individualism and a spurious evangelism."

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

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JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1905.

THE ETHICS OF GAMBLING.

Gambling is the determination of the ownership of property by appeal to chance. By chance is here implied the resultant of a play of natural forces that cannot be controlled or calculated by those who appeal to it. In tossing "heads or tails" for the possession of a coin, neither party has any knowledge or control of the adjustment of forces which determines upon which side the coin will fall, or if by practice the tosser acquires such knowledge or control, he cannot possibly predict or control the "call" of his opponent which thus keeps the determination of the transfer of property within the realm of "Chance."

Gambling may be described as "pure" or "mixed" according as the determining power of chance is or is not blended with other powers. Few so-called games of chance are entirely destitute of skill, even if the skill consists entirely of speed or accuracy in calculating "chances." Where such skill plays a large and a continuous part the game ceases to be classed as "gambling," though chance may exercise a quite considerable influence in determining the result. In betting on horse races and in commercial gambling superior knowledge of some of the determinant causes may so qualify the chance that, from the standpoint of those who have such knowledge, the operation ceases to be gambling. If such knowledge is equally attainable by all those who "speculate," the game becomes one of skill; if it consists in genuine "tips"

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or private knowledge the operation is fraudulent. This last fact is generally recognised: all gamesters denounce betting on "certainties." Again, both on the turf and the stock exchange chance may be reduced or even eliminated by an actual manipulation of the forces so as to yield a result favorable to the interests of some of those who pose as gamblers. But when the result supposed to rest on chance is known or controlled by any sort of skill, fraud or force, the case is not one of pure gambling; for though it is a matter of significance that gambling commonly keeps company with cheating, the latter is not gambling.

Where the skilful draftmanship of a lottery-prospectus allures the dull or sanguine reader into staking his money, by deceiving him as to the size of his chance of winning, such trickery, though designed to appeal to the gambling instinct of investors, is not itself an act or a part of gambling: it is simply fraud, though not necessarily fraud in a legal sense.

On the other hand, when the terms of a lottery are clearly understood by those who stake their money, the mere fact that the managers arrange the speculation so as to procure for themselves a known and certain gain, offering prizes admittedly of less value than the aggregate of the stakes, need not debar us from regarding the proceeding as "pure gambling" so far as the players are concerned. So with the roulette table at Monte Carlo: the players are aware that the chances are favorable to the bank over a prolonged piece of play, they even know the precise amount of this bias. But this knowledge does not prevent their play from ranking as pure gambling, for no skill or knowledge or trickery on their part can enter in as a determinant of the result.

Thus an honestly managed lottery, or roulette, may fairly serve as a type of pure gambling which will serve to enable us to test the psychology and ethics of the procedure.

Before approaching the distinctively moral aspects of gambling, we must clearly realise its intellectual reaction. The rational basis of the acquisition of property is the "natural" relation of effort to satisfaction. A man who converts an unshaped piece of matter into an object of human

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utility may be said to have a "natural" property in it. And this in a double sense. The expenditure of human energy given out in this piece of labor requires recuperation: this recuperation is achieved by "consuming" that which he has made, or its equivalent obtained by processes of equal exchange. The effort of production requires the satisfaction of consumption. Thus it is commonly recognised that labor, or human effort, is the natural basis of the right of property. Or, regarding the same relation on its psychical side with reference to motive, we perceive that a property in that which he has made must be accorded to the maker wherever any painful effort of production is required, in order to induce his will to sanction the effort. In a society where social forces coöperate with individual effort a *full* property in that which a man is said to make may not be essential, but that is because no man working in society and for a market can truly be said to make the whole of anything, much less its "value" when it is made. But everywhere some proportion of property must be guaranteed to the individual who is required to exert himself in productive labor. Any form of theft, fraud, extortion, "sweating," on the part of individuals or governments, is liable to interfere with this physical and psychical adjustment between production and consumption, output of effort and intake of satisfaction, which forms the natural or rational basis of individual property. Just in proportion as this rational character is firmly and clearly stamped upon the processes of the acquisition of property do we possess security of social order and progress. When property comes to anyone in any other way its transfer has an "unreasonable" character. So a society where force or fraud habitually or frequently displaces this sane process of acquiring property, where some persons eat bread *sudore vultus alieni* and others consequently sweat without eating, is not only economically enfeebled, but is irrationally constituted. And this unreason in the social organism corrupts and derationalises the individual members. But even an unjustly ordered society, where the domination of one class is accompanied by the subjection of another, where organised parasitism or plunder

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prevails, differs from "anarchy" as regards its reactions upon the intelligence of man. A bad system, the worst of systems, is less derationalising than no system. So the habitual exploitation of the poor by the rich, the "have-nots" by the "haves," though substantially irrational in the modes of acquisition of property involved, is less demoralising than the abandonment of the determination of property to pure chance.

Gambling involves the denial of all system in the appointment of property: it plunges the mind in a world of anarchy where things come upon one, and pass from one miraculously. It does not so manifestly sin against the canons of justice as do other bad modes of transfer, theft, fraud, sweating, for every one is said to have an equal chance; but it inflicts a graver damage on the intellect. Based as it is on an organised rejection of all reason as a factor, it removes its devotees into a positive atmosphere of miracles, and generates an emotional excitement that inhibits those checks which reason more or less contrives to place upon emotional extravagances. The essence of gambling consists in an abandonment of reason, an inhibition of the factors of human control. In the history of mankind civilisation of the individual has chiefly consisted in and been measured by this increased capacity of rational control, a slow, gradual, imperfect taming of the animal instincts which made for emotional anarchy of conduct.

This assertion of rational control, implying some sort of plan in life, restraints on conduct and trust in orderly processes of phenomena, has doubtless been most imperfectly established even in the picked members of the more highly civilised races. But such as it is, it represents order in society and progress in humanity.

The practice of gambling is thus exhibited as a deliberate reversion to those passions and that mental attitude which characterise the savage or pre-human man in his conduct and his outlook. There lurk in "civilised" man the remnants of survivals of countless ages of pre-human and of savage heredity, anarchic passions inspired by barbarous superstí-

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tions. The order of civilisation claims to have killed or atrophied the grosser forms of these atavistic tendencies, but many of them are not dead; social control and education of individual habits keeps them in subordination or acquiescence, but on temptation they are ready to awake. Just as war and certain forms of sport can call from the caverns of heredity brutish traits whose presence was utterly unknown to their possessors, so the interest of gambling discovers in many natures a similarly fatal inheritance.

Maeterlinck has recently sought to find a quasi-rational basis for "luck" in the occasional revival of certain primitive instincts of self-protection which, seldom needed in the higher progress of humanity, have died down and rarely assert themselves. Whether such latent powers of extra-rational warning exist or ever did exist, we need not here discuss; it is, however, quite evident that the widespread belief in "luck" among gamblers is a reversion to a form of unreason which carries no sound instinct of direction with it. It is fair to adduce this belief in luck as an important testimony to the derationalising influences of gambling.

It does not seem true that the gambling habit pervades only or chiefly the least intelligent types of men. Among habitual gamblers on the stock exchange, on the turf and in the card-room, and wherever skill tempers chance, high degrees of cunning, memory, and judgment are often found, while certain qualities of determination and of self-command are conducive to success. But while many men possessing these qualities are drawn to games or business pursuits where a strong element of chance is present, there is no real affinity between any of these personal powers and pure gambling. It is not, for instance, true that skill, judgment or self-command is of the least assistance at the roulette table or at *rouge-et-noir*. The fact that these qualities are so commonly regarded as serviceable to the player may be cited as a conspicuous evidence of the derationalising influence of gambling even in the case of those who do not gamble. For in reality they are only useful in proportion as the game is not pure gambling.

The curious cunning expended in devising "systems" and

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the attention to multifarious incidents of "luck" indicates a genuine inhibition of the reasoning faculty. Both modes of manipulating chance are vitiated by the same two fallacies. Belief in the efficacy of a "system" implies that a series of consecutive coups is a causally connected chain, whereas, in fact, the result of each coup is entirely unaffected by the coup which preceded or follows it. The "system" gambler also believes that he is able to forecast to some extent the drift or current of chances which makes this causal connection. Similarly with the cruder superstitions, such as the notion that a virgin player will win his opening bout of play, or that turning one's chair or changing one's seat will break a spell of bad luck: they also imply that a sequence of separately determined events is in some unintelligible way a mutually determined group, and that a tendency running through the series can be altered by a casual or purposed action which is interjected from outside. The amazing hold which these superstitious notions obtain over persons of education and intelligence is a striking testimony to the intellectual havoc wrought by gambling. How insidious is the illusion about runs of luck may be shown by the case with which the mind of most persons, who are averse to gambling and would deride the notion of a "system," fall into the snare when it is set in the following form: Enter a room where *rouge-et-noir* is going on and learn that red has turned up twenty times in succession, when the next card is in the act of being drawn there is an almost irresistible tendency to expect black, from a first impulsive judgment which has false reference to the general improbability of red turning up twenty-one times running. Most persons, including trained scientists to whom I have put the case, requiring an immediate reply, have admitted that they would be disposed to bet against red.

A practice so corrupting to the intelligence not only of the *habitué* but even of the casual spectator stands condemned as a formidable enemy of education and of intellectual order.

In thus exposing the irrationality of gambling, both as a mode of transferring property and as a mental occupation, I have implicitly exposed its immorality also. Its repudiation

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of equitable order involves at once an intellectual and a moral descent to a lower plane of thought and feeling. Perhaps no other human interest, not based on purely physical craving, arouses so absorbing a passion: alcoholism itself scarcely asserts a stronger dominion over its devotees.

So widespread has been the zest for gambling among whole races as widely different in character and environment as the British, the Zulu, the Chinese, that we are almost driven to seek some physiological root for the passion. To give an added weight of interest to chance by attaching to it a transfer of property seems to imply a love of hazard as a permanent feature in humanity. Though the transfer of property by gambling not merely feeds the passion but imports grave moral injuries of its own, it cannot be said to originate gambling or to be essential to the play of the interest in chance or hazard. The folly and the social injury of gambling grows with the proportion of the stakes, but high stakes, while they concentrate and dramatise the play, do not create the interest.

Educationalists and other reformers who would exorcise the gambling habit must look deeper for its origin and early sustenance. The fevered excitement of the gambler is part of an exaggerated reaction against certain excesses of order and routine imposed upon the life in which he lives. The dull prolonged monotony of uninteresting drudgery which constitutes the normal workaday life of large masses of people drives them to sensational reactions which are crude and violent. The factory employee, the shop-assistant, the office-clerk, the most typical members of modern industrial society, find an oppressive burden of uninteresting order, of mechanism, in their working day. Their work affords no considerable scope for spontaneity, self-expression and the interest, achievement and surprise which are ordinary human qualities. It is easily admitted that an absolutely ordered (however well-ordered) human life would be vacant of interest and intolerable: in other words it is a prime condition of humanity that the unexpected in the form of happening and achievement should be adequately represented in

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every life. Art in its widest sense, as interested effort of production, and play, as interested but unproductive effort, are essential. But where either the physical or mental exhaustion of industry, or other external conditions prevent the due cultivation or the expression of wholesome art or play instincts, baser attractions usurp their place. It is impossible, and it would be undesirable to deny to man the satisfaction of his instinctive zest in the unexpected, the hazardous, the disorderly: he needs not only achievement but accident to sustain his interest in life. The latter factor may yield largely to the former in highly civilised man, in a society where varied modes of art offer varied stimuli to self-expression and achievement: the artist, who is a true artist, is least likely to be a gambler. But a margin of disorder, or hazard and unreason, will always remain a factor in the interest of life: hence an element of unordered play as distinct from art will always survive.

Even a moral order imposed in the public interest, if too uniform and rigorous, will arouse, not merely in bad but in good natures, reactions towards lawlessness. There is much truth in what Charles Lamb wrote of his interest in the Seventeenth Century Comedy: "I confess for myself that (with no great delinquencies to answer for) I am glad for a season to take an airing beyond the diocese of the strict conscience—not to live always in the precincts of the law courts—but now and then for a dream-while or so, to imagine a world with no meddling restrictions—to get into recesses where the hunter cannot follow me—I am back to my cage and my restraint the fresher and more healthy for it."

So it is with all sorts and conditions of men: the incalculable, the lawless remains an ineradicable factor in life.

Where there is little or no provision of or stimulus to art, the crudest and most sensational play tends to absorb the entire margin of energy left after work is done.

In such a state of society every field of activity capable of generating such elements of hazard is pressed into the service of gambling: sports and business occupations become popular in proportion as they can by their structure be made to

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minister to the craving for hazard: every sort of competition where a sufficient element of the incalculable exists is pervaded by gambling.

If the monotony of toil drives large numbers of workers to such violent sensational relief in gambling, the ennui of idleness prompts the leisured classes to the same abuse. A totally or partially parasitic life (where little or no socially directed labor is imposed), though leaving a large margin of free energy, makes more for dilettantism than for art, and depriving play of its healthy interest as a relief from work induces a "boredom" which fosters gambling among other sensational extravagances. Moreover in the rich, leisured class the disproportion between earning and spending loosens the just sense of property more than in any other class, so that large miraculous transfers of property by betting seem less discrepant with the ordinary conditions of their life.

This line of diagnosis makes it quite apparent what are the real supports of gambling and how the vice inheres in the wide "social problems," only to be cured or abated in proportion as sounder general conditions of social order are obtained. When we regard the actual life of an ordinary worker in a factory town we can easily understand the attraction of "betting." It is hard to refuse sympathy to the factory "hand" or clerk who occasionally puts his "shilling" on a horse, goes through his weary day's work with the zest of expectancy and hope afforded by his speculation. It gives him a topic of conversation in the intervals of his work and is for him a sort of "politics" in leisure hours: into his dull life it introduces an element of romance.

It is, however, impossible to discuss the practical ethics of modern gambling without regarding that factor of pure gambling, which we have analyzed, in its actual place as part of a vicious amalgam in a dissipated life.

We have chiefly considered the derationalising influence of the anarchic element of chance which is the nucleus of the process. But regarded as a mode of transfer of property gambling involves a union of several anti-social desires. The desire to take unearned gains is, as we have seen, itself

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immoral, for such gains of necessity imply an injury to some other known or unknown persons, nor in the case of gambling is the damage thus done to the character of a winner mitigated by the knowledge that those from whom he wins have sought similar unearned gains at his expense. In many natures the possibility of such facile gain quickens the latent instinct of avarice, one of the most insidiously disintegrating influences in human society, inviting as it does complete self-absorption and an entire loss of sympathy with the material interests of one's fellows. The brooding infatuation of the habitual gambler chills human sympathy more certainly than any other practice, inducing not indeed enmity or active animosity so much as a callousness which views the misfortunes of others with placid indifference. It is just this absorption upon selfish ends in reference to incidents fraught with emotional strain that is prone at once to break down the whole fabric of the moral character and to dethrone the reason. For as man is only moral and rational as a being who stands in orderly relation to other similar beings in human society, so a practice based on a virtual denial of this social order is the arch enemy of human personality: instead of a man we have a self-absorbed emotionalist. "In the making of a bet—a man resolves to repress the use of his reason, his will, his conscience, his affections; only one part of his nature is allowed free play, and that is his emotions." [1]

The passion of gambling, once settled in a man, seems to take physical root in him and to be almost as difficult to expel as drink, opium, or any other acquired physical vice. In extreme cases, it is often held, gambling tends to absorb all other interests, even swallowing up its associate vices. This, however, is not the normal case. Gambling commonly consorts with drink: gambling houses are commonly places for the sale of alcoholic liquors, and wherever the law permits, or can be evaded, drink-shops are betting haunts. Professional gamblers are doubtless sober when they ply their craft, for skill and cunning are requisite in most kinds of "mixed"

[1] "The Ethics of Gambling." W. D. Mackenzie, p. 64.

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gambling: a broker "cornering" the market, like a bookmaker handling a sudden shift in the odds, or a cardsharper with suspicious dupes, needs to have his wits about him. But it is not as gamblers but as tricksters that these men need to be sober, and as they require sobriety in themselves they desire the opposite in their dupes. Hence, the business of gambling is often done in an atmosphere of alcohol. This is not, however, invariably the case. The temperament of some people is so sanguine and so prone to reckless play that no physical stimulant seems necessary. But in Northern European peoples drink is usually necessary to induce that instability of judgment and disregard of the future which are conditions of gambling.

The statistics of crime prove beyond all cavil that gambling is the king's highway to fraud and theft. This is not merely because it loosens general morality and in particular saps the rationale of property, but because cheating is inseparably associated with most actual modes of gambling. This does not imply that most persons who bet are actually cheats or thieves: but persons who continue to be cheated or robbed, half conscious of the nature of the operations, are fitting themselves for the other and more profitable part if they are thrown in the way of acquiring a sufficient quantity of evil skill or opportunity. The "honor" of a confirmed gambler, even in high life, is known to be a very hollow commodity, and where there is less to lose in social esteem even this slender substitute for virtue is absent. What percentage of "men who bet" would refuse to utilise a secret tip of a "scratched" favorite or the contents of an illegally disclosed sporting telegram? The barrier between fraud and smartness does not exist for most of them.

Serious investigation of the gambling process discloses the fact that pure gambling does not afford any economic basis of livelihood, save in a few cases where, as at the roulette table or in a lottery, those who gamble know and willingly accept the chances against them. And even in the case of the roulette table the profits to the bank come largely from the advantage which a large fund possesses in play against a

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smaller fund: in the fluctuations of the game the smaller fund which plays against the bank is more likely at some point in the game to be absorbed so as to disable the player from continuing his play. If a man with £1,000 were to play "pitch and toss" for sovereigns with a number of men each of whom carried only £10, he must, if they played long, win all their money. So, even where skill and fraud are absent, economic force is a large factor in success.

Since professional gambling in a stock broker, a croupier, a bookmaker, or any other species, involves some use of superior knowledge, trickery, or force, which in its effect on the "chances" amounts to "loading" the dice, the non-professional gambler necessarily finds himself a loser on any long series of events. These losses are found in fact to be a fruitful cause of crime, especially among men employed in businesses where sums of money belonging to the firm are passing through their hands. It is not difficult for a man who constantly has in his possession considerable funds which he has collected for the employer to persuade himself that a temporary use of these funds, which otherwise lie idle, to help him over a brief emergency, is not an act of real dishonesty. He is commonly right in his plea that he had no direct intention to defraud his employer. He expected to be able to replace the sum before its withdrawal was discovered. But since not only legally but morally a person must be presumed to "intend" that which is a natural or reasonable result of his action, an indirect intention to defraud must be ascribed to him. He is aware that he is acting wrongly, as well as illegally, in using the firm's money for any private purpose of his own. But in understanding and assessing the quality of guilt involved in such action, two circumstances extenuating his act, though not the gambling habit which has induced it, must be taken into account. A poor man who frequently bets must sooner or later be cleared out and unable, out of his own resources, to meet his obligations. He is induced to yield to the temptation the more readily for two reasons. First there is a genuine probability (not so large, however, as he thinks) that he can replace the money before any "harm

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is done." So long as he does replace it no harm appears to him to have been done: the firm has lost nothing by his action. This narrower circumstance of extenuation is supported by a broader one. The whole theory of modern commercial enterprise involves using other people's money, getting the advantage of this use for one's self and paying to the owner as little as one can. A bank or a finance company is entrusted with sums of money belonging to outsiders on condition that when required, or upon agreed notice, they shall be repaid. Any intelligent clerk in such a firm may be well aware that the profits of the firm are earned by a doubly speculative use of this money which belongs to other people: it is employed by the firm in speculative investments which do not essentially differ from betting on the turf, and the cash in hand or other available assets are kept at a minimum on the speculative chance that depositors will not seek to withdraw their money as they are legally entitled to do. In a firm which thus lives by speculating with other people's money, is it surprising that a clerk should pursue what seems to him substantially the same policy on a smaller scale? It may doubtless be objected that a vital difference exists in the two cases: the investor who puts his money into the hands of a speculative company does so knowingly and for some expected profit: the clerk who speculates with the firm's money does so secretly, and no possible gain to the firm balances the chance of loss. But even to this objection it is possible to reply that the revelation of modern finance in such cases as the Liberator and the Globe Finance Companies shows that real knowledge of the use to which money will be put cannot be imputed to the investor in such companies, and that, though some gain may possibly accrue to him, such gain is essentially subsidiary to the prospects of the promoters and managers of these companies.

It is true that these are not normal types of modern business: they are commonly designated gambling companies, some of them actually criminal in their methods. But they only differ in degree, not in kind, from a very large body of modern businesses, whose operations are so highly specu-

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lative, their risks so little understood by the investing public and their profits apportioned with so little regard to the body of shareholders, as fairly to bring them under the same category. In a word, secret gambling with other people's money, on the general line of "heads I win, tails you lose," is so largely prevalent in modern commerce as perceptibly to taint the whole commercial atmosphere. Most of these larger gambling operations are either not illegal or cannot easily be reached by law, whereas the minor delinquencies of fraudulent clerks and other employees are more easily detected and punished.

But living in an atmosphere where secret speculation with other people's money is so rife, where deceit or force plays so large a part in determining profitable coups, it is easy to understand how an employee, whose conduct in most matters is determined by imitation, falls into lax ways of regarding other people's money and comes in an hour of emergency to "borrow" the firm's money. This does not excuse his crime, but it does throw light upon its natural history.

Publicity and education are, of course, the chief instruments for converting illegitimate into legitimate speculation, for changing commercial gambling into commercial foresight. This intelligent movement towards a restoration of discernible order and rationality in business processes, by eliminating "chances" and placing the transfer of property and the earning of industrial gains on a more rational foundation, must, of course, go *pari passu* with other movements of social and industrial reforms which aim simultaneously at the education of individual personality and the reformation of the economic environment. Every step which places the attainment of property upon a sane rational basis, associating it with proportionate personal productive effort, every step which enables men and women to find orderly interests in work and leisure by gaining opportunities to express themselves in art or play under conditions which stimulate new human wants and supply means of satisfying them, will make for the destruction of gambling.

LONDON. JOHN A. HOBSON.

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THE POLITICAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF LYNCHING.

The statement is often heard that constitutional government in America is losing ground, that confidence in the written word is waning, and that those who still retain their old loyalty to the constitution do so by conscious defense and apology rather than with enthusiasm. The fifteenth amendment is cynically nullified throughout a very wide section of the country, short cuts to direct results are taken as in the Panama affair, and partisans, not without some show of reason, point to a dismal array of so-called executive and legislative "usurpations." With the view that opportunism is in the saddle and that the fundamental law is being overridden by groups of citizens or governmental agents, the writer has little sympathy. The men who sat in the Philadelphia convention never dreamed of the necessity of coaling stations in the Pacific nor of the immense capacities for human intercourse dormant in steam and electricity. No peoples except the stagnant societies of the Orient are governed by the unchangeable words of dead men. The spirit giveth life, the letter killeth. The expanding needs of a society demand a readjustment of creeds, formulas, and statutes to meet changed conditions. This change may proceed silently through legal fictions and extra-constitutional understandings or obtrusively through the violent processes of revolution. The human organism develops through the unconscious adaptation of structure to the demands of a larger life. But a crab grows by bursting its shell and casting it off—this is progress through revolution. While the letter may in large measure determine the character of the spirit, the letter must keep pace with the demands of expanding growth or be cast off as an outworn shell in the form of obsolete law. No government, as it exists on paper, exactly corresponds to the realities of its working form. That which is extra-constitutional—usage, tradition, precedent, actual administration—is as much a part of constitutional government as the accepted enunciations of a constitutional convention.

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In the opinion of the writer we suffer to-day not so much from strong governments outrunning constitutional limitations as from weak governments which lag behind in giving effect to constitutional guarantees. This is particularly true of the state governments. Labor agitation in one great state deprives the entire nation of hard coal. The national government is helpless to provide a remedy under its constitutional limitations and the state government weakly halts in its duty of preserving public order. In Colorado during the present year, groups of men have defied the law and proceeded to run mining communities with dynamite and shotguns. Here, as in other parts of the country, men were brutally beaten for the sole reason that they were working for their living in pursuance of the liberty guaranteed them by the constitution. A day seldom passes without its grim record of mob violence in some part of the country—violence which deprives some human being of "life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Mob law is becoming epidemic in America. These outbreaks of lawlessness tend to reduce constitutional government to a sham and to lower the character of the American nation in the eyes of the whole world. A Senator of the United States, as recently reported in the public press, defended the burning of two Mississippi negroes on the ground that the act was necessary to the "preservation of society." The preservation of society is becoming a stock argument for mob violence. There is a law of necessity and life governing human relations, we are told, which is higher than any formal rules of legal obligation. Excuses for the lynching of negroes have been made on the ground of the law's delay, or the cruelty of requiring testimony of a certain character in open court. But in Somerset County, Maryland, a few years ago, a negro was taken from the Court House by a mob and violently put to death at the close of a trial in which he had been legally sentenced to capital punishment. Rcently in Statesboro, Georgia, two negroes were taken from almost the shadow of a court of justice, in which they had been sentenced to the gallows, and burned alive at the stake. These self-appointed administrators of justice had no complaint to make of the

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law's delay or of a miscarriage of justice. Let us credit the more intelligent members of these mobs with the notion that they were discharging a public duty. Let us assume that they were intent upon the maintenance of law and order in the community, and that these acts of quasi-private retribution were demanded in the interests of the preservation of society.

Let us scrutinize these claims from the standpoint of the principles involved in self-government. There are two general sets of conditions under which lynchings are to be interpreted as social phenomena. These conditions, in large measure, determine the character of lynching as a defense of society or as an offense against society. The rude life of the frontier and of the stampede mining camp furnishes an illustration of inchoate civil society in process of becoming. The "popular justice" of a vigilance committee is the crude advance agent of sheriff, judge, and jury. Under such conditions, the preservation of society may owe much to the swift processes of popular justice. Lynching is thus a protest against anarchy. But there is another set of conditions under which lynching means a return to anarchy and the abandonment of constitutional government. Where popular government is fully established, mob violence is a crime against society. It is a curious commentary upon our civilisation that the lynching spirit has invaded communities which build court houses and jails, support Christian churches and contribute liberally to the evangelisation of the heathen sitting in darkness. For example, recent notable cases are reported from Wilmington, Del.; Evansville, Ind.; Springfield, O.; Statesboro, Ga.

It is a truism to observe that the peril of democracy lies in its lack of self-restraint. Any proper conception of freedom in a self-governing community is based upon obedience to law. Mob law as an assertion of liberty on the part of a group to extemporise law, means a denial of the political freedom based upon submission to law. One must reflect that the highest political freedom is found in obedience to the will of the entire community, rather than in the satisfaction of the partial, capricious will of a fraction of the community.

In the juristic or primary sense, freedom means power to act

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as one wills. In the psychological sense, freedom means power to act as one wills. Ethical freedom means something more than power to act or power to will as one wills. Ethical freedom is concerned not only with power of willing, but with the character of the objects willed. Legally and psychologically, the drunkard is free—ethically he is in bondage. The object which he wills is a hindrance to the realisation of his highest good. True freedom is freedom to realise one's highest self. The highest self in turn represents the permanent interests of the whole man rather than the transient, temporary interests of particular impulses. Thus it is that the higher self is to be realised through obedience to the demands of the whole self seeking its permanent good rather than in the satisfaction of the demands of the capricious partial self seeking its temporary good.

Self-realisation is not a mere cant term of stale philosophic flavor. Self-realisation means the attainment of freedom through the development of latent capacities. These latent capacities become actual powers through surrender to demands of universal law. A poor boy looking to the future says, "I mean to deny myself present satisfactions and by rigid economy and perseverance gain an engineering education and so become a great bridge builder;" another says, "I will apply myself to the study of music and some day become a famous musician." In these cases the agent puts before himself another self which he hopes to realise and this other self is a completer, a freer self than the old self. But the process of self-realisation implies on the other hand self-surrender and self-denial. The music student intent upon realising his higher self cannot afford to indulge his caprices or ignore the imperatives of the music master. It is for him to labor, to sacrifice, and to obey. But by and by through the hard process of becoming, he consciously attains a higher freedom. Having been a slave to a musical instrument, he becomes its master and with a marvelous power of manipulation and interpretation, comes into the possession of a freedom which is at once the admiration and despair of the novice.

Between self-control and self-realisation the closest ethical

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relationship subsists. Moreover a similarly close relationship exists between self-universalisation and self-realisation. According to the Kantian teaching, freedom consists in a life ordered by reason in accordance with the principles of universal law. "So act," says Kant, "that the maxim of thy conduct may be fit for law universal." [1] No man has succeeded in moulding himself into a higher self except through submission to law universal. Culture itself in a happy phrase of Bosanquet's is defined as the "liberation from one's own caprices and the acceptance of a universal task." [2] This acceptance of a task universal constitutes what is termed "self-universalisation." A man strips himself of his crudities, his caprices and his vanities as he merges himself in a greater whole and thus attaches himself to a "definite class of service renderers." It is common to refer to a man as "tied down" by the necessity of supporting a family, but in this connection the idea of bondage is to be properly applied only in a juristic sense. Freedom of action may indeed be limited by duty to one's family, but ethically a man realises his freedom in the acceptance rather than in the rejection of these obligations. In the routine duty which many a father, of limited means, undertakes in the education of his children—the satisfaction of tastes for travel, for horses, for servants, is surrendered in the interests of a task universal. From the standpoint of the good father, the effort to realise the welfare of his children is an effort towards self-realisation. Should such a man die in poverty, he has none the less failed at self-realisation, inasmuch as the object which he put before himself to be realised was not wealth, but the intellectual and spiritual well-being of his family. There is nothing puzzling, therefore, in the notion of freedom through submission to the law of the ethical self. Self-control, self-abandonment, self-universalisation are only other terms to express liberation from the capricious self seeking its satisfaction in objects which defeat the realisation of satisfaction. The ordinary man believes that he is free when allowed to follow his caprices, but precisely in caprice is

[1] "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik d. Sitten," Sec. 1.
[2] "Philosophical Theory of the State," p. 275.

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involved a contradiction of freedom. "When I will the rational, I do not act as a particular individual, but according to the conception of ethical observance in general. A man who acts perversely exhibits particularity. When a great artist finishes a work we say, 'It must be so.' The particularity of the artist has wholly disappeared and the work shows no mannerism. Phidias has no mannerism; the statue itself lives and moves, but the poorer is the artist, the more easily we discern himself, his particularity and caprice." [3]

In like manner from the standpoint of the theologian, the higher self is to be realised in the glory of God. In the injunction, "Be ye perfect even as your Father in Heaven is perfect," is presented an end outside of self whose realisation is the despair of the "natural man." Yet the attempted fulfilment of the idea of perfection by an imperfect being means the abandonment of the false freedom of caprice and the acceptance of the true freedom of self-realisation. St. Paul on one occasion proclaims that he was born free, yet on another occasion cries out, "Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" Paul's ideals had undergone a sudden change on the journey to Damascus. The heavenly vision had revealed to him a goal of moral perfection to which he could aspire but not attain. The things which he now struggles for with imperfect success were, in no way, objects to be struggled for by the old self. He was "alive once without the law," now he is in "bondage to fear." He is conscious of his inability to perfectly measure up to the requirements of the newly-revealed law and the new ideal fills him with a depressing sense of his bondage to the flesh. The law is "spiritual," but he is "carnal." But what is at first done with difficulty, by rule, and with a depressing sense of imperfection, is done, after a while, by instinct and by nature. The law, at first presented as a hard external rule of conduct, may become an internal principle of action. The outward formula may be transformed into a self-legislated maxim of conduct. And so it was that Paul, who so bitterly complained of the schism

[3] Hegel's "Philosophy of Right," Dyde trans., p. 26.

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between the law of his Spirit and the law of his members has, later on, occasion to rejoice that he has received, in the stead of the old spirit of bondage to fear, the spirit of adoption. That is to say, becoming conscious of union with God through adoption, he becomes a partaker in the divine will as represented by the hard external law. This law which was once his despair becomes, as an internal principle of action, his hope. "The law of the spirit of life" frees him from the "law of sin and death," and he is consciously delivered from the bondage of corruption into the "glorious liberty of the children of God." [4] He is free because, in Kantian phrase, "he is conscious of himself as the author of the law which he obeys." [5] He is conscious that he is realising his good by conforming to the right.

In like manner from the standpoint of the good citizen in a well-ordered state, it may be maintained that, while self-realisation is the end of conduct, the highest self-realisation must include within its reach loyalty to the state and reverence for its laws. In this aspect the good citizen attains his freedom through obedience to hard external rules of conduct. But in civilised states, at least, he is free because conscious of himself as the author of a law which he obeys. In the thought of Aristotle, the ἀπολις—the cityless, masterless man was a monster—an aberration from the kindly race of men. The truth was recognised that the Greek city state necessarily tended to rationalise and humanise the citizen. The modern state *a fortiori* with its manifold disciplinary, educational, and reformatory influences does directly contribute to ethical freedom. In the Hegelian teaching, the state is regarded as the realised ethical idea.[6] The particular self-consciousness raised to the plane of the universal constitutes the true essence of the modern state. This, once more, is self-realisation through self-universalisation. In the hard sacerdotal despotisms of the East there exists no union of universality and particularity in the state. The one notion of citizenship is that of *status,* im-

[4] Romans VII, 19; VIII, 2, 21.
[5] cf. Green, "Principles of Political Obligation," p. 5.
[6] Hegel, op. cit. Sections 257, 260, 261, note.

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plying obligation to some substantive reality. The modern state regarded as an ethical person also implies obligation to a substantive reality; but as in the case of the obligation implied in the self-imposed law of the ethical self, duty is only another aspect of freedom. In a well-ordered state, duty and right are bound together in the same reference. In fulfilling his civic duties, a man is seeking to realise his good by conforming to the right. This is the freedom which inheres in loyalty to law —in the loyalty that springs from conscious identity between my particular good and the universal good.

The true explanation of political obligation is found in the explanation of ethical obligation. Obligation in both cases implies the duty of obedience, and the duty of obedience in both cases implies the attempt to realise a higher self through the fulfilment of the idea of perfection. In the paradox of ethical obligation we inquire how self may exercise authority over self— in the paradox of political obligation we inquire how selves may exercise coercion over selves. In both cases the answer is found in the control of the particular by the universal. In ethical obligation the self achieves a higher freedom through the subordination of the partial self of caprice and impulse to the demands of the permanent good of the whole man. In political obligation the citizen achieves a higher freedom through the subordination of the demands of the purely egoistic self to the demands of a social self. A real identity of meaning exists, as Mackenzie has pointed out, between the freedom of a man who is inwardly master of himself and the freedom of a citizen who is outwardly mastered by the coercive power of a civilised state.[7] Freedom in both cases implies the satisfaction of the whole self through the submission of the partial self. In each case we have to do with the conditions under which a man may realise his real will rather than his trivial, capricious, actual will. The essence of the virtue of constitutional government resides in this: It provides for the triumph of the real will seeking the permanent good of the whole over a capricious actual will seeking the temporary good

[7] "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 174.

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of a part. Under a proper respect for the principles of constitutional government the public officer and the private citizen alike are restrained from seeking their good in objects which defeat the realisation of the good of the whole. Constitutionalism is the foe to opportunism and to headstrong and hasty action. Lynch "law" is a contradiction in terms. The lyncher's claim that he is vindicating the criminal law is specious. He is an enemy of law and a reproach to popular government. He is substituting his vengeful, capricious, temporary, actual will for the real will of society, seeking a universal good through orderly legal process. It is the savage's degraded idea of liberty—it is the false and contradictory freedom of the brutish man who prefers the immediate greedy satisfaction of the animal self to the realisation of the permanent good of the whole man. The lyncher displays his freedom in the choice of Esau. Savage-like, he cannot postpone the present to the future.

There is another aspect of the case that may be briefly considered. Mob violence, in contemptuously denying to its victims the enjoyment of constitutional rights, serves not only to bring contempt upon the processes of criminal law, but also serves to undermine the foundations of public morality. Passion breeds passion. Lawlessness breeds lawlessness, and the hot and spasmodic effort to vindicate the majesty of the criminal law actually serves to invoke contempt for legalised justice. The vendetta, the "blood revenge," "private justice," all imply a rejection of the sufficiency and authority of public laws against crime. In civilised society a crime is a legislatively determined offense, its essence being found in an imperiling of the public welfare. The *lax talionis,* as unofficially administered, is nothing more nor less than an assertion that society is resolved into its original elements.

A closer genetic relationship obtains between individual morality and respect for the external law than is ordinarily supposed to exist. In most classes of human action, the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy is apparently simple. A self-legislated act is autonomous in character, while an act done under external compulsion or in accordance with law

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given by another is heteronomous. The science of ethics is mainly concerned with human conduct from the view point of autonomy. Ethics deals with the individual as a rational animal, controlling his own conduct with reference to an ideal. In ethics, therefore, laws for the regulation of human conduct are properly regarded as self-legislated. The science of Jurisprudence is mainly concerned with human conduct from the view point of heteronomy. Jurisprudence considers the conduct of the individual primarily in relation to the rights of others, and laws designed to protect these rights are imposed by external authority. But as between the self-legislated laws of ethics and the externally imposed laws of Jurisprudence the closest relationship exists. In enlightened societies that which is legally commanded by the state as good tends to coincide with that which is ethically commanded by the conscience as right. The springs of public and private right tend to meet at a common source, hence it is impossible to distinguish, in many classes of conduct, between autonomy and heteronomy. The ethical self assimilates to itself the external law, establishes a harmony between the inner and outer law and becoming conscious of itself as the author of a law originally presented externally, converts heteronomy into autonomy. Autonomy of the will expresses itself in an effort to realise a moral ideal. Yet this ideal, in turn, is determined in far greater measure than we suspect by the provisions of external law. How otherwise explain the life-long *remorse* of the Hindoo widow who has failed in the *duty* of sacrificing her own life on the funeral pyre of her husband? Again one may readily concede to the Anglo-Saxon polygamist, as a member of a society which legislatively insists upon monogamy, occasional "compunctious visitations" of conscience; but in the case of a Mohammedan polygamist, unrestrained by the provisions of external laws, one may properly concede occasional emotions of regret, but never emotions of remorse. Among the ancient Hebrews, the deeply rooted conviction that idol worship, magic, and divination, the consecration of children to Moloch, Sabbath breaking, and disobedience to parents were heinous and mortal sins was chiefly due to the fact that the ancient historical law had pro-

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nounced these offenses atrocious crimes and punished them by the severest penalties. As Mr. Lea observes in this connection: "To the Hebrew priest the preservation of his religion was the one essential thing and no penalty was too severe for aught that threatened its supremacy." [8] The moral aversion in Christian communities to-day for what is termed "Sabbath desecration" bears a close relation to external laws, whether civil or ecclesiastical, against Sunday employments. It is not enough to explain away these external laws as the result, rather than the cause, of the moral feeling on the subject of Sabbath observance. The candid mind is forced to admit that no inborn sense of right counsels abstinence from worldly employments on one day in every seven. Sabbath observance is genetically dependent upon external law and is in no wise founded upon eternal and imprescriptible moral law. Again, marriage with a deceased wife's sister is widely regarded as a moral wrong in England where its legal prohibition has long existed. The average American, on the other hand, does not concern himself with either the legal or moral aspects of the question. This seems to be a clear case of founding *malum in se* upon *malum prohibitum.* A somewhat similar case is presented by the moral and legal aspects of wife beating. Formerly under the English common law, a husband's right to beat his wife with a stick, not exceeding the thickness of his thumb, was legally perfect. This method of maintaining domestic discipline is now legally prohibited by Anglo-Saxon codes and wife beating is regarded as a moral no less than as a legal offense. It may be objected that the legal change was the expression rather than the cause of moral change—yet I am inclined to think that in this case, as in many others, new moral standards were actually created by changes in the external law.

A surrender to heteronomy means a rejection of human responsibility. An act done under compulsion or solely for the purpose of escaping punishment is entitled to no moral consideration. The essence of moral conduct lies in autonomy, but we cannot escape the dilemma by rejecting heteronomy.

[8] "Ethical Values in History," H. C. Lea. *Am. Hist. Rev.,* Vol. IX, No. 2.

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The logic of autonomy means that every man is to be a law unto himself. But if the will is absolutely autonomous, why may I not legislate theft so long as I keep out of jail and maintain my social standing? As between autonomy and heteronomy of the will, we cannot make a choice of either to the exclusion of the other. The explanation of human conduct is found not in one but in both. The arts, graces, courtesies, conventions, institutions, laws, and orderly relationships of family, trade, and church are so many limitations upon the actual will of the capricious self. But all, in turn, provide a wider scope for the expression of the real will seeking to fulfil the idea of perfection. The struggle to attain a higher, freer self through the process of divesting self of social relationships finds pitiful illustration in the history of anchoritism. The hermit who, in solitary contemplation, would realise "the peace that passeth all understanding" is realising nothing but the "fury of desolation." The chief thing to be remarked about an air plant is its singular ability to live at all. The self, divested of social contact, is a maimed, incomplete, partial self. Ethical and legal freedom depend upon social relationships. These relationships in turn depend for their security upon strict observance of law.

The nullifier of the law, in a civilised state, is the foe rather than the preserver of society. He is undermining the moral as well as the political structure of society. In the act of punishing the gravest offenses against morality, he is the destroyer rather than the creator of moral values. It is self-contradictory to assert that the moral sentiment of a community supports an act of mob violence. Such support is an indication of a moral sentiment that is diseased or defective. The lyncher goes unpunished because the moral sentiment of the community is too weak to assert itself. In these communities witnesses of lynchings "having eyes see not," and "having ears hear not." Grand juries will not indict and sheriffs will not arrest. In such localities, where public opinion tacitly sustains the resort to mob violence, an honest return to popular government by law can only be expected through the creation of higher moral values. In this process of creation, the external civil law may

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be made to play a most important part. A State law, such as that of Ohio or Louisiana, which holds the local community pecuniarily responsible for a lynching outrage, is a step in the right direction. There seems to be no reason, in principle, why communities should not be held responsible for mob violence to persons, just as they have long been held responsible for mob violence to property. This is a return to the ancient Anglo-Saxon principle of the *Weregeld.* The demand of the State upon the township, parish, or county for a "man-price" or blood money strikes a responsive chord in the breast of every taxpayer. Fulfilling the ordinary law of material self-interest the taxpayer becomes the direct guarantor of orderly legal process. To give to every man's life a valuation in point of law, is to give to human life a distinct valuation in point of morals. The beauty and majesty of the law are, in no aspect, so supremely illustrated as in the point of equality of application. Without passion and without prejudice, without haste and without delay, without fear and without favor, the law is presumed to know no distinctions of rank and fortune. The vile wretch who a few years ago, wantonly robbed this nation of its most conspicuously valuable life was safe-guarded in his trial by all the legal rights of which our civilisation boasts. From the legal view point the life of the murderer was of equal value with the illustrious life which he cruelly destroyed. Impose upon local communities a legal assertion of the equal value of human life in terms of cash compensation and any prevailing notion that a life may be accounted cheap because it is vile, will pass away in the re-establishment of the orderly processes of justice under a constitutional government.

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THE RELATION OF THE ETHICAL TO THE ÆSTHETIC ELEMENT IN LITERATURE.

If we are to understand the function of literature and its relation to life, we must consider to some extent the wider question of the function of art and its relation to life. Poetry, at least, is generally included among the fine arts, and the same reasons will lead to the inclusion of the other forms of creative literature, not only the drama, but that form of prose literature which has recently to a large extent taken the place of the drama, and which will be chiefly in our minds in the present discussion,—I mean the Novel.

We must first distinguish between the Fine Arts and the useful or mechanical arts. Both are productive; but the aim and end of the productive activity is very different in the two cases. The useful arts come into existence in response to the needs of life; their aim is the supply of these needs. In this sense the fine arts, as such, are useless; they supply no need, or at least none of the lower and elementary needs. Their aim is pleasure or enjoyment; the productive activity which they exemplify is not an activity constrained by the necessities of human existence, but an activity as free as the play of the child, and its products are valued not for their utility, but for their beauty, for the æsthetic satisfaction which they give. The distinction between the mechanical and the fine arts is, of course, a distinction of degree, rather than of kind. The former pass into the latter by gradual and almost imperceptible steps. The useful may be also beautiful; and whenever we find this coincidence of beauty and utility, we have passed from the mechanical to the fine form of art. It is no doubt because of this coincidence, as well as because utility, or the adaptation of means to their ends, is itself an element in the beautiful, that Socrates, and others, have held that utility is the secret of beauty. Still we must recognise an added something in every truly artistic product —not mere unmeaning decoration which has no relation to the end which the thing is intended to serve, but a beautiful

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adaptation, or the use of beautiful means, to the end in question. The distinction between the mechanical and the fine arts may be said, then, to be that the former are primarily concerned with utility and that the æsthetic interest is always in them subordinated to the utilitarian, while the latter are concerned chiefly, if not exclusively, with the beautiful as such.

It is necessary further to distinguish carefully between the creative and the non-creative, or merely descriptive form of literature, that of science or history, for example. In both we have a representation of Reality; but the representation is in the one case a mere description, in the other an interpretation, an "imitation" of nature, a reproduction of life itself. Science and history are essentially realistic; art—and creative literature alone is art—is essentially idealistic. Science describes the facts as they are; art seizes the truth which the facts only imperfectly suggest, translates the *facts* into *truths*, or shows us the facts as they ought to be, and as they have it in them to become. Thus it is that, in the words of Aristotle, "Poetry is more philosophic and of higher worth than history." It seizes the universal, the typical, the human element in the facts of human experience, and uses the particular facts of that experience merely as the vehicle of this their common truth or meaning. Of all creative literature we may use the words which a great poet has used of poetry—it is "the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge," it is knowledge consummated and made perfect. Literature is, in another but not less true sense than science, an "anticipation of nature," a fulfilment of her unfulfilled prophecies, a completion of her uncompleted purposes. It is an "anticipation" of *human* nature, a fulfilment of her unfulfilled prophecies, a completion of her uncompleted purposes. Its function is not to describe the facts of the moral life, to re-tell the tale of man's failure and imperfection—it may leave that to the moral analyst, to the biographer and historian—but to discover to us the *truth* of the moral life, its ideal meanings and possibilities.

Literature, then, is not realistic in the sense that it is a mere

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transcript of nature, an indiscriminate or photographic duplicate of the facts of human experience as they actually occur; it is not an "imitation of nature" in the sense that it simply "holds the mirror up to nature," or reflects the actual life of man. Its function is to transcend the actual facts, and depict the ideal possibilities; its truth is not the truth of fact, but the truth of idea. Yet there is an element of realism in all art, and an element of moral realism in all creative literature. If the ideal always *transcends*, it never *contradicts*, the actual. Its roots are deep in the actual; that is, the soil from which it springs. We must not confuse the idealism of art with mere romanticism or sentimentalism, the vision of the artist with the dream of the ghost-seer or sickly sentimentalist. As Professor Butcher has expressed it: "In fashioning his material [the poet] may transcend nature, but he may not contradict her; he must not be disobedient to her habits and principles. He may re-create the actual; but he must avoid the lawless, the fantastic, the impossible. Poetic truth passes the bounds of reality; yet it observes the laws which make the real world rational." A true idealism, as opposed to a false romanticism, recognises the inevitable limitations set to human life by its natural environment or external conditions. Romanticism breaks through these limitations, and pictures to us a life emancipated from these conditions, an unconditioned life. Such a life is an unreal and unintelligible life in an unreal and unintelligible world.

Now, the great condition of human goodness is that evil which is the enemy of goodness, but apart from which goodness as we know it would lose its meaning. The moral life is essentially a conflict of good with evil; what we call goodness is the triumph of the good in this conflict. A goodness which is not achieved in this way is not the ideal good of man. Or, to put the same thing in another way, an idealism which disregards the "flesh"; that is, the ordinary desires, affections, and appetites of human nature, condemning these natural human propensities as hopelessly evil and forever inimical to the spiritual life, is a false idealism, is not, indeed, strictly an idealism at all, but a sickly sentimentalism, a fool-

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ish and unmeaning romanticism. "From flesh unto spirit we grow"; and all true literary art will recognise and take account of the laws of this growth of the human spirit; that is, will possess ethical truth. Ethical truth means truth to ethical actuality as well as to ethical ideality. In this sense the moral artist must be realistic as well as idealistic; he must reckon not merely with the moral ideals of mankind, but with the conditions of human action and the elements of human nature.

It is doubtless the inevitable reaction from an abstract idealism or an empty and unmeaning romanticism that explains, in part at least, the realistic tendency of current literature. In the words of George Meredith, it is a reaction from the one extreme of "rose-pink" to the other, of "dirty drab." It takes the form of a naturalism which so affirms the influence of the environment or conditions of human life as to deny the reality of moral freedom, which so affirms the reality and the strength of evil as to deny the possibility of goodness, or the triumph of good over evil, which so identifies the moral nature with the "flesh," or natural and animal propensity, as to deny the possibility of any truly spiritual, or properly human, life for man. For the shallow and unfounded optimism of an abstract idealism it substitutes a pessimism which is the result of an equally shallow and one-sided observation and interpretation of the facts of our moral experience. If, then, we are to find deliverance from this realism or naturalism, on the one hand, and from this pessimism, on the other, it must be through a revision of our former naïve idealism in the light of the conditions of our moral experience which realism has emphasised, and through a revision of our former naïve optimism in the light of the facts of human experience to which pessimism has called our attention. To put the matter more concretely, if we would be delivered from the naturalism and pessimism of Thomas Hardy, it can only be through the idealism and optimism of George Meredith. Nor is the method of George Meredith a new method; it is the method of all truly great literature, it is the method of Greek tragedy, it is the method of Dante and Shakespeare

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and Milton. The great creative writers of the past have seen no irreconcilable quarrel between idealism and realism, between optimism and pessimism. An idealism which did not take account of all the facts of human nature, an optimism which did not reckon with all the evil of human life, had for them no meaning or value. But a realism which refused to see ideal possibilities in the real, which was blind to the spiritual possibilities in all, even the lowest animal elements of human nature, was equally repugnant to their clear vision of moral truth; a pessimism which ignored the possibility of a triumphant issue of the contest of good with evil, was impossible to their moral faith. Literature is essentially a "criticism of life," a criticism which, being grounded in true insight into its possibilities, condemns alike an idealism which has not incorporated into its very substance all the truth of realism, and a realism which, proclaiming itself to be the whole truth, refuses to be subordinated to the higher truth of what Meredith would call a "philosophic" idealism. For, in truth, as that great literary artist has so forcibly expressed it, in the future as in the past of literature, "rose-pink and dirty drab" are destined alike to pass away . . . the shuffle of extremes . . . where a phantom falseness reigns." "We are not so pretty as rose-pink, not so repulsive as dirty drab."

The present tendency to naturalism both in philosophy and in literature is in part, no doubt, the result of the scientific habit of thought which is so characteristic of our time, and which is itself the result of the remarkable advance of natural science in the latter half of the nineteenth century. From the point of view of natural science man is a natural being; but to naturalise man is to eliminate the properly human or ethical element in his nature; to regard him as a merely natural being is to regard him as a non-ethical being. The fallacy of naturalism arises from the ambiguity of the word "nature," which may mean either what man *is*—what he is born *as*, or what he has it in him to *become*—what he is born *to*. It is in this latter and deeper sense of the word that all true literature is true to human nature: it is true to

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that nature not in its poor actuality and in its lowly origins, but in the wealth of its ideal possibilities and in the height of its spiritual destiny.

Even so far as literature is inevitably realistic, its realism is implicit rather than explicit; while it may not contradict the laws of human nature, any more than it may contradict the laws of the wider cosmic system to which man belongs; while it must in this sense be scientific, just as painting and architecture must be scientific, it must never confuse its own proper function with that of natural science. The "psychological novel," with its analysis of character reminding us of a treatise on psychology, and still more the pathological novel or play, reminding us of a treatise on criminology or insanity, is not literature, not only because it loses the ideal in the actual, but because it confuses the function of art with that of science. A work of fiction may be very good science and at the same time very bad art—very bad art just because it is such good science. To make the analysis of character, and the discovery of psychological law, the explicit purpose of a novel or a poem is to destroy its literary value; to allow the psychological analysis to become explicit at all is like exhibiting to the audience the mechanism by which stage-effects are produced or explaining to the reader the laws of metrical composition upon which the rhythmic effects in a poem depend. The late Sir Walter Besant may not have been a great writer of fiction, but he at any rate knew well what was legitimate and what was illegitimate in the "art of fiction." "I have never," he tells us in his Autobiography, "attempted what is called 'analysis of character.' Most so-called 'analyses' of character are mere laborious talks—attempts to do on many pages what should be done in single strokes and in easy dialogue. If my people do not reveal themselves by their acts and words, then I have failed." With all the great novelists, as he says, "the analysis of character takes the form of presentation by act and word."

The tendency to limit the application of the term "reality" to the actual facts of experience—the tendency to a superficial realism which regards idealism as its contradiction—has

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led to the common mistake that literature, being mere fiction, a mere "imitation" or representation of reality, cannot possess the quality of truth. It has led even Plato, in spite of his own poetic nature and in spite of his idealistic interpretation of reality, to condemn the poets, with the exception of a small minority, to exile from his ideal State, as liars, who substitute appearance for reality, and keep men away from truth. The poet's world is three removes from reality, he tells us: it is the copy of a copy, the shadow of the shadow of the real world. Yet the poet makes us believe his lie, makes us take the picture for the thing itself. Now it is obvious that the world of art and of creative literature *is* a world of imagination, while the world of science and of descriptive literature is the world of actual experience. It is also obvious that the element of illusion is essential. Yet it is no less true, if not so obvious, that the element of fiction and illusion in literature is but the means by which the artist leads us away from the particular and accidental to the universal and essential aspects of human experience, but the finger-post which points the way from appearance and illusion to reality and truth. If we fail to see this, we make literature a mere amusement, a species of witchery and legerdemain whose only service is to beguile a weary hour or to relax and restore our tired intellectual energies by treating us as children with the child's passion for a story and the child's inexhaustible credulity. Nor can it be denied that this childish state of mind is wonderfully long-lived, and that there is a great deal of so-called "literature" which appeals only to this childish taste; but surely true literature always makes a higher appeal and has a higher value—is always marked by that "high seriousness" of which Matthew Arnold speaks, which leads it to use its illusions in the interests of truth. It was because the poets seemed to Plato to interpret their function as mere amusement, because their only end seemed to be to please—no matter by what devices—that he condemned them as not only a useless but a pernicious element in the State.

This Platonic criticism of poetry, or rather of the poets,

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raises the large and difficult question of the relation of the ethical to the æsthetic element in literature—the large and difficult question of the true interpretation of the principle, "Art for art's sake." In the light of what has been already said regarding the essential idealism, and therefore ethical truth, of literature, it is clear that the principle in question cannot mean that literature is non-ethical or indifferent to moral distinctions. Poetic truth and ethical truth cannot conflict; on the contrary, they must be identical. What the principle does mean can only be that the aim of literature, as of all art, is not to inculcate moral truth, or to influence conduct and character, not to teach or preach, but to please; and accordingly that to estimate its value in terms of its moral influence is to apply to it an irrelevant standard of value. Plato's criticism of the poets on account of the demoralising influence of their representations of moral badness, and his demand that they shall be allowed to represent only the good, would mean not merely the limitation, but the annihilation of literature. To restrain the poet or the novelist from the representation of evil as well as good, would be to make impossible his representation of goodness itself. But although the freedom of the literary artist must not be restrained by any intrusion of the thought of the moral influence of his work, although he may not compose his work with a moral purpose, it does not follow that the interests of morality are not safe in his hands. If ethical and literary truth are identical, then, even though evil must be represented as well as good, the influence of good literature cannot be demoralising; and a work that represents only evil is no more entitled to be called good literature than a work that represents only good. It is in the interplay of good and evil that the only meaning of good as well as of evil is discovered. To take a recent illustration, it is surely no less a literary or æsthetic than an ethical defect that, in "The House with the Green Shutters," there is one long monotone of sordid wickedness; as it is at once an æsthetic and an ethical defect in certain recent delineations of the same or similar types of Scottish life and character that they consist of one long-

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drawn monotone of insipid and untried goodness. "We are not so pretty as rose-pink, not so repulsive as dirty drab." Yet the objection recurs, the aim of literature being merely to please, its influence must be counter to the interests of morality, unless it is restrained by moral considerations. As Plato puts it, if the poets are allowed to pursue their vocation without let or hindrance, "pleasure and pain will have sovereign power in your State, instead of law and those principles which, by the general consent of all time, are most conformable to reason." But does not this insistence upon the inevitable hedonism of literature, as of art generally, overlook the all-important consideration that its function is not merely the production of pleasure or delight, but of æsthetic pleasure or delight? Aristotle, with fine insight, emphasises this essential objectivity of æsthetic satisfaction. As Professor Butcher expresses his view, "the subjective emotion is deeply grounded in human nature, and thence acquires a kind of objective validity. As in ethics Aristotle assumes a man of moral insight (ὁ φρόνιμος) to whose trained judgment the appreciation of ethical questions is submitted, and who, in the last resort, becomes 'the standard and the law' of right, so, too, in fine art a man of sound æsthetic instincts (ὁ χαριείς) is assumed, who is the standard of taste, and to him the final appeal is made. . . . The pleasure that any given work of art affords to him is the end of the art. . . . The state of pleasurable feeling is not an accidental result, but is inherently related to the object which calls it forth." The pleasure in question is, in truth, the appreciation of the beautiful, the satisfaction which the beautiful object yields to the æsthetic sensibility; and the morally beautiful is the good.

Literature, therefore, does teach, although its aim is not to teach, but to delight. While it is true that, in the words of Dryden, "poesy only instructs as it delights," Bacon's words are also true, that "poesy serveth to magnanimity, morality and to delectation," and Sidney's, that its aim is "to teach and to delight" or "delightful teaching." And I fancy it was this view of the poet's mission that Plato had in his

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mind as the possible "defense of poesy" when he guarded his sentence of exile with the condition that it was not necessarily final. It was not poetry, after all, but the poets—the false representatives of poetry—that he banished; there was another and a truer conception of poetry which his criticism of the actual poets was intended to call forth. "The sentence of exile is to remain in force against poetry until she has made her defense, either in lyrical or in some other measure;" and "I suppose," he adds, "we shall also allow those of her patrons who are lovers of poetry without being poets, to advocate her cause in prose by maintaining that poetry is not only pleasurable, but also profitable in its bearings upon governments, and upon human life: and we shall listen favorably. For we shall be gainers, I presume, if poetry can be proved to be profitable as well as pleasurable."

There is one other criticism which Plato makes on poetry, a criticism which is often made on literature in general, and especially on the novel, from the ethical point of view: namely, that its appeal being to emotion rather than to reason and will, its influence is inevitably subversive of the true relation of reason to emotion, and that, habituating as it does both the author and his readers to life in the world of imagination, and cultivating in them a bad habit of emotionalism which never finds expression in action, it unfits them for action in the real world. Aristotle's answer is that literature *educates* the emotions by purifying and ennobling them, by idealising or spiritualising them. The criticism rests in part upon the false or absolute antithesis, already discussed, between idealism and realism, and in part upon a mistaken and puritanic distrust of emotion. The criticism may be in large measure true of the average novel or play; it may be true also of that excessive interest in art itself which implies deficiency of interest in the practical life and failure in ordinary duty; it is not true of any novel or play which is entitled to the name of literature, or of that sane interest in literature which recognises that, while it ministers to the highest ethical ends, it is only one among other elements of the true life of man, and ought to stand in organic and harmonious relation to all the rest.

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The antithesis between literature or art, on the one hand, and life or action, on the other, is no less superficial than the antithesis between action and thought. Even Sir Walter Scott was haunted by this idea, and was in the habit of contrasting the greatness of action with the triviality of literature, or the mere representation of action. And Plato, with all his appreciation of the life of thought and depreciation of the merely practical life, argues with keen humor that if the poets had been fit for any kind of practical service they would never have been allowed to idle away their lives in writing poems, if they had been of any *use* to their fellows, they would never have been allowed to practice the *useless* art of poetry. "Is it conceivable that, if Homer and Hesiod had been really capable of improving men in virtue, they should have been suffered by their contemporaries to travel about reciting?" But surely if we believe in the practical power of ideals, and still more if we believe in the superior value of spiritual to merely material ends, we must admit that, though the sphere of literature is not any more than that of science and philosophy, itself the sphere of action, yet the man of letters, like the man of science, is far from useless, even from the point of view of action, and that the distinction between the useful arts and those which are not useful does not hold when we take into the account those higher uses which have reference to the higher ends of human life. To the best life of the nation and of the individual literature is an indispensable minister; it is a shallow utilitarianism which discovers no utility in it. We may confidently share the conviction of Matthew Arnold that "good literature"—the literature which is characterised by "high seriousness" and a true idealism—"never will lose currency with the world, in spite of momentary appearances; it never will lose supremacy. Currency and supremacy are insured to it, not, indeed, by the world's deliberate and conscious choice, but by something far deeper,—by the instinct of self-preservation in humanity."

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THE MORAL TRAINING OF THE YOUNG AMONG THE JEWS.*

A noted Philadelphia sculptress, Miss Katherine Cohen, has created a masterful figure emblematic of the Jew in his onward progress through the ages. He is presented as the sage of stately form and noble mien, his radiant countenance bearing the impress of divine inspiration. Whole volumes are conveyed by the attitude of eager and appreciative zeal with which he clasps to his heart the huge tome of the Hebrew Scriptures. This fond idealisation of her people, on the part of the artist, is not without ample justification in history. True, to the man on the street, the typical Jew is that tattered, sordid, and woebegone creature, tottering under his pack, scorned and despised of men. But you, who are students of history, well know that this guise of humiliation which has been forced by his persecutors on the hapless exile, conceals the soul of one who has suffered the most tragic of fates only that he might endure to render in loyalty that service to humanity unto which he felt himself commissioned from of yore. Thus, out of the long, dark past he has come and, in the consciousness of his manhood, he has now entered into the broad daylight of this twentieth century, still bearing in his arms his priceless treasure, the Bible, safeguarded with his very life's blood, through the dark ages. That gift he gladly places on the centre table of the family of man, rejoicing to know that it is universally esteemed as the world's best help in the moral training of the race.

How the Hebrew Scriptures developed was reviewed in your hearing in the able paper presented by Professor Jastrow.[1] Its moral ideas were traced from the primitive tribal concepts as they expanded into the national ideals of the Mosaic theocracy and finally developed into the broadest possible universalism

* A lecture in the Saturday Afternoon Course on "The Moral Training of the Young in Ancient and Modern Times," under the auspices of the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture.

[1] A lecture in the Saturday Afternoon Course by Professor Morris Jastrow, Jr.

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as conceived and proclaimed by those rarest and most unique geniuses the Hebrew Prophets. The final outcome of this development was that lofty Ethical-monotheism under the commanding influence of which the Bible was canonised in the fifth century before the Christian Era. From that time forward until the present hour, the moral training of the sons and daughters of Israel has been based upon the supreme ideal, therein proclaimed and frequently emphasised in the sententious injunction: "Holy shall ye be for I the Lord your God am holy" (Lev. xix, 2).

This call—"Holy, holy, holy is the God of Hosts!" running through all the Biblical ages, grows ever more intense and sublime in its power of appeal. Holiness is the synonym of all moral perfection. Man is constrained by this uplifting idealism to aim at moral perfection in conduct. "But how can mortal man be like God?" is the old inquiry of the Jewish Schools. The suggestive answer given provides the simple key to the practical Jewish method of character-building: "As God is merciful, long-suffering, acting with kindness, justice, and truth, so are you to be and so are you to act" (Talmud, Babli, Sotah End., Yalkut, 873).

These relations of the human and the divine apply to all mankind. Israel's election is simply an historic commission, a sublime but severe responsibility to be the custodian, teacher, and exemplar of the principles of morality in the service of the human race. These sterling precepts are grounded on the philosophic optimism which rests in the steadfast faith in the perfectibility of man through his endowment of a moral free will, acting under the urgency of the divine voice of conscience.

Resting on these doctrines there grew up a definite system for the moral training of the young, which has had a sustained history and development from earliest days to the present. The primary element of that system which has prevailed throughout the generations, is summarised in that simple injunction, which the devout Jew repeats thrice daily: "And thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt speak of them when thou sittest in thy house, when thou walkest by the way, when thou liest down and when thou risest up"

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(Deut. vi, 7). The parent was, and is by nature, the first teacher, imparting by precept and by example, walking and sitting, night and day, those lessons which mould character. The home was and yet remains the primary school for the moral training of the young. That first school and those first instructors have never been superseded. Indeed, I wish to emphasise my firm conviction that they never can be adequately replaced. I would enter my most earnest protest against the present day effort to remove from the home the sense of its responsibility in this matter, by laying an over-emphasis upon the scope and the demands of the school.

That organised institution we call a school, came not to supplant, but to supplement the home in reinforcing the moral education of youth. It grew out of the necessities of the disturbed and changed conditions which arose during the Second Hebrew Commonwealth. The stress of life robbed parents of the time needed for imparting instruction. Many proved incompetent for the task as this became more comprehensive. Wars and disasters increased the number of orphaned children. Thus ultimately the school became a necessity. At the beginning of the century preceding the Christian Era. the movement for organised instruction had advanced to such a stage that it had already become compulsory. The ordinance of Simon ben Shetach, the head of the Sanhedrin at that time, is of record in the Talmud (Yerushalmi Kethuboth, viii, end). "The world could not last but for the breath of the school children" is one of the fine Rabbinical utterances which reveals the intense seriousness with which this obligation was felt (Talmud, Babli Sabbath, 119 b).

Out of this elementary education developed a great system of advanced learning, as it became necessary to fit the youth for the important requirements of the Synagogue. The Synagogue or House of Assembly was not originally and distinctively the house of prayer. It was rather the Assembly of those who sought to learn the Law and the decisions of the Rabbis, as to its expanded application under new and changed conditions. It was really an Academy in whose exercises religious functions were a natural part. And, indeed, educa-

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tion has ever remained the central purpose of the Synagogue. "Study exceeds all things else," is the leading maxim of the sages. Study has been exalted by Judaism to the plane of worship—the offering of the intellect in the service of the divine.

After the destruction of their nationality, the life of the Jewish people in fact centered in the schools. There is a beautiful story told of Johanan ben Sakkai, the leading teacher of the time. Jerusalem was beleaguered by the Roman soldiers. In the love of his faith, he had recourse to a strange strategy. Feigning death, he had himself carried beyond the city walls in a coffin, borne by his disciples. He succeeded in making his way into the presence of Titus and revealing his identity, pleaded for a simple boon. "Let me open a school in the little seaport town of Jabne," he asked. So innocent a request could not well be denied.

Judea fell, but Judaism abode henceforth in safety in the schools. Thence she saw the downfall even of the mighty Roman Empire as she has witnessed the successive overthrow of every institution founded by men on immorality, cruelty, injustice, and wrong.

"Residence is forbidden in any town in which there is no school for the young!" (Talmud, Babli Sabbath, 119 b). This Rabbinical dictum has guided the Jewish people to the present day. Though in exile, poverty, and misery, they have yet never been without some intellectual life. In the Dark Ages of Europe, they were the active custodians of the world's knowledge. None of the great intellectual currents that have moved the thought life of mankind, but the Jews were profoundly stirred by them. As the Mosaic system had been a revolt against the materialistic sensualism of the heathen doctrines, and as the prophets combated the pessimistic dualism which in their day largely controlled the minds of men, so the latter Rabbins met and resisted the fascinations of the Grecian system, in which the æsthetic ideal was exalted above the moral. In Alexandria, Philo sought to co-ordinate the neo-Platonic theory of emanations from the Godhead with Judaism, and thus created the philosophic basis upon which Christology

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reared its imposing structure. Among the Mohammedans the Jews took a leading place in the discussions of the doctrines of the Mutazalites or Unitarians, who contended for a spiritual conception of God and for the doctrine of the freedom of the will. In the great Jewish Academies of Spain, the philosophy of Aristotle was earnestly considered and Moses Maimonides in his immortal work, "The Guide for the Perplexed," sought to harmonise that system with the Jewish faith.

All this intellectual wealth was brought into the Jewish schools where it passed through the fiery furnace of free and open discussion in the earnest effort to extract the pure gold of truth from the dross of error. This effort required and evoked two opposing schools of thought among the Jews. As of old, the Prophets set themselves against the strict ritualism of the Priests, so later, the much maligned and misunderstood Pharisees contended against the fixity of the vested rights and rigid doctrines of the Sadducees. The genial liberalism of the School of Hillel offset the severer decisions of the School of Shammai. Here I may be permitted to add that Jesus sided with the more liberal interpretation of the law that characterised the School of Hillel. The beautiful teachings which fell from his lips were Jewish. He made no departure from the Jewish doctrines. His disciples were all Jews. It is most astounding that the world continues wilfully to ignore these simple facts. All that literature and history contained in Apocrypha, Mishna, Hagada, and Halacha, by which alone the Gospels can be truly understood, is studiously disregarded and defamed. In the Middle Ages, Rabbanites and Karaites contended in the Jewish schools—the former for tradition, the latter for the unaided authority of the Biblical text. Later the Rationalists were set against the mystic Kabbalists or Hassidim. Thus all along the centuries the schools have been open and active.

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the Jews endured the worst period of their repression. Locked into Ghettos, denied ordinary human rights, regarded politically as outcasts, they were likewise shut out from the free participation in the intellectual movements of the nations. For the vast ma-

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jority of Jews these hard conditions still prevail. Under them, the life of the Jewish schools became contracted. The study of the Talmud and the legal codes was made supreme. Even Biblical study was subsidiary and philosophy largely neglected. The disputations often degenerated into a vapid scholasticism or polemics called Pilpul, which stimulated ingenuity and developed sophistry. The Yeshibah or higher school of learning was devoted to the sing-song mechanical process of memorising and discussing the obsolete legalism of bygone ages.

In the elementary school, the 'Heder, a similar parrot-like method prevails, by which the Hebrew language is imparted. A knowledge of Jewish History, religion, and doctrine are not thought of as distinct disciplines, but are left to be inferred and to be acquired as secondary matter from this unsystematic and haphazard method.

In spite of all this, however, it must not be supposed that the moral training of the young is a failure. The home still remains the safeguard of the people. The tenderness of domestic life was intensified by its very narrowness. The poor Jew who was a dog to the world, was in his home a prince. The hateful legislation and oppression to which he was subject, was calculated, with the utmost refinements of cruelty, to undermine his character. Driven to bay by his persecutors, what wonder he became a sullen creature in their eyes. In mere self-defense, he was forced to cultivate the arts of shrewdness, cunning, and duplicity. But within the confines of his own home and among his own people, he lived his own natural life. Men might harass his body, they could not mutilate his soul. None could assail the sanctity of his home, the purity of the marriage ties, the chivalric considerateness displayed toward women, the loving kindness for the aged and helpless, the tender paternal, filial and fraternal relations. These were and remain his effective moral supports.

Of vast importance in the moral training of the Jew is the poetic symbolism of his religious observances practiced in the home and in the sanctuary. These never fail to inspire and uplift with high thoughts and glowing idealism. The Passover rings out its glorious message of freedom and sustains the

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down-trodden with hope. Pentecost, with its majestic traditions of Sinai, impresses those sturdy lessons which makes the Jew everywhere law-abiding and peace-loving. Tabernacles, with its exquisite poetry is the harvest-home festival that makes the heart mellow with gratitude and by deepening the sense of human dependence, cultivates that true humility, which flowers into the well known deeds of Jewish charity, better called by him, "acts of loving-kindness." Purim, the Feast of Queen Esther, brings the sunlight of blithesome festivity even into the dingiest home. The Maccabean feast spurs the heroic and courageous impulses. The Sabbath impressing the sweetness of rest and the sanctity of work, is a moral teacher of incalculable force. The great days of searching, self-scrutiny, the New Year and Atonement Day, constitute a discipline which in sublimity and effective teaching of morals are, I believe, unsurpassed by any kindred institutions. Thus the home and the Synagogue unite to conserve and cultivate the ethical side of the life of the Jewish people.

In those Jewish schools which I have described, we may however, despite their defects, nevertheless discern a definite plan of Bible study which is exceedingly interesting. This plan is based upon the Bible readings in the Synagogue. These are traced in their origin back to the eighth chapter of Nehemiah in which Ezra is presented as reading the Law to the assembled people, men, women, and children. This reading became a permanent custom. Josephus and the Gospels give corroborative testimony to the fact that from the earliest days it was customary to read in the Synagogue the lessons from the Scripture. By the ordinance of the Rabbins, the Pentateuch was divided into fifty-four sections, one or more to be read each Sabbath, thus completing the whole in a year. The reading of these definitely assigned sections of the Pentateuch guides the studies of the home and the school.

The Gospel of St. Luke, ch. iv, 7, tells how Jesus was called to the desk in the Synagogue at Nazareth as any man of note coming into his old home would be still in our days. This honor Jesus fulfilled by turning the Scroll to the appointed section in the prophecies of Isaiah. He reads and then pro-

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ceeds to expound two of the verses (ch. lxi, 1, 2), "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he anointed me to preach good tidings to the poor," etc. This is a reference to another universal custom still prevailing among us of reading some selection from the Prophetical Books or the Hagiographa. I direct your attention to this, the oldest international system of Bible study extant. It is that which rules in all the Synagogues throughout the world and upon it to a large extent are the studies of the Jewish home and schools based, in the effort to impart to the young and to the old the lessons of that Scripture which is still the world's text-book of morals.

Such are the methods which have grown up among the Jewish people. These still prevail among the vast majority of them in all parts of the world, but especially in the lands of Eastern Europe and also here in America among the million or more of the immigrants who have fled to these hospitable shores from those places where the mediæval lies still darken the minds of the people, and recourse to massacre is still fostered and condoned by the state.

Permit me now to turn the page and read to you a new chapter, a more pleasing story in the history of my people as it relates to the subject in hand. When on the 27th day of September, 1791, the National Assembly of France convened to consider the enactment of the most momentous bill of human rights recorded for eighteen centuries in the statutes of any nation, then the wandering Jew crouched at the door of the legislative chamber and waited with bated breath and throbbing heart for the joyous announcement which at last proclaimed his emancipation and admitted him to the rights of citizenship. Can you conceive of the rapture with which that announcement seized upon his soul! Only he who has passed through like agonies of suffering and degradation can realise the joy of the free man. In the course of the nineteenth century, England, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Holland, Turkey, and other countries, followed the noble example of France. This was not all done in a day nor without the strenuous efforts and appeals on the part of the Jews themselves to the enlightened conscience of the modern world. This blessed land of liberty

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was the answer to the age-long prayers of our people. In 1492 the cruel edict of Ferdinand and Isabella issued under the domination of the bigot Torquenada, drove the Jews from Spain. The last ships to carry the exiles from that land passed those of Columbus in his voyage of discovery. A Jew, Santangelo, had supplied the money for the equipment of this voyage and Jews were among the crews. What a significant portent!

With what avidity the Jewish people leaped into the newly opened avenues of opportunity. Joyously they laid down their lives on many a heroic battlefield in the service of the countries that had given them freedom. Everywhere they have become ardent patriots; in peace, serving as faithful, loyal citizens. Into all the pursuits and industries hitherto closed to them, they plunged with zest and have everywhere become a valuable economic factor. It is almost pathetic to see with what anxiety they flocked to the schools and universities to slake their burning thirst for the knowledge of the modern day. Most noteworthy was the retroactive effect of this access to the sources of learning.

In Germany there sprang up what is called the Reform Movement in Judaism. Broadly stated, it was an honest effort to square the new life of the people with the old religion. The essential factor in this movement was the differentiation of the permanent from the transitory elements. Moses Mendelsohn, the sage of Berlin, had opened the new era of culture by translating the Bible into German. Under the inspiration of Dr. Leopold Zunz, of Berlin (1819), a scientific investigation of the origins and development of Jewish institutions was inaugurated. Hosts of scholars followed in his wake. The final results of these investigations have made possible that stupendous and monumental publication, "The Jewish Encyclopedia," of twelve massive volumes, now being issued in the English language and published in the city of New York.

The century of investigation became a century of transformation. The principle of progress could not be stayed in its speedy application to rites, ceremonies and customs. Nay, all

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ancient doctrines were subjected to its scrutiny and demanded a re-statement.

To quote the words of one of the leaders of this reformation: "The spirit of Rabbinical Judaism is diametrically opposed to the spirit of our time. Rabbinical Judaism has converted into religious ideas and tendencies all the exclusive national ideas and tendencies of the Bible which were intended for entirely different conditions and circumstances, and has thereby given them eternal validity. The Rabbis have perpetuated as religion the temporary part of Mosaism, the symbolism and particularism of the theocracy, and on the other hand, they misconceived and neglected its eternal element, the ideal of universalism, which was in truth the real purpose of the theocracy. Hence the irreconcilable conflict between Judaism and the spirit of the modern age" (Holdheim, "Reformbestrebung and Emancipation," p. 123, Schwerin, 1845).

Those who accepted these conclusions found a readjustment imperative in the home, the Synagogue and the school. It is the latter which alone concerns our inquiry. The effect on the educational system was revolutionary. That revolution is still in process. In the first place, it compelled the broadening of the curriculum to introduce the entire course of secular studies. It relegated the Talmud and all its appendages to the new seminaries for the education of Rabbis and specialists. It led to the introduction of instruction in modern languages, history, and science. In the course of time, it was found that all this work was better done in the public schools, and so these special Jewish schools for general education were and are still being steadily abandoned in all countries. The study of the Hebrew language, Biblical History, and the moral and religious doctrines of the faith were relegated to special classes.

The American Jewish community has taken a leading part in these educational reforms. In 1838 the first Hebrew Sunday school was opened in the city of Philadelphia, organised by the famous Rebecca Gratz who, as Washington Irving tells us, was through his suggestion made the model of the heroine of Sir Walter Scott's masterly novel, "Ivanhoe." The Sunday School movement has spread, especially in our country, until it

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has now pervaded all sections of the land.[2] Such schools exist in connection with nearly all the Jewish congregations. Independent societies, like that founded by Rebecca Gratz, which numbers now eight branches with three thousand pupils, supply the needs of the vast body of children not otherwise provided for. The Hebrew Sunday School Union of America publishes leaflets and other forms of literature for such classes. The organisation of these Jewish schools is not unlike those of the Christian Sunday Schools. Children are enrolled at about six or seven years of age. The principle of the Kindergarten has been widely adopted in the conduct of the primary classes. Regularly graded classes follow year by year until in about its fifteenth year the child enters the Confirmation Class. It has thus far received consecutive instruction in Biblical History, usually following the lessons of a compendium or text-book. These lessons are used as illustrative material for imparting ethical and religious precepts. In addition to this, the Hebrew language is taught in most schools with the aim of equipping the child for participation in those portions of the public worship which are retained in the ritual of the Synagogue, but mainly to deepen the consciousness of a unity pervading the Jewish community of the world, and at the same time to cultivate a sense of interest in and responsibility for the conservation of the great Hebrew literature of which the Jew is the heritor and custodian. During this period Divine Services, especially arranged for children, are quite generally conducted, during which a sermonette, adapted to the needs of the child's mind and heart and appealing to its scope of experiences, is offered, making a valuable adjunct to its other moral instruction.

In the Confirmation Classes, the doctrines of the religion are expounded. Here comparative studies are in some measure introduced and the agreements with Christianity and other faiths are emphasised. These lessons close with an impressive

[2] As early as 1730 the Shearith Israel congregation of New York maintained a school at which the secular and religious branches were taught. When about 1842 the Public Schools began to be established free from sectarian influence they were gladly hailed by Jewish parents. Thenceforth the special Sabbath or Religious Schools became a valuable adjunct.

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public ceremonial in the Synagogue, in which the child participates. By this means, an earnest effort is made to seize on the vital period of adolescence, in order to stimulate and direct the forming character by the purest moral and spiritual ideals.

Within the last decade, a widespread movement has been inaugurated aiming to extend the work of religious and moral instruction by the organisation of Post-Confirmation classes, Young People's Reading Circles, and study classes for adults. This has been furthered by the National Council of Jewish Women. The Jewish Chautauqua Society, which instituted and fostered this plan, has published systematic course-books or syllabuses, containing outlines for Bible Readings, taking cognisance of the higher criticism, and following this with a series, leading the reader through the mazes of the absorbing story of the Jews from the close of the Bible to the present time. These readings are based mainly on text-books in history and literature issued by the Jewish Publication Society of America. There are also Chautauqua Course-Books in the study of the Hebrew language by the correspondence method.

The Summer Assembly of the Jewish Chautauqua has become the recognised forum for the discussion of all problems affecting Jewish life. During the past eight years it has persistently directed attention to the constructive agencies required to-day for the moral training of the young. It has called into being special classes in religious pedagogy, which attract teachers from all parts of the land. The Gratz College of Philadelphia, the Jewish Theological Seminary of New York and the Hebrew Union College at Cincinnati aim to guide the teachers of the Jewish schools and to equip them for their tasks. The Summer Assembly reaches out to the thousands of teachers scattered throughout the land and sends its message of help into many towns and villages.

Two years ago the Assembly appointed a "Committee of Fifteen" of leading Jewish Educators to take in hand the whole problem of the training of our children with the avowed purpose of bringing our schools into line with the most advanced results of the modern psychological and pedagogical researches. We are absorbed in behalf of our constituency in those very

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problems, to the solution of which this course of lectures, as I understand, is to point, viz., a synthesis of the best ideas and a co-ordination of the best methods for the moral training of the young to be deduced from a comparison of what in our separate fields we have done in the past and are doing at the present time.

Our common problem, as I understand it, is this. The moral training of our youth must be improved because of the degeneracy revealed by the Juvenile courts and those very necessities which forced these courts into existence; because of the growth of reformatories and other agencies for reclaiming delinquents; because of the fearful havoc wrought by social impurity; because of the low moral standards in politics and the over-riding of high ethical considerations in the trades, commerce, industries, and even the professions.

What then are the agencies which have been and are employed for the moral culture of the young? Let these be seriously inspected and let our combined wisdom and earnestness be applied to make them more effective. These agencies are (1) Because most widespread—the system of public instruction, including, of course, all academies and institutions privately supported. (2) The schools specifically devoted to moral instruction and generally denominated Sunday Schools. (3) The Homes of the people.

The effectiveness of these agencies is impeached. The Catholic Church has withdrawn its children from the Public Schools, because she would have all knowledge instinct with religious force. The Protestant Church recognising the validity of the argument of the Catholic Church, stands for the reading of the Bible and the use of devotional exercises in the Public Schools. The mother Church Judaism, who instructed both in the supreme value of religion as the inspirer of moral action, yet would put her maternal hand in persuasive restraint upon both of her children. The Jews have broken up their parochial schools, because they recognise in the Public Schools the most blessed gift of America to modern civilisation. Within their walls the democracy finds its truest life. Here all distinctions of wealth, color, race, and creed disappear. It is to be greatly regretted that our Catholic friends withhold their

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children from this fraternity. The public school-ground is the real battlefield which is developing the highest American manhood. Under the influence of a high-minded and zealous band of teachers, ideals of civic, national, and social life are impressed, which are intensely moral and, to my mind, devoutly religious. A good man, a good woman, exceeds any book as a moral instructor. The schools may be unreligious in a dogmatic sense, but they are not to be charged with being irreligious. The Jew who gave the Bible to the world and naturally prizes it most, objects strenuously to Bible readings and other devotional exercises in the Public Schools. He regards this as an invasion of the rights of conscience for which our government stands and a defeat of the democratic system. The Book of Esther does not mention the name of God, yet the old Rabbis were not afraid to place it in the Biblical canon. It contained, even though not in words, the vital truth that we shall not see: "Truth forever on the scaffold. Wrong forever on the throne."

To make the Public Schools more effective moral mentors, we must give them the fullest possible scope as arenas of applied ethics. A bill was introduced in the Legislature of New York this very week, providing that in all schools and Reformatories receiving State aid, instruction in the principles of morality shall be given from text-books, as thoroughly as in any branch of learning. Considering the fact that so many are dependent in the main upon these schools for their moral training, such a movement is undoubtedly the outgrowth of the purest zeal in behalf of the highest welfare of the child and the State. Strenuous insistance will, however, be necessary upon the avoidance of every tinge of sectarian bias. This demands the removal of all dogmatic instruction to the second agency for the moral training of the young, viz., the religious schools themselves.

The necessity of these special schools for moral instruction whether they be called Sunday Schools, Religious Schools, or Ethical Schools need not be argued here. The Religious freedom we cherish involves the right to teach the sanctions and grounds of morality, as each sect or group of people under-

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stands them. One finds them in a supernatural revelation; another finds them in a mere doctrine of utility and between these extremes are many shades of conviction. Morality becomes vital to each only in that degree in which it is suffused with the ideal which inspires it, be that ideal a living God or the abstraction called Humanity. Each group of people must therefore be permitted, nay urged, to teach morality in accordance with its own convictions by the means of its own dogmas, symbols, rites, and ceremonies. Therefore with the forms of Judaism, I teach morals to Jews. These forms would be meaningless perhaps to others. So also the Catholic can appeal best to Catholics with the impressive formula of that Church, and the other sects in the language they best understand. Perhaps in that "far off divine event" towards which we are tending, these distinctions may fade out, but to-day they exist. Let us not blink at facts. Let each one be concerned rather to so use the tools he handles that he may create from the unformed child's spirit a superb and beautiful character. To this end, the religious schools must be energised. Too much have they been given over to mere entertainment, to mushy sentimentalism, to the emotionalism that breeds fanatics or at best to shallow recital of texts and verbal exercises and showy displays that lay no lasting hold on the heart. The organisation of such a great national movement as the Religious Education Association is a confession of the fact that the religious schools are far behind the other schools in accomplishing the results aimed at. The Universities, Seminaries, Churches, and Sunday Schools are sending their best men and women to confer together in order to take up this matter more seriously than heretofore and I look with great expectation to the results.

But let these schools attain to their highest possibility and they will yet fail in themselves to make moral men and women. I stand for the ancient Jewish averment that the school is only a supplement to the home. The home is after all the best school of morals. The function of the school is to work with childhood in the mass. The function of the home is to work with the individual child. The school as adjunct to the Church or Ethical Society cultivates the communal sentiment and

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inspires to those moral undertakings in which a common responsibility leads to united effort. The home alone can cope with the inherited tendencies, the acquired habits, the intellectual misconceptions, the daily and hourly temptations that assail the individual. Our concentrated effort should be directed towards safe-guarding home-life and securing to every child its rights in a pure, clean, decent home. We must labor to expunge from our civilisation the plague spots of congestion in our cities, where vice festers and dens of misery make the name home a mockery and disgrace. We must struggle to overcome those economic evils that set parents and children in competition for the mere crumb of existence, that ruins the tenderness of womanhood and blights the care-free innocence of childhood.

The final and supreme remedy for the deficiency in the moral training of the young, lies in restoring to parents, rich and poor alike, the deeper sense of that responsibility towards the helpless child which they assume in giving it birth. There is no single strenuous appeal so deep as lies in that old, but ever new demand: "Thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, when thou sittest in thy house; when thou walkest by the way; when thou liest down and when thou risest up."

HENRY BERKOWITZ.

PHILADELPHIA.

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THE MARIAGE DE CONVENANCE IN FRANCE.

There can be little doubt that among the highly-civilised countries, France is one of those that lag furthest behind in the matter of the relations of the sexes. But it is one thing to pass such a judgment, and quite another to rate it at its proper value in a general estimate of the comparative advancement of the different leading races. By some critics of French life and manners the point is often pressed unjustly owing to a lack of discrimination; by others it is dealt with too lightly, because its full significance is not realised. It may be worth while to look into the matter a little more closely than is commonly done.

The admitted laxity of morals in France is misunderstood when it is taken to imply a universal acquiescence in breaches of the law and spirit of monogamy. There is unquestionably a body of public opinion there, not yet large, but steadily increasing, and of special weight from its authority, which is in substantial accord with the mass of sentiment among ourselves as to the inviolability of marriage and all that it implies. Various causes, not all discreditable, have helped to obscure this fact. The French are much more candid and fearless in facing realities than we are, and scorn the hypocritical homage which we love to see vice paying to virtue. Their exaggerated tolerance for a degree of outspokenness that often amounts to cynical bravado is naturally misleading, but we must learn to take it with a proper discount. The tone of their comic papers and their novels gives evidence of a sad deficiency of good taste in the moral sphere, but it is not to be accepted too seriously as a reflection of the prevailing feeling and practice.

The moral laxity is misunderstood again by those who see in it only a survival of the primitive contempt for women, as inferior creatures existing mainly for the use and pleasure of men, such as still exists in Germany, in spite of the traditional Teutonic regard for feminine virtue, and forms a serious hindrance to further social progress in that country. In France there is no department of life where women do not count for a great deal, and it is remarkable that a professed disbelief in the inviolability of their chastity involves no general disrespect

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for their nature, or lack of appreciation of their influence. There is more hope for a nation that sins through lack of restraint, than for one that is righteous, but has not the saving grace of insight into the possibilities of progress that lie in securing for women their proper status.

On the other hand the position is equally misunderstood by those who fail to see how closely the state of sexual morality in France is bound up with other features of the national character, and how much that is unfortunate in the social condition of the people is to be set down rather to the presence of outworn and mischievous conventions than to ineradicable faults of temperament. Let us examine one of these historic conventions,—the so-called *mariage de convenance*,—which is responsible for a great deal more than is at once apparent, though in its turn it is of course to be explained in its relation to other factors. If we can analyse the forces that have determined the prevailing sentiment of the French people in regard to the union of the sexes, and distinguish the subtle influences on character and manners to which it has given birth, we shall have gone far to explain the leading features in the life of present-day France.

It may be objected that the expression "*mariage de convenance*" is too indefinite to bear so much stress, and that the institution is not much more characteristic of France than of other countries that profess what they consider to be a higher ideal. It is enough for the present purpose, however, to assume what can scarcely be denied,—that in France it is only a minority of marriages that are determined by mutual inclination, and that the proportion of such marriages is smaller there than in any other country of equal status. It is also quite unnecessary, of course, to assume that the marriages arranged on what we should consider irrelevant grounds are on that account usually unhappy, or that the love matches which our public sentiment approves invariably lead to unmitigated bliss. It is in no way to the purpose to urge that domestic wellbeing is often more certainly secured when regard is paid mainly to considerations of fortune and social connections, than when the decision rests entirely on personal fancy. The Anglo-Saxon ideal as to selection in marriage, which is contrasted with the

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French, does not, except in the sentimental exaggeration of protest, exalt the first amorous flutter of inexperienced youth into a sign from heaven; it lays ample stress on the need for deliberation, for calm judgment, for extent of choice. The difference is simply that we believe in mutual attraction as the prime condition of a successful union, and try to secure indirectly the social guarantees that form so useful a support, whereas in France it is the prudential outlook that takes the first place, and is definitely and directly provided for, while what is considered the romantic element is looked upon with little more than tolerance, as a kind of fifth wheel to the coach. The proud satisfaction with which French parents will sometimes tell you that their daughter's marriage was one of inclination, may be the presage of a change in public feeling, but it is also a clear proof of the wide prevalence of the traditional attitude.

But although the *mariage de convenance* has all the appearance of a social institution that has been consciously created to secure a definite end, it has evidently, like most other national customs, a historical explanation in the blind struggle of primitive instincts. Any justification of it that may now be offered is to be taken as an *ex post facto* defense, not as a rational account of its origin. It is in no sense, what it sometimes professes to be, a chosen means of consolidating family life in the interests alike of the present and of future generations; it is simply a device for the distribution of property, and whatever subsidiary ends it may have been made to serve, the impulse with which it stands in closest relation is the desire of gain. There is no need to paint this motive in very dark colors. It does not often reach the point of avarice, and it may be no more than a reasonable self-regard. But let the fact be faced that marriage in France turns more upon questions of money than of affection. Perhaps the situation may be summed up fairly in saying that while we ask for love first and as many favorable material conditions as possible afterwards, the French prefer to make sure of the material fitness first, and welcome as a gratuitous amenity whatever degree of love may discover itself.

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It may be granted that certain collateral effects of this view of marriage are in some aspects at least worthy of respect. The acknowledged duty of providing a sufficient *dot* for their daughters calls for considerable self-denial on the part of the parents, and is commonly fulfilled in an admirable spirit; and the independent position which is thus secured for their children seems to be an end worth striving for. But even this apparently laudable endeavor has its seamy side. In many households the effort to lay aside money from the earliest years, which may or may not be needed for marriage portions, entails a sacrifice that scarcely any later benefits could outweigh. The whole family life is narrowed, the parents are overworked, and the young people may be deprived of advantages of nurture and education which would have been of more value to them in after life than the money that would have made these possible. Moreover, there is a serious indirect evil that is caused by the institution of the *dot* as a matter of conventional necessity. There are cases where it is impossible to provide it, and girls are practically shut out from marriage through no fault of their own. The individual injustice and hardship of these cases might be disregarded, if the evil went no farther, but it is a grave social misfortune not only that the range of choice should be artificially restricted, but that the question of eligibility should be so explicitly associated with pecuniary considerations.

It is not enough then to term the *mariage de convenance* a prudential arrangement; it must be frankly recognised as materialistic in its origin and in its effects. Some of these effects are direct and obvious; others are more subtle and far-reaching. There is no need to dwell on the necessary instability of a marriage tie that has been formed without regard to the guarantee of mutual attraction. Nearly the whole of modern French drama and fiction finds the material of its tragedy,—and too often, alas, of its comedy also,—in the breaking of such fragile bonds. Though the scenes with which we are made so familiar in books and on the stage are not to be taken as bulking so largely in the national life as their writers would lead us to believe, there is at least a serious danger even in the artistic

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representation *ad nauseam* of unedifying situations. The spectacle of the passion of love in inevitable antagonism to the claims of duty, to the emotions that consecrate the home and safeguard the highest interests of the generation that is to succeed the present,—such a spectacle, offered without reserve or qualification, does grievous harm to the nation that permits it. It may be a small matter that it should suffer thereby in its reputation with other nations, though such a gratuitous loss of sympathy should not be lightly borne, but it is a terrible pity that what the best people in France hold to be the chief shame of the country should be continually held up to its youth as the main source of emotional interest.

The picture, moreover, though exaggerated, is in the main not unfaithful to reality. It is impossible to know in how many French homes the children are brought up in an atmosphere where there is perfect constancy and confidence between the parents, and in how many cases irresponsible passion usurps the place of hallowed love, preventing or disturbing the family affections which are the foundation of all other virtues; but a judgment may be formed, with a sufficient degree of certainty, from the tone of public opinion in regard to all the social arrangements that affect the relations of the sexes. If the stage and the press are not wholly trustworthy as reflections of general feeling, at least we may rely on the evidence of such an institution as the accepted system of education. It is here that there is really to be traced the most baneful effects of the belief in the *mariage de convenance*, which casts a dark shadow backwards across all the years of youth. The evil of this particular effect is not generally recognised, but it forms the chief hindrance to any advance either in opinion or in practice. Children are brought up with a view to their being eventually married under a mercenary scheme of selection, and the character of such an upbringing inevitably tends to perpetuate the tendencies and traditions that make it so difficult to substitute a higher ideal. It is not easy to see what point of this vicious circle can be most fruitfully attacked. Probably the reform should begin at both ends, but it is always more profitable to bring influence to bear on the young than on the old. Unfortunately in this

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case the children can be directly reached only through their parents. When the French people can be convinced how greatly the strength—perhaps even the safety—of their national life depends on the well-being and stability of individual homes, how imperative it is that the coming generations should be nurtured in the fullest enjoyment of all the family affections, they will no doubt give some thought to remodeling their ideas of early education. On the other hand, if the traditions of this education can be attacked from outside, and a more reasonable practice imposed, which the parents can be persuaded or induced to accept, there is good hope that a generation would grow up whose natural instincts would rebel against the current materialistic view of marriage, and who would insist, for their children if not for themselves, on taking full account of the promptings of mutual inclination in forming the permanent ties of life.

The mischief is centered in the practice of sending children away from home even in the earliest years. The upbringing of girls in convents had no doubt originally a quasi-religious motive, but it has been used for centuries simply as a convenient means of seclusion, by which the daughters of the household could be kept most securely from the chance of any connection that might interfere with the parents' plans for their future. In the case of boys the boarding-house system had a military rather than an ecclesiastical origin, but it matters little whether the discipline be that of a barracks or a monastery; the practical effect is to isolate brothers from their sisters, and from all other family influences, for the greater part of their youth. Though our own country has not kept wholly free from the same grave error, we are at least alive to the dangers it involves in the extreme form that it has taken in France. There is no need now to dwell at length on the results of an artificial separation of the sexes during the critical years of adolescence. If the desired ignorance, which is mistaken for innocence, can be preserved till the world must be entered, the youths and maidens, who have had no training in schooling their feelings and behavior under the stress of sexual attraction, are then in the worst possible position to face the difficulties that present themselves.

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The revulsion of instincts that have been unduly repressed will drive them towards extravagances, and even if the choice of partners for life were left to themselves, there is but a small chance that the decision would be wisely considered. In such cases a selection by the parents may often be the less of two evils, but in any event there can be no good prospect of a stable union. The mischief has already been done, in the neglect of the priceless opportunities of accustoming girls and boys to grow up together, with mutual understanding and respect, in the natural environment of a family circle. Where, on the other hand, the monastic upbringing fails to secure the desired ignorance, as is generally the case, the evils that attend the removal of authority will only be intensified. Those who marry without due warrant in genuine attachment and in preparation, are supported by public opinion in taking their legal bonds lightly, and giving free rein to inclinations that they have never been taught to control.

It is customary to account for the comparatively low standard of sexual morality in France by referring to the insufficiently-controlled sensibility of a Southern temperament. It is no doubt true that the warm blood of the Latin races has encouraged a tradition of greater license than could be claimed in excuse for the colder natures bred in Northern Europe, and while our judgment of French manners and sentiment in these matters must be uncompromising in relation to the ultimate ideal, it is only just to make full allowance for the stress of stronger temptations than we probably have to withstand. Let there be no question of our thanking God that in this respect we are not as our neighbors are across the channel. Every race must work out its own salvation, and if criticism is offered from outside, it should be based less on a comparison of one nation with another than on the possibilities of progress that are disclosed in the form of civilisation that is under review. France has no need to borrow ideals from other lands. In this as in other matters there are many within its borders who bear aloft the torch of a high morality, and who seek, with more ardor than any foreigner can pretend to feel, to lead their countrymen to what they believe to be a loftier plane of con-

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duct. It would savor of self-righteous impertinence to hold up an Anglo-Saxon example to those who have no less exalted a vision than we can have, of the heights that may be attained in pursuing the true monogamic ideal, and of the regenerating influence that such an attainment would bring to bear on all other forms of social life. One may even hazard the opinion that a higher destiny in this regard may be awaiting France than is likely to be reached by other nations that now pride themselves on their advancement. If sensibility to the influence of women does not necessarily guarantee them a position of dignity, it is at least the foundation on which the fullest respect can alone be based, and in this respect, as has been said, there is good promise for the future of the French people, in their pre-eminent appreciation of the *rôle* that women may play in almost every department of life. But though the outside critic may well hesitate to preach an ideal to France which is already cherished by its best thinkers and teachers, it is permissible to draw attention to certain of their institutions that seem to interfere with progress, in ways that perhaps strike the foreigner more forcibly than those to whom they have become almost a matter of course. There are features in our methods of bringing up children that the French have recently begun to admire, and are seeking to imitate. Advantage may be taken of this attitude to make certain suggestions in matters that are of even greater moment than the encouragement of athletics, though in so far as this latter movement may prevent an unhealthy emotional precocity, it also is not without value from the present point of view.

It may be said, however, that the seclusion and surveillance of the young, which has been accounted for by the artificial method of arranging marriages in France, is now a thing of the past. It is fortunately true that in recent years the tradition has to some extent broken down, and that its effects are no longer to be seen in such extreme forms. We do not now hear of girls being sent to a convent at the age of two, to remain there with hardly any intercourse with their families till they are taken away at sixteen or seventeen to be rushed into a marriage with someone they have never seen. There are cases

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even yet not very far removed from this, but let it be granted that they are rare. The *régime* of the convent has largely passed away, and in the strict sense it will disappear still more rapidly in the future. Much of this healthy change is due to the initiative of the State, in founding schools for girls that have much more the character of day-schools than of boarding establishments. It is satisfactory to find also that in the boys' *lycées* the numbers of those sent to board is steadily diminishing in proportion to those who come daily from their homes. But with all these hopeful signs of a better practice there remains a great deal to be done, before it can be said that the best conditions of upbringing, alike in the home and in the school, have been secured both for boys and for girls, so that they may be trained with neither too much nor too little guidance to grow into the proper relations with each other. Parents have still to learn that an unobtrusive watchfulness and an indirect control form the most effective, if not indeed the only admissible, means of influencing their children's conduct, in regard to the relations of the sexes as in other relations of life, as soon as they reach the age of reason. School authorities have still to learn that an attitude of suspicion is sure to defeat its own ends, by encouraging the surreptitious use of opportunities that cannot be supervised, in ways that would not occur to those who were trusted with a fuller responsibility. As long as the majority of French parents who have it in their power think it advisable that their children should be constantly in charge of someone, not only in the streets and in the class-room, but even in their playtime, for fear of what they might possibly say to each other, or of any unauthorized friendships they might form, so long will they expose themselves to being outwitted in what they wish to avert, and to laying up a store of future troubles even when their efforts are successful. Nothing but approval can be given to the solicitude that seeks to provide the children with suitable companionship, but this is not to be done by autocratic methods under the impulse of an essentially worldly motive. Friendship cannot be forced at any age; the only safe guarantee is a wide selection and freedom of choice. If children have been wisely brought up under the influences of a

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healthy family life, they may be trusted to conduct themselves reasonably in relation to so much of the outer world as they encounter in the school, or in the home companionship of their brothers' and sisters' friends. This free intercourse among young people is as yet very largely wanting in France, and its absence is to be held responsible for many of the most serious evils in the national life.

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CARLYLE'S ETHICS.

We are wont to think of Carlyle more often as a moral teacher than as a historian or a writer on literary subjects. As historian or essayist alone, he might perhaps be superseded or fall into neglect; as a moral philosopher, it is scarcely conceivable that he should not permanently occupy a high place in English literature and have a wide influence upon readers. Yet a close examination of his moral doctrines reveals striking deficiencies as well as peculiarities. He has enunciated his ideas with tremendous vigor, a clearness that never leaves uncertain the meaning of any sentence or paragraph, and with wearisome iteration; yet he has nowhere reduced them to any system, nor sought to establish them on a secure metaphysical basis; and at times even their practical application remains in doubt. He was impatient of any attempt to "justify the ways of God to men." His moral convictions were ingrained, and suffered no essential change—a characteristic rare among great thinkers—during the whole course of his literary activity. An expression of "Sartor Resartus" or of "Friedrich" is equally authentic as an expression of his permanent belief and doctrine. His attitude toward literature and literary art altered remarkably as the sense of the earnestness of life bore with increasing weight upon him; his hopefulness disappeared, his denunciation became more vigorous and unrestrained; but his perception of duty and its sanction was the same from first to last.

The analyst of character finds much in the influences of

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Carlyle's life to explain his dominant qualities and beliefs. To his inheritance of the stern and sombre Scottish temperament, were added the struggles of his youth and earlier manhood with untoward circumstances, poverty, ill health, and doubt, to impress upon him the darker side of life. He was driven by outward as well as inward necessity to work, yet was capable of no performance without extreme effort; and *work,* by the unnatural stress which he must lay upon it for himself, became to his mind the chief object of existence. He suffered much and magnified his sufferings; and endurance appeared a virtue as well as a necessity. The power of enjoyment—the taste for art, music, society, and travel—were denied to him by nature as well as circumstance; and he conceived the pursuit of happiness to be among the most unworthy of human motives. In spite of his rejection of the externals and the dogmas of Christianity, he retained a profoundly religious sense, solemn and awful in its combination of the Scotch with the Hebrew spirit. Beyond the necessity for bread, he felt that there was an equally peremptory and inexorable spiritual necessity—a vocation not to be combined with the other except at the price of exhausting effort and suffering. With all his earnestness and force, he was long unheeded; and the neglect and misinterpretation which he and his works encountered may well have exaggerated his idea of the evil, injustice, and thoughtlessness of the world.

The seriousness of life is to Carlyle a part of the fixed order of the universe; but its immediate causes lie less in that misery which the philanthropist tries to alleviate than in the human error which the theologian condemns. In many points Carlyle resembles the theologians of the older school, from whom, indeed, he had directly inherited.[1] Evil is in the world by human agency, by human choice wrongly exercised. Pain, poverty, want, are by no means to be regarded as always and necessarily evils; they may be only the indispensable discipline to prepare us for our work. No Epicurean gods or blind fates preside over the world; much that seems evil is sent by the

[1] See Froude's "Life of Carlyle," Vol. II, ch. 1, ch. 26, pp. 220 ff.

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Powers of Heaven in wise beneficence. But real evil exists also in vast amount, inexcusable and pernicious, subserving no useful purpose, and with which any patience is out of place. The great sources of evil are Sin, Sham, and Stupidity. But the great mass of mankind is stupid and blind; there is only now and then one who sees things clearly in their true relations, who knows and is obedient to the laws of God and of Nature.

Yet however tolerant or insensible men may be of the evil which ought to be swept away, the Eternal Powers will, when it has reached the wholly intolerable point, interfere and sweep it away more or less completely themselves. The overthrow of Charles I, the annihilation of Poland, and—most conspicuous example of all—the French Revolution, were such violent manifestations of the wrath of Heaven, working through human agency against profane and sinful shams which had become intolerable in its sight. A nation may be spared beyond its desert, as England has been in the last two centuries, because, in spite of foolishness and hypocrisy, it has not yet filled the cup to overflowing—or, perhaps, only by the unmerited mercy of Heaven. So long as Heaven's mercy continues there is a gleam of hope and a possibility of remedy. Carlyle is pessimistic, but not wholly so:

"O Heaven, and are these things forever impossible, then? Not a whit. To-morrow morning they might all begin to be, and go on through blessed centuries realizing themselves, if it were not that—alas, if it were not that we are most of us insincere persons, sham talking-machines and hollow windy fools! Which it is *not* 'impossible' that we should cease to be, I hope!" [2]

A sincere and humble recognition of the Laws of God and Nature, an obedience to them and a willingness to speak and act the truth, will work much or all. Yet in general he hardly cares to turn his eyes in the direction of the future. In its uncertainty it is as nothing to him. Intent upon that truth which has no limitations of time, he studies its manifestations only in the past and the present. We have learned to look at the future with infinite hopefulness because we think we per-

[2] "Latter-Day Pamphlets," No. 4.

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ceive a law by which unlimited progress and improvement are promised. For Carlyle no such law existed. The present seemed to him in many ways a deterioration from the past; the future was little hopeful, and the prediction of it a work of the imagination, often false at best, and wholly unprofitable.

In the doctrines of the sinfulness and moral blindness of man, the certainty of penalty, though deferred, the mercy which endures as long as endurance is possible, the sole hope of salvation in recognition of Divine Law and obedience to it, we find but a repetition of the fundamental principles of Christian theology, though with little stress on the Love which is so important a part of the Christian religion. But Carlyle had rejected the supernatural origin of Christianity, and it therefore became incumbent on him, when he spoke of Divine Law, to explain what that law is. This he has failed to do clearly. He often uses the expression "Laws of Nature" in a similar way; but one would be sadly wide of the mark in seeking Carlyle's meaning in any scientific treatise. We might interpret the phrases in the light of two other familiar antithetical expressions of Carlyle's—reality, not appearance; right, not wrong. But if we ask, "What *is* appearance, and what reality; what right and what wrong?" we must answer in Carlylean phrase, "Right is conformity to the Laws of God and of Nature." A vicious enough circle!

The question as to the actual application of the terms right and wrong is, at our stage of moral enlightenment, by no means an idle or superfluous one. Every man has his own ethical standards, differing more or less widely from those of other men. Few of them are likely to be correct; perhaps none of them are wholly so. Morality may yet make as important advances as the physical sciences promise. It is hardly conceivable that the boundary line between right and wrong can ever be accurately determined at every point: at present it is still vague—more vague perhaps in the political matters with which Carlyle so largely dealt than in personal ethics. But the function which he assumed was by no means that of revealing new moral truth, but of emphasising the old, which to his mind had fallen into neglect. The condition of things which he would

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fain see restored is always one that he can parallel from a past age.

Nevertheless Carlyle has presented old truths in a new light, or at least with originality of expression. His cardinal virtues, as we may call those upon which he has most insisted, are by no means the traditional ones. The first and greatest of them is, of course, *sincerity, truthfulness, honesty,* the opposite of sham and falsehood. The keynote of his teaching is struck in his ever-recurring exaltation of this virtue, and denunciation of its opposite.

Carlyle found, or believed he found, in his own time more sham, hypocrisy, and falsehood than had existed in any age before, unless it were the eighteenth century, which by its swollen excess of untruth fairly exploded at the end. We need not decide whether he was right. All thoughtful men recognise the dishonesty which is prevalent in certain spheres of life, especially in business and in politics, and the decline of that universal faith, earnestness, and candor, which Carlyle found at its best in the Middle Ages. But "Carlyle never understood or tried to understand his time," says Edmond Scherer.[3] It was difficult for him to see how people could believe otherwise than as he believed; he was intolerant and avowedly defended intolerance; and so he found sham in religious professions, because people sat while they pretended to kneel, or because, while professing belief, they would question and speculate.

Carlyle's second cardinal virtue may be considered to be *patience.* Man is born into a world which is by no means wholly to his liking, in which for the most favored there is much to bear and suffer, much to do that the natural man would far rather not do. For the less fortunate this is in a vast degree more true; for neither in the actual world nor in the scheme of things is any equality of lot or compensation found or designed. Some may have little but unrelieved suffering in their lives, because thereby better work can be had from them, others because they are fit for nothing else, others—be-

[3] "Essays on English Literature," translated by George Saintsbury, p. 230 (from "Etudes sur la Littérature Contemporaine," Vol. VII).

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cause Heaven wills it so. Instead of demanding happiness as his merit, man had better assume that he has deserved nothing but eternal misery, and then see whether the order of nature will not appear a little more cheerful. At any rate, "Man that is born of a woman is full of trouble"; and this trouble it behooves him to bear patiently and unrepiningly, without hope of reward, but solely because it is the will of Heaven. Only if the evil he encounters is the result of human folly, error, or sin, may he be impatient—like Carlyle himself. The only happiness he may hope for is the satisfaction of having found his work and done it faithfully with his best powers.

Closely akin to patience is the virtue of *obedience*. Obedience —first to the Laws of God and Nature, secondly to his King or ruler—the wise and good man will always strictly render. Having found his place in life and his work, he will perform his duty with humble submission. For the great mass of mankind, indeed, it would seem as if this were the first requisite, especially if there is one worthy to command. For there is little liberty in the world, except the liberty to do one's duty; the millions must obey unquestioningly the supreme and absolute command of their King, as he must obey the Laws of God and of Nature. Such a ruler is, as Carlyle knows well enough, not always to be found, nor even once in every century. But when he is found, let mankind make the most of him. Let them render him not only obedience, but such a reverence as they render to Heaven itself. Such a man is a hero, and the worship of heroes is one of the most instinctive, as well as one of the noblest inclinations of the human soul.

Finally, we may add to this list the virtue of *silence*. Carlyle is aweary of the talking of this great world—talking without meaning, talking before consideration, talking for talking's sake, and, worst of all, talking to *conceal* thought or to deceive. Let man keep silence until he has something to say worth saying, and then let him say it in the fewest, plainest words. Rather than talk in the highest circles, let him act and work in the lowest. For action, not speech, is what is needed.

To Carlyle the most ill-directed action is more hopeful than inaction, or than any speech which is not necessary. Work to

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him is the prime object of life, and all his virtues are the virtues of a worker. It were well that a man's work should be wise and useful; but even the most sordid money-getting is preferable to idleness. The man who is seeking to act, to work, to do something, even though his efforts are wholly misdirected, may at last be turned in the right direction; while the idle man is almost without promise or possibility of good. Carlyle cannot conceive that inaction may at times be as truly a virtue as silence. He knows, indeed, that half the activities of the world are useless or worse; he knows that there is a fault somewhere in the industrial system which results in over-production and glut of the market at the same time that thousands are naked and starving. But useless activity he would have reformed by a corrected moral sense; the fault in the industrial system is for legislators, not for him, to discover.[4]

Carlyle assumes that there is work appointed for every man —some work for which he is fitted; that by diligence and willingness each can find his proper work, and can then be useful and, so far as is permitted, happy. The appointment of this work he refers to a divine predestination.[5]

Carlyle was no democrat, and, great as was his sympathy with the "masses" when they were suffering, he probably thought that it made little difference at what or where they were employed, so long as they labored usefully and escaped starvation.

These five, then—truthfulness, patience, obedience, reverence, silence—are Carlyle's cardinal virtues. Of the old Greek virtues, temperance, courage, and wisdom are quite in keeping with those newer qualities on which he most strongly insists. But regarding justice, which was to Plato the consummation of all virtue, there is in Carlyle a strange insensibility, or rather a

[4] His teachings, it seems, did have direct influence upon British legislation. He helped to strike the *laissez-faire* doctrine its death-blow.

[5] "In spite of science," says Mr. Froude, "he had a clear conviction that everything in this universe, to the smallest detail, was ordered with a conscious purpose. Nothing happened to any man which was not ordained to happen. No accident, no bullet on battlefield, or sickness at home, could kill a man till the work for which he was appointed was done."—"Life," II, ch. 29, p. 275.

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pushing of it into the background as not of primary importance. "Justice? Yes, Friedrich had a sense of justice, too," is the substance of his perfunctory mention of that in his largest work, where, indeed, temperance and fortitude are better illustrated.

Justice, in its abstract form, is the assuring to everyone of his exact desert. To perfect justice it would make no difference whether the balance were on the debit or the credit side—whether the desert were reward or punishment. A complete system of rewards has been found impracticable in human government; and, except when it acts as arbiter in civil cases, the state has mostly confined itself to a crude system of penalties supposed to vary in severity according to the offense. To this half of justice Carlyle is keenly sensitive; he sees clearly that violation of law must and will sooner or later bring its penalty. And that is almost the total of justice to him, as it is to criminal jurisprudence.

But, though human government is incompetent to satisfy both halves of justice, Heaven and the individual man need not be so. The balance of credit may be paid as well as the balance of debit exacted. This is what religions have sought to assure, reserving payment—since perfect justice is hardly discoverable in this world—to a future life. But Carlyle's religion, neither Christian nor ethnic, had little room for reward. "My friends," he exclaims, "I think you are much mistaken about Paradise! 'No Paradise for anybody: he that cannot do without Paradise go his ways.' Suppose you tried that for a while! I reckon that the safer version." [6] The poor human being must be content if he can escape punishment: neither in this world nor in the next dare he demand or expect perfect justice, unless indeed he assumes that he has deserved nothing or worse.

If any one virtue more than another may be called the flower of moral discovery, it is this same virtue of justice, which is the last to appear in the world. Little trace of it exists in nature. Temperance, patience, courage, silence, and the rest are, in a rude but effective way, enforced upon the beasts; but the natural world and the brute creation live and thrive upon

[6] "Latter-Day Pamphlets," No. 2.

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injustice. All physical evolution is a series of monstrous examples of it. What we call natural penalties are almost as likely to fall upon the innocent as upon the guilty. Only when man has reached a considerable stage of advancement is justice conceivable. It is the latest in order; and, as Plato held, the most consummate of all, the one which includes and binds together all the others. Perhaps its meaning has never as yet been fully understood: Carlyle, a man of primitive force, has but a rudimentary sense of it.

Carlyle's conception of the practical duties of man is tolerably evident from the kind of virtues he chiefly preached. But to the fundamental question of the sanction of morality, Carlyle, inspiring preacher as he is, has contributed nothing. The matter is perfectly clear to him, but, upon the basis of his philosophy, to him alone. He has pretty much thrown overboard the incitement of reward, so effective in religion, and with it all "Benthamee," utilitarian, and hedonistic theories of "greatest happiness." He has retained the threat of punishment for wrongdoing, and expressly asserted the existence of a Divine Power which judges, condemns, and inflicts the penalty; yet, by doubting the reality of a future life, he removed from this terror much of its certainty and thoroughness, and he surely did not conceive the dread of punishment to be the highest or in any way a satisfactory motive of human endeavor. At most, he has assumed, as a thing too positive for discussion, that right is that which is in harmony with the laws of God and of Nature.

The sanction of right must consist either in its inherent desirability, recognisable to the human mind, or else in the decisive, unquestionable, perhaps inexplicable *fiat* and command of God. In reality it seems to have both these sanctions; but let us consider each one separately. In the latter case—if right is that which has, for any reason whatever, been appointed as such by the Divine Will—it must, in order to be binding upon us, be revealed in a sufficiently distinct manner. Revelation may be of two sorts: the natural revelation which the mind with its own powers recognises and accepts in nature, physical law, and the known facts of the world; or special revelation through the

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voice of God, incarnated divinity, or inspired men. The former can teach us much, even concerning the will of the Creator; it makes known the laws of nature, which are divine in their origin if anything is divine: and the dullest soon learns to respect the forces of gravity and hunger. Natural revelation may even teach us something of morality; but that it can give us a complete and perfect system of moral law, based upon the more or less arbitrary ordainments of divinity, and especially that the divine commands can be discovered in nature by any but utilitarian considerations, it is not easy to believe. This is the ground which Carlyle took.

For any complete system of morality based solely upon the Divine Will, special revelation seems imperatively called for.

On the other hand, if morality is placed upon a merely human basis, and right is to be commended and practiced only because it is desirable, the source of its desirability can hardly be found elsewhere than in the fact that it conduces to human happiness. From this purely human point of view, if any action brings neither happiness nor unhappiness to one's self or any other, it is hardly conceivable that such an action can be either right or wrong. If any particular action brings unhappiness, without any consequent and compensating happiness, near or remote, to any one, it is certainly evil. If any action causes only happiness to one's self and others it may safely be set down as good. And if these three supposed actions are, as they seem unquestionably to be, respectively indifferent, bad and good, all actions may, so far as we can foresee their results, be weighed and determined by the same standard. But this is the philosophy against which Carlyle cried out most vehemently—with inconsistency as well as with unreason. To his mind the pursuit of happiness was not only unworthy, but futile—a view which was doubtless quite as much the result of temperament as of thought. He is inconsistent in rejecting the pursuit of happiness, and yet preaching the terrible penalties of wrongdoing. Avoidance of penalty is nothing more or less than the pursuit of happiness; and there is no reason why one who does not seek happiness should strive to avoid the suffering of punishment. The pursuit of happiness

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is indeed often futile; but that is no reason why we should not seek such as is obtainable. Is man to endeavor only where success is assured?

The abstraction called God which we can obtain from nature, apart from revelation, might not impress us as having the qualities of love and compassion, but, unless a future state of punishment is granted, should hardly inspire great awe or fear. By rejecting both revealed religion and the pursuit of happiness as ground and motive of morality, Carlyle has left his moral system without sufficient basis. One or the other, or both together, are necessary.

Carlyle was by no means sure of immortality, and was consequently unable to admit the consistency of happiness as an end with his conception of God. The complete development of the happiness-philosophy postulates a future life.

Carlyle's political doctrines are closely connected with the general principles of morality which have been outlined. In his view there can be no good government unless the nation is deserving of such. In Democracy he has no faith at all. The majority is always hopelessly wrong, and no amount of promiscuous voting will lead to any result of value, except a knowledge of what the people will endure and what they will not. But his faith in the results of hereditary kingship is, of course, equally small. It seems to be either a fortunate accident or a gift of the gods when a nation, as nations now are, does obtain a true king. Carlyle uses by preference the word King as a generic term, partly, perhaps, attracted by a false etymology, partly because of its suggestions of supreme and unquestioned authority. The elder Pitt was the last real king of England, though not a king in name at all; Frederick the Great was the last king in all Europe; and we may have to wait long for another. But certainly in the lower ranks of the people, if not in the higher, there must exist from time to time a very few men of royal nature and wisdom; and Carlyle is democratic enough to wish no obstruction to their rising, if it happens so, from the lowest to the highest place. His Ideal State, like Plato's, is one in which "the wise men are kings, and the kings wise men." Wise men are seldom to be

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found; when they are to be found, let the wisest one or the wisest ten be king or rulers by a certain divine right, which men have only to recognise and respect.

But how to find and know the wise man, the born king? Somebody or some number of people must find him and invest him with power, if he is to be king. But the voters, whether many or few, are apt to be blind in such a matter. "Why not cast dice for them?" he asks once, but offers no serious proposal for the solution of the question. The reform of politics must be begun at home. However large or small the electing or voting body may be, the rulers will be wise and true kings when that body is itself wise and true. Only to a wise, earnest, sincere, and reverent people can a true and good king be given. Such was the dominant party in England, though never a majority, in the time of Cromwell; and Cromwell was given to England. The primary thing to be sought is not, after all, any trifling variation in methods of government or of election, but rather the increase of wisdom and the development of character in the individuals of a nation.

When once the true king has been found, almost the only civic virtue for the mass of the nation is obedience. The king in his wisdom is to command and be obeyed, not to suggest and be overruled by an ignorant, clamorous, greedy mob. The people must recognise, or be made to recognise, that they are born to be governed, with an iron hand if necessary, and that their only function is cheerfully, obediently, and unquestioningly, or else by inexorable constraint, to perform the tasks set them. It is for their own good, and in accordance with eternal law.

Carlyle has been dead but little over twenty years, but his voice comes to us like a voice out of the past. The catchwords of modern philosophic writing—optimism and pessimism, altruism, evolution, and the like, are absent from his works. He paid little heed to the passing phases of thought: his eyes were fixed upon eternal truth, as he could perceive it, regarding with impatience all distorted reflections of that truth. The reflection of it in his own mind may to others appear distorted; we may find his Why insufficient, and differ from him.

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as to the How. Yet a teaching which enforces man's serious duties, even with an excessive degree of gloomy earnestness, must always have its place and value. His office is not that of the metaphysician, but that of the preacher, who, dispensing with analysis and taking much for granted, warns and incites, stimulates and denounces. The duty of ascertaining what is the right to which he exhorts, he leaves, if somewhat doubtfully, to our own perceptions and consciences.

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PLEASURE, IDEALISM, AND TRUTH IN ART.

Answers to the query, What is the relation of art to truth? must continue to vary with men's philosophies; because on our philosophy, express or tacit, must depend our conception of what truth finally is, and of its attainableness, and also of the sufficiency of art and the art-faculties as ways of arriving at it. The answers, too, of course, will differ with the degree in which they themselves have been thought through to their consequences. The following paper, therefore, will frankly move on highly general and abstract ground, though the motive which originally prompted the working out of the ideas embodied in it was not so much any direct eagerness to press to their application some points of preconceived remote theory, as a desire of working back to a more solidly thought-out basis for the evaluation of some very close-lying and concrete art-manifestations. Years ago the writer had felt the need of describing such poetry as that of Lord Byron, if this latter was to be acknowledged as being true art at all, in different terms from those prevalent even in professional philosophical æsthetics. This need was not made any less when one confronted such phenomena as Ibsen, Zola, Hardy, and the rest of our modern deniers, doubters, and positivists in the field of art. The present paper may be taken as primarily an endeavor at a solution of precisely the difficulties thus encountered. Furthermore, as undertaking the

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inquiry whether art must not, in some sense, give a report of what *is,* in distinction from what merely would be *desired* or is *pleasant,* the paper may be regarded as in a way a sequel to the one by myself on "Byron and Morals," published in the October (1903) number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS; for this other practically closed with the remark that conclusive judgment on Byron, so far as at heart he ends in denial and disappointment, must be deferred until we have settled the question whether a poetry of this nature can or can not be accounted good art. Seeing that in my discussion of the matters before us I find myself diverging from what might be called the ordinary orthodox opinions, even among philosophers, I have tried to avoid too dogmatic a spirit by sometimes asking questions rather than making assertions, and by simply indicating the bearings of different philosophical views on the topics in hand, instead of persisting too exclusively in my own particular manner of looking. That, however, I have an attitude of my own, and what it is, will not, I hope, remain entirely unclear. The combining of a treatment of the problems of the ideality and pleasureableness of art with that of its truth, requires no explanation—the three inquiries are one.

It ought to require no arguing even with the general reader that our question is not the one which Ruskin ("Modern Painters," vol. II, ch. 4) brushes aside in such summary, characteristic fashion. Ruskin finds himself at a loss to know how anyone ever could have advanced the notion that the beautiful is the true: a cloud is not a castle, though it is all the lovelier for looking like a castle. In other words, beauty, if not a matter merely of semblances, at any rate does not exclude mere semblance. However, even Gorgias the Sophist might have informed the famous English critic that the case is harder than this; for Gorgias observed that "Tragedy indeed practices a sort of deception; but it is a deception of such a kind that those who yield to it are wiser . . . than the not-deceived." Some sort of truth there would seem to be about art and beauty. While as regards that untruth—semblance, fiction—which he calls attention to as compatible

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with beauty, well might Ruskin wonder if any but a babe or bush-man should fail to perceive it. In reference to our purposes here, the only point about it which might seem to call for remark is one looking rather in an opposite direction; namely, that the artists themselves have been too prone to forget that to even this permissible kind of untruth in their work there is a limitation. In art as in science, the law of "parsimony" holds sway, and fiction should not be gratuitous. In this direction, for instance, lies in part the secret of our preference for the gray, grim realism of tragedy or the novel, over the far-away idealism of romances and idylls: the latter indulge too far in the falsity of elimination. Departure from commonplace actuality should not go beyond the requirements of effectively showing forth that essential truth—truth of principle, type, idea—which (and not matter-of-fact) is the real object of art.

Yet is it so? How, for instance, does the ordinary statement that pleasure is the end of art comport with this assertion that truth—no matter of what species now—is the aim? Can these two requirements be made conjointly? It is evident that the coupling of them is an expression either of unreflecting popular optimism, or of an optimistic philosophy. What, though, of the attitudes of pessimism, scepticism, and non-committal, not merely in speculation, but in æsthetic utterance? For a great share of nineteenth-century art-work is fairly describable only as inspired by the sceptical or pessimistic genius; while a whole great movement like French realism seems to me justly apprehended only when judged as an æsthetic counterpart to the Positive philosophy of France, a philosophy unwilling to pronounce at all regarding the final drift of the world, much less to proclaim that the last truth of things shall be agreeable. Clearly, art of these types, if it is to insist on truth, will be obliged to deny the necessity or even the possibility of fundamental pleasure as its accompaniment—unless it be the bitter-sweet pleasure of insight, no matter how tragic, or of insight into the impossibility of insight. If the customary objection be made, that such art is not properly art at all, we have only to demand—Why not?

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If one be the possessor of a conclusive, optimistic philosophical system, well and good; one knows such positions, as final, to be impossible and absurd. And yet they historically have been held in serious speculation. Why, then, should not sceptical, pessimistic, and positivist phases be as legitimate in the evolution of the æsthetic as of the philosophical consciousness? Unless we profess an essentially absolute knowledge, does not our denial of the possibility of unbelieving art involve us in the denial of truth as the *sine qua non* of art, and in the substitution for it of pleasureableness? Only here we come into another trouble, perhaps a paradox,—will the merely pleasant, *which is not believed to be true,* really please at all? The fact is, æsthetic pleasure is not a blind gratification, so to speak, of the higher animal, but a satisfaction—it may be, melancholy—of the sense of reason in us.

Bound up with the conviction that art must be pleasant, is the ordinary assertion of its ideality. It will not be necessary for us to traverse the time-worn arguments of idealists and realists; we can perhaps get nearer the heart of the problem involved here by asking, in as philosophical a spirit as the narrow limits of a short paper will permit,—What is an ideal? In the first instance, it is a conception of worth, a subjectively-derived norm—a type-form, principle—applied to things. In this general sense, though, all thinking is idealisation—to find anything obedient to the mere law of cause and effect is to find it responsive to a demand of the mind—we strive to envisage things under this relationship, because, conceived thus, they satisfy a notion, standard, or ideal craving brought to bear upon them by the mind itself; and so far it is correct enough to describe as idealists even the realists who profess in their art to furnish simple "scientific documents," or doubters and disconsolates who deal in "reality" and not "illusion." However, there is another sense, too commonly ignored by critics, in which these persons rightly protest against the accusation of idealism. They are charged with idealising by selecting their materials, and keeping to what is significant. But a scientist, too, selects in this manner, because he regards his objects only in certain relevant,

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special characteristics; and yet he is not an idealist within the usual meaning. Idealism signifies ordinarily a faith in the conformity of things to our fullest and richest and highest, or *absolute* criteria; and it is in this sense that art is commonly called idealistic. Is it such? In one point of view we may, perhaps, safely enough say, Yes. Most judges would probably concur, that just as philosophy, be it even agnostic or destructive, never can quite divest itself of the great ideal objects of God, Freedom, and Immortality, but always implies an attitude toward *them,* so in the same way art, be it of whatever type, always has at least the lurking aspiration of this more alluring ideality, in the same fashion that it has that of pleasureableness. Otherwise it would not be art, any more than philosophy would be philosophy without having regard to final problems. If, however, by its idealism is meant a *gratification* of the mind's absolute demands—a presentation of ideals as *fulfilled*—then the mere existence of the whole tribe of the Byrons, Zolas, Ibsens, Hardys, Hauptmanns, and the rest of the realists, flingers of challenges and dispellers of dreams, is a refutation of its inevitable ideality. Or are we to refuse these latter the character of artists? We will not avail ourselves of a parallel by pointing out again how such disbelievers in the achievement of the cherished ambitions of philosophy as Comte, Schopenhauer, and Hume nevertheless are recognised as genuine philosophers; we shall try to confront, very briefly, some of the directer logic of the situation.

We may start by asking at once, Who cares for idealism divorced from truth? Plainly, in the idealism of art, as in its pleasureableness, truth is demanded. It is a poor species that would be content to rank as a narcotic. Yet how far does truth comport with idealism? As a measuring by a subjective standard, an ideal expresses a subjective need, and hence at least something of the truth of the nature of the subject that has the need. In this light, an art even of absolute affirmations, though it should be found to reveal only the truth as, for the subject, it *ought* to be, irrespective of what it *is*—the "ideal" truth in precisely the sense in which, perhaps, more

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frequently than not, the term is used—yet must always possess a certain real truth, and must always retain a certain serious import in the way it did for Kant, who read its verifiable meaning altogether subjectively, and discovered its solid interest solely in its suggestions touching the "destination" of the subject. All the more will such art of the Ought-to-be preserve its import, if we believe that in virtue of that concrete perceptual mode of representation which differentiates it as art, it may often achieve a fuller truth than will reflective thought with its abstractions; and still more yet will it keep its abiding significance as a mode both of discovery and expression, if we hold, not that reflective thought is the goal and grave of perception, but that, on the contrary, reflective thought, being by its very nature as reflective (*i. e.,* self-conscious), inevitably abstract, formal, false, is itself in its highest and subtlest uses only an instrument for the mediating and developing of perceptions. For in this latter case, the true course of mental evolution will not be from perception to reflection as the end, but from perception ultimately to perception,—from the primitive "innocency," *i. e.,* unconsciousness and concreteness of instinct, to the regained unconsciousness and wholeness of habit and ripe intuition. On which account, under this view, philosophy cannot ever supersede art as a higher over a lower, but the final stage both of insight and utterance, whatever we may name it besides, will still be artistic.

This kind of subjective truth, then, art may safely enough aspire after; but can we get no farther? What about objective truth, truth "in the World" instead of simply "for the mind?" Surely we can advance at least one step more. Later philosophy, with its monistic temper, would not consent to draw such a line between mind and world, subject and object, as Kant drew. For us, the human mind itself is only a manifestation of the one Universe; so that whatever throws light upon the nature of the former, cannot but bear testimony in a certain measure as to the constitution and process also of the latter. This is a vein of philosophy of which I am not sure that it has yet been worked to its full worth. Still, for the very reason that we are not nowadays disposed radically to sever the inward sub-

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jective being from all other existence, we ought hardly to expect to derive from it insights so utterly divergent from and beyond anything derivable from the other or objective phase of reality. And historic experience does seem to testify that the unfolding of the inward nature of mind and the outer nature of things, go pretty much hand in hand. So, now, what *direct* objective truth has ideal art? What truth have the *objects purporting to be cognised in its ideals?*

Thus far, we have not attempted to define more closely the content of the ideals which art pictures forth. Is it enough to say that art occupies itself with ideals, without specifying further; or do ideals differ in degree of their attainableness, or the conformity of the objective order to them? If we follow Kant, and besides permit ourselves, as everyday usage fairly warrants, to include under the name of ideal all subjectively-posited standards and desired goals, we must divide ideals, serious ideals, altogether aside from imaginative levities, into the objectively verifiable and the objectively not-verifiable; the finite ideals of the Understanding, such as the Kantian "Categories" themselves, and the infinite, absolute ideals of Reason, like God, Freedom, and a completely teleological World. Provisionally granting this distinction, we still run into controversy touching which class art has to do with; namely, whether its creations are simple concrete presentments of commonplace scientific relations of rhythm, proportion, unity in variety, and causal development (the spirit, tacitly at any rate, of a good deal of the contemporary psychological and "exact" æsthetics, and, most notably of all, and avowedly, of modern French realism and the school of criticism that goes with this movement); or whether (as Plotinus and Hegel, or even Kant and Aristotle would say) it is an attempt "to chisel the image of God"—an attempt, like the boldest philosophy, to grasp the final significance of the whole scheme of things. To undertake a subtle demonstration that even one of Herrick's fragile lyrics or Hogarth's "Line of Beauty" is beautiful and not simply pleasant, because it touches the spirit's last perplexities, and that the most positivistic of Zola's novels, so far as it succeeds as art, engenders and expresses a mood haunted

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by infinite suggestions, would lead us too curiously far afield. I shall be dogmatic at this point, as before, to the extent of asserting that at least the approved imperishable sort of art utters the mind's absolute demands, and pries at the absolute Secret. This much assumed, are we forced to go on and add that these demands and these pryings must in the nature of the case remain forever futile, and the contents of our bravest visions never find a place *as things* out in the kingdom of Nature?

Once more, then, what amount of objective truth have the absolute ideals of great art? Of course, this truth, if they possess it, must be describable as a truth admitting of development, growth; for the æsthetic consciousness has most notably had a developing, growing content. But Hegel has once for all taught us that truth may be on different planes, and that the advance of our insight from a lower to a higher plane does not involve a simple repudiation of the lower, but that the lower is lifted up into and "conserved" as an abiding, vital element in the higher; so that the fact that insight has had a history does not signify a disowning of its past. The past of the human mind, whether in philosophy or art, is not, to use Hegel's vivid image, a museum of the mind's aberrations, but a Pantheon of godlike figures, each of which is an indispensable stage or phase of truth. This much, therefore, is fairly simple. With it disposed of, however, we at last come to our crux, which, as alway, is a matter of our whole philosophical viewpoint. For Hegel and his literal disciples, the enduring essence and final reality, after all, of the World, lies in the pure abstract "Idea," or the total system of the World's broad underlying structural principles—the "Categories"—these latter being conceived, it is true, not as a dead formal World-plan, but as livingly enforming the World; yet nevertheless abstract, inasmuch as in their inmost nature they persist above and after all particular existences. The serious difficulty which here arises for such of us as are not Hegelians, does not spring from a disposition on our part to doubt whether such categories and genuinely objective World-shaping principles are possible of apprehension. Few trained thinkers, I imagine, will be gravely tempted to

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carry scepticism or the worship of the Unknowable to the length of combating Hegel's position that, in any given stage of advance, philosophy and art alike may hope to seize hold of what in some sort are grand world-outlines; or that the latter may, *after all reservations,* be comfortably accepted as real and permanent factors of the *absolute* truth of the World. And so far, we are ready, most of us, if anyone prefers the term, to speak of art's ideals as "absolute," and yet to grant them direct objective validity. Let me repeat and emphasise this concession, that *in so far as by the idealism of art is meant only that in its "criticism of life" it applies deep-lying, large schematic norms, and by its truth that these norms are justifiable as enduring, fundamental traits of the ultimate reality itself of things—so far, unless we be complete, all-around sceptics and agnostics, we may cheerfully assent that art's idealism is compatible with a very actual outer truth, and need not dread very strenuous controversies in the matter.* But is this all that art's idealism signifies, all that its claims of truth involve? We straightway come upon a chance for radical divergences the moment we insist on pressing either of two reflections. First, can the entire truth ever be told in terms of so-called essential principles—can any interpretation involving abstraction be absolutely adequate? Secondly, is there ever realized such a thing as a stage of truth unconditionally achieved—such a thing even as a perfect and completed system of categories? Or, to put this second query another way, can the mind, by sheer power of insight or of pure activity within itself, and without waiting on experience and history, compass an unconditionally closed circle of truth—even of the nakedly universal sort? The orthodox Hegelian of the old school, so far as I have followed him, appears to me to answer both these questions with an affirmative; for him, the whole *essential and imperishable* truth is summed up in the categories, and he pretends to put before us the entire body of them. Consequently there should exist for him no reason why he could not pronounce the ideals bodying themselves forth in mature and elevated art, as capable not alone, of an unequivocally final adequacy—of an absolute absoluteness, if we may put it so—in themselves as mere ideals, but

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also of an absolutely unqualified objective verity. But how does the case stand with such of us as are of little faith? Suppose we refuse to believe in an absolutely absolute philosophy, much rather looking upon the Universe as literally inexhaustible, not simply as regards the infinite variety of its "contingent" particulars, but likewise as to the wealth of "essential" principles which it is able to unfold. One may conceivably be unprepared to assent that, as to its vital core, the drama of history was all played out within some few thousands of years and, as Lotze has pointedly commented, in and around the basin of the Mediterranean; so that one may be unwilling to accept even a final body of categories. Of course, the situation is not improved if, further yet, we do not believe anyway that reality ever can be exhaustively described in categories, or any "essential" traits, generalities, or abstractions whatsoever, but that out of the limbo of despised contingency and residual phenomena, new essential principles as well as a new history are ever rising to sight. Obviously, on such a view, *absolute* compassing of truth is not to be looked for in our ideals, whether created and given utterance in the form of art, or in any possible other finite mode of theory or projection outward. because all alike *do* involve abstraction. And suppose now, lastly, that our doubting goes a greater length still, in that, first, we cannot feel an unconditional objective cogency in any necessity of a merely inner, or moral, or subjective, or any other species divorced from *demonstration,* in the literal sense of *showing forth,* in the world of outer experience; while, secondly, at the same time, we do hold that over and above all (in the just-noted sense) demonstrable ideals, the mind keeps always irresistibly positing such supreme ideals as God, Freedom, and a total World, and these, in their last reaches, are ever turning out subjective and indemonstrable—or while, indeed, we hold it to be of the very nature of all ideals to have this indemonstrable residuum, if so we may call it, which, accordingly, like all subjective contents, is constantly liable to revision, correction, and illusoriness. In these circumstances, plainly, the ideality of art—its high vision of the ought-to-be—is not an unreservedly true vision, but subject to *re*vision and

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renewed attempts at demonstration, with the attendant opportunities for renewed doubt, or occasional not altogether silly despair over the possibility of demonstration at all. And hence the recurrent opportunities, too, for artistic expressions, not of optimism solely, but of agnosticism, scepticism and blank negation. The artist-mind, no less than the philosophic mind, may doubt or repudiate its own idealism.

In conclusion, that we may not appear to have hung back too timidly, for even these few pages, in mere interrogations and suppositions, I would urge that at least the following affirmative items, if not in every case expressly enlarged on, yet can all be gathered from our discussion, and may be regarded as summarising its substantial drift and upshot. They are:

(1.) That the aims of art are, in their last intent, serious; namely, revelation, truth in some sort, if only of the needs and nature of the spirit itself.

(2.) That art is an expression in terms of sense and feeling, but of and for reason through these; and therefore its communications need produce gratification in no other fashion than do the pronouncements of reason through the medium of philosophic reflection. They should produce the pleasure of insight, in which, however, in every other respect, that sense of furthered being which we call pleasure, may be thwarted, quite as conceivably as it can be in the outcome of *legitimate* speculation.

(3.) That its content is ideals—mind-born demands on the World—which apart from the question of whether the relatively more appropriate mode of having them is in sensuous perception or pure thought, are simply in themselves as ideals final or finite, complete or incomplete, in just the same sense and in the same way as those of philosophy itself.

(4.) That its ambition, too, of vindicating these ideals in the sphere of external reality is just as much and just as little attainable as in philosophy—it is capable of achieving a truth precisely as absolute and as relative, as "objective" and as "subjective," as is philosophy. Whether the sensuous concreteness of the æsthetic ideals is to be accounted a drawback or an advantage for their objective truth, depends upon whether we

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regard sensuous individuation as a "contingency" and clog to be worked free of, or as something indispensable to completeness of being and insight.

(5.) That, lastly, from all the preceding points together, it appears that the movements of art are thorough counterparts to the phases of philosophy; so that once more we may conclude, that if in the one region we are able to find legitimate room, not for optimistic syntheses alone, but as well for moments of positivism, agnosticism, scepticism, and pessimism, so likewise must we do in the other.

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THE VIVISECTION PROBLEM.

(A Reply.)

The thoughtful article on vivisection which appeared in a recent number of this periodical* is suggestive of conclusions with which some of its readers are not inclined to agree. By a process of reasoning, based, we think, upon an imperfect acquaintance with the facts, the writer has apparently come to believe that animal experimentation is so carefully and humanely carried on, so free from all abuse and so productive of benefit to humanity that it should be permitted to continue, untouched by the criticism of the "sentimentalist" and unhindered by restriction or restraint. What defects are to be found in Mr. Myers' line of reasoning? Why do arguments, such as those which he has so ably presented, fail to convince some whose regard for the progress of science is as genuine as his own? Against the suggestion or claim that vivisection is, in effect, altogether right, how is it that some intelligent men believe that certain phases of the practice are unjustifiable and wrong? Within the limits of a brief paper, it is, of course, impossible to bring forward all the reasons for dissent; but some outline may be given, sufficient to define the differing standpoint of those who believe that without definite limita-

* "Is Vivisection Justifiable?" C. S. Myers in April number, 1904.

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tions, the practice of vivisection is sometimes carried to an extent which is not ethically just.

Is vivisection ever painful? Does it sometimes imply prolonged agony. This seems to us a matter of no little importance. We think that the decision regarding the morality of the practice rests almost entirely upon the answer to this one question. Could it be demonstrated beyond doubt that a dog undergoing vivisection suffers no more of what we call pain, than a tuft of grass torn out by its roots, or a flower pulled to pieces, the justifiability of animal vivisection would be assured. The impeachment of unlimited vivisection rests wholly upon the conviction that in some of its phases, it is productive of agony. A few years ago, hardly anybody in the medical profession questioned the fact. To-day, nearly every apologist for the method, attempts, as Mr. Myers has done, to show the absence of any great degree of discomfort. Every effort, he assures us, is made to diminish pain; "an anæsthetic is always administered;" the pain of certain inoculations is but that of a needle-prick; and even the cries and contortions of a vivisected creature are to be regarded for the most part, as an illusion. "When an animal manifests the appropriate signs, the sentimentalist at once leaps to the conclusion that the behavior that he observed in others implies the presence of the same state of feelings in them as would induce the same behavior in himself." But this, Mr. Myers assures us, is an error of the kind known as the "psychologist's fallacy;" we really know nothing about it. "Considerations of this kind only show what control the layman should exercise over the springs of his natural pity, when he reads of seemingly painful, but really painless experiments upon the internal organs of living animals." That during such operations (which, by the way, are sometimes extended over weeks and months) the animals are put under the influence of an anæsthetic; that in England this is demanded by law, that in other countries it is the voluntary custom of physiologists—all this he most confidently and fervently seems to believe. It is not denied that occasionally, some pain may ensue; but to this writer, this apparently seems of such a trifling character that he passes it without criticism.

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That the pain inflicted in vivisection ever amounts to torture, is not once admitted or implied.

Now we are far from being satisfied with the comfortable conclusions which Mr. Myers has apparently reached, and which he desires to impress upon his readers. He tells us at the outset that he is not a practical vivisector; and his statements regarding the practice must therefore rest upon the exculpatory assertions of the very persons against whom the charge of inhumanity has been made. Do all of these persons invariably tell us *the whole truth* about a practice whereby they earn their daily bread? Is it in accord with what Mr. Gladstone happily designated "the delicate sense of the reasonableness of things" that some of the men charged with cruelty should not attempt to defend themselves by distorting the truth? It seems to us that while the statements of experimenters are entitled to all consideration which character and motives imply, a little hesitancy in granting absolute faith may be excusable; and that "laymen and sentimentalists" have some reason to doubt. That vivisected animals sometimes suffer, is a charge that rests wholly upon the evidence of men who are neither "sentimentalists" nor "laymen," but members of the medical profession. Speaking before the British Medical Association at its annual meeting in 1899, the President of one of the sections, Dr. George Wilson, LL. D., made this remarkable charge:

"I boldly say there should be some pause in these ruthless lines of experimentation. . . . I have not allied myself to the anti-vivisectionists, but *I accuse my profession of misleading the public as to the cruelties and horrors which are perpetrated on animal life.* When it is stated that the actual pain involved in these experiments is commonly of the most trifling description, there is a suppression of the truth, of the most palpable kind. . . . The cruelty does not lie in the operation itself, which is permitted to be performed without anæsthetics, but in the after effects. *Whether so-called toxins are injected under the skin into the peritoneum, into the cranium, under the dura mater, into the pleural cavity, into the veins, eyes, or other organs—and all these methods are ruthlessly practised —there is long-drawn-out agony. The animal so innocently operated on may have to live days, weeks, or months, with no anæsthetic to assuage its sufferings, and nothing but death to relieve.*" [Italics ours.]

And yet Mr. Myers would have us believe that even in these experiments the pain "cannot exceed that of a poisoned rat

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or mouse." How does he know? Do poisoned rats and mice live in agony "for days, weeks, or months?"

Take another medical witness. In his presidential address before the American Academy of Medicine, Dr. Theophilus Parvin, LL. D., a professor of Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia, protested warmly against the cruelty of certain vivisectors. There were men, he declared, both in America and Europe, "who seem, seeking useless knowledge, to be blind to the writhing agony, and deaf to the cry of pain of their victims, and who have been guilty of the most damnable cruelties, without the denunciation by the public and the profession that their wickedness deserves." Is not this remarkable language, coming,—not from a "layman,"—but a professor in a leading medical college, regarding a practice wherein Mr. Myers finds nothing worthy of criticism? It was no sentimentalist, but rather one of the most distinguished surgeons that America ever produced, and for many years a professor in Harvard Medical School—Dr. Henry J. Bigelow, LL. D., who in a paper read before the Massachusetts Medical Society, protested against *"the cold-blooded cruelties* now more and more practised under the authority of science," producing results which he declared were "contemptible, compared with the price paid in agony and torture." Elsewhere the same eminent medical authority says:

> "The ground for public supervision is that vivisection, immeasurably beyond any other pursuit, *involves the infliction of torture to little or no purpose.* Motive apart, painful vivisection differs from that usual cruelty of which the law takes absolute cognisance, mainly in being practised by an educated class, who, having once become callous to its objectionable features, *find its pursuit an interesting occupation under the name of Science. . . .*
>
> *"The law should interfere.* There can be no doubt that in this relation there exists a case of cruelty to animals far transcending in its refinement and in its horror anything that has been known in the history of nations.
>
> "There will come a time when the world will look back to modern vivisection in the name of Science as it now does to burning at the stake in the name of religion." [Italics ours.]

Quotations like these, from the writings of medical men might be indefinitely multiplied. They are the utterances not merely of physicians, but of medical professors familiar with

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what goes on about them. We cannot afford to dismiss them with a shrug and a sneer. If their tones seem more resonant than those of the majority in their profession, it may be because success and assured eminence has gained for them the inestimable privilege of absolute fearlessness regarding the criticism of lesser men. But of the existence of these "cold-blooded cruelties," of this agony and torture, of this pain to which death by burning alive is a happy release—where do we find the slightest reference in Mr. Myers' paper? Not a hint of its existence is there to be found! Why? Is it because he accepts with implicit faith the word of the experimenter? That is his privilege. We admit that it may be a matter of choice. But upon whom is reliance most safely placed in our attempts to penetrate to the truth,—upon men grown old in the medical profession, connected with institutions of learning, men who cannot have the slightest reason for adverse criticism, but every inducement for discreet silence—or, on the other hand, the practical experimenter who may feel that his position is dependent upon the maintenance of absolute freedom to do whatever he likes within the walls of his laboratory?

If space permitted, it would be of interest to follow all the ramifications of Mr. Myers' remarkable argument. In certain directions, it seems to us to denote a peculiar tendency to credulity wherever vivisection is in question. Bichat, he tells us naïvely, once saw dogs "tearing their peritoneum and devouring their own intestines which had protruded from a hole in the abdominal wall." But does Mr. Myers seriously consider such an action as the painless and contented gratification of the animal's appetite? Once, in a physiological laboratory, we witnessed precisely the same thing; an animal, during a vivisection, partly escaped from its bonds, and with the utmost fury of despair, bit and tore its own bleeding wounds. Had Mr. Myers been present at that experiment, we hardly believe he would have contended for its painlessness. "Again and again," he assures us, "dogs have been observed to wag the tail or lick the hands of the operator, even immediately before the beginning of the operation!" What inference would he have us draw from the fact? That it betokens the

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happiness of the animal? Observers have drawn a far different conclusion. "I recall to mind," said Dr. Latour, "a poor dog, the root of whose spinal nerves Magendie was about to expose. Twice did the dog, all bloody and mutilated, escape from the implacable knife, and twice did I see him put his fore-paws around Magendie's neck and lick his face! I confess I could not bear the sight." It was a phenomenon recorded also by the editor of the London *Lancet* in a description of what once was done in the physiological laboratory. "Look," says this editor of the leading medical journal of England, "at the animal before us, stolen (to begin with) from his master; the poor creature, hungry, tied up for days and nights, pining for his home, is at length brought into the theater. As his crouching and feeble form is strapped upon the table, *he licks the very hand that ties him!* He struggles, but in vain, and uselessly expresses his fear and suffering. . . ." We need not go on with this picture of past experimentation. It is merely of interest to show how the same fact impresses different men. Strange it is, that a dog, licking the hand of "the operator immediately before the beginning of the operation" should seem to any man to betoken the absence of all apprehension—a sign of happy animal indifference to its fate, rather than the mute, instinctive and vain appeal for sympathy to a being in the human form.

But the most painful part of Mr. Myers' essay, and in one sense its most significant inference, pertains to his unqualified approval of the attitude taken by Dr. Emanuel Klein. When this distinguished vivisector was examined before the Royal Commission regarding his practices and opinions, he frankly and honestly admitted that he never used chloroform or any other anæsthetic, except in public demonstrations, unless necessary for his personal convenience; declared that a physiologist had the right to "do as he likes with the animal;" that to save himself inconvenience, he would perform even one of the most painful of operations on a dog's nerves without the use of anæsthetics; that he held himself "*entirely indifferent to the sufferings* of the animal," and had "*no regard at all*" to the anguish of the creatures experimented upon. Quoting the last

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sentence, Mr. Myers does not hesitate to declare that *"Dr. Klein is perfectly right."* We are not particularly surprised at this assurance of his agreement; but unless very much mistaken, Mr. Myers is the first Englishman who, during the past quarter of a century, has openly confessed his sympathy with such sentiments. Certainly, they were very far from meeting the approval of scientific men at the time they were uttered. One of the most eminent scientists of the last century, writing to another man of equal eminence, thus referred to the profession of indifference to animal suffering:

"This Commission is playing the deuce with me. I have felt it my duty to act as counsel for Science, and was well satisfied with the way things are going. But on Thursday, when I was absent, ——— was examined; and if what I hear is a correct account of the evidence he gave, I may as well throw up my brief. I am told he openly professed the most entire indifference to animal suffering, and he only gave anæsthetics to keep the animals quiet!

"I declare to you, I did not believe the man lived, who was such an unmitigated, cynical brute as to profess and act upon such principles; and I would willingly agree to any law that would send him to the treadmill."

We must ask pardon for the quotation of these forcible and far-reaching denunciations. They occur in a letter written to Charles Darwin by Professor Huxley. More than a quarter of a century has elapsed since the great English biologist thus made known the feeling which such sentiments inspired. The times have changed. To-day, a writer in defense of this attitude of indifference, tells us that Dr. Klein "is perfectly right."

The utility of animal experimentation is a question too great to be discussed now. The trouble with most of the advocates for vivisection without limitations is that they go far out of the way to glean and gather what they hope may be fresh evidences of its utility. Even those who regard vivisection in its milder aspects with a favorable eye will hardly care very much for the evidences of its usefulness that Mr. Myers presents us. Hardly a single claim made rests upon generally acknowledged facts. What, for example, has "the value of vaccination in small-pox" —however "widely recognised"—to do with vivisection of animals? Mr. Myers brings it into his catalogue of utilities,

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seemingly unconscious that with Jenner's discovery, the practice of vivisection had nothing to do. Where are the proofs that the mortality from typhoid fever in any country has been reduced by the general use of the "appropriate antitoxin"? Where are we to look for similar evidence regarding mortality from "the Mediterranean fever" in France and Italy? We venture to say that official statistics proving any marked reduction in the mortality from these causes of death through use of such antitoxin cannot be produced. It is interesting to know that for the first time in its history, "Havana is practically rid of yellow fever." What has this to do with experiments on animals? Perhaps the most surprising assertion of utility is that which concerns the mortality resulting from the venom of serpents; we are told that "hardly a failure is on record from the treatment of snake-bite." Of course a statement like this may mean anything—or nothing at all. Of any number of imaginable drugs or appliances it might very truthfully be said that there is "no record of failure,"—simple because they have not been tried. But if Mr. Myers believes, and desires to convey the impression that a specific and almost certain cure for the poison of venomous serpents has at last been discovered through experimentation upon animals, and that its claims of efficacy are amply evinced by *a decrease in the mortality from this cause* in the countries where venomous serpents abound, he is entirely mistaken. Every year, in British India alone, over twenty thousand men, women, and children lose their lives from this one cause. That was the record up to five years ago. Has this mortality been diminished in any appreciable degree by the employment of the new remedy regarding whose use we are assured that there is "hardly a failure on record?" If so, where are the statistics? There are none. It is a claim of the laboratory. No such specific, the value of which has been demonstrated by a steady decrease of mortality as shown in the statistics of any country, can be said to exist. This is not criticism of this phase of experimentation. It is not denial that certain laboratory experiments have been apparently successful. But the claim should have stopped there. We cannot but think that the suggestion of a far wider utility should never

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have been made in view of the present practical impotency of every alleged discovery of the kind.

What may we say of the moral aspect of unlimited vivisection? Every man's attitude toward this question will depend in great measure upon certain primary intellectual concepts. Behind a thinking man's judgment of what is right or wrong in human conduct must be his personal conviction regarding the meaning of the Universe in which he dwells. The creed of the vivisector is not always beautiful. Writing for the *Popular Science Monthly* a few years since, a leading American biologist, Professor Hodge, of Clark University, declared that "God clearly gives to man *every sanction to cause any amount of physical pain which he may find expedient to unravel His laws.*" Seldom, if ever, has the supremacy of science over the ordinary conceptions of morality been more definitely announced. If this doctrine be true, then the experiments with poisons, made by Ringer and others upon patients in a London hospital, the experiments upon dying children and the incurably insane, made in certain American institutions—would all find equal justification with every phase of animal experimentation; for it could then be said that "they were expedient to unravel His laws." And if the elucidation of a new fact makes right any method by which it may be torn from the secrecy wherein Nature has concealed it,—if this be the meaning of the message which modern Science is to proclaim to Humanity, then—in more senses than one—we are at the beginning of a new era. One may, indeed, imagine a Universe wherein the idea of Justice does not exist, where compassion and pity and sympathy are unknown, and where Might makes Right. In such a world, no thought of the uprighteousness of an action would come to mind. In such a world—unchecked except by fear—would flourish whatever tyranny might desire and force compel,—the prostitution of woman, the slavery of the weak, the murder of the helpless, the causation of any amount of physical pain upon animals or children, if thereby what is hidden by Nature could be brought to light. It would be the reign of selfishness and greed, of lust and force, of cruelty—and utility. That to-day, we are not living in a world, ruled supremely by claw and tooth

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and nail; that some conception of moral ideals has brightened the path of humanity in its slow progress upward from brutality; that with us, power does not mean equity; that cruelty is infamous, and injustice is ignoble, and pity is divine, this world of ours owes to teaching far different from that of the biologist who, in his imagination, creates a "God" that hides facts, and gives torture the right to find them.

What may we hope to accomplish in the reform of vivisection as it exists to-day? Considerations of space forbid anything but the briefest of outlines; and yet certain lines of possible activity would seem apparent. It seems to us, that first of all, there must be the gradual creation of public sentiment which shall be eager, not so much to condemn all vivisection, or to approve it all, *as to know with certainty the facts.* Take, for example, the question of vivisection in institutions of learning. To what extent is it carried on, merely to demonstrate what every student knows in advance? If one may judge from authoritative statements put forth for general information, it would appear that certain lines of experiment are now permitted in America and in England, which hardly more than a generation ago were condemned as cruel by the medical profession of Great Britain. We ought to know if this is true; and if found so, we ought to inquire why it is that experiments which scarcely thirty years ago were almost universally condemned, are less abhorrent to-day? The removal of the secrecy that so generally enshrouds vivisection is the first and most important step toward any true reform.

And when secrecy is removed, and we know the facts, then must there be a yet wider promulgation of the truth about it than is possible to-day. By the propaganda of the press; by the advocacy of the principles which underlie our opposition to irresponsible and unrestricted vivisection; by the contrast of views; by the incitement of interest in a subject which is naturally most distasteful to the average mind, there must gradually be created a public sentiment that will be heard when it asks for some measure of reform, some method for preventing what ought not to exist.

And finally, there must come the regulation of vivisection by

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law. This does not mean the abolition of all physiological investigation, as they who clamor for non-interference so often assert. It need not imply a single impediment to any scientific inquiry that is of potential value to humanity and possible without anguish. But the law certainly should forbid all cruel and all useless experiments such as those so emphatically condemned by Parvin and Bigelow and Wilson. It ought to bring upon official records the number of experiments performed, the objects which were in view, the results which were attained, the species of animals upon which the investigations were made, the anæsthetics which were administered, and everything that pertains to the prevention of pain. We may say that all this is but little more than the drawing aside of curtains, and the admission of the light. It is so little to ask, that one is amazed at the resistance which the laboratory makes to the demand. Will that resistance be perpetually effective? We doubt it. No human institution has yet been able to keep hidden what the world wishes to know; and when all is known, we may be sure that in the matter of vivisection, the distinction will be very clearly drawn between what is permissible and what is to be condemned, by the conscience of mankind.

ALBERT LEFFINGWELL.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN ETHICS: THREE LECTURES TO CLERGY GIVEN AT CAMBRIDGE. By W. R. Sorley, M. A., Hon. LL. D. (Edin.), Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1904.

This little book consists of three lectures on "Some Leading Features of the Ethical Thought of the Present Day," delivered at Cambridge (England) to a summer meeting of clergy held there in July, 1903. The chapters in the books are headed respectively: "Characteristics," "Ethics and Evolution," "Ethics and Idealism."

In the first chapter Professor Sorley says that in "English Ethical thought during the last century . . . the controversies of the time centered almost exclusively round two questions: the question of the origin of moral ideas, and the question of the criterion of moral value." Moralists were separated "into two hostile schools, known as Utilitarian and Intuitionist." The Utilitarian school held that moral ideas "could be traced to experience; and by 'experience' they meant in the last resort sense-perceptions and the feelings of pleasure and pain which accompany or follow sense-perception" (p. 2). With regard to the standard of morality "they held that the distinction between right and wrong depended upon the consequences of an action in the way of pleasure and pain" (p. 3).

On the other hand the Intuitionists maintained that moral ideas were in their origin spiritual, although they might be called into definite consciousness by the experience of the facts to which they could be applied.

With regard to the criterion of morality they held that "moral ideas themselves had an independent validity; they had a worth and authority for conduct which could not be accounted for by any consequences in which action resulted" (p. 5). However (and here we get for the first time the *raison d'etre* of Mr. Sorley's book), "the Utilitarians no more than the Intuitionists were opponents of the traditional—as we may call it—the Christian morality of modern civilisation" (p. 7). "Their controversies were almost entirely of what may be called an academic kind, and, however decided, would have little effect upon a man's practical attitude. But it would not be possible to make any such confident assertion regarding the ethical controversies of the

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present day" (p. 12). It appears as if modern controversy "would not hesitate to call in question the received code of morality, and to revise our standard of right and wrong" (p. 13). "It is on this ground, therefore—because I believe that the ethical question is no longer so purely an academic question as it was some years ago, because it affects not only the philosophic thinker but the practical man who is concerned with the problems of his day—that I have selected the topic for these lectures" (p. 13). "Perhaps we might trace the beginnings of this controversy as to the content of what is right and what is wrong to an older opposition in ethical thought . . . the controversy of Egoism and Altruism" (p. 14). But while both egoist and utilitarians have agreed "to insist that morality means the same for both, . . . on the other hand, the more recent tendency to which I refer emphasises and exalts the egoistic side, and thus accentuates the difference between the new moral code—if we may call it moral—and the Christian morality" (p. 18).

"Nietzsche, the *enfant terrible* of modern thought, is the 'boldest exponent' of this tendency" (p. 32). He maintains that man's life must be interpreted "physiologically only and not spiritually," and he would "replace philanthropy by a boundless egoism."

The trend which Professor Sorley thus describes in modern ethical thought, he ascribes in large measure to the material success of last century; to the feeling of irresponsible power in those who have accumulated vast wealth—("the world seems to lie before them as something to be bought and sold;" "they are unrestrained by the traditional obligations of ancient lineage"); to a slackened feeling for duty, and a lessened belief in human goodness, which Mr. Sorley apprehends in literature, of which Ibsen's and Zola's works are taken as typical. A misapplication of the biological doctrine of "natural selection" is also responsible for a large measure of the present confusion of ethical thought.

This brings the reader to Chapter II, in which this misapplication is dealt with at length. The line taken is that with which readers of Mr. Sorley's "Ethics of Naturalism" have been made familiar. "Natural Selection" is, in biological evolution, a negative process. Nature produces spontaneously variation; the unfit are eliminated by Natural Selection. Fitness, in the individual, implies the qualities of strength, courage, prudence, and temperance; in the group, self-restraint, self-sacrifice, and obedience must be added. But how shall we account for the development

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of such qualities as philanthropy and sympathy beyond the point at which they can be said to make for the efficiency of the group in its struggle for existence? Here another form of natural selection comes into play, viz., the competition of ideas, and the survival of the fittest. At this point, Mr. Sorley thinks, the theory of natural selection breaks down. "Bishop Wilberforce was killed by a fall from his horse, not by the triumphant dialectic of Professor Huxley. Sir Richard Owen lived to a patriarchal old age, and did not disappear from the face of the earth because he still clung to an idea which the best intellect of his time had relinquished."[1]

"What was it then that led to the victory of the one idea over the other? The cause was intellectual. With the experts it was logical conviction. . . . With men in general" it was adoption or imitation of "the ideas of those who knew" (p. 59). "It was therefore not natural selection at all. . . . One idea was deliberately accepted and the other deliberately rejected. . . . But natural selection is a physical, external, objective process. . . . It is simply natural law."

Here (p. 60) as elsewhere "Nature" seems for Professor Sorley the unconscious. And though he would doubtless deny the intention, he seems to use the terms "objective" and "external" as though to be objective were to be external to mind. Moreover, "simply natural law" seems to be a law that does not run in mind. To be "subjective" is to be out of the domain of "natural law." But when Mr. Sorley maintains that the distinctive characteristic of human action is that it implies choice, he is also obliged to admit that "choice always follows some kind of principle" (p. 78); and if the principle that choice always follows is—in the last resort—logical necessity, have we not here also a "natural law"? Have we not also something "objective" which is at the same time within mind?

In Chapter III, Professor Sorley deals with the ethics of modern Idealism, as represented by the "Prolegomena to Ethics" of T. H. Green; the "Appearance and Reality" of Mr. F. H. Bradley; and the "Problem of Conduct" of Mr. A. E. Taylor. While holding Green's "Prolegomena" to have been the "contribution of greatest value" made by "this idealist movement" "to English

[1] Is it logical to lay the premises in the intellectual plane—the conflict of ideas—and to draw the conclusion in the biological plane—the survival or otherwise of the men? Most men have more than one idea.

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thought" (p. 88), Mr. Sorley finds within it the germs of the tendency which he most deplores in more recent Idealism. "Those whose business it is to test intellectual notions," he says, "have been impressed by the difficulties involved in Green's metaphysical positions and in his connection of them with morality" (p. 90). These difficulties may be gathered together as represented by Green's use of the word "self-realisation," and by the connection of the implied point of view with his metaphysical doctrine that "the consciousness which is in man and which raises him above nature is the manifestation of—the 'reproduction' of itself by—an eternal self-consciousness" (p. 97).

In order that the practical value of this conception may justify itself, it is necessary that "the distinction of good from evil must be first of all made clear. Green's appeal to an eternal self-consciousness does nothing of itself to elucidate this distinction. Tendencies to exalt selfish interest over common welfare, and to prefer sensual to what are called higher gratifications, enter into the nature of man, and have fashioned his history. Green does not even ask the question whether these also are not to be considered manifestations, or 'reproductions' of the eternal self-consciousness. But his metaphysical view does not exclude them; and if they are included, morality disappears for lack of any criterion between good and evil" (p. 99). This passage is exceedingly characteristic of Mr. Sorley's whole attitude throughout this book.

Mr. Bradley develops, in Mr. Sorley's judgment, this fundamental mistake of Green's. "Like Green, he looks upon man's moral activity as an appearance—what Green calls a reproduction—of this eternal reality" (p. 101), and, "he brings out the consequence, which in Green is more or less concealed, that the evil equally with the good in man and in the world are appearances of the Absolute." "Mr. Bradley's Absolute (p. 106) is eternal, relationless, ineffable. To it goodness cannot be ascribed; indeed, no predicate can be properly applied to it, for any predication implies relation." "If all predication involves relation, and relation is excluded from reality, then no predicate—not even truth and goodness—can be asserted of the real" (p. 102).

"From the monistic view of morality, as set forth by Mr. Bradley, there is no direct route to the distinction between good and evil. If the distinction is reached at all it will be found to be psychological rather than cosmical, to be relative to the attitude

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of the human mind which contemplates the facts, and in this strict sense to be, what Mr. Bradley calls it, appearance" (p. 109). Good is "that which satisfies desire" (p. 110). It is "co-extensive with approbation" (p. 111). "This approval is still simply a feeling of some individual person" (p. 112). Thus Mr. Bradley's theory "does not advance us at all towards determining the validity of this approval, or towards an objective criterion of distinguishing 'good' from evil" (p. 113). Mr. Bradley, moreover, holds that "Two great divergent forms of moral goodness exist. . . . These are "self-assertion and self-sacrifice" (p. 118). "System" is aimed at by the former, width by the latter. Mr. Sorley holds that "neither on the method of system and self-assertion nor on the method of expansion and self-sacrifice has the author given or suggested any criterion for the distinction of good and evil. He has cast his net so wide as to include all conduct within it without discrimination of moral worth. . . . The good as such has never been reached at all, nor any tenable suggestion offered for distinguishing it from evil" (p. 121).

Mr. Sorley concludes: "I have contended in these lectures that neither the mechanical unity of the naturalists nor the rational unity of the idealists has succeeded in comprehending within its unifying principle the essential nature of morality with its deep-going dualism of good and evil" (p. 133).

"The moral concept (p. 131)—whether described as worth or as duty or as goodness—cannot be distilled out of any knowledge about the laws of existence or of occurrence. Nor will speculation about the real conditions of experience yield it, unless adequate recognition be first of all given to the fact that the experience which is the subject-matter of philosophy is not merely a sensuous and thinking, but also a moral, experience."

Professor Sorley's book is avowedly addressed to those whose interest in life is practical rather than theoretical; its aim is obviously to be practically helpful to such people, who must, however, be people who have turned to philosophy for some measure of practical guidance, or at least for fuller illumination of a world which such students approach from the side of practical interest. The main question, therefore, for its critic is: does the book fulfill its purpose? Is it likely to give efficient direction and assistance to such students? It must be owned that to the present critic it seems chiefly to warn off from the realm of philosophy all students of the quality described. All philosophy, they are told, is full of

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pitfalls: ancient philosophy is pervaded throughout its length and breadth by two unsolved contradictions, that between Egoism and Altruism on the one hand, and that between Necessity and Free Will on the other. If, in despair of solving, or escaping, these the student bethinks him of modern philosophy, a still deadlier danger lies in wait for him. The two ancient horrors have given birth to a modern monster by whom the unwary will be not only mentally confused, but morally corrupted. One cannot wonder if such people will add the authority of a philosopher to the authority of "the Christian morality of modern civilisation" and refrain from further inquiry.

That would be, often, an excellent result. But is it the result desired by Professor Sorley?

Seriously, though the difficulty of presenting philosophical ideas to a popular audience is very great, it is not so insurmountable as to justify a philosopher in simply stating puzzles without giving his hearers any clue or hint as to the solution, or as to the direction in which solution might be sought. The difficulty has been overcome many times in recent years. An instance might be given in a field of philosophy other than that touched upon by Professor Sorley, viz., Prof. A. C. Bradley's lecture: "Poetry for Poetry's Sake" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901).

It is perhaps not too much to say that both in method and in implied point of view Mr. Sorley's book is too slight and too old-fashioned to do justice either to recent philosophy, or to Professor Sorley's position in it.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

London.

METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. By N. P. Gilman. New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Co. London: Macmillan Co. Pp. x, 430.

"Within two years there will be the greatest struggle between organised labor and organised capital that the United States has yet seen." This prophecy, made to me last October by an American economist, bids fair to receive ample fulfillment in the many grave conflicts now in progress in various parts of America. The organisation of labor has gone on apace; probably between three and four millions of industrial workers are enrolled members of labor unions, a number twice as large as three or four years ago. Such a rapid influx of new blood has naturally imbued leaders and followers alike with a sense of increased strength and a deter-

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mination to put it to the test, while it has perhaps given a temporary advantage to the more radical spirit of the "Newer Unionism." It is, therefore, hardly a matter for surprise that the period of business depression following on a space of several years' rapid expansion should be made the occasion for a general effort on the part of the workers to enforce one of their cardinal economic doctrines—viz., that a reduction of wages is merely an aggravation of the evil of trade depression and over-production. Equally is it to be expected that employers should seek relief by discharging hands and lowering the wages bill. The present conflict is, however, more than an effort to readjust wages and hours of work to a depression in trade. It is being made the occasion on both sides to contest the fundamental principles of union recognition and the union shop. We cannot here discuss the grave issues at stake, nor point out the implications involved by a victory of one side or the other. What is of importance is that one should recognise that the issues are of vital moment to our general social development, and that in consequence the decision will come more and more to lie with the general body of citizens rather than with the immediately contending parties alone. Even now it is the force of public opinion which really determines the gradual changes in the interpretation of the common law, a factor of prime importance in modern industrial conflicts. Public opinion, again, by granting or withholding its sympathy makes or mars an effective boycott, supports or crushes a prolonged strike.

It is far from easy, however, for the general public to form an intelligent judgment on the current of affairs involving issues so manifold and complicated as the diverse relations of labor and capital. The chief value of Mr. Gilman's latest book on Industrial Peace will be the statement, dispassionate, and in clear form, of the main facts of the case and of the principles in accordance with which industrial organisation would appear to be moving.

The book takes an Anglo-Saxon point of view, since it draws almost as much upon English as upon American experience, besides making considerable reference to Australian and New Zealand developments. It undertakes a good deal more than a discussion of the special machinery designed to further industrial peace, giving a brief but concise statement of the chief facts incidental to the history and present position of trade unionism.

Mr. Gilman argues that under modern industrial conditions col-

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lective bargaining is practically a necessity, and this implies, if the tyranny of either labor or capital is to be avoided, efficient organisation of both employers and employed. The latter, being the first to feel the need, gained a long start in the matter of organisation, but the chief feature of to-day is the rapidity with which employers are following suit. The first machinery elaborated as a wage regulator in the interests of industrial peace was the sliding scale. In Chapter V, after some consideration, this method is on the whole condemned and the modern tendency to substitute a minimum wage and a Board of Conciliation is approved.

But if organised capital and labor are to enter into contracts through their representatives, fulfillment of contract with compensation for breach is a corollary. This raises the question of the legal constitution and liability of trade unions. After a full discussion in Chapter VI, Mr. Gilman strongly urges unions to become incorporated.

The ensuing chapters deal at some length with the Aims and Methods of Unions, their conduct of Strikes and Boycotts, and the place borne by the public in relation to their actions.

The remainder of the book is given to a general account of Trade Boards of Conciliation, State Boards of Arbitration, and the methods of legal regulation in force in New Zealand.

Mr. Gilman has naturally to be content with judgments mainly negative. He shows indeed how intolerable is the ever-increasing extent to which idleness, financial loss, and personal violence result from the failure of two great economic factors of production to co-operate harmoniously. Yet all attempts at providing voluntary machinery such as State Boards of Arbitration or Conciliation are proved to do no more than touch a mere fringe of the difficulty. Is the conclusion to be drawn that resort must be had to legal regulation of a compulsory character?

In the case of monopolistic industries Mr. Gilman argues rather in the affirmative. "Just as these businesses are, in fact, diverse from ordinary business so they should be more subject to public control in respect to labor relations." It might indeed be argued that with well-organised labor and capital throughout any given trade all business was as regards its labor contract in a position of monopoly. This is in fact the crucial point. Will the law, public opinion, and the loyalty or self-interest of unionists allow trade unions permanently to maintain a "union shop," the end for

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which they are universally striving? Again, will the fight for the "open shop" on the part of employers' associations lead to conflicts so bitter and widespread that the public determine to take the matter from private hands and give them over to a Government department? Mr. Gilman thinks some movement in this latter direction almost certain. In the meantime the elements of the problem are themselves continually suffering modification. Raw unions are in process of education and may adopt a more conservative policy. Employers may cease from "union smashing" and conclude an honorable peace. The social and political ambitions of the wage-earning classes may develop into a strong Socialistic movement, or they may find expression, through increased power in local government, in activities bringing greater stability for the individualist regime. Mr. Gilman, in common with Mr. Graham Brooks and Mr. Bolen, thus concludes that we are confronted with a parting of the ways, but he hesitates to guess along which path our labor organisations will move.

In criticism of this book one might suggest that Mr. Gilman has traveled over so much ground that he has at times become a little sketchy in his treatment. The chapter on Combination of Employees is anything but complete, failing even to mention the American Labor Union, which is likely to play an important part in its rivalry to the American Federation of Labor, as also in its open approval of Socialism. Nothing is said, when dealing with Conciliation, of the English Conciliation Act of 1896. In dealing with the Taff-Vale Judgment it is a mistake to regard Lord Lindley as maintaining that where the funds of a union are not sufficient to pay damages an employer can attach the property of individual members. We doubt whether the statement, "Boycott has no standing before the courts," is correct in view of certain judgments which certainly recognise the boycott as justifiable within limits. In view of the fact that Mr. Gilman says in his preface that he is concerned with analysis rather than history, one might have expected a more critical examination of the premises from which trade unions start, as also of the peculiar features of American as opposed to English unions. Description rather than economic analysis is the strong point of the book.

In a subject so far reaching, however, it is perhaps unfair to expect more than a broad presentation of the material which will enable others to formulate particular problems and to attempt independent judgments. This Mr. Gilman has done in a manner

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so interesting as to command the gratitude of all interested in current labor problems.

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AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Alexander Bain, LL. D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Aberdeen. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904. Pp. xi, 449.

The Autobiography, as Professor Bain left it, ended with an account of the events of the year 1890; a supplementary chapter, relating to the last thirteen years of his life, has been added by his literary executor, Prof. W. L. Davidson.

The chief feature of interest in this volume is its clear and candid account of the stages in the writer's mental growth, under the circumstances of the time. Curious lights are also thrown on the past history of University Education in Scotland. Specially attractive is the account given in the first two chapters of the way in which the difficulties of the author's early education were overcome, and of the manner in which his native intellectual tendencies began to show themselves. The appalling theology which was taught to him in youth does not seem to have affected his emotions, and only roused in the intellect a rebellious tendency. He was partially emancipated from Calvinism by Dr. Kidd, an Aberdeen preacher famous in his day, for whom the evangelistic "plan of salvation" was supreme. In his twentieth year his attention was directed to Channing, all of whose works he seems to have read with enthusiasm: "The effect was to dissolve the exclusive evangelism of my previous education, and to inspire an ennobling Theism, without regard to special embodiments" (p. 39). He also acquiesced in the "new turn to the work of Christ," which Channing, as a Unitarian, gave. It is perfectly evident, however, that no vestige of permanent interest was aroused in him with respect to what would now be called Liberal or Rational Christianity. It will be said that this was because the mode of thought in question is not one in which any consistent thinker can rest, for it is only a half-way house to scientific Naturalism. As against this easy conclusion, I would venture to affirm that the reason lies deeper, and is found in a certain point of view with regard to human nature which Bain early adopted and by which he stood to the last, and which represents the direct antithesis of the fundamental principle of Rational Chris-

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tianity. The basal principle of all teaching of the Channing type is the supreme, and, in fact, the infinite worth of human nature, a value which belongs to man intrinsically, and of which no moral descent to infra-bestial depths can divest him. Such a view is axiomatic to theologians of the mental mould of Channing and Martineau, and to philosophers of the mental mould of T. H. Green. To Bain it is merely a prejudice, unconfirmed by experience, and pandering to vanity ("Practical Essays," p. 30), and all idealism which rests on it is visionary.

An absorbing interest in physical science, and subsequently the study of Comte's "Philosophie Positive," caused him to reject all theology, and he found his abiding place in a thorough-going empiricism. He appears never to have taken up any position of public antagonism to the Pharisaic and obscurantist orthodoxy by which he was surrounded, yet his student days were not over before he acquired the reputation of "infidelity." In 1840 a small knot of class-fellows formed a society meeting weekly for the reading of papers and discussions. Three years later the club entered on an elaborate study of Comte's complete work. This had to be kept in a great measure secret, "though it was impossible to avoid giving indications that in those days were calculated to bring the individual students into trouble" (p. 157). When his friendship with Mill, Grote, and other leaders of English empiricism became known, he was set down as "a Westminster Reviewer," and the utmost opposition was offered to his academic advancement. It has been justly said that if the appointment at Aberdeen had rested with the Academical authorities, instead of with the Home Office—of which Sir G. C. Lewis was then (1860) the head—it would never have been given to Bain.

Bain's natural aptitudes showed themselves even amid the difficult circumstances of his early education. He evinced unusual ability for the study of mathematics and exact science; his interest in the former was in no respect speculative—it is characteristic that he should almost abandon work at mathematics as soon as he had mastered enough of its higher branches to prepare the way for its application to physical research. Up to the year 1860 he had frequently been engaged in teaching and writing on Natural Philosophy—to employ the term which was then invariably used —and he had qualified himself for a university appointment in this subject. In connection with this natural bent towards precise science, it is interesting to find him speaking of "the very early

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development of the tendency to take all statements of fact in their literal meaning, and to compare them with one another, and with the facts in their actual occurrence" (p. 12). The psychological bent also soon displayed itself. It is here, in what is now called Analytic Psychology in the strict sense of the term, in the *observation of mind,* that his originality lies. It is probable that he was much more indebted to Hartley than he was aware of; it is doubtful whether he introduced any new *principle,* in his properly psychological work, beyond those that Hartley had used, and I believe that Martineau was justified in speaking of the psychologist of the "Mill and Bain" type as the "Hartleyan"; but to work out these principles with a fullness and power such as Bain evinced, was a mark of scientific originality of a high order. He began to make systematic psychological observations in boyhood: "Long before this date (eighteenth year) I had the habit of frequently watching my trains of thought, and trying to ascertain the links of connection in the mind subjectively" (p. 30); "the study of the mind had now (nineteenth year) become with me incessant and overmastering; and the habit of continued self-observation with a view to ascertain the laws of mental successions was now established for good, and has remained through life" (p. 49). His works will remain among the classics of the science of Analytic Psychology as it was in its infancy—classics containing elements of permanent value, "stones," as he said, "that will fit into the structures of our successors." In Logic, he was an independent disciple of Mill, to whom he gave important assistance when the former was preparing his System of Logic. The value of Bain's two volumes on Logic is not sufficiently recognised. He makes important advances on Mill, and corrects some of Mill's mistakes, though he retains others, and those some of the worst. None the less, his review of the "Logic of the Sciences," in the second volume, seems to the present writer not unworthy to be compared with the elaborate treatments of Sigwart and Wundt. An important characteristic of his thinking is that he shrinks from pushing any theory to extremes. Even empiricism with him is less a metaphysical system than a methodological precept. He had a clear perception of the limitations of analysis both in psychology and in physical science (cp. pp. 318, 319, 320, 389).

It is difficult at the present day to realise the apparently invincible supremacy of agnostic empiricism in British thought during

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the third quarter of the nineteenth century. It is significant that Bain, mentioning his appointment as Examiner in London University (1857), should speak as though it were a matter of course that his own and Mill's works should be exclusively used (p. 248). In fact, as he indirectly admits, the syllabus of the examinations in "Mental and Moral Science" consisted of little more than extracts from the contents' tables of these books. I mention this, not as reflecting on Bain, but as indicating the situation in British philosophy. And by a change which was little less than dramatic, this powerful mode of thought was in a few years almost completely displaced by two systems, *both* of which are essentially metaphysical and speculative in tendency—evolutionary Naturalism on the one hand, and on the other, an Idealism claiming descent from German thought. In the palmy days of the sixties, however, there was only one opponent whose powers were equal to the task of offering any effective resistance to the reigning philosophy of the day, and that was Martineau. Bain's references to Martineau are not very satisfactory. In one place (p. 241) he unintentionally conveys the impression that Martineau took advantage of his sister's business difficulties to persecute her. Elsewhere (p. 273) he incidentally remarks that Martineau had never been in Germany. This mistake is curious, for it was during a period of study in Germany in 1848-9 that Martineau experienced the "new intellectual birth" which emancipated him finally from the limitations of the traditional British empiricism. Martineau's critique of the first editions of Bain's two principal psychological works in the "National Review" (1860), reprinted in "Essays," vol. iii, p. 537, is not referred to.

Bain's Ethics are the natural outcome of his general principles. His doctrine is essentially practical and utilitarian, and shows the same aversion to system-building that we have already noticed. The General Happiness or Welfare is a sufficient statement of the final end; "the final end cannot be proved—it must be assumed" ("Logic," p. 315); and an element of disinterestedness in human nature must be regarded as ultimate. Bain certainly verified the latter statement in his own life. He was a man of genuine public spirit and benevolence, with a high ideal of duty and self-sacrifice. The benefits conferred on philosophy in England by his initiation and support of *Mind* are widely recognised.

S. H. Mellone.

Holywood, Belfast.

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GIORDANO BRUNO. By T. Lewis McIntyre. London: Macmillan & Co., Lim., 1903.

In every history of philosophy the name of Bruno marks what is called the transition from mediæval to modern thought; but the abstracts of his philosophy do not show that he was remarkable as an original thinker. His philosophy seems hardly distinguishable from many of the Pantheisms which preceded him. For nearly all his distinctions he is indebted either to the Platonists or to the Aristotelians whom he attacked.

Mr. McIntyre's book is the first philosophical biography of Bruno of any thoroughness in the English language. It is a most interesting book. He has divided it into two parts. The first tells the story of Bruno's life; the second gives an account of his speculations and attempts to trace their influence and descent.

The first part is extremely interesting. Mr. McIntyre has succeeded in giving his readers an idea of the most romantic of philosophers, of the emotional value of his philosophy, and in great measure even of the times in which he lived. Without Pater's literary arts and graces, he has drawn Bruno more vividly and convincingly than he appears in Gaston de Latour. Judicious quotation is the best method of historical portraiture. This book is full of interesting quotations.

The second part is not such a good piece of work. In the preface Mr. McIntyre says that he has not tried to give a systematic outline of Bruno's philosophy ("which would be nearly impossible"), but to sketch, "as nearly as possible, in Bruno's words," the problems which interested him and the solutions he offered. He adds that Bruno's style "lends itself to selection, but not easily to compact exposition." The result is that Mr. McIntyre's account of Bruno's philosophy is a patchwork of unreconciled quotations. Passages occur in which there is an attempt to pull mutually repulsive tenets together; but unless the reader's intelligence is of the kind which "brightens at the clash of yes and no," he will become confused and probably turn with relief to some frankly enigmatic, condensed account of Bruno in a history of philosophy. This is more Bruno's fault than his expositors'; but granted that it was impossible to make a system out of theories which Bruno taught as coherent, there was a second alternative to the merely selective method; namely,

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to point out how badly his philosophy hung together. If Mr. McIntyre, for instance, had shown how Bruno's attempts to reconcile his philosophic pantheism with scientific atomism failed, it would have been easier to understand these attempts. I believe a more critical method would have enabled the ordinary reader to see more in the arguments which Bruno found convincing. The monadistic side of Bruno's philosophy (apparently most justly) is given more prominence than is the case in other epitomes. Mr. McIntyre draws a parallel between the monad of Bruno and the monad of Leibnitz to show that the resemblance is only superficial. He decides that there is not the slightest ground for attributing direct influence. But he thinks, with Sigwart, that Spinoza may have been influenced by Bruno's *"De Deo seu Homine"* in writing the short *"Tractate."* All the ideas, however, which are common to both philosophers are the property of the Neo-Platonists, and the supposition rests on the fact that the collocation of ideas is very similar in both these works. The collocation itself seems a very natural one to occur independently to two students of Neo-Platonism, so the supposition remains a possible probability and nothing more.

Mr. McIntyre is not more successful in finding traces of Bruno's ideas among his contemporaries. He expresses surprise that there are so few. Bacon is discussed as a possible instance; but again the ideas which are common to both are to be found elsewhere as well: both believed "in a purified natural magic"—but this was the general belief among the intelligent of their age; both inveighed against Aristotle and systematising schoolmen—but this animus sprang mainly, in Bruno's case, from his mystical bias, in Bacon's, from a belief in the methods of natural philosophy; both accepted and discussed the distinction between *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata*—but in Bruno it was transcended, in Bacon it threw back to *"form"* and *"substance";* both admired the book of Job, says Mr. McIntyre, and quoted Solomon to the effect that there is nothing new under the sun—but this proves nothing.

On the whole, the impression that this book leaves behind, contrary to the drift of certain passages, in which it is urged that Bruno has a right to a more important place in the genealogy of thought than is generally accorded to him, is that he was not a great philosopher, but a great imaginative thinker, with a passion for dialectic. No man ever spent himself more furiously in dis-

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coursing upon the nature of man and of the world in which he lives; but, as Mr. McIntyre remarks, in contrasting him with Descartes, Descartes' aim was "certainty," while Bruno aimed at "knowledge," at adding to or correcting "the sum of general opinion as to the world as a whole." In other words, Descartes aimed at finding truths, which cannot be doubted, like a philosopher; Bruno at discovering ideas which expressed or harmonised with his emotional attitude towards experience, like a prophet. He is only a great philosopher in the sense that Carlyle, Nietzsche, and Meredith (the spirit of whose poems, by the bye, is very like that which animates the religious utterances of Bruno) are philosophers; and if traces of his great influence are sought for, they will be found not in philosophies but in literature and the current notions of succeeding times, in the poems of Sidney and Brooke, in the paganism and amoristic philosophy of the Renaissance.

> "Man should make much of life, as Nature's table
> Wherein she writes the cypher of her glory.
> Forsake not Nature, nor misunderstand her,
> Her mysteries are read without Faith's eyesight.
> . . . . . .
> Yet when each of us in his own heart looks
> He finds a God there far unlike his books."

These lines of Brooke express exactly the effect of Bruno's teaching.

Bruno regarded himself as a prophet of a new religion. He died for it; and this book is full of his splendid boasts of what it had done and could do for mankind. Mr. McIntyre makes the reader feel as he reads that these boasts were not vain. That is the best success a biographer of Bruno can achieve.

D. MacCarthy.

London.

Selections from the Literature of Theism. Edited, with introductory and explanatory notes, by Alfred Caldecott, M. A. (Lond.), D. D. (Camb.), Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, King's College, London, etc.; and H. R. Mackintosh, M. A., D. Phil. (Edin.), etc. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1904. Pp. xiii, 472.

To put into the hands of the student a selection from the treasures of theistic thought in the past was an excellent idea, and the editing of these selections fell into excellent hands when it was

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entrusted to Professors Caldecott and Mackintosh. Professor Caldecott, by his work on "The Philosophy of Religion in England and America"—most favorably noticed at the time of its publication in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS—raised himself to a position of commanding influence in the world of theological thought, and Dr. Mackintosh, by some careful review work, gave himself a good preparation for the part here entrusted to him. These professors say, in their admirable preface: "It is agreed on all hands, in our day, that no one, except here and there an original genius, can expect to be in line with twentieth century thought who dispenses himself from reference to the positions held by great minds. It is by training his mind in their high thoughts that he can expect to win power and insight for himself." These remarks are, no doubt, true and just, but there is also something to be said on the other side. Necessary as such knowledge is, it has its attendant dangers, which it is worth while to recognise. For the theological student is only too apt to be content to rethink the thoughts of the departed masters, and to remain within the closed circle of their thought to the repression of his own original power and thinking. The difficulty is precisely to get him to allow their thought to do no more than stimulate his own fresh thinking, and not to hold himself absolved from effort after new and independent modes of conception. Should the student so fail, it will, of course, be no fault either of the masters or the editors. The misgivings of the editors as to the wisdom of the selections made are quite needless, for nothing better could have been desired. The judicious use of them will not, for an instant, render the student's thought a pale semblance of that of a Lotze or a Martineau.

The subjects overtaken by Professor Caldecott are, Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, the Cambridge Platonists, Berkeley, Cousin, Comte, and Janet. It may be said in a word, that the notes and biographical notices are very fine—fresh, scholarly, interesting. No stilted professional conventionalism keeps Professor Caldecott from saying what will really help the student. Worthy of the highest praise as the work is, a few remarks of more critical character may be added. In the Anselmic portion, 'tis hardly enough to say that Kant "severely" criticised the Ontological argument without indicating how "severely" criticised Kant was for pointlessness and irrelevance in his manner of doing so. The real modern significance of the Ontological argu-

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ment might also have been more clearly indicated, for nothing whatever is said which will bring home to the student that the argument can be construed in terms of the self-assertion of spirit, to which the existence—and not merely the idea—of God, is a necessity of reason. The assertion, on the part of spirit, of the actuality of its own unique and infinite ideal—that is the modern bearing of the Ontological argument, too important for the student not to be held to it.

As to Aquinas, the notes are faultless and the selections good. Yet no one, who has made any careful study of a system so rich and vast, can fail to wonder what coherent idea the student will gather, from these scattered notes and extracts, of the system of one whom Rosmini styled the chief of Italian philosophers, and whose architectonic work embodied the whole philosophy of the Middle Ages, expounded in the spirit of the time. Some brief yet more systematic presentation of his theological and ethical ideas was badly wanted in such a case, in the interests of the student. Such a presentation would have succinctly put before him the positions of Aquinas on such matters as being, God, causality, creation, Divine intelligibility, reason, will, sin, the soul, and Providence, giving him an interest in the relation of Aquinas, theologically, to Augustine, Albertus Magnus, and others, and, ethically to Aristotle, Augustine, and Anselm, to all of whom he is, at certain well-defined points, distinctly superior. Such a presentation is by no means wanted in the case of more modern and accessible writers, and would be superfluous in instances like Descartes and Spinoza, which follow. Does it not seem a little hard on the student to present him, in the case of the Divine Substance of Spinoza, only with some "material" for a "provisional" judgment of his own? If doctors like Professor Caldecott—who is so well able to form conclusions of his own—refrain from expressing any personal opinion or judgment as to the real significance of Spinozism, the student will absolve himself from the attempt to do so as presumptuous. I do not share Professor Caldecott's hesitation, but it would, of course, be wholly out of place to intrude any judgments of mine here. The references, in the chapter on the Cambridge Platonists, might well have included Bishop Westcott's chapter on Whichcote in "Religious Thought in the West," as more relevant than some of the items given.

Cousin and Comte are the subjects of the next sections under

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Professor Caldecott's care. As to Cousin, one would have liked some indication, in the introductory notice, of Cousin's position in relation to Theism, for the guidance of the student. As for Comte, one feels rather queer at finding him among theistic philosophers, especially in view of names that are wanting. The notes are admirable, though perhaps the merit of Comtism, in insisting on the objectivity of the true, as found in nature and history, rather than in the introspection of the ego, might have been more explicitly set before the student. Possibly, also, it might have been worth noting more clearly his method of elimination, whereby religion becomes in the end an artificial and idealized abstraction. In the excellent chapter on the Idealism of Berkeley, it seems to me somewhat strange that it has not been deemed necessary to append any note on the important passage (p. 152), wherein Berkeley says, "We have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrated knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits;" for surely the imperiled existence of finite spirits is too important a point of weakness in his and other idealistic systems not to be worthy of the student's attention. One would also have welcomed a clearer indication to the student that, notwithstanding Berkeley's talk about *substance,* it is *causation* which is the ruling idea when Berkeley comes to demonstrate the being of God. In the section on Janet, one is sorry to see such slender stuff as Teleology in "The Quest of Faith" recommended to students. Has it come to that with British thought? Turning to the portions edited by Dr. Mackintosh, we have first a section on Kant. The introductory statement to the student is good, being of the kind required. To the student beginner the notes will also be of much service, although they seem to me somewhat lacking in suggestiveness and independence. A carefully prepared section on Schleiermacher follows. Yet one cannot help feeling that the defects of Schleiermacher might have been presented in some more incisive and definite form. Also, the references to English writings might, with advantage, have been fuller. German references are more adequate here than in the section on Kant, where they are rather strikingly wanting.

Excellent chapters on Mansel and Lotze follow. The Mansel references might have included Caldecott's "Philosophy of Religion" and Flint's "Agnosticism" (though the latter is already mentioned in the notes), to name no others. It seems hardly desirable, in the Lotze section, that students be sent back

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so far as the paper by Dalgairns, even if allowed to have been "masterly"—it certainly was able—at the time it appeared. For thought has surely not stood still, even on the personality of God, during the last three decades, and in so small a bibliography, it is most essential that the student be somewhat up to date in his reading and sources. No references are given, in this section, to relative German literature. Martineau and Ritschl form the subjects of the last two chapters edited by Dr. Mackintosh. Martineau forms the theme of the next chapter. The introductory notice is appreciative, but it is a pity that, in the notes, the student is left in so unsatisfactory a position as to Martineau's real attitude on Freewill. Also, some meagreness attends the references. The work closes with a section on Ritschl, which seems carefully done.

Though I have deemed it necessary to say some things of more or less critical character, yet, taking the work as a whole, it is a welcome and highly useful addition to theological literature, and both editors are to be congratulated on the high measure of success they have attained in their praiseworthy task.

Kilmarnock, Scotland. JAMES LINDSAY.

ELEMENTS OF METAPHYSICS. By A. E. Taylor, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford; John Fotheringham Professor of Philosophy in McGill University, Montreal; late lecturer in Owens College, Manchester. Methuen & Co. Pp. xvi, 419.

In the volume under review Mr. Taylor has given us an exposition of the principles of metaphysics from a point of view which is in the main that of Mr. Bradley. In doing so he has not failed to make use of the important works by Professors Ward, Royce, and others, which have seen the light since "Appearance and Reality" was published, while his own treatment of the subject is often both new and suggestive. Nevertheless, his book may, I think, be fairly regarded as an attempt to present its subject in as positive and constructive a manner as is possible without relinquishing the fundamental positions of Mr. Bradley with regard to the nature of thought and reality. If, notwithstanding the expository skill of the author and the many excellencies of his treatment of special questions, the main contentions of his work do not appear convincing to the present writer, it is mainly because of a suspicion, which will not be allayed, that the principles in question do not really admit of any positive construction whatever.

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Mr. Taylor divides his work into four books, the first of which is devoted to a preliminary discussion of the problem, method and subdivisions of metaphysics. This is followed by a discussion in Book II of the general structure of Reality, including, in addition to an attempt to indicate the nature of the Absolute, the consideration of the most universal categories by which science and common sense seek to determine the world of things. The remaining books deal with the more special questions involved in the interpretation of nature and the interpretation of life.

We are brought, then, face to face at the start with the question of the nature of ultimate reality. To this question Mr. Taylor returns in its essentials the answer of Mr. Bradley. Reality must be conceived as an all-inclusive, perfectly consistent system, the materials of which are immediate experience. Separate chapters are devoted to the development of the implications of its experiential nature and to the consideration of the nature of the unity of the system. In the first of these, Mr. Taylor lays great stress upon the purposive character of all experience, in the uniqueness of which he finds the key to the meaning of individuality. In defining reality as experience we have therefore by implication asserted that it is thoroughly purposive and uniquely individual. Failure to realise the logical character of the unity of the Absolute and undue emphasis upon its merely numerical unity are signalised as errors into which monism in the past has fallen. Further, in endeavoring to conceive the nature of the system which constitutes reality, equal justice must be done to the aspects of unity and multiplicity. These must be apprehended as equally real and real through each other. This condition can only be realised if the whole constitutes an individual experience of which the partial constitutents are experiences. When we seek to substitute a more concrete conception for this very abstract formula we have at best only the analogies of our own personal and social consciousness. Mr. Taylor discusses the value of these and decides, mainly on the ground of the greater self-sufficiency of a society, that while both self and society must be pronounced to be finite appearance, "of the two, society exhibits the fuller and higher individuality, and is, therefore, the more truly real" (p. 351). Indeed "if the absolute cannot be called a society without qualification, at any rate human society affords the best analogy by which we can attempt to represent its systematic unity in a concrete conceptual form" (p. 350).

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I have endeavored above to present in outline the constructive side of Mr. Taylor's theory of Reality. We must now notice the tendencies which are traceable to his acceptance of Mr. Bradley's logic. Although the whole system and its constituent members are equally real, and real "in and through and for each other," we find "the completed system as it is for itself" identified with Reality *par excellence,* of which the partial constituents are appearances. What, one wants to know, are these partial constituents for the whole itself? Are they still appearance, that is to say, something that is not in the full sense real? Unless they are still only appearance, reality and appearance are spoken of from different points of view, and the designations are misleading. If they are still only appearance, the claims of the multiplicity of the system to equal justice with its unity have not been met. Again, although we are to interpret individuality in terms of the unique realisation of purpose, comprehensiveness is taken as a coördinate mark of individuality with internal systematisation. This seems to me a reversion to the lower category of whole and part. Finally, we are warned that we cannot say without reservation that Reality is an ordered system, since the idea of system implies the operation of the distinguishing intellect which, as such, involves falsification. The immediacy which is ascribed to the experience which constitutes the Absolute must be understood in a sense which excludes all distinctions. Mr. Taylor endeavors to make more comprehensible Mr. Bradley's postulate of a form of experience which shall be immediate in this sense and yet preserve in some way all the distinctions which we find in the world of appearances by a comparison with the cultivated appreciation of a complicated æsthetic whole and with the experience of personal love. The analogy, of course, is at best an imperfect one, since these forms of consciousness are not entirely immediate in the sense required. Its appropriateness at all would seem to depend upon the assumption that the non-immediate aspect of these experiences is not of their essence, an assumption for which I can see no justification whatever. These examples, then, it seems to me, fail to show that the results of thought can be preserved in a form of consciousness from which thought itself has been entirely eliminated, and we must, I think, look elsewhere for our deliverance from the empty mysticism which Mr. Taylor proclaims the necessity of avoiding.

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In support of his contention of the necessary failure of all forms of thought, Mr. Taylor reproduces Mr. Bradley's argument that any recognition of relations involves the indefinite regress, and is therefore self-contradictory, and examines the attempts which have been made to turn this position. He seems to me to succeed in showing that Professor Royce's way of escape is not a satisfactory one, but hardly deals sufficiently seriously with the more recent criticism of Professor Stout.

It is impossible to do more here than indicate the nature of the questions discussed by Mr. Taylor under the head of cosmology. In successive chapters he treats of the problems of matter, the meaning of law, space and time, some conditions of evolution and the character of descriptive science, all of these topics being dealt with in an interesting way.

In the forefront of his discussion of the fundamental questions concerning the life of mind Mr. Taylor places the determination of the logical character of psychology. The various social and historical sciences "all involve the use of such psychological categories as those of *self, will, thought, freedom,* and thus any sound interpretation of history and society must begin with investigation into the logical character of the science to which these concepts belong" (p. 295). Moreover, idealist metaphysicians are constantly in danger of treating these categories as if they were possessed of an absolute validity. We can, however, Mr. Taylor thinks, cut the ground from under them by showing that the subject-matter of psychology is highly artificial and far removed from concrete actuality. Psychology, then, we are told, presupposes an "artificial severance of the unity of direct experience into a physical order and a non-physical realm external to that order" (p. 287). The psychologist does not deal with the actual experiences of living subjects, but with symbols which he substitutes for these as the result of an elaborately artificial method of transformation. This procedure is, however, justified, because we can interpret these symbols by indicating the physical conditions and expression of the so-called "mental state;" and this science of symbols is necessary both as a temporary stopgap, pending the development of physiology, and to afford "a set of symbols suitable for the description, in abstract general terms, of the teleological processes of real life, and thus providing Ethics and History and their kindred studies with an appropriate terminology" (p. 305). Now it is, of course, true that psychol-

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ogists have often defined the subject-matter of their science as if it constituted a realm which is somehow distinct from and coördinate with a realm of physical fact, but it is also true that this is a position which is now rejected by the psychologists who have given most attention to the determination of the standpoint of the science. Psychology, according to them, investigates the process of individual experience. If one asks why it is that such a position appears impossible to Mr. Taylor, the answer would seem to be that it is ruled out as inconsistent with his conception of the real nature of experience. Real experience is for him, as we have seen, immediate in the sense that it excludes all thought discrimination. As such, it cannot be described in general terms, for the curious reason that before we could so describe it "we must cease to feel or apprehend directly and go on to reflect upon and analyze the contents of our experience" (p. 30). Thus, so far from its being recognised that the process of thought is itself as genuine and "immediate" an experience as any, we are told to regard the total experience of which it is a constituent as somehow contaminated by its presence. But surely the truth is that the experience which is really direct and immediate is the experience of which some amount of thought reference is always a function, while the conception of an experience from which it is entirely absent is merely a hypothetical construction, which we may find useful and necessary for the interpretation of forms of conscious life which are not directly cognisable. Nor does there seem to be any reason why we should not succeed in characterising an experience so conceived as the result of reflection upon our own experience and the observation of its physical expression. Nay, even Mr. Taylor himself speaks of experience which is immediate in his sense as purposive. We need not, then, I think, accept the unsatisfactory conclusion that the only real, concrete experience is something akin to a merely feeling experience, about which we can say nothing because in order to characterise it we should have to be ourselves in a state akin to a merely feeling experience, in which *ipso facto* all characterisation would be an impossibility.

I have above drawn attention to what appear to me to be the most fundamental positions in Mr. Taylor's book, and these unfortunately are positions which I am not myself able to accept. This disagreement is, however, by no means inconsistent with a full recognition of the many merits of Mr. Taylor's work, and

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of the value and suggestiveness of his treatment of various metaphysical topics. His book is certainly one which all who are interested in the present position of metaphysics ought to read.

JAMES GIBSON.

University College of North Wales.

THE PATHWAY TO REALITY. Stage the Second. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Session 1903-1904. By the Right Honourable Richard Burdon Haldane, M. P., LL. D., K. C. London: John Murray, 1904. Pp. xxvii, 275.

Mr. Haldane explains in his preface that the lectures of this, like those of the previous series, were for the most part not written. Although the subject has engaged his studies during a good part of his life, the lectures as delivered were *extempore* talks, which were taken down in shorthand at the time, and have simply been corrected for publication. Compelled to this plan by lack of leisure, Mr. Haldane admits that "such a method of producing a metaphysical book has defects."

One cannot but agree that such a method, however well adapted to the original purpose of a course of lectures, is not a suitable method for producing a metaphysical book. What a lecture properly aims at is to put some subject or problem before us in a broad and striking way, so that we may be incited to work it out into definite shape for ourselves by means of reading and reflection. Consequently in a lecture stimulus and suggestiveness are far more important than a rigid sequence and exact definition of ideas. Now, it is evident enough that for this essential work of the lecturer Mr. Haldane has great gifts, and that he is capable, as the present volume shows, of remarkable achievements. In the art of free, or *extempore*, discourse as applied to philosophy, he can have few rivals. The very qualities which become defects of form in the book were no doubt aids to effectiveness in the lectures—the repetitions and reiterations, the discursiveness, the frequent illustrations from poetry, the references to the latest philosophical fashions. Still, with all respect for the gifts of the lecturer, one must judge the book as a book. And what we look for in a book—which we can study at our leisure—is just that close sequence and precise definition of ideas, which the lecturer is more free to disregard. For if these qualities make the lecture difficult to follow, they make the book easy to use. And

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naturally they are qualities in which the present work is deficient.

Another thing that is against Mr. Haldane is that the subject of the book is not really adapted for his method of treatment on the scale to which he is restricted. His subject is practically the philosophy of Hegel in its religious bearings—in fact, "Talks about Hegelianism" would be a tolerably accurate, if undignified, title for the volume. Now, Hegel himself expressly repudiates the attempt to convey a general impression of a philosophy. Just because philosophy is systematic, its results, he holds, lose all their proper significance and value if they are not seen to be necessary expressions of Reason. Mr. Haldane refers to this difficulty in his opening discourse, and warns his hearers against short cuts in philosophy. But he does not really take his own warning to heart. And it is significant, I think, that his interpretation of Hegel allows him to try to give that very sort of general impression which Hegel himself would deprecate.

The two problems with which the present volume is mainly concerned are (i) the problem of the relation of the Absolute or Divine Mind to the Finite or Human Mind, and (ii) the problem of Immortality.

The language which Mr. Haldane habitually employs in his discussion of the first of these two problems is vague, and possibly he would not accept what I am just going to say, but certainly what strikes me most in his general view is its close resemblance to the metaphysical doctrine of Green. To try to show this resemblance in detail would take up far too much space, but I will quote one summing up which may be taken as typical. "We have found, as the result of our journey of discovery, that the pathway to reality leads us to look at the nature of what is ultimate as mind completely comprehending itself, and that finite mind is this same mind in imperfect forms of self-comprehension, self-determinations on the part of the Absolute Mind that are but phases of the activity in which it creates and gathers up the full riches of its concrete self-comprehension. It is only relatively to an insight which is not fully attained in finite self-consciousness, but which is yet presupposed as its foundation, that space and time are abstract and insufficient forms. They have their meaning as distinctions made in the course of its self-realisation by the consciousness within which all reality falls, and whose vocation it is at once to distinguish in comprehension and to com-

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prehend in distinction" (pp. 255-6). The resemblance in all this to Green's timeless self-distinguishing consciousness, reproducing itself in finite forms, seems to me evident.

Probably most of Mr. Haldane's readers will feel that the strongest and most interesting part of the volume is that in which he deals with the second of the two problems mentioned above. The doctrine which he there expounds is not a new one, but in his full and eloquent re-statement of it he does his utmost to give it a fresh appeal to the minds and hearts of his hearers. Yet his argument can hardly be said to be really convincing. And the reason is that his statement of the problem and his solution of it are both alike too abstract. "There are two extremes," says Mr. Haldane himself, "two forms in which we can think reality, each of which is abstract, and each of which is divided from the other by a considerable gulf. [One extreme is] the notion of mere endless succession. . . . The other extreme is such a logical conception as the abstract one of mind, as that within which all space and time and all distinctions within them fall" (pp. 227-8). I do not see that in the end he does any more than apply these two opposing abstractions to human life, and substitute the second for the first. The ordinary conception of a future life arises, according to Mr. Haldane, from regarding human life exclusively from the point of view of its duration in time. If this statement is meant to apply to the Christian belief in a future life, it seems to me to do the latter a grave injustice. Surely from the Christian, no less than from the philosophical, point of view duration is not valued merely for itself. On the other hand, even though we rise to Mr. Haldane's conception of an eternal self-consciousness within which all finite and temporal existences fall, yet, just because this self-consciousness is above, and indifferent to, time, the conception of it can never avail to solve a problem that arises wholly within time. Abstraction for abstraction the conception may be preferable to that of endless duration. It seems at least to be quite as capable of being used (how far legitimately we need not inquire) for purposes of edification. But I cannot see that either the one abstraction or the other takes us very far in dealing with the real difficulties of the problem.

H. Barker.

Edinburgh.

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EDUCATION THROUGH THE IMAGINATION. By Margaret Macmillan. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1904.

This book contains a large collection of experiences with children and in schools, penetrated with an exceptional power of insight into cause and effect in mental phenomena, and accompanied by a deep sympathy with children. And Miss Macmillan is a student also; her reading in philosophy and history is wide. She seems to have gone far afield in order to help her to understand the development of the child.

But the book is, after all, ineffective. The author has not learned the art of writing a consequential book: isolated passages of real eloquence, of deep insight, of strong feeling, abound in every chapter, but the thread that connects them is too thin. And the greatest error of all is to base the book upon a theory of the Imagination. Nine-tenths of what is here written might just as well have been offered under the Herbartian label of Interest or the Froebelian of Self-Activity. Miss Macmillan has remarkable power, and those who are interested in children will find what she has to say well worth their attention, but if she desires to influence opinion through a book, she must study with more care the art of putting a book together. This work gives us the impression of being a collection of magazine articles or addresses brought together not without strain under one cover.

J. J. FINDLAY.

Manchester, England.

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

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OXFORD UNIV... SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1905.

THE ABOLITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.*

I. Benevolent Sentiment and Criminal Law.

An important part of my task will be to show that passion and sentiment perform a necessary function in the ordering of our individual conduct, and in our advance as individuals from a lower ethical stage to a higher; and it will, of course, follow that the same is true of the progress of society. During the last one hundred and fifty years, for example, great changes have been made in the penal systems of the Old and the New World: changes which appeared to some of the wisest men of former ages to be so absurd, so pernicious, so subversive of social order and security, that they could not conceive of such measures being adopted by rational men. Most of us, on the other hand, whatever may be our opinion of the need of further reform, cannot easily find words to express our astonishment at the callousness, the fanatical and useless severity of our ancestors. Now the men who, in the first evil days, advocated these reforms, the necessity of which appears so obvious to ourselves, were denounced by the legal and spiritual authorities of their time as dreamers and sentimentalists. We shall presently see that the reproach, which the name "sentimentalist" conveys, may not always be undeserved; and that humanitarian causes have suffered and may still suffer from the "sentimentality," in the sense presently to be explained,

* An address to the Cardiff Ethical Society.

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of their advocates. Still, we must insist that the instinctive abhorrence, for example, felt by tenderer spirits at acts, the social necessity of which they were not able to disprove, has been an indispensable factor in the moral progress of our race.

But though sentiment has its proper and important place, it is incumbent upon those who cannot rid themselves of feelings of indignant repulsion, or refrain from impulsive acts of benevolence, which their fellows admit to be creditable to their hearts, though anything but creditable to their heads, to make all convenient speed in bringing the dictates of their own hearts and heads, at least, into agreement and harmony. Our meeting to-night seems to offer an opportunity of making some attempt in this direction, and I hope so to use this opportunity that the charge of unworthy sentimentality cannot, with any show of justice, be brought against ourselves. It is comparatively easy to induce charitable men and women to hope that a particular person, convicted of murder, may not be quite as bad as he has been made, by the prosecution and by the press, to appear; and such people will often do everything in their power to avert the pain and the shame of any particular execution. I do not wish to depreciate the moral value of such efforts; but it is obvious that they are only the crude beginnings of a movement towards secure and permanent humane reform.

Our duty, however, is to examine this question, not indeed without an earnest and sober desire that for every man and woman the best possible may be done, but without any impulsive outbreaks of benevolence or of anger. Let us consider our problem in the light of a full recognition of the awful possibilities of human wickedness and error; of the terrible seriousness of crimes against human life, happiness, and reputation; and of the needs, so far as we understand them, of human society as a whole. Much of what I will say will apply not only to capital punishment but to the typical moral problems which it is not alone in presenting. For you and for myself this course will not only be more agreeable but also more instructive; and I hope that no further apology will be

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needed for calling your attention, at a time when no urgent and particular demand presses upon us, to a matter so distressing.

Capital punishment is almost invariably discussed in the vague and spacious commonplaces of legal or religious phraseology, or of the serious or humorous newspaper press. Attempts to concentrate public attention upon the squalid details, which these expressions gloss over, are met at once by the freezing reproach of sentimentality. "Your feelings," we are told, "do infinite credit to your heart; but the head must govern us in these matters. If the millennium were arrived—and would that it were!—we could do without this penalty; but we live in a hard, practical world, and must accept the conditions which it imposes. If the abolition of capital punishment were practicable, how comes it that our legislators, judges, and ministers, who are notoriously the humanest in the whole world,[1] have not expressly or in effect abolished it? No, sir! the most glorious characteristic of English law is and has been its respect for human life; and capital punishment is its head cornerstone."

Let us now consider this reproach of sentimentality a little more closely, inquiring under what circumstances the epithet "sentimental" may be justified; and, under what circumstances and for what reasons it is right or wrong to be sentimental.

Broadly speaking, the sentimental person is a species of the passionate person; that is, of the person who acts, not on general principles but on particular impulses. We may call the man who acts habitually from angry or malevolent impulses a violent man, using the word violent in a neutral sense without any implication of praise or blame. On the other hand, we may call the person who usually acts from benevolent and charitable impulses, a sentimental person. Of course, as between persons, this distinction is not absolute: a person who is usually self-possessed or violent may at times act in the manner of a sentimental person; while an equable

[1] So the undiscriminating patriot of every clime supposes.

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or sentimental nature may be provoked by circumstances into extreme violence. Experience of human character shows that these extremes, like many other extremes, tend to meet or pass into one another in the history of the same individual. The cases of Robespierre, Schopenhauer, Nietzche, and in England, perhaps, of Sir Thomas More, will illustrate this point.

Now, in certain situations, malevolent or benevolent impulsive action is the only action possible, or, at least, the only action which our moral judgment could approve. A soldier on the field of battle, a person resisting a violent attack upon his person or reputation, or averting some imminent danger from himself or those dear to him must act promptly; and he is more likely to do so if he is roused by overpowering malevolent passion against the enemy, the murderer, the slanderer, who has brought this peril upon him. In the same way the mother who endures privation and death itself for her child, or the person who rushes in front of an approaching train, or into deep water, to save the life of a fellow-creature, would very probably not do so, unless overcome by a benevolent impulse, which makes him ignore fine calculations of the possible good or harm which may ensue from his action. In such case, our moral sense does not hesitate to applaud the passionate person, whether his act be violent or sentimental; nor to condemn the calculating person, however cleverly he may try to show that the balance of good was secured by the line of action which he adopted.

But there are outbreaks of violent and of sentimental passion which we cannot and do not approve. We demand, in the first place, consistency, as between impulses, and, in the second place, some proportion between ends and means. An access of violent passion because of some trifling or merely apparent offence; the refusal to listen to explanation or remonstrance; the directing of this passion against unoffending persons who happen to be convenient; the prolonged harboring of the passion after its occasion has been remedied: such things mankind may, according to circumstances, excuse, but cannot approve. Again we condemn selfish or capricious outbreaks of violent

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passion: as when a person is profoundly stirred by his own wrongs but indifferent to those of his fellows; or is incontrollably angry to-day with what he tolerated yesterday; or is indignant at the wickedness of tweedledum and unconcerned at the wickedness of tweedledee.

The same is obviously true of the benevolent emotions, and we may very conveniently illustrate our statement from the various humanitarian movements of our time which have, through the inconsistency and caprice of their respective advocates, so grievously retarded one another. A lady opponent of vivisection, for example, contrasts the noble passion of the soldier, fighting for king and country, with the cold-blooded cunning of the vivisector, lacerating dumb animals in order to enlarge his knowledge. A humanitarian critic charges this lady with "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel." To come a little nearer home: I have spoken of capital punishment to persons who felt this taking of human life in cold blood to be a disgrace to Christian civilization; but on asking them what is to be done with the murderer, I found that they consoled themselves for the disappearance of this penalty with the assurance that life-long imprisonment was, in fact, a great deal more terrible and cruel. Wayward and uncoördinated impulses, whether angry or kindly, are clearly a sorry guide for conduct or legislation; and in particular, the unscrupulously and whimsically benevolent person may very justly be called "sentimental" in the bad sense of that word.

It is, however, conceded that a consistently benevolent disposition is to be preferred to a consistenly malevolent one. Slowness to take offence; willingness to endure and to forgive; sympathy with the difficulties, under hardship and temptation, of the worst as well as of the best of men; an ardent desire to help men to rise from the lowest depth to higher things: these qualities are recognized as morally admirable and socially desirable. The only reservation which we make is that a kind man's benevolent impulses may sometimes lead him into error. On the other hand, a constant readiness to become angry, and to do prolonged or repeated harm to a person who has given offence; a general suspicion of all men and a willingness to

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believe the worst of them; a belief that very little harm is done, in comparison, even by unjust violence: these are qualities which are recognized as unamiable, as dangerous to the safety and well-being of their possessor's associates, as well as to his own mental and moral balance. It is also vaguely allowed that our hopes for the future depend rather upon our benevolent than upon our malevolent impulses, and that, in the fullness of time, "the meek shall inherit the earth."

But, in the meanwhile, we are told, if a crime has been committed, we must not yield to angry passions on the one hand nor to benevolent feelings on the other, but we must be guided by cool practical common sense. Common sense alone, and not feeling of any kind, should decide: (1) what conclusions are to be drawn from the evidence; and (2) what punishment should be inflicted on the offender. Let us take these two points in order.

1. Evidence in many criminal trials and in the majority of murder trials is of the kind known as circumstantial: it is not the evidence of eye-witnesses of the deed, which the prisoner is alleged to have committed, but evidence of other facts from which his guilt may be inferred. Moreover, chiefly in consequence of the death penalty, trials for murder are overshadowed by the disquieting and often impossible question as to the prisoner's responsibility. Let us suppose that a jury convicts a prisoner, and that the judge expresses his approval of their verdict. The narrative of the events which they may be presumed to have accepted is now probably published with full assurance by the newspapers and implicitly believed by the public generally. But a little reflection shows that such narratives are in most of their details altogether lacking in scientific or demonstrative certainty: for constructions reared on slight foundations of directly known facts, only "moral" certainty can be claimed. Now moral certainty, as such, is not to be obtained by mathematical or quasi-mathematical methods, as newspaper reporters and writers of detective stories would have us believe: moral certainty depends intimately upon the moral bias and disposition of the person before whom the evidence is laid. A man who holds narrow and

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harsh views of human nature in general, or of the erring and criminal members of the human family in particular, will be convinced of the prisoner's guilt on evidence which a benevolent and sympathetic man would reject as wholly insufficient. For example, people with strict views of female unchastity may believe that an adulteress must have poisoned her husband, though there may be strong evidence to the contrary. Others who feel certain that under no circumstances would they be tempted to poach, are quite satisfied that a man who in the course of trespassing kills another, even by accident, was quite capable of murdering anyone, and that his execution will be a salutary moral lesson to himself and to his fellow-men. The benevolent may cling to the possibility of the prisoner's innocence or comparative innocence in the face of very clear presumptive evidence against him; at the best, he will not believe, even of a very bad man or woman, anything worse than he must. But without moral sentiments and tendencies of some kind or other no moral certainty of any kind can be obtained.

This being so, we are entitled to argue on behalf of the benevolent people who sign petitions for reprieves, and persist in hoping against hope, that in some cases and in respect of some details they are quite probably in the right. They reflect, it may be, upon the possibility of a charge of murder being falsely brought against themselves, and upon the certainty with which, whether the evidence against them were strong or weak, thousands of their fellow-men would instantly be convinced of their guilt. They know that judges and juries are only human, subject to moods and dispositions of misanthropy and suspicion: that juries at least are sensitive to plausible argumentation and very willing, in cases of difficulty, to be guided by the judge; and, therefore, that their own conviction or that of someone to whom they stand in some special relation, is a not impossible contingency. They know that judges, upon whom the issue of a trial very often depends, vary greatly in their readiness to draw favorable or unfavorable conclusions from the same evidence; they know that the resistance of a single juryman, or of a small minority of jurymen, has led

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to the abandonment of a prosecution or to an acquittal, and they know that the readiness of a jury to convict varies according to all kinds of circumstances, notably according to their local associations and knowledge. It is thus not surprising that their sympathy discovers defects in the evidence, which their robust and complacent fellow-countrymen cannot understand. The conclusion which a circumspect man must draw is that the golden mean of common sense is never with certainty to be discovered, and that gaps in the evidence should be filled in by considerations favorable, and not unfavorable, to the prisoner. And that is the sense in which most of us, I presume, would understand the admonition to give the prisoner the benefit of every doubt.

The plain fact is that moral problems or even questions of moral fact cannot be settled by non-moral intuitions or considerations; and a person who pretends to judge of the guilt or innocence of a human being as he would solve a mathematical problem is deceiving others or himself or both. The much admired hardness of head is, in fact, too often only a specious name for a greater or less degree of hardness of heart. Individuals of unsympathetic or angry temperament, whether inhabitants, for example, of a district in which a shocking act of homicide has been committed, or those who are made acquainted with gruesome details through the newspapers or through the proceedings in a court of justice, are disposed to carry their resentment at the crime into their judgment of the guilt or innocence of any person who may be charged with it. The malevolent impulse which, in its proper place, we do not condemn, is passing into a malevolent disposition, which we must condemn as in the highest degree demoralizing and dangerous. Gaps in the evidence must be filled in, for suspense is intolerable; and from our knowledge of human nature we may infer that they are very often filled in, not by benevolence but by malevolence. And it is not absurd that we should demand of a society which is increasing in civilization and humaneness that this balance should be redressed (1) by a revision of the evidence and the trial in particular cases; and (2), which is much better, by the regular and deliberate

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adoption of the principle or policy of benevolence in our general criminal procedure.

2. Now let us pass to punishment. The advocate of the law, as the expression of pure practical reason, determining the golden mean between violence on the one hand and sentimentality on the other must be prepared to give some explanation of the penal provisions of former times, which the hardest common sense of the present day admits to have been deplorable. Perhaps he will say that these ancient provisions, though not consonant to the common sense of the twentieth century, did correspond to the common sense of the age in which they prevailed; and, in the same way, our penal provisions, including our law of murder, are the expression of the highest common sense attainable by ourselves. I have tried not to state this argument, so as to make it appear, on the face of it, absurd; for it is very common in the general political and historical writing of the present day. But it is very easy to show that, as against the innovator, it has no force at all. For if the dictates of common sense have varied so enormously in the course of past time, we have every reason to suppose that they have still further changes to undergo. If, however, it is implied that certain provisions of the English criminal law are in fact the dictates of the highest imaginable common sense, we may answer: (1) Our criminal code is not likely to be nearer perfection than the other laws of the realm, in which there is no end of innovation demanded and obtained; and (2) benevolent sentiments and principles have in the past modified our criminal law to an extent unimaginable to the common sense of earlier ages. May not our opponents to-day be in the position of Archbishop Paley and the greatest judges of his time, whose prophecies have come to naught, while we are in the position of Sir Samuel Romilly, whose gospel was foolishness to the common sense of Englishmen, but has nevertheless achieved signal victories, which seemed at one time to be beyond all hope?

The archdeacon and the judges considered the punishment by hanging of the theft of more than the value of five shillings from a shop to be an indispensable bulwark of social order in

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general and of the English constitution in particular; and they held those who protested against this and similar severities to be hardly better than traitors or imbeciles. Here, as in discussing the execution of King Charles I, we can avoid being sentimental: we need not suffer any acute transport of moral indignation against these exalted personages. This is not because pity for the victims of cruel laws is always out of place; but because it does not always subserve any useful purpose. In this case, our transport would not help to alter any proposed line of action: Paley and the judges are dead and gone, and what they have said they have said. But we might very properly feel violent abhorrence against anyone who commended their views as worthy of our imitation; for our indignation might then serve the practical purpose of averting a moral disaster.

If we analyze the progress of moral and legal principles we shall find that, in the main, such principles are the generalized product of a number of antecedent impulsive acts. The criminal code of the ancient Israelites, for example, recognized very fully the principles of vengeance and retaliation. The first impulse of a man's friends in primitive times, and frequently in modern times, is to kill his murderer, and generally to make the homicide and the aggressor to suffer as far as possible the same injury as he himself has caused. Out of this impulse the principle is developed that an eye must be forfeited for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; and where the public authority is weak, no law is possible which is in conflict with this impulse and this principle.

Passing to an intermediate stage, we come upon regulations which reflect the strife of various moral principles and present us with what the common sense of to-day would denounce as glaring absurdities. Early Roman law punished a thief caught in the act with the loss of life or liberty; the thief not so apprehended, however clearly his guilt might be proved, was required only to restore the stolen object itself and to pay a compensation of twice its value. No reflecting person can have supposed that a thief who chanced to be caught red-handed was a worse man than his swifter or more circumspect

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fellow-thief who succeeded, for a time, in escaping.[2] The explanation is that legislators were bound to take the varying degrees of the despoiled person's vindictive feelings into account. If this person caught the thief in the act, he would be impelled to capture or kill him; if some time elapsed, his passion would have cooled and he would be satisfied with restitution and compensation. English legal history offers very similar distinctions. Both cases show that the supposed common sense of the law may reflect very faithfully, not the sentiment of equity and fairness, but the strength of vindictive passions which demand legal institutions to correspond with them.[3]

A further stage is reached when the public authority is strong enough to take individual resentments less into account and to base its policy towards criminals on the principle that crime must be "stamped out," and that legal punishments, rigorously enforced, are adequate to the task. The adjustment of the penalty to the particular crime is to a great extent abandoned, private persons coming to rely more and more upon the terrors of the law for their protection. Even self-help is sternly repressed. A person who quietly entered into his despoiler's field and drove away his stolen cattle might, under English medieval law, be executed for theft. The punishment is very often not less but much more severe than under early systems; and this is often admitted by advocates of severity. "Our object," they say, in effect, "is not to make the punishment fit the crime, but, by enforcing the law, to stamp out the crime. If a crime has become more prevalent, the punishment must be increased, or the law enforced with increased rigor. This method is, in the end, the most humane, for it

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[2] Common opinion would, however, merely because of the difference in the punishment, be inclined to view the red-handed thief with peculiar resentment or scorn. Similarity of punishment has a similar effect. Wordsworth, justifying capital punishment, writes as though all "felons" were equally guilty and vile; and public opinion is still little disposed to admit differences in the degree of guilt of "murderers" who are executed.

[3] The law may subsist long after opinion has outgrown the principles which underlie it; or it may retard the growth of humane opinion, through the awe with which it is regarded.

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is the only method by which crime can be destroyed by the roots and thus the necessity for all punishment removed."

The wide prevalence of humane sentiments towards offenders is, in the states of modern Europe, a comparatively late phenomenon; and though these sentiments have wrought tremendous changes during the later eighteenth and the nineteenth century, progress in this direction has been, in recent years, exceedingly slow, especially, I am afraid, in our own country. Our private sentiments, our legal enactments, the procedure of our courts, all present a medley of different principles so incoherent and whimsical, that it confounds any systematic treatment, and must fill the future historian of our time with perplexity and amazement. Side by side with almost nominal penalties for brutal assaults, we have an unutterable punishment for assaults which happen to prove fatal.[4] And by this second punishment our scriptural belief in exact vengeance is supposed to be gratified and edified. Or again, we may compare with the mild punishment of non-fatal assaults, the awful punishment of ten years' penal servitude for repeated petty theft. On all hands, we hear the complaint that our penal system does little or nothing to diminish crime, and, in many cases, obviously tends to propagate it. In particular, the crime of murder shows no appreciable tendency to diminish.

It is only to be expected that the "safe" systematic thinking on this subject should reflect the anarchy and caprice found in law and public opinion: discovering in punishment a combination of several inconsistent and incoherent principles, which can yield no guiding principle for the fair apportionment of punishment, or for the future reform of the criminal law. Vengeance, individual and social; the deterrence of other offenders; the improvement of the criminal; the vindication of the law: all these are said by our recognized authorities to be combined in legal punishment. And it is perfectly true that our established system does combine these principles and possibly many more.

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[4] It is not implied that all murders are of this nature.

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But let us return to the development of benevolent moral principles in general, and in relation to transgressors in particular. Benevolent principles are developed out of benevolent impulsive acts and emotions. The mother's passionate and beneficent devotion to her child gives rise to the belief that all mothers ought to love their children. The kindly impulse to forgive, and the experience of the good effects of mercy upon him that gives and him that takes develops into the principle that it is, in general, noble and expedient to forgive. By acting rightly under the stress of particular situations, as Aristotle taught, we gradually come to think rightly on moral questions. We need not say that this is the whole truth; but experience of moral development shows that it is much more than half the truth. Usually it is close personal contact with the moral issues involved in a particular case that opens our eyes to the futility of our old abstractions and sets us upon constructing our moral theories anew. A benevolent person, for example, may go through life without being brought into any sympathetic relation with a member of the criminal class; and in that case he will very probably not depart from the conventional attitude of indifference or contempt towards those who transgress the obvious precepts of divine and human law. Still the step forward is often taken: in consequence, it may be, of some unexpected relation to a person who happens to be condemned; or of reading the "sentimental" narratives of Thackeray, George Eliot, or Victor Hugo. The old principle of vengeance or deterrence may still be recognized as a general rule, the benevolent impulse confining itself to exertions on behalf of particular person or persons, as some special occasion arises. But the impulse may become settled into a general principle, which in time, by the processes of reflection and mental strife, expels its adversaries, becomes adopted as a rule of action, and, at length, demands its recognition in the laws of the state.

However, until the moral principle has been formed, until it is not only obeyed in the stress of particular emergencies, but recognized as binding in hours of cool reflection on the mutual relations of mankind, the moral impulse is likely to

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be capricious and narrow, and to render us justly liable to the reproach of "sentimentality." We are far from denying that the exercise of benevolent impulses may be of very great value. On the contrary, our complaint against many writers on punishment is, whether they lean towards severity or mercy, that their speculations are so wholly in the air, so innocent of personal, direct, sympathetic knowledge of the phenomena with which they deal. But it is true that moral principles, whose force we recognize always and not only when some particular emergency is upon us, are of the first importance for our private conduct, and are indispensable for the legislator and the judge; and we are all of us, in our degree, called to be both legislators and judges.

II. Special Objections to Capital Punishment.

It is important for us to determine whether not merely our benevolent impulses but our moral principles are really opposed to capital punishment; whether they are adequate to expel the opposing considerations, which, to many of our fellow-men, seem to be the merest commonplaces. Bearing in mind the discussion which has preceded I shall aim at presenting our objections to this penalty in a generalized and unimpassioned form.

1. We may fairly ask whether in the trial and conviction and execution of a murderer, an originally justifiable angry or malevolent impulse is not becoming hardened into a malevolent disposition or policy, which lacks the original justification, and is full of moral and social danger. Feelings appropriate to the discovery of a crime or to the pursuit and capture of an aggressor may well seem out of place when the aggressor is captured and can no longer injure anyone: the original angry passion has passed away, and we can no longer support a settled policy of retribution and revenge. We have read of judges and juries and assemblies being moved to tears when sentence of death is pronounced, even upon persons who are certain to escape execution, or upon criminals for whom no obvious or plausible excuse can be urged. This must mean that the indignation proper to the discovery of the crime and the appre-

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hension of a criminal is no longer an exclusively dominating sentiment; and that benevolent impulses towards the criminal who is disarmed and can no longer do battle against us are asserting their sway. In ordinary life, this is the obviously right policy to adopt towards those who have offended us: we should persuade them of the wrongfulness of their action and do what we can to reconcile the offender to ourselves and to his own better self. May we not, likewise, urge that these tears of compassion are, of all the incidents of a murder trial, the most satisfying to our moral sentiments, and that it is they, not the ancient formulæ of vengeance and expiation, that point to the more excellent way, in the warfare of good against evil.

Let us take the case of war: We may approve of the soldier who, when his life and that of his comrades is in danger, is carried away by angry passions and fights recklessly and without pity. But the conflict is over, and the captured or wounded enemies can do us no further hurt. Now is the time says our mature and deliberate moral judgment, not for blind violence, but for succoring the wounded, it may be, and for working towards a durable peace, with adequate security for its maintenance. Does it not seem to you that this analogy, though, of course, not perfect or exact, suggests a fair justification of the pity which overwhelms us at the fate of a criminal, condemned to an ignominious and hopeless punishment? What shall we say of the deliberate hardening of the heart against pleas of penitence; the refusal to admit any extenuating considerations, or to entertain hopes of gradual improvement and reconciliation; the attempts of the newspapers and the public to inculcate the extreme estimate of the culprit's guilt; the surrounding of his last hours on earth with a harsh and jangling blend of religious phraseology and ceremonial, the certainty of the Divine mercy being especially invoked, and narratives, based for the most part on imagination and malevolent construction, of the prisoner's wickedness? Have not all these things something of the moral aspect of killing prisoners of war in cold blood, though with unctuous phrases on our lips; or of aspersing with scandalous gossip the memory of the silent and unoffending dead, who may, indeed, in their

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lives have erred deeply, but who can no longer make answer to our accusations? [5]

2. The actual crime of murder, especially as English law extends the term, varies immeasurably in heinousness and criminality. So much is this the case, that some offences which within living memory were punished by hanging and are legally still so punishable, are in fact visited with a much lighter penalty and sometimes hardly punished at all: whether through the commutation of the death sentence; or by the refusal of the jury to convict; or by the mitigation of the charge: the last two being often in obvious defiance both of law and evidence. But within the range of crimes still actually punished with death the widest divergence prevails; and the intermediate stages are infinite. What essential community is there between the act of an impulsive poacher who in the effort to escape capture or injury or death at the hands of a gamekeeper, fires his gun at him and happens to kill him, and the act of a bloodthirsty maniac who entices one innocent girl after another to follow him, and then, after violating her, hacks her in pieces without compunction? May not our moral principles demand that the law shall show some appreciation of the immeasurable difference between such cases?

3. And even when two crimes do not obviously vary in cruelty, there may be a very great difference in the character of the two criminals. The one may be stricken with an inveterate, and to all appearances incurable, hatred of his fellowmen and a blind lust for their blood: presenting all the characteristics of the habitual criminal or homicidal maniac. The other may have been led to his first crime by a sudden, a rapid, or a gradual decline from an irreproachable character, through misfortune, great provocation, or violent temptation. Imme-

[5] Our instinctive repugnance to the abuse of the dead, as in historical works of the emphatic and comminatory kind, admits of complete moral and social justification. The sphere of angry denunciation is limited to present emergencies, and even then it is very liable to defeat its own purpose; partly through the angry feelings which it arouses on the other side; partly through the sympathy which it kindles for its victims in the impartial spectator; and through the errors of judgment into which it may lead those carried away by it.

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diately the crime is committed, or as soon as any kindness is shown to him, he is overwhelmed with remorse, and we may be very sure that he would ever afterwards avoid not only the crime of murder itself but also the misguided courses which led to it. Surely we may demand that if the penalty of death be retained in the first case, it ought, in the name of common sense, to be remitted in the second.

4. There is no difference between murder and other crimes which our moral sense can admit to justify this unique difference in the penalty. Unless the fundamental principle of our criminal law be the crudest Mosaism, what reason is there for treating an act of wounding which proves fatal differently from an essentially similar act from which the victim wholly or partially recovers? In particular, is it rational to take the life of a man who, intending only to wound another person, kills him, and to punish a man who, intending to kill another person, wounds him, perhaps seriously, with a long or short term of imprisonment? Or what shall we say of the perjurer who deliberately swears away the life or liberty or reputation of an innocent man? Or of the speculator who, without remorse, reduces thousands of men to beggary and starvation? or of the person who hurls one young woman after another into an abyss of infamy and despair? Is it an enlightened common sense which assigns a ferocious punishment to the homicide, while these and other offences are more lightly punished or not punished at all?

5. No one can deny that the death penalty grievously impairs public respect for the law and its administration. It is unspeakably degrading that a criminal trial should resolve itself into a gamble for a man's life, into a game, moreover, in which everything may depend upon chance circumstances: upon the emotions, imagination, or often defective reasoning powers of witnesses; upon the skill of the respective advocates, upon the optimistic or pessimistic disposition or mood of the judge; upon the susceptibility of jurymen to appeals to their often irrelevant prejudices. The irrevocability of the punishment demands a certainty which the evidence can seldom supply; and so it comes that a man's fate is determined by

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circumstances which lie wholly outside of his own disposition, and indeed of the specific act of which he is accused.

6. The execution of the capital sentence is full of the possibilities of moral corruption and desperation. If our opponents do not immediately assent to this, they should be asked to explain why a former public executioner, and even his children, can find no one to employ them. They should be asked whether they would themselves apply for the post of executioner or would like to see one of their friends do so: whether a lady executioner should not be provided for female convicts![6] We can find a ready explanation for the abolition of public executions in this country and for the more recent omission of their picturesque incidents, once thought to be so solemn and impressive, which formely accompanied the execution of the death sentence: such are the tolling of a sepulchral bell and then the hoisting of a black flag, in token that the "dread sentence of the law has been duly carried out." These changes have been made not merely or mainly out of consideration for the sentimental people, whose feelings were lacerated by such sights and sounds. Thy have been made because it became increasingly evident that the immediate awareness of cruel punishments and processes which make such punishments vivid and fascinating do harm and not good to the less refined section of the people. That is, the very people who, on the common deterrent theory, most need to be impressed with the awfulness of this punishment are driven to violence and desperation by seeing it performed, or by being informed through the eye or ear that it is being or has been performed. Surely, we may ask whether the knowledge of the infliction of this punishment obtained through the newspapers or otherwise is productive of moral blessing, and not, rather, of great moral injury.

7. Let me call attention to a class of people whose interests are not often considered in this connection, namely, the in-

[6] These illustrations fully justify us in charging our opponents with sentimentality, in the worst sense of the word. We would probably find work for a former executioner, if we could, though we totally disapproved, on principle, of his old occupation.

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mates—prisoners and officials—of the place in which the execution takes place. It might easily befall an innocent or highly refined person to be confined to a prison at such a time; and his feelings as well as those of his less fortunate fellow-prisoners surely deserve our most earnest consideration. These people share very slightly, if at all, in the benefits which the public is supposed to have secured from the diminishing publicity of executions; and our objections acquire a tenfold force when we protest that the criminal class, which we desire to make less criminal, and the persons in charge of the criminal, should not be subjected to influences so degrading and ruinous.

8. I need only mention the obvious fact that the death penalty is in great part responsible for the fascination which stories of crime and violence exercise over youthful and undisciplined minds. The amount of crime produced by disordered imaginations, which have, through contemplating deeds of violence, become irresistibly fascinated and obsessed, is incalculable.

9. And, in conclusion, capital punishment is the one definite and practically unmitigated survival in our criminal law of the old traditions of vengeance and retaliation. It is true that certain measures are adopted—we may think of them as we may—with a view to reconciling the murderer to his fate and to his Maker. It is not easy to ascertain, from the arguments of our opponents, on what principles they would base this practice. If we suggest that a murderer's obvious penitence ought to encourage us to cherish hopes for his moral improvement in this life, we are told that it is easy enough to be penitent with a rope round one's neck. If, on the other hand, we urge that penitence under such circumstances must be difficult and precarious, we are comforted with the reflection that the person murdered, if he died immediately, had no time for penitence either; or we are assured by accounts of sincere repentance and resignation to a just punishment. This ought to suffice to show that the death penalty is a source of anarchy and devastation in our moral principles, as it certainly is in our attempts to treat crime systematically. Recourse to penitence and reform on the one hand, and to vengeance on the

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other, just as the defence of any existing anomaly requires, is intellectually, morally, and socially vicious and humiliating.

The Greeks of old believed that blood once shed brought an inexorable curse even upon the innocent, and more blood must henceforth be shed from generation to generation until the curse were accomplished. Observation of what still goes on in the twentieth century might often supply us with proofs that this old pessimist belief was not wholly fantastic and superstitious; but that facts still lend it, as of old, no inconsiderable support. Surely, we may demand of the institutions of an enlightened and civilized society that they should do something to frustrate these curses. But we fear that if some unrecorded ruined lives were written we should find that we still allow an original violent deed, often of comparatively little guilt, to become the poisonous source of a rushing stream of wickedness and horror.

III. The Deterrent Power of Punishment and of Capital Punishment in Particular.

Thackeray complained that, with a certain kind of person, it was no use arguing about capital punishment. "You may talk to a man for a year upon the subject, and he will always reply to you, 'It is natural, and therefore it must be done. Blood demands blood.' "

We may hope that this is not an argument which at the present day would give much trouble to any thoughtful person; and its emyployment is usually confined to an abstract and unscrupulous controversialist, when every better argument failed him. What chiefly frightens many good people from the thought of abolishing capital punishment is an instinctive apprehension that the country would immediately begin to swarm with murderers and life would not be safe for an instant. Death is the only effective deterrent, they say, for a certain class of people, and the state cannot relax its hold of this weapon. This general abstract doctrine is often found to co-exist with a willingness to intercede for any condemned person, whose case is brought effectively under the theorist's notice. We contend that the theory is without foundation,

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and that the benevolent impulse to uplift the individual criminal not least by sympathy, patience, and mercy, provides the basis for a much better moral and legal theory.

1. As a general principle of punishment, it is hap-hazard and illogical. If deterrence be your object and harshness be your means, why should the present condition of the law, which is only, as regards murder, a matter of some forty years, give you such complete satisfaction? There is no reason, on this theory, why the harshness of the punishment should not be augmented and the same principle extended to other crimes. The criminal codes of Western Europe were long dominated by this principle, and they had a fair opportunity of "stamping out" crime if it could be done by such means. The statistics of crime in the centuries of this régime are a sufficient comment upon the claims of the deterrent principle.

2. Like the rest of mankind, criminals vary extremely in their desires and fears. We very often read of murderers jesting with prison warders about "being swung," and walking with alacrity to the scaffold. And what shall we say of the constant combination of murder and suicide, or of murder followed by the immediate self-surrender of the homicide to the police?[7] We even read of some who accuse themselves of a crime which they never committed, or who commit murder with the deliberate intention of confessing, and obtaining through the scaffold a release from a disordered and miserable life. In general, we ought to learn, if only from the increasing prevalence of suicide, that it is idle to think of frightening desperate men with the threat of death; and that men need much rather to be encouraged to live bravely and nobly, in spite of their past, than to be cowed by spectacles and narratives of deliberate and professional homicide

3. A close acquaintance with our own hearts and with actual cases of crime shows us that the thought of the punishment

[7] The common case of the murdering of sweethearts, for example, especially when followed by attempted suicide or surrender, seems to me to demand no less sympathy than if the suicide had succeeded, or than the killing of infants by their mothers. The practice of our courts in this matter is curiously capricious and very disquieting.

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is either not present at all, when a powerful impulse leads to the commission of a violent act; or that it is commonly overwhelmed by a conviction of the certainty of escape.[8] And, by the nature of the case, fear of capital punishment cannot prevent sudden and strictly unintentional acts of homicide, which, according to circumstances, are liable to be treated by our courts as murder.

4. Even if a large number of acts of violence were prevented by the fear of the death penalty, we might well doubt whether it would not be at the cost of producing a much larger number of such acts: whether mercy would not immediately, as well as in the long run, prevent more murders than are now prevented by severity. We are here in the region of moral probability where moral disposition and bias determine our judgments; and a man whose benevolent and merciful moral principles extend to the tempted and the erring will not doubt for a moment from which of the two, harshness or clemency, he may expect the most favorable results.

5. Past experience does in no wise belie the anticipations of our moral sentiments. Statistics cannot, from the complex character of this class of phenomena, generally speaking, supply us with convincing proofs of our theories. But so far as they go they justify us in making the following inferences:

(1.) The increasing humaneness of the penal codes of Western Europe has not led to an increase of those crimes in respect of which the severity of the punishment has been relaxed.

(2.) In particular, certain homicidal acts, formerly punished as murder, have not increased in frequency since they have been treated more leniently. In those cases, even if an increase in the crime took place, few, if any, would suggest a return to the old policy of severity.

(3.) The experience of those countries where capital punishment has been expressly or in effect abolished is, in the main, favorable to abolition. The Protestant Cantons of Switzer-

[8] In the case of murder, the chances of escaping the supreme penalty would seem from statistics to be very great indeed.

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land, Portugal, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Scotland,[9] for example, do not compare unfavorably, to say the least, as regards statistics of violent crime, with Spain, France, Germany, England, and Ireland.

(4.) The abolition of capital punishment does not, of itself, secure a community against outbreaks of violent crime. But it is equally obvious that its retention does not protect either: homicidal crime is increasing, not diminishing, in England, France, and Germany; and the last few years are among the worst on record.

(5.) Even comparative failure would not discourage a community which had deliberately committed itself to a merciful and reformative policy; it would only be an incentive to apply the new principle more amply and consistently in all departments of criminal law and administration, and of individual and national life.

George Eliot, to whom the principle of gentleness towards the erring is so deeply indebted, allowed herself, in a reactionary moment, to express a fear that much thinking over the causes of crime might make us unfit to punish the criminal. We face the reproach which such words commonly convey, without fear or shame. We believe that it is only by thinking wisely, patiently, and anxiously of the causes of crime, and the real character of the criminal, that the deliverance of society from evil passion and violence can come. We believe, too, that much thinking or even a little thinking would make much of our punishing seem inhuman and preposterous; and even if the policy which our thinking brought us to adopt should appear, in many if not in all cases, to be anything but "punishment," we would joyfully abandon the name as well as the thing. We are confident that the victory over evil in others can be won only as we eliminate evil in ourselves: especially

[9] In Italy homicide is still very frequent, but enlightened opinion in Italy is in no wise inclined, in spite of the recent assassination of the King, to ascribe this frequency to the absence of capital punishment. On the contrary, murder was more frequent in Italy under the severe régime, and we hear of progress in this matter as well as in others with the diffusion of the sense of good and humane government in the peninsula.

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as we become conscious of an ever-increasing debt of gratitude to those who have forgiven us and of responsibility towards those whom we must forgive; as we realize that cruel and degrading acts do not cease to be our own, because we do not like reading about them, or would rather have nothing to do with the agents whom we hire to perform them; as we believe more and more fully that the mercy of man to his fellow is able and mighty to heal and to save.

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THE MORAL EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG AMONG MUSLIMS.*

Muslim pedagogy at its best, like the best of all phases of Muslim civilization, is a legitimate and worthy descendent from the Greek stock. Plato and Aristotle were its parents. These two, indeed, turned Turk and speaking Arabic, form the intellectual life of Islām. True, this is only of things at the best. The Western comment is to the point that in the East the young idea is taught not to shoot, but to shout. Still more significant and full flavored with the sub-acid religious humor of Islām is the tradition from Muhammad, "Verily, the green rod is of the trees of Paradise."

But beyond these crudities there were minds—making, alas, too little impression—which studied the psychology of youth, methods, and curricula, and followed bravely in the traces of the Greek writers upon pedagogy. The pity was the slight effects they produced. In the translations which I shall lay before you there is little from them.

Your object, if I understand rightly, is to study and advance the ethical training of the young in independence of any definite theological instruction. That would to all orthodox Muhammadans be an impious absurdity—absurd, because

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* A lecture given in a course on "The Moral Training of the Young in Ancient and Modern Times," under the auspices of the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture.

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against the laws of thought; impious, because against the revealed Word of God—as a whole, simply unthinkable. A moment must be given to this, which conditions the whole ethical attitude of the Muslim East. With regard to it their theologians reckon three parties and three views, two orthodox and one heretical. The heretics—the Mu'tazilites—held that man had a certain sense of good and evil; that from it he could develop a knowledge of God and the moral law; that then the prophets came and strengthened this sense and drove this law home. This position Islām has definitely and finally rejected. The other two parties—the Ash'arites and Mātarīdites—both orthodox, held and hold that man has no such faculty; that the moral law depends upon the will of God and must be revealed by Him through prophets. Thus, man apart from the revelation of God cannot know whether an action is right or wrong. The two parties differ only in that the Ash'arites hold that man, unassisted by revelation, cannot even reach the knowledge of the existence of God, while the Mātarīdites admit so much power in human faculties, but deny that man can go on to construct a law for himself. The effect of this, of course, is that ethics are absolutely dependent upon revealed religion, and can only be taught as contained in a sacred book and imparted by an inspired teacher.

Whence, then, you may ask, came the knowledge of right and wrong which is to be found among the heathen outside the circle of Islām? The answer is, roughly, two-fold. First, it must be remembered that God has been revealing Himself and His will from the beginning of the world by means of a goodly fellowship of prophets, now to one people, now to another. It is true that mankind has always been corrupting, forgetting, abandoning these prophets and their teachings. But, nevertheless, there has come thus to exist, scattered through the world, an immense mass of imperfect and mingled information as to the will of God. Only in Islām is it still retained in its purity. Further, Islām, beginning with Muhammad himself, has shown a most interesting syncretistic tendency. The sages and heroes of past times are often accepted by it as prophets in more or less regular standing. Thus Luqmān, such an

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early sage, and a fabulist confused inextricably with Æsop, is a prophet, even in the Qur'ān. So, too, Job, and, very differently, Alexander the Great. But, secondly, besides this great gift of prophecy scattered thus broadly through the lands, Islām teaches the existence of minor prophetic gifts closely akin to the χαρίσματα of the early Christian Church. These, consisting of illumination and supernatural powers, are bestowed by God on those who have striven to approach Him by ascetic exercises and utter devotion of mind and body; who, in a word, are saints. To them God reveals Himself and reveals also themselves, and it is upon the experiences and teaching of these that the whole science of ethics, as developed and taught, for example, by the Greek thinkers, is based. All your laws, then, and theories upon this subject, all your analysis of the qualities of the mind, your summing and tabulating of defects and your exercises to meet them, go back in the end to these saints of God, who have witnessed for Him and are witnessing for Him still. God has never left Himself without a witness, and other foundation than these witnesses can no man lay. These are not prophets; they are not sent with a message to deliver to mankind; they are saints, and part of their belief is in some one of God's prophets.

Let me dwell a little more fully on this fundamental point in the Muslim position, the basing of all human knowledge upon revelation from God, through prophets and saints. It solves for the Muhammadans the problem of the fate of the unevangelized heathen. If no message has come to them from God, their ignorance is to be excused; they will have a place in Paradise, but of a lower rank, as they have no works to their credit. Still it is evident that Islām felt that there was something out of joint in any people not having God preached to them, and the hypothesis of the existence of such people was only necessary for them in order to exhaust all possibilities. You will remember how, in "The Arabian Nights," travelers sometimes come to lands beyond the mountains and to races not of the children of Adam, and yet find them worshipping Allah and confessing Muhammad. These always tell a tale how once there appeared to them a great figure clothed in green,

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who cried, "Say, 'There is no God but Allāh, and Muhammad is His prophet!'" and then instructed them in the saving ordinances of Islām. By such means, Islām sees to it that the true religion, on which all depends, is offered to all.

It will now, I think, be plain that, from such a point of view as this, any consideration or teaching of ethics apart from theology can only be described as an impious absurdity. I cannot, therefore, keep entirely or even at all free from theology in the sketch upon which I now enter; and I can, therefore, only ask you to bear with the eccentricity of my Muslim friends who held that the fear of God was the beginning of wisdom and of everything else.

It is true that there exist in Arabia, and are current generally in the East, a most multifarious multitude of treatises of all sizes and profundities on moral philosophy. Their subject is called *"ilm al-Akhlāq,"* "the science of characters," which is a tolerable rendering of the Greek τὰ ἠθικά, and they, undoubtedly, all stand in some relationship with the ethical systems of Plato and Aristotle, treating these with strict eclecticism. In many the Greek element almost vanishes; in some few it greatly preponderates, being yoked most curiously and unequally with extracts from the law of Islām. Others, again, have clothed a skeleton of Greek theory with incongruous robes and trappings of Muslim religious experience, the sayings, sermons, deeds, and miracles of the Saints of the People of Muhammad. Others, again, and they are many, are frank collections of hagiology for the satisfaction and admonition of him who would be admonished. In these we wander in a wonderland of angels, jinnīs, and earthly marvels in no way different, though generally more monotonous and duller than those we meet in the enchanted world of "The Arabian Nights." In truth, it may be said, that the Muslim East has discovered the art so to construct its treatises on moral philosophy—that dullest of all sciences—that they cannot be distinguished from that book which the West regards as of the most irresponsible morality.

But, when we examine these treatises and estimate their weight in the ethical training of the East, we discover that

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the Greek element has become an atrophied limb, an unused appendix. The part of them which lives and acts is that which tells the experiences, the sayings, the marvels of the pious and wise—mostly the pious—and which exhorts to the imitation of these things. For the ethical system of Islām is strictly a system of separate things—words, happenings—the imitation of which is impressed, not an ordered investigation of the nature of the Good, or of the nature and constitution of human character. The psychological analysis and scientific system and habit of the Greek mind vanish, and in their place the Semitic conception of custom and example come to rule supreme.

It would indeed be hard to overestimate the part which the customary usage *(sunna)* of Muhammad plays in Muslim life. Every pious Muslim endeavors to pattern his actions, down to the merest details, on the recorded manners and methods, words and ways, of the Prophet. Even the ordinary Muslim, not overburdened with piety, finds that his life is hedged with tolerable strictness by this prophetic precedence. Men do not ask what the right thing to do under such and such circumstances may be; they ask what the Prophet did or said. Fashion and custom are with us often mechanical enough, but they have never reached this absolute imitativeness, this complete lack of inquiry as to a governing thought or reason. But you must not think that this first appeared with Islām and with the overpowering personality of Muhammad. It was always existent in the desert. The Bedawī tribes, ruled by nothing else, were ruled by the customs of their fathers; "Our fathers have told us," was enough for them; "The paths of our fathers —the old paths—we will follow," spoke their sociological creed. This, of course, they share alike with the savage of all lands, but they retained the same unyielding conservatism long after they had passed from savagery to comparative civilization. The tales of the ancient days, the proverbs and apologues of the wise and their keen and eloquent words, when they came from a sufficiently hoar antiquity, were accepted and followed unquestionedly. So it had been before Islām; so it was after Islām. Only there then entered the especial usage of the

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Prophet of God, weighted with a divine sanction which overpowered everything else. Yet in time, as I have already indicated, other elements came to hold a distinct if subordinate place. The saints had their experiences and uttered their half inspired ejaculations. Proverbs, in which Arabic is wealthy to a degree, could claim a standard and acknowledged position. Even tales of the lives of the philosophers, whose systems no one dreamt of studying, of their vicissitudes and sharp replies, of Socrates and Diogenes, of Plato and Aristotle and all the rest, contributed to this mass of moral commonplaces. The poets themselves, although Allāh had said that "they never do the thing they say" (Qur. xxvi, 226), when they had put a sufficiently prosaic maxim into a sufficiently brilliant jingle, might add their stone to the great cairn.

All these things, then, are on the lips of Islām and mould the conduct of Islām to this day. In it life is ruled by maxims, proverbs, examples of every kind; its despotisms are not tempered with epigrams, but with apposite tales and wise saws. Under its sun can be no new thing; all things have been reckoned and tried by them of old time and their judgment is to be followed.

And so with the education of the young. It is strictly on a basis of imitation. All the ways are marked out, and just as a man himself walks in these paths, so must he teach his child to go. And this duty of teaching he must take seriously. Here is a passage which gives, in short, the Muslim view of the rights of a child from his parents. It is from the *Ihyā* of al-Ghazzālī. The book is an elaborate treatise covering the whole field of religion, and its writer, who died in A. D. 1111, was the greatest doctor of the Muslim Church, a man of the intellectual rank of Augustine. He says (Vol. vi, p. 316 of Cairo edition, with commentary by the Sayyid Murtadà):

"A man said to the Prophet, 'O Apostle of God! to whom must I show pious duty?' Said the Apostle, 'Show it to thy parents.' But he said, 'I have no parents.' Then said the Apostle, 'Show it to thy child. Just as thy parents have a claim against thee, so has thy child.' The Apostle said, 'May

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God have compassion upon a father who guards a child as to his pious duty; that is, who does not drive him to any undutifulness by treating him badly.' Also the Apostle said, 'Deal evenly between your children as to gifts; it hath been said, "Thy child is thy odorous plant (or Basil plant) for seven years, and thy servant for seven years, thereafter he is either thine enemy or thy partner." ' Anas said, 'The Prophet said, "The 'Aqīqa sacrifice is offered for a boy the seventh day, when he is named, and his head is shaved; then when he has reached six years, he is put to sleep alone, and when he has reached thirteen years, he is beaten if he does not pray. Then, when he has reached sixteen years, his father marries him; thereafter he takes him by the hand and says, I have educated thee and taught thee and married thee; I seek refuge with God from thy sin in this world and thy punishment in the next." ' The Prophet said, 'Part of the right of a child against his father is that he should give him a good education and a good name.' "

Again, Muhammad himself is naturally the first and most important guide after whom men must walk and teach their children to walk. It was God Himself who educated Muhammad by those gradual revelations to him which are now gathered up for us in the Qur'ān. Now the Qur'ān itself and whatever else we know of the character of Muhammad is to educate us: this is what al-Ghazzālī has to say on the matter (*Ihyā,* vii, 91 f.):

"An exposition of how God Most High educated His beloved and chosen one Muhammad by means of the Qur'ān.

"The Apostle of God abounded in abasement and supplication to Him and was constant in prayer that He would adorn him with beauties of good breeding and graces of character. He used to say in his prayer, 'O God, make beautiful my outward and my inward fashion.' And he would say, 'O God, turn me away from characteristics that are disliked.' Then God answered his prayer in accordance with His saying, 'If ye ask me, I will answer you' (Qur. xi, 62), and sent down to him the Qur'ān and educated him thereby; so his character is the

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Qur'ān. Said Sa'd b. Hishām, 'I went into 'A'isha and asked her concerning the character of the Apostle of God, and she said, "Dost thou not read the Qur'ān?" I said, "Yes, indeed." She said, "The character of the Apostle of God is the Qur'ān." ' And the Qur'ān educated him simply by means of such things as the saying of Him Most High, 'Take hold of gentleness and command kindness and turn away from the ignorant' (Qur. vii, 198). And, 'Verily God commandeth justice and fair dealing and giving to kindred, and forbiddeth wickedness and iniquity and oppressions' (Qur. xvi, 92). 'And be patient as to that which has befallen thee; lo, that springs from the absolute determination of things' (Qur. xxxi, 16). 'And he indeed who is patient and forgiveth, that indeed springs from the absolute determination of things' (Qur. xlii, 41). 'Then forgive them and overlook, verily God loveth the well-doers' (Qur. v, 16). 'Let them forgive and overlook, do ye not desire that God should forgive you?' (Qur. xxiv, 22). 'Repel with that which is better, then, lo, he between whom and thee is enmity will be as a warm friend' (Qur. xxiv, 34). 'And those who choke down anger and forgive men; and God loveth the well-doers' (Qur. iii, 128). 'Avoid much suspicion, verily some suspicion is a sin, and envy not one another and back-bite not one another' (Qur. xlix, 12).

"And when his side incisor was broken and his face was gashed on the Day of Ohod and the blood was made to flow over his face, while he was wiping the blood and saying, 'How can a people prosper which dyes the face of its prophet with blood?' and while he was praying for them to their Lord, then God Most High revealed, 'Thou hast nothing to do with the matter' (Qur. iii, 123), as an admonition to him against that. The like of such admonitions in the Qur'ān are not few. And the Prophet himself was first intended by the admonition and correction; then, from him, the light shines upon all created beings. So he was educated by the Qur'ān, and created beings are educated by him. And therefore did he say, 'I have been sent that I may perfect the graces of character.' "

Such, then, is the beginning and basis of all moral education

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in Islām. The method will be shown by the following longer translation, also from al-Ghazzālī (vii, 362 ff.):

"An exposition of the method of training boys at their earliest age and the manner of educating them and beautifying their characters.

"Know that the method of training boys is one of the most important and urgent of things. A boy is a trust with his parents and his clean heart is a precious jewel, plain and free from all engraving or form. He is prepared to receive whatever is engraved and to incline to whatever is inclined to him. Then if he is accustomed to and taught good, he grows up according to it, and is happy in this world and the next, and his parents and each of his teachers and educators share with him in his reward. But if he is accustomed to evil and neglected, as cattle are neglected, he is unhappy and perishes and the burden of the sin is on the neck of his guardians and supervisors. God, whose characteristics are Might and Majesty, has said, 'O ye who believe, protect yourselves and your families from the Fire' (Qur. lxvi, 6). And often a father guards his son from the fire of this world, when guarding him from the fire of the next were more fitting. Such guarding is by educating him and admonishing him and teaching him the beauties of character and keeping him from partnership with evil; not by accustoming him to ease and making adornment and the causes of luxuriousness beloved by him, that so he may squander his life in the search for them when he has grown up, and perish eternally. But it behooves that he watch him from the first, and that he do not use in rearing him and suckling him any but an excellent and pious woman who eats lawful food. For the milk which comes from unlawful food has no blessing in it. So, whenever the growth of a boy comes from it, his clay is kneaded with uncleanness and his nature inclines to what is kin to uncleanness.

"And whenever a father sees in a boy signs of discrimination, it behooves him to increase his watchfulness. The first of that is the appearance of beginnings of shame; for when he is abashed or ashamed and abandons some action, that is nothing

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but the shining in of the light of reason upon him so that he sees that some things are vile and opposed to others; then he becomes ashamed at one thing rather than another. This is a gift of God Most High to him and a piece of good tidings which points to poise of character and purity of heart and gives promise of completeness of reason when he attains maturity. So it is not fitting that the boy who has reached the point of educating him in his sense of shame and discrimination.

"The first quality which will gain control of him will be greediness in eating. So it is necessary that he should be taught as to it that he should take food with the right hand only, that he should say over it, 'In the Name of Allah!' when he takes it; that he should eat of what is next him and not grasp at the food before another; that he should not stare at it nor at those who eat; that he should not hurry in eating, but chew well; that he should not take several bites at once, nor soil his hands or clothes; that he should be accustomed to dry bread at times so that he should not come to regard seasoning as necessary; that much eating should be vilified to him by comparing all those who eat much to cattle, and by blaming before him the boy who eats much and praising before him the boy who is well brought up; that he should be taught to like choice food for another and to pay little attention to it himself, and to be patient as to coarse food.

"Also he should be taught to like white clothes instead of colored and brocade; and it should be fixed in him that such are the affairs of women and the effeminate, and that men despise them. That should be repeated to him. And whenever he sees upon a boy a garment of brocade or colored, then he ought to blame it. And a boy should be protected from boys who accustom themselves to an easy life and luxury and the wearing of splendid clothes, and from mixing with anyone who will cause him to hear what will make him desire that. For a boy, whenever he is neglected at the beginning of his growth, ends, for the most part, of evil character, a liar, an envier, a thief, a tale-bearer, a wrangler, overmuch of speech and laughter and guile and impudence; he can only be guarded against all that by being well trained.

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"Then, it is incumbent that he should be occupied in school and should learn the Qur'ān and the traditions and the stories of the saints and their manner of life, that the love of the pious may be planted in him; and he should be guarded against poems in which there is mention of love and of lovers; and he should be guarded from intercourse with such scholars as maintain that these belong to culture and polish, for they plant in the hearts of youth a corrupt seed.

"Then, when there appears in the boy good disposition and a praiseworthy action, honor ought to be showed to him therefor, and he should be rewarded with what will rejoice him and be praised in the presence of others. Then, if he at sometime does anything different once, no attention should be paid to it, and his veil should not be rent, and he should not be uncovered, and it should not be suggested to him that anyone would dare to do the like, especially if the boy veil it and strive to hide it. For the bringing to light of what he has done will sometimes increase his daring, until he will not pay attention to the uncovering of it. Then, if he do it again, he should be rebuked in secret, and the thing should be magnified to him, and it should be said to him, 'See that you do not return again to the like of this; if you are known to do the like of this you will be put to shame before men.' But let not rebuke of him be frequent on every occasion, for the hearing of reproach and the committing of vile things will come to be a slight matter to him, and the effect of speech upon his heart will cease; but let the awfulness of speech from his father be preserved; let him not rebuke him except upon an occasion; and let his mother terrify him with his father and forbid him from vile actions.

"And he ought to be hindered from sleeping by day, for that produces laziness; but he should not be prevented at night; only he should not be allowed a soft bed, that so his limbs may be hardened and his body may not grow fat, so that he may not be able to endure anything but pleasantness; rather let him practice hardness in bedding and clothing and food; and he ought to be hindered from anything which he does in secrecy, for he would not conceal it if he did not believe that it was vile; then if he is let alone in that he becomes accustomed to the

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doing of what is vile. And he should practice, part of the day, walking and motion and exercise, so that laziness may not get control of him; and he should practice not to leave his extremities uncovered, and not to hurry in walking, and not to let his hands drop loosely, but to hold them firmly to his breast; and he should be prevented from boasting himself over his fellows as to anything which his parents possess or as to anything of his food or dress or tablet or ink-bottle; rather, he should be practiced in humility and the rendering of honor to all with whom he comes in contact, and in gentleness of speech with them; and he should be prevented from taking anything from boys; if he be of the children of the respected, rather let him know that loftiness consists in giving, not in taking, and that taking is blameworthy and ignoble and low; and if he is of the children of the poor, that seeking and taking are disgrace and meanness, and that such actions are of the nature of a dog, for it glares in expectation of a morsel and in desire for it. In general, the love of gold and silver and the desire for them are vile in boys, and a boy should be guarded against them more than he is guarded against snakes and scorpions, for the bane of the love of gold and silver and the desire for them work more ill in boys than the bane of the simoom, and even upon older people also.

"And he ought to practice not to spit in an assembly, nor to blow the nose, nor to yawn in the presence of others, nor to turn his back upon another, nor to put one foot upon another, nor to put the palm of his hand under his chin, nor to prop his head with his arm—these things are signs of laziness. And he should know how to sit; and he should restrain much speech; and it should be made plain to him that much speech shows shamelessness, and is the action of the sons of the blameworthy; and he should restrain himself from oaths, absolutely, whether they are true or false, so that he may not become accustomed to them in youth; and he should restrain himself from beginning to speak first; and he should practice not to talk except by way of answer and only as much as the question requires; and that he should listen attentively whenever another talks to him of those who are older than he; and that he should rise up for

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him who is above him and give him place, and sit before him, and should restrain himself from vain and immoderate speech, and from cursing and abusing, and from intercourse with him upon those tongue anything of that kind runs. For that necessarily comes from comradeship with evil and the root of the education of boys is guarding from comradeship with evil.

"And whenever his teacher strikes him, he ought not to cry out much, nor seek the intercession of anyone, but he should be patient and remember that such is the nature of the brave and of men, and that much crying out is the nature of slaves and women; and his teacher should permit him, after he has turned from his books, to play with such a pleasant play as will rest him from the weariness of school, so that he shall not be wearied in play. For keeping the boy from play and keeping him at learning continually destroys the mind and blunts sharpness and embitters life so that he will seek out some strategem to be free of it absolutely.

"And he ought to learn to obey his parents and his teacher and his educator and everyone that is older than he, both relations and not, and that he should look upon them, honoring them and magnifying them, and should not play before them; and when he has reached years of discernment, he ought not to be spared observing the laws of purification and prayer, and he should be commanded to fast on some days of Ramadān, and to leave off wearing silk and brocade and gold; and he should learn all that behooves him of the restrictive ordinances of the law; and he should be made to fear theft and eating of what is unlawful and lying and shamelessness and everything that prevails among boys.

"Then, if he has grown up in this way in youth, it will be possible, when he has arrived at maturity, to instruct him in the secret meanings of those things, and he may be told that foods are but remedies, and that their only object is to strengthen man for the obedience of God; and that the world as a whole has no root since it has no abiding and death cuts off its pleasures, and that it is an abode which passes away, not an abode which abides, while the other world is an abode which abides, that passes not away; and that death should be looked

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for at any moment, and that the shrewd and prudent is he who gathers provision from this world for the other, so that his rank may be magnified with God, and his pleasure in Paradise may be enlarged.

"Then, if the growing up has been healthy, this explanation at time of maturity will make a healthy impression, abiding in the heart as engraving abides on a stone. But if the growing up has been different from that given above, so that the boy has been given to play and immoderation and impudence and greediness in food and dress and adornment and to boasting, of himself, his mind will break away from receiving the truth, as a wall of dry earth breaks away. And it is the beginnings of things which ought to be considered. For a boy in his nature is created capable of receiving good and bad equally and only his parents turn him to one of the two sides. The Prophet said, 'Every child is born with a natural religious faculty and it is only his parents who make him a Christian or a Jew or a Magian.' Sahl b. 'Abd Allāh at-Tusturī said, 'When I was a child of three years old, I used to rise in the night and watch the prayer of my uncle, Muhammad b. Sawwār. Then he said to me one day, "Are you not mindful of God who created you?" I said, "How ought I to be mindful of him?" He said, "Say in your heart, when you are putting on your clothes, three times without moving your tongue, 'Allah is with me; Allah beholds me; Allah witnesseth me.'" So I said that for some nights; then I told him that. So he said, "Say it every night seven times." So I said it and told him that. Then he said, "Say it every night eleven times." So I said it. And the sweetness of it fell into my heart. Then, after a year had passed, my uncle said, "Guard what I have taught you and abide in it until you enter the grave, for it will avail you in this world and the next." So I ceased not doing that for years, and found therein a sweetness in my secret soul. Thereafter, my uncle said to me, one day, "O Sahl, he with whom God is, whom God beholdeth and witnesseth, can he be rebellious against God? Beware of rebellion!" And I used to keep alone with myself. Then they sent me to school, and I said, "I fear that my spiritual solicitude will be separated from me." But they made a con-

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dition with the teacher that I should go to him at a certain hour, then I should study, then I should return. So I went to the school and learned the Qur'ān and committed it to memory when I was six or seven years old. And I used to fast from the world, and my food was barley bread when I was twelve years old. Then, a religious question occurred to me when I was thirteen, and I asked my people that they would send me to the people of al-Basra, that I might ask concerning it. So I came to al-Basra and asked the learned there, but none availed anything to heal me; so I went to Abbādan, to a man who was known as Abū Habīb Hamza b. Abī Abd Allāh al-Abbādānī. So I asked him of it, and he resolved it to me. So I remained with him for a space, profiting by his words and being educated by his accomplishments. Then I returned to Tustur and kept my food within bounds, on the basis that I would buy for myself, with a dirhem, some musty barley, then it would be ground and baked for me, and I would break my fast at dawn upon the weight of an *ūqīya* of it, plain, without salt or seasoning. And that dirhem would suffice me for a year. Then I determined that I would fast three nights, then break my fast one night; then five; then seven; then five-and-twenty nights. And I held to that for a year; then I went out wandering in the earth for years; then I returned to Tustur, and I used to stand in prayer during the whole night, so long as God willed.' Ahmad said, 'I never saw him eat salt, until he met God Most High.' "

You will easily see the point of this last narrative. As the twig is bent, so the tree grows; that for al-Ghazzālī is the whole secret of religious training. You will notice also how easily he passes from the moral training of children in general to a special case of infant asceticism and religious devotion. Life in the world and in religion, moral training and devout contemplation, all run together for him. Further, moral training as to principles and those rules of decent conduct which we sometimes call minor morals are parts of one whole. Indeed, he makes skilful use of such details to form habits from which principles may thereafter spring. A child who is taught al-

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ways to stand in respectful attention to his elders will easily learn the meaning and value of respect, reverence, devotion, as principles in life. I need not enter on the many other details of the same kind which this long extract shows. Only, understand that in all this al-Ghazzālī is not an isolated, individual voice, but is expressing the attitude of all Islām.

Finally, let me give another extract which puts, even more clearly, the gradual development from mechanical acceptance to intelligent grasp. It deals, it is true, in the first instance, with theology, but theology and ethics, as I have already said, are one in Islām. It comes in al-Ghazzālī's work after a creed which he composed specially to be learned by heart by children. This creed you will find translated in my "Development of Muslim Theology" where it occupies eight small-type pages. You will probably have perceived already that Muhammadan religious education moves on a strenuous plane and that the well trained Muhammadan child would think little of such trifles as our Westminster Shorter Catechism.

After his creed for infant minds al-Ghazzālī thus continues (ii, pp. 42 ff) :

"On the method of gradual approach to guidance and the ordering of the stages of belief.

"Know that what we have mentioned in the preceding creed ought to be taught to a boy in earliest childhood, so that he may hold it absolutely in memory. Thereafter, the meaning of it will keep gradually unfolding itself to him, point by point, as he grows older. So, first, is the committing to memory; then understanding; then belief and certainty and acceptance. That is what results in a boy without proof; it is by the grace of God upon the heart of man that He opens him in earliest childhood to faith without need of evidence or proof. How can that be denied, seeing that all the creeds of the mass of the people, in their beginnings are simple imitation and acceptance of authority purely?

"It is true that the belief which results from simple acceptance on authority is not free from a certain weakness at the beginning, in the sense that it is capable of being destroyed by

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contradiction if it meets with that. So there must needs be a strengthening of it, and a supporting of it in the soul of the boy and with the common people until it is firmly rooted and cannot be shaken. But the method of strengthening and confirming it is not that he should be taught the art of disputation and scholastic theology, but that he should occupy himself in the recital and exposition of the Qur'ān and in the reading of traditions of Muhammad and their meanings and in the functions of the acts of worship. Then his belief will continue to increase in firm-rootedness through what meets his ear of the proofs and evidences of the Qur'ān and through what shines out upon him from the lights and functions of acts of worship, and what reaches him from observation of the pious and their intercourse and their signs and their practices in humility to God, in fear of Him and submission to Him. So the beginning of imitation is like the casting of seed into the bosom, and these other causes are like the tending and watering of it until that seed sprouts and grows strong and rises into a pleasant tree, well rooted, with its stem firm and its branches in the heavens.

"But he should be guarded in the most absolute way from hearing disputation and from scholastic theology. For the degree to which disputation discomposes him and to which it injures him is greater than that to which it benefits him. Strengthening him by disputation would resemble beating a tree with a pestle of iron in the hope to increase its fruits. But such treatment mostly crushes and injures it. That is what happens usually; and observation will show you this sufficiently. Compare, then, the creed of the pious and God-fearing from the masses of the people with the creed of scholastic theologians and disputers, and you will see that the creed of the people is like a lofty mountain which calamities and thunderbolts cannot move, but the creed of the theologian who is on guard and his belief in the subtleties of disputation are like a thread hung in the air, which the winds move at one time thus, and at another time thus. And if anyone hears from them the proof of the belief, and accepts it on authority, is he not like one who accepts the belief itself on authority? For there is no distinction with

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regard to accepting on authority, between learning the proof or learning the thing proved. Imitation of a proof is one thing and developing a proof by meditation is another thing, far distant from the first.

"Then, when the early development of a boy has been according to this creed, if he busies himself with the gain of this world, nothing more than this creed will be open to him, but he will be safe in the world to come through belief in the truth, since the law did not impose upon wild Arabs more than acceptance of the external meaning of these doctrines. As for investigation and seeking and requiring of proofs, they were not held to that at all. But if he desires to be one of those who follow the path of the other world, and if Providence assist him, so that he occupy himself with works and hold to the fear of God and deny his soul to lust and occupy himself with exercises and striving, gates of guidance will be opened, revealing the essential proofs of this creed, through a divine light which will be poured into his heart on account of his striving, in accordance with the promise of God when He said, 'And those who strive for Us, We will indeed guide them in Our paths. And verily God is with the well-doers' " (Qur. xxix, 69).

These are all actual words of Islām and will probably suffice to make plain to you the fundamental Muslim position on the training of children. Briefly, they advocate, first, mechanical imitation and practice; to grow, second, into habit; and, third, into intellectual acceptance and devotion. That imitation has its object first and principally in the figure of Muhammad, imitation of whom is the ideal of all Muslims. Therefore children learn by heart from the earliest the Qur'ān, which is the character of the Prophet, and the traditions which tell of his words, actions, and ways. Secondly, they learn by heart elaborate creeds, the greater part of which develop the conception of the being and nature of God and thus have a converse action on the heart of their learners. A pretty description has come down to us in the biographies of Saladin of how he made one of his court chaplains draw up for him a special little creed and how he used himself to instruct his children in it and make

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them repeat it to him. The gulf between Islām and the Christendom of that day may be felt when we try to imagine Richard Lion-Heart—Richard Yea-and-Nay—doing anything of the kind. Thirdly, use is made of the enormous Muslim literature of moral tales and sayings, edifying stories of saints and their godly words. For these, I need only refer you to the "Thousand and One Nights"; it is full of them. Though we, nowadays, shrink from didactic stories and hackneyed quotations, we must remember that the oriental who is still a child, has no such reluctance. In the "Thousand and One Nights" also you will find reference to the institution of the *Wasīya* or death-bed exhortation which a dying father is expected to give to his son, and some examples of it. Finally, to that book I would send you, if you wish to learn to appreciate the moral tone, the standards and attitude of Islām; you will meet these there at their best and at their worst. In the "Nights," it is true, there is little direct information on our present subject, but only there can you find in English—and perhaps even in Arabic—the atmosphere, the ideals, and ideas which can make real and living the subject which I have now had the honor to lay before you. To that book I send you with confidence.

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PASCAL'S WAGER.

A certain rustic moralist in Mr. Thomas Hardy's "Far from the Madding Crowd" gives his opinion about the relative chances of salvation contingent on attending church or chapel in the following homely but telling terms:

"We know very well that if anybody goes to heaven they [chapel-folk] will. They've worked hard for it and they deserve to have it, such as 'tis. I'm not such a fool as to pretend that we who stick to the church have the same chance as they, because we know we have not. But I hate a feller who'll change his old ancient doctrine for the sake of getting to heaven."

So far the excellent Coggan, for such is the name of Mr. Hardy's pot-house philosopher. Whether churchmen or dissenters should be credited with the better chance of salvation is a deep question in which I do not now propose to enter. The Conformist and the Nonconformist conscience may safely be left to take care of themselves. But the ingenuous confidences of this particular churchman suggest a problem of wider interest on which I propose to offer a few remarks. Is there any method of salvation that may be called distinctly mean? I believe there is at least one such, and I am sorry to say that it is a method recommended by no less an authority than Pascal.

What the French call "le pari de Pascal"—in English Pascal's wager or bet—forms the theme of one of the most celebrated passages in his fragmentary defence of Christianity, published after his death and universally known as the "Pensées." A very elaborate edition of this work, filling three large volumes in the great series of French classics which is one of the glories of French bibliography, has recently appeared.[1] Nearly the whole of the first volume is occupied by an elaborate Introduction in which all the literary facts necessary for the full understanding of Pascal's position are brought together. Then comes a presumably immaculate text accompanied by an ample array of critical and explanatory notes, the Thoughts

[1] The references in this article are to this edition.

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themselves being so arranged in sections as to exhibit themselves to the best logical advantage; and the whole is completed by what is rare in French books, an excellent index. So far as externals go we cannot expect that this splendid and sombre genius will ever make a better appearance before the world than in M. Léon Brunschvicg's edition.

Pascal's apologetics are as obsolete as his satire on the Jesuits is fresh and living. The higher criticism has ruined his theory of Christian evidences. Evolution has ruined his theory of the Fall. And what some modern mathematicians defend with arguments no more solid than his would not have been recognized by him as the true faith. But one, at least, of his points has secured an undying literary interest from the extraordinary energy and passion with which the case is put rather than from any peculiar ingenuity or originality in the thought itself. This is the argument of the wager to which I have already referred.

It runs as follows. Speaking by the light of nature, says Pascal, God, supposing him to exist, must be out of relation to ourselves. Being without parts or limits he is infinitely incomprehensible. We can neither know what he is nor even that he is. This admission goes beyond that form of modern Agnosticism according to which we can say with certainty that the Unknowable exists, but not what it is. And of course it goes very far beyond Herbert Spencer's affirmation of an Unknowable which is infinite, eternal, an energy, and the cause of all things. But we are not to take so skeptical a confession as defining Pascal's own position. Being a Christian he has other sources of information than the light of nature. His supposed sceptic—who turns out to be a very real sceptic with a place in French literary history—has none. But the sceptic's ignorance cuts both ways. It leaves the non-existence of God as uncertain as his existence. Reason supplies no means of choosing between the two alternative possibilities. Nevertheless we are obliged to back one side or the other, to play at a game of hazard in which, at an infinite distance, heads or tails will turn up. "But," answers the sceptic, "I do not want to play at all; in such a doubtful case as what you describe

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prudence bids us abstain." To which Pascal replies, "You must bet; you are in for it; it does not depend on your will." For as his Port Royalist editors put it in an elucidatory addition to the text, "Not to bet is to bet for the non-existence of God."

Plato observes in the "Republic" that he "hardly ever met a mathematician who could reason" (531 E). So at least Jowett translates the passage—not perhaps without a spice of malice. According to some the word he uses (διαλεκτικοί) does not exactly imply what we mean by ability to reason. But I think it will be admitted to imply the power so signally displayed by Plato himself in the "Parmenides"—the power, that is, of exhaustively enumerating the possible issues in a given question, and of deducing the necessary consequences in each instance. And it seems to me that, whatever may be the case with modern mathematicians as a class, Pascal shows himself remarkably deficient in that sort of dialectical ability, so much so indeed as to ruin the basis of his whole argument at the very start. The deficiency may or may not be connected with his great mathematical genius; anyhow it is there.

Why must I bet? No reason whatever is given, but it needs only a very slight acquaintance with the dogmatic Christianity of Pascal's time to supply what he leaves unsaid. To be saved man must believe positively in the existence of God: to leave it an open question is to incur the same penalty as complete atheism, that is, eternal damnation.

Here we come at once on a flagrant self-contradiction which even if it stood alone would leave the sceptic triumphant. Pascal began by saying that God, as infinite, is unrelated to us *(il n'a nul rapport à nous.)* But if so he can neither save nor damn us: our future fate has nothing to do with his existence or non-existence, still less with our opinion or absence of opinion on the subject.

I do not profess to know much about the turf; but I strongly suspect that anyone who had such loose notions as Pascal about the laws of betting, if he acted on them, would soon be cleared out of every penny he possessed; that is, supposing his ignorance to be real; while if it were assumed for the purpose of eluding

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payment, he would before long find himself turned off every race-course in England.

However, we will let that pass. We will suppose that the phrase "out of relation" slipped in by an unfortunate oversight and would have been deleted had the author lived to see his work through the press; noting, however, that they were allowed to stand by the logicians of Port Royal who otherwise made free enough with his manuscript. Let it be granted as not impossible that the infinite Being, if he exists, is no other than the God of Catholicism. But there is a long way from possibility to certainty, and Pascal himself has warned us that the knowledge, if any, of God's existence is quite distinct from the knowledge of his attributes. Assuming there to be a God, that bare fact leaves us in absolute ignorance about his character. Now it might fairly be contended that the number of different characters which may possibly be ascribed to an infinite being is infinite, and even infinite in the second degree on account of the possible permutations and combinations of attributes. Accordingly the conditions of the wager must be altered. Pascal has appealed to the light of reason and to reason he must go. Apart from objective evidence, of which there is at present no question, the chances against his theology being true are at least infinity to one.

It is, however, on the cards that Pascal, admitting so much, might still maintain that a man of sense was justified in staking his life on the existence of God. In order to make this clear we must examine the conditions of the wager.

"If you win," he tells us, "you win everything; if you lose, you lose nothing." In the more concrete language of religious belief, if there is a God and you have faith in his promises you gain everlasting felicity; if there is no God, death ends all. It is not precisely explained what is meant by staking your life; but as Pascal is addressing himself to a careless worldling he must be supposed to mean what such a person would call "life"; that is to say, an existence of sensual and social enjoyment. The author of the Thoughts would not admit that the abandonment of such a life involved any real sacrifice; and so far the serious moralist of any religion or of no religion would not be

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disposed to quarrel with him. In fact, as we shall see presently, there is much more involved, certainly more than the sage who finds life "very tolerable without its amusements" is prepared to give up.

Of course no Christian, and Pascal less than another, believes that eternal felicity can be won as the fruit of such a cold-blooded calculation, such brutal cynicism, to use M. Sully Prudhomme's blunt phrase,[2] as would seem to be implied by the aleatory proceeding recommended. Simply as a bet it would to the Searcher of all hearts be no more than the celebrated short prayer, "O God, if there be a God, save my soul, if I have a soul!" In fact, it is only the first step towards acquiring a genuine conviction. And Pascal does not leave us in doubt about the second step. His sceptic is made to reply, "I fully acknowledge the force of your reasoning. But is there no way of seeing the faces of the cards?" "Yes, there are the Scriptures, etc." "But what if I am so constituted that I cannot believe?" "Do what others in your position have done before. Act as if you believed; take holy water, attend Mass, etc. The natural effect of all that will be to make you believe and to stupify you *(vous abêtira)*." "But that is just what I am afraid of." "Why so, what have you to lose?"

I do not think that such a method would commend itself to the ingenuous mind of Mr. Hardy's rustic. I fear Coggan would "hate a feller" who submitted to such a degradation "for the sake of getting to heaven." Even the Port Royal editors were ashamed to print this precious advice, softening it down into a harmless recommendation to imitate the conduct of believers. Victor Cousin was the first to publish the words as they were originally written. That brilliant rhetorician was neither a deep nor a sincere thinker; but he still retained some respect for truth and reason. He asked, was that then the last word of human wisdom, and can we only approach the supreme Intelligence by the sacrifice of our own? But nowadays among orthodox Frenchmen Victor Cousin would pass for a dangerous

[2] In his article entitled "Le Sens et la Portée du Pari de Pascal," in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of November 15, 1890.

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character, an "intellectual." M. Brunschvicg defends Pascal by putting a sense on his words which they will not bear. "S'abêtir," he tells us, means no more than that we should get rid of the prejudices which stand in the way of faith. Surely if so great a writer wanted to say this he had command enough of the French language to say it for himself. A course of dogmatic theology, however disagreeable, would be more effective against rationalistic prejudices than a course of holy water. Pascal was a shrewd observer and understood the effect of mechanical devotion better perhaps than his apologist. One need only study the faces in a Bavarian *Corpus Domini* procession or at a Breton *Pardon* to see what "abêtissement" means.

Besides a natural if sinful objection to part with his reason, the sceptic has still a difficulty. The hope of salvation is all very well, but against the happiness it gives we have to set the fear of hell. To which Pascal replies, sensibly enough from his point of view: Which has more reason to fear it, he who remains in ignorance if there be a hell, with the certainty of being damned if there is one, or he who is certainly persuaded of its existence, with the hope of being saved if it does exist?

This is a very important passage. Both Ernest Havet in his notes to the "Pensées" and M. Sully Prudhomme in his essay on the wager, have assumed, as not needing discussion, that backing the wrong side involves not only the loss of eternal felicity, but also the positive payment of an infinite penalty under the form of everlasting torment. A more recent critic, however, repudiates their interpretation. The eminent philosopher M. Lachelier, writing in the *Revue Philosophique* (June, 1901, p. 625), declares peremptorily that hell has no place in the wager. As the terms are first stated it certainly is not mentioned; but to insist on the omission seems more like a lawyer than a philosopher. And even from the strictly legal point of view M. Lachelier's contention seems unjustifiable. In drawing out the full significance of the wager we have a right to interpret its conditions in the light of its author's known and unconcealed opinions about the future fate of unbelievers. To say that I am obliged to bet must mean that my refusal would entail the

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same consequences as if I betted against God's existence and lost. And that must be more than the mere privation of eternal felicity, for so much the sceptic is already prepared to face with equanimity. Besides when he asks to see the faces of the cards played Pascal refers him to Scripture for information, and we know that in the eyes of a seventeenth century Catholic, Scripture consigns the infidel to eternal torment.

One is almost ashamed to labor so obvious a point. But it is a question of some interest why the chance of damnation is left to be inferred when it might have been made to figure with such tremendous effect in the wager as originally stated. I apprehend that the reason is one of simple politeness. Pascal, as Walter Pater reminds us,[3] was a gentleman; and the sceptic for whose benefit he started the whole idea of making the supreme verities a subject of betting, was also a gentleman and a dear friend of his, the Chevalier de Méré, a man of the world, and apparently like others of the kind, a gamester. That is why Pascal addresses him in terms borrowed from the favorite amusement of his class, and that is also, I suggest, why he spares him words not suited to polite ears. Both, however, understand perfectly what the truth of the Catholic theory would imply. A losing bettor not only misses infinite happiness, but has to pay the stakes by suffering infinite misery. And with great tact the first reference to this unpleasant aspect of the wager is put into the mouth not of the Christian advocate, but of the hesitating sceptic. Méré, not Pascal, is made responsible for introducing it into the discussion. To convince ourselves that the softening down of the risk incurred by infidelity is a mere concession to the rules of personal politeness, we need only turn to the passages where Pascal has to deal with mankind in general. Here the loss of felicity is not mentioned as a motive for belief. With his usual and incomparable splendor of rhetoric he describes death as infallibly destined to place the impious and indifferent under the horrible necessity of submitting either to eternal annihilation or to eternal misery without knowing which of these eternities has

[3] "Works," Vol. VIII, p. 63.

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been prepared for them forever.[4] And this alternative, such as it is, must not be thought of as existing objectively in the nature of things, or rather in the unknown purposes of Providence, but subjectively in the reasonable apprehensions of the doubter.

Judged by Jesuit or modern Ultramontane standards the author of the "Provinciales" and the "Pensées" may have been a heretic. But he was far too good a Catholic to entertain for a moment the idea that hell could mean annihilation. He speaks *ad hominem*. If you are right in your unbelief you will cease to exist at death; if you are wrong you will certainly be tormented forever.

So much being established let us return to the wager and its implications. It was presented under the form of an even chance, with nothing to lose (except one's reason) on the one event, and everything to gain on the other. One is struck by the suspicious resemblance to a plea sometimes advanced for trying a quack remedy. It may do good and it can't do harm. Now in the case of a drug about which we know nothing—for the modesty of that "may do good" is really a confession of complete ignorance—the possibility of harm is precisely measured by the possibility of benefit. For us the chances are equal, because either event is no more than a chance. And an attentive examination shows that Pascal's reasoning suffers from the same fatal flaw.

From respect for so great a name two enormous assumptions have been let pass. We withdrew our objection to the logical impossibility that a Being out of all relation to man can affect man's future fate. And we accepted as an even chance the infinitesimally small probability that an infinite personality, supposing it to exist, has exactly the character of the God in whom Jansenist Catholics believed. But our concessions do not end here. What security has Méré that in accepting the wager he sacrifices no more than his reason and the healthy enjoyment of life? "You have," says his friend, "the word of God." Is that so certain? or is it a sufficient

[4] II, p. 121.

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guarantee? It will not do to call the question blasphemous, for our moralist has imbued us with the idea that truth is a matter of geography, and we know what the Nicene Creed would be called across the straits of Gibraltar.

Here we have the nemesis of agnosticism as a method of faith. A universal solvent is created and then poured into some consecrated chalice in the ingenuous expectation that the holy vessel will resist its corrosive action. In a series of brilliant aphorisms congealing the loose and lazy scepticisms of Montaigne into a hailstorm of diamond-pointed epigrams, Pascal had denounced the supposed eternal laws of human morality as a set of arbitary expedients, varying from country to country, and merely intended to win respect for the authority of their princes. From such a discordant medley of customs no fixed moral standard or natural system of ethics can be elicited. Still less can our ideas of what is right and good be applied to the criticism of God's ways with man. Anterior to revelation we cannot predicate morality, more than any other attribute, of the infinite Being; nor can a self-revealing Deity be expected to act in conformity with human notions of right and wrong when those notions are not conformable with one another.

Pascal accepts the consequences of his sceptical theology with cynical candor. "What," he exclaims, "can be more opposed to our wretched rules of justice than the eternal damnation of a child without any will of its own for a sin in which it seems to have had so little share that it was committed six thousand years before the said child came into existence?" [5] In fact, moral distinctions are created by God; and "the sole reason why sins are sins is that they are contrary to his will." [6] Were the whole human race to be eternally damned God would stand acquitted of injustice.[7]

Nevertheless with an inconsistency not uncommon among sceptics Pascal recognizes one kind of moral obligation as universally binding, so much so as even to impose itself on

[5] II, p. 348.
[6] III, p. 104.
[7] I, p. 125.

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God in his relations to man. And that is the obligation of keeping a promise. It is mentioned quite naïvely as a self-evident truth, valid apparently on both sides of the Pyrenees. "There is a reciprocal duty between God and man . . . God is bound to fulfil his promises." [7a] If we have backed the winning card the stakes will be honestly paid.

I know not what answer the Chevalier de Méré made to the aleatory apologetics of his illustrious friend; but his conversion was delayed so long as probably to have been effected by considerations of a different order. He might well have required a better security for the divine fidelity than Pascal's guarantee. It seems rather rash to infer that because a gentleman keeps his word and pays his debts of honor, the Jansenist God will. A Being who is wholly unaccountable may mean something different from what he says, or the exact opposite, or nothing at all. An irresponsible despot is generally not less remarkable for perfidy than for cruelty. He who predestines little children to eternal damnation may quite possibly be reserving the Sisters of Port Royal for the same fate. We were told that the whole human race might justly be so treated, and how do we know that the full divine right may not after all be exercised. "We have the word of a King for our Church, and of a King who was never worse than his word." Such was the confident answer of the English bishops to those who suspected the intentions of James II. History tells how their credulity was rewarded.

What is more, Pascal's interpretation of Scripture goes to prove that deceit and treachery are among the revealed attributes of his God. A particularly nauseous quality of that personage is that, not content with exercising his undoubted privilege of damning human beings at sight, he tries to manufacture a colorable pretext for their condemnation by introducing difficulties into the Bible. "There is obscurity enough to blind the reprobate, and clearness enough to make them inexcusable." [8] "Do you suppose that the prophecies quoted in

[7a] III, pp. 277-8.
[8] III, p. 23.

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the New Testament are mentioned to make you believe? No, it is to prevent you from believing." [9] The whole Jewish people were purposely blinded to the real meaning of the Messianic prophesies in order that their rejection of Jesus Christ might render them unsuspected witnesses to the authenticity of the evidentiary documents committed to their charge. Had they accepted the gospel it might have been said that they had forged the predictions by which its supernatural origin is attested and of whose antiquity their word is the sole guarantee.[10]

It would surprise me to learn that there was any greater distortion of truth and justice in the casuistry of Escobar than in the sophistry of his Jansenist satirist. And the Jesuits if they erred had at least the excuse of erring on the side of mercy. They constructed fire-escapes where Pascal opens *oubliettes.*

Our only knowledge of God, our only proof that there is a God comes through the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament and their fulfilment in Jesus Christ. But it is of the very essence of these prophecies to be ambiguous and misleading. We asked to be shown the cards with which that awful game for our soul's salvation is being played "at an infinite distance," and our wish has been gratified: the cards are no other than the pages of Scripture. And now we learn that their color and value depend entirely on the inscrutable will of the dealer. He can call black red and a king a knave. He can change trumps at pleasure and count an ace as eleven points or as one. That is how his antitype Napoleon played chess, moving the pieces just as he liked, regardless of rules. Our Ariel-souled thinker constructs a God meaner if not more malignant than the Setebos of Caliban, in that wonderful study of Robert Browning's which is also such a scathing satire on the creed of his youth. Granting that such a person exists our conduct cannot be affected one way or the other by the fact. As we cannot take his word for anything we are exactly in the same position as if he had never spoken. Perhaps after all he

[9] III, p. 15.
[10] III, p. 16 ff.

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is less amenable to the charms of adulation and submission than his more abject adorers would have us believe. Our moral superiority over him may at last make its ascendancy felt. Possibly in that case his first impulse would be to wreak vengeance on the reptile souls who sought to stupefy their reason by the copious use of masses and holy water. Then we who never stooped to that degradation will intercede with the converted Moloch for the shivering wretches, who may escape with no worse penalty than transmigration into the bodies of apes.

Briefly, then, the existence of an infinite Being out of relation to ourselves cannot possibly influence our future fate. In the absence of positive evidence it remains infinitely improbable that an infinite Being, actively related to us should have a character identical with that of the Jansenist deity. Assuming such a deity to exist, the chances are precisely equal that he will or that he will not behave towards us in any particular manner. Therefore, so far as theology goes, Méré is rationally justified in adopting the line of conduct that seems most agreeable to his own desires. When the door of death opens it is even betting whether the lady or the tiger will receive him.

Metaphor apart, no revelation can be of any practical value unless it is assumed to come from a person whose word we can trust. But the veracity of God is only guaranteed by his general moral perfection, and such perfection can only be conceived as the consummation of human goodness. But goodness includes justice as known to us by earthly examples, and these, according to Pascal himself, forbid us to believe that innocent little children can merit eternal torments—or, we may add, that Méré could merit them for honestly using his reason to find out the truth, or even the judges of Galileo for suppressing it. In theology the method of Descartes is a surer guide than the method of Montaigne.

The idea of accepting Christianity (understood in an orthodox sense) as a probability which seems safer to believe than to disbelieve has been traced back to Arnobius, from whom Pascal is supposed to have derived it through Raymond Sebon, whose "Natural Theology" he had certainly read. But the

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after fortunes of the argument are more interesting than its origin. It had the singular good fortune to be taken up by Butler and made the very keynote of his "Analogy," whence it passed to the leaders of the Tractarian Movement, betraying its inherent weakness by the conflicting interpretations respectively put on it by Newman and Keble.

I do not know whether Butler had or had not read Pascal; but his theory of probability as applied to the evidences of Christianity is a distinct improvement on the wager, in so far as it encourages instead of abolishing the use of reason. On the other hand, his appeal to the most degrading of all "pragmatic" motives is considerably more explicit, and will hardly be denied even by the most unscrupulous of apologists. After detailing the arguments for revealed religion based on the performance of miracles and the fulfilment of prophecy, he shows an uneasy consciousness of their insufficiency, but urges as a make-weight that "a mistake on the one side may be, in its consequences, much more dangerous than a mistake on the other.[11] Butler alleges, it is true, that he gives this ominous warning not to influence the judgment but the practice of his readers. The distinction, however, is not easy to grasp, nor is any attempt made to illustrate it. If his sole object was to strengthen the motives for virtuous action irrespective of creed he ought to have made his meaning plainer. Many of the Deists would have agreed with him in recommending a high and pure standard of morality, while they deprecated the attempt to compromise it by a reference to selfish hopes or fears. In any case judgment and practice cannot be isolated from one another nor made amenable to different orders of motives, least of all when we are discussing a creed most of whose advocates consider that a man is morally responsible for his belief. It is difficult not to think that Butler knew this, although he avoids committing himself to an open use of the argument *ad terrorem*. Nor will any reservation make his theoretical assumption anything but a gross fallacy. There is no safe side in religion for there is no experience to show where

[11] "Analogy," Part II, chap. vii, sub fin.

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safety lies. To seek safety may, for aught we know, be the most dangerous, as it is certainly the most pusillanimous of choices.

In the controversy between theology and rationalism it requires a greater effort of abstraction than most minds are capable of to grasp this possibility and to appreciate its bearing on the aleatory method of belief. And as between Roman Catholicism and the various Protestant sects all doubt would vanish. The superior safety of belonging to the Church which alone claimed to monopolize the means of salvation was constantly urged as a motive for submitting to its pretensions, and proved in fact a most efficacious method of proselytism. Henry of Navarre is said to have put the argument in a particularly pointed form. The Protestant divines whom he consulted on the subject reluctantly admitted that he might be saved if he became a Catholic. The Catholic divine told him without hesitation that he would certainly be damned if he remained a Protestant. He therefore chose that side which by universal agreement offered the best prospect of escaping from perdition. What the great King had offered more than half in irony as an excuse for his politic apostasy was accepted in deadly earnest by many persons of quality in England under Charles I as a reason for deserting the cause of the Reformation. Charles II's deathbed conversion was probably dictated by the same motive, and if so would be a crowning example of the adroit opportunism by which his whole life was distinguished. In this as in other respects the ablest of all the Stuarts bore a close resemblance to his grandfather, the ablest of the Bourbons. When Butler wrote the danger from Rome had greatly diminished, but had not wholly disappeared, as we learn from Neal's "History of the Puritans" (1732) and Middleton's "Free Enquiry" (1747).[12] It is therefore rather surprising that he did not observe what consequences might be drawn from an argument, perhaps derived from Pascal, in favor of Pascal's creed.

If English churchmen did not draw the logical consequences

[12] The date of the "Analogy" is 1736.

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of their greatest champion's apologetic method, their escape is due not only to the happy inconsistency of the theological intellect but also to the pervasive influence of eighteenth century rationalism, extending as it did far beyond the small circle of avowed free-thinkers. Whatever else Englishmen might believe, their own Deists and the Voltairean movement abroad gradually convinced them that Popery was a superstition too absurd for even a Frenchman to accept—destined to speedy extinction, Horace Walpole thought, if the ill-advised abrogation of our penal laws had not given it a new lease of life. It would have surprised the dilettante of Strawberry Hill to hear that his own experiments in Gothic architecture had rather more to do with the dreaded revival of mediæval faith than the repeal of some obsolete statutes. Anyhow, by accident or otherwise, he proved a true prophet. Whether as grim wolf or good shepherd, two centuries after "Lycidas" Rome once more put in play the arts against which Milton had raised his warning voice. Or rather the natural magnetism exercised by the larger on the smaller body acted without the help of any direct proselytism on the part of Jesuits or others to disintegrate the Church of England and to draw its detached fragments into the central orb of Christendom.

Now it is interesting to note that in this process the method of Pascal and Butler played an important part, and was appealed to with confidence by both parties, by those who clung to the Via Media of Anglicanism and by those who scorned it as an illogical compromise between the right way and the wrong.

Cardinal Newman briefly refers to Butler's doctrine of probability as the guide of life as that whence his own theory of faith took its rise. Keble treats it at much greater length, and in particular connection with the issue on which he and his greater friend parted company in a very interesting but little read document, the preface to his "Sermons, Academical and Occasional," published in 1847, soon after Newman's secession.

The principle in question is stated as follows: "In practical matters of eternal import, the safer way is always to be preferred, even though the excess of seeming evidence may tell in

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any degree on the opposite side. Thus if one mode of acting imply that there is an eternity and another contradict it . . . the tremendous, overwhelming interest at stake ought to determine a man's conduct to the affirmative side. He should act, in spite of seeming evidence, as if eternity were true." [13]

Keble had not the same lingering regard for truth as such that still distinguishes Butler, and the context clearly shows that "acting" meant not merely conformity to Christian ethics but also adhesion to the Catholic creed, which, in the supposed circumstances, some, among whom the present writer is one, would call in plain language, cowardly and deceitful.

Fortunately, or rather inevitably, systematized immorality is suicidal; and a recent incident has reminded us that when sailors fall into a panic they are apt to fire into their own ships. Keble very frankly admits that "the principles of Butler and Pascal" cannot be limited to "the controversy with unbelievers." [14] And if personally he had been disposed so to limit them Newman would not have allowed him to stop short. So he proceeds to state the argument for going over to Rome in terms which I shall not transcribe as they are substantially identical with the Bourbon argument (white plume argument, let us call it) already quoted.

Keble's way of getting out of it is amazing, and practically amounts to an abandonment of the whole principle. It is that "the argument put in this form proves too much, for it would equally show that Puritanism or Mahometanism, or the ancient Donatism, or any other exclusive system, is the safer way." [15] And he also goes on to remark, rather late in the day, that there seems to be something "cold and ungenerous" about the method —in short what we call mean. Accordingly it is to be reserved for the exclusive benefit of unbelievers, and not mentioned in controversies among Christians. Kicking down the ladder by which we have risen is a policy with which persons of this class have made us familiar; but the ladder has been known successfully to resist such treatment. Or, to employ a perhaps more

[13] Op. cit., p. 6.
[14] Op. cit., pp. 7, 8.
[15] Op. cit., p. 14.

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relevant illustration, when a familiar spirit is sent for water to wash out the house, he has a trick of bringing bucket after bucket until the whole town is flooded and its inhabitants drowned. There is an Orthodox Church, not less positive in its anathemas than Rome, and growing at a far more rapid rate; while the immemorial Asiatic religions bide their time, "in patient deep disdain" for the pretensions of parvenu European establishments.

Pascal's method was destined to one more singular development before it silently took its place among the obsolete weapons of religious controversy. With the collapse of the Tractarian Movement the rationalistic movement which it had temporarily arrested returned in a flood, and before many years had passed became predominant at Oxford, at least among her more serious and intellectual residents. To meet this new danger Mansel delivered his famous Bampton Lectures in 1858. He does not, I think, ever mention the argument *ad terrorem,* but he follows Pascal in denying that our moral distinctions are applicable to the proceedings of an infinite Being about whose real nature we are totally ignorant; and he follows Butler in contending that every other system is open to as many objections as Christianity, or rather as his own particular version of Christianity.

Mansel was hailed by his admirers as a second Butler; but the reception of his work by the intellectual public generally showed that such methods had passed out of date. I question whether in the controversy that it provoked a single name of distinction is to be found on his side. Against him were such writers as F. D. Maurice, James Martineau, R. H. Hutton, and Professor Goldwin Smith. Herbert Spencer, accepting his premises, pushed them to the length of an Agnosticism which absolutely excluded belief in revealed religion, and reduced natural religion to the most attenuated of abstractions. But the most resounding stroke of all came from John Stuart Mill. In the course of his destructive attack on the philosophy of Mansel's teacher, Sir William Hamilton, the great thinker and moralist, then at the very height of his fame and power, turns aside to tear up the flimsy pretences under which the Bampton

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Lecturer on the "Limits of Religious Thoughts" had attempted to eliminate morality from religion. Pascal is not named; but here at last Pascal's method receives its final quietus. Convince me, says Mill, that the world is ruled by an infinite Being of whom I know nothing except that his proceedings are incompatible with the highest human morality, "and I will bear my fate as I may. But there is one thing he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go." [16]

Mansel sneeringly forbore "to comment on the temper and taste of this declamation." [17] But what he said or did not say mattered equally little. The ghastly idol had fallen and fallen forever.

It has been said by some who are in full sympathy with Mill's contention that the sentiment here expressed, however admirable, is irreconcilable with his utilitarian ethics. I am not so sure of that. The moral degradation of worshiping an omnipotent demon through eternity might conceivably be more painful than any punishment in his power to inflict. Or on finding himself defied he might "tak' a thought and men' "—to the great increase of the general felicity. But there seems a sort of pedantry about such considerations. The supreme ironies are partly serious; supreme seriousness is a little ironical. There is such a phrase as "I bet you all to nothing," and as the language of the gaming-table has once been introduced it may here be appropriately used as best describing Mill's position. There is no more than an infinitesimally small chance that Mansel's non-moral theology may be true; but neither on that chance nor on any other will a high-principled human soul forfeit its self-respect.

My object has been to show that to incur either intellectual or moral degradation on a calculation of selfish interest would be not only mean but unavailing. For with the limitation of

[16] "Examinations of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy," (3d ed.) p. 124.
[17] "Philosophy of the Conditioned," p. 168.

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our knowledge assumed by the theologians who appeal to such motives there is no safe side, the chances either way being precisely equal whatever attitude towards the hidden arbiter of our destiny we assume. It remains that our conduct should be determined by considerations equally applicable whether the supernatural does or does not exist.

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THE ARGUMENT FOR IMMORTALITY.

There is without doubt at the present day a strong inclination in many quarters to dispute the importance of a belief in immortality, both for the practical conduct of life and for our intellectual constructions about the nature of the world. It is because I think that the religious feeling of mankind is truer here than the current tendencies, and that, instead of standing on the outskirts of the philosopher's task, as at best a work of supererogation, the question has a distinct importance for general philosophical results, that I wish in the following pages to inquire just what the significant point in the argument for immortality really is.

And as a means of approaching the question, it will be useful first to review briefly the general character of the historical proofs for the belief. It lies outside my purpose to dwell here upon the specifically Christian proof from revelation, except indeed as this is capable of a philosophical statement. When Paul speaks of life and immortality as brought to light through the Gospel, in part, I suppose, he means that the Christian revelation has been a revelation of the divineness of human life. No one, therefore, to whom this has once come home in its full power, can doubt that life is a permanent fact in God's universe, not to be broken off arbitrarily; that each man, as a recipient of God's love, and a co-worker with him, has a value which is eternal. In so far, this will enter into what I have to say later on. But certainly Paul also has in mind the historical fact of Christ's resurrection, as the basis of the Christian's hope. Of course, in so far as the historical evidence seems

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to warrant the acceptance of the fact, it cannot fail to be highly important in influencing belief. It must, however, always labor under a certain disadvantage which attaches to any particular fact of history as such. For there always remains the question whether, after all, our evidence is really conclusive; and from the nature of the case, since our supposed fact is now in the past, and out from under our control, there is no possibility of bringing it to the test of fresh and personal experience.

I shall exclude also another argument which is receiving a large amount of attention at the present day. This is the argument from spiritualistic phenomena. Until comparatively a short time ago, one might safely neglect this without apology; but now the tide, it would appear, has turned. The Society for Psychical Research has undoubtedly called attention to a group of experiences which can hardly be dismissed offhand any longer; and when we find men of high intellectual rank accepting the authenticity of facts that cannot be brought under a—in the traditional sense—natural explanation, it ought perhaps to give us pause. Nevertheless I can hardly think it likely we are destined to get any very solid footing here, at any rate for a long time to come. Perhaps we may secure evidence that will help give added probability to a belief already entertained. But that we should be able to found a proof of immortality on such grounds, is very seriously to be doubted. Two features of the situation, in particular, interfere to prevent this. One of these is, that the facts, if facts there be, have to be sifted out from the midst of an altogether stupefying and heart-rending mass of detected blunders and impositions of the grossest sort. No one pretends that any save the merest fraction of these phenomena are both genuine and significant; and unluckily the cases which have been exposed stand to outward appearance quite on a level with the supposedly genuine remnant. The same features for the most part accompany both. How, then, in any particular instance, are we to avoid the lingering doubt whether after all, in spite of all our tests, this may not be just another of the cases of which we have met so many,—cases which offered at first view unimpeachable evidence, and which yet at some unfore-

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seen point have broken down under examination. I do not mean to imply that in my opinion a continued investigation will result in negativing the probability that there is a saving remnant of spiritualistic phenomena that is genuine. It is conceivable that a certain number of cases will succeed in meeting the most rigid tests. But I do not think that the circumstances under which this is brought about, if it is brought about, will effectually prevent its ever serving as a satisfactory basis for a great religious and practical article of faith. It is psychologically impossible that the mind should feel the certitude it demands under these conditions. When I know that so many similar facts have turned out to be the result of mistake or of fraud, and when I come more and more to find out how inconceivably honeycombed with illusion and self-contradiction human testimony is, how subtly and unavoidably error creeps into the apparently plainest matters of fact, it is inevitable that after the most searching scrutiny has failed to discredit the few cases which are left, there should still for most of us remain a lurking doubt which renders impossible any whole-hearted credence. The bad company which they keep must necessarily affect the reputation of such facts if not their character.

And the further point is this, that even if the facts are granted, there still is a choice of explanations. The only admissible evidence in such cases must rest upon the communication of objective information which it would have been impossible to obtain through natural channels. The mere seeing of visions is of course valueless as evidence, since they are so readily to be explained as hallucinations. But in the case of apparently supernatural knowledge there is still an hypothesis which is available, and which many prefer to accept, viz., telepathy. It is true that if all the supposed facts are admitted, the hypothesis has to be strained somewhat to fit them. But after all, in a realm in which everything is surprising, and goes beyond what sober people are accustomed to consider probable, a little added improbability is not perhaps fatal. And until the alternative explanation is logically excluded—and it is difficult to see how this ever could be done—immortality has no secure ground.

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Leaving this class of considerations, therefore, I shall come to the more general philosophical arguments. And without pretending to go into any exact historical analysis, there are three aspects of the proof for immortality which have in a way a historical basis. The first is the purely metaphysical treatment which belongs especially to the Middle Ages, and to certain forms of rationalism which inherited some of the features of the Scholastic philosophy. Here the stress is upon the nature of the soul as an ontological fact or entity. The type of thought which this represents was broken down largely by the growth of science and scientific methods, and it does not at present play any large part in discussions of the subject. In addition to this indirect influence on the problem, however, science has also been the means of emphasizing one aspect of it in particular. This came about through the increased attention which it directed toward the physical side of life. By pointing out in detail the way in which every phase of the conscious or soul life depends upon, or at least is intimately connected with bodily processes of some sort, it naturally seemed to strengthen the presumption that consciousness cannot exist at all without its bodily accompaniment. This, in turn, has called forth a special emphasis upon another set of considerations, which in a general way may be called the moral argument. And this argument, though with many variations, may be regarded as the central one at the present time. I wish to take up these aspects of the question separately, passing over the first two somewhat lightly and dogmatically.

THE METAPHYSICAL ARGUMENT.

What has been called the metaphysical argument goes back to the nature of the soul as a thing in itself. From the properties which belong to this soul substance, it is supposed we can deduce something of its destiny. In particular, its indivisibility is thought to guarantee its integrity, since only that which has parts can be decomposed and destroyed. Perhaps it is enough to say that this conception of the soul as a substantial entity, indivisible and eternal, lying behind and separate from the phenomena of consciousness, and persisting

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changeless through their eternal change, is a conception which modern philosophy has not so much disproved as discarded, because it is meaningless and useless. We need, it is true, to find a unity to the life of the self. But such a separable entity unites nothing and explains nothing. It is a mere abstraction, which has no content when we try to grasp it.

Has then the metaphysical argument no validity? From one point of view I should say, absolutely none at all. In so far as it embodies the attractive, but essentially delusive ideal of attaining a demonstrative certainty, by means of a process of abstract logical reasoning, it is, and always is bound to be, entirely futile. Nevertheless it has a motive back of it which is quite legitimate. Obviously it tries to fill the need of finding some permanent fact to which to attach the conscious life, which shall not share the instability and ephemeralness of this life, or of the bodily structure which is its apparent foundation. Such a demand has necessarily to be met if immortality is to be established; is there not, however, some less debatable way of doing this?

THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY FROM THE SIDE OF SCIENCE.

And this leads to the materialistic argument, whose refutation has always occupied a considerable share of the energies of the defender of immortality. It must be premised that any advantage which is gained here by the upholder of the doctrine is purely negative. At best it only shows that the continuance of the soul life after the death of the body involves no contradiction or impossibility; and this by itself furnishes, of course, no evidence whatever for the fact of continuance. But with this limitation the answer to the materialistic assumption is perfectly plain. Indeed, when the question is made clearly one of *possibility,* a sober science can hardly hesitate to admit its lack of any right to speak with authority. Science may say, and perhaps be perfectly right in saying, that from the standpoint of scientific experience she knows nothing of consciousness except as it appears in connection with certain organic structures. It is, indeed, an obvious fact that there is a break in our lives which our direct knowledge does not

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serve to bridge. But what reason can be given in the nature of things why life might not be continued under different, though at present unknown, conditions? There is no greater likelihood *a priori* that a unitary stream of consciousness should be confined to one particular body, than for the opposite hypothesis. The mere fact that conditions which attend life as we know it do not persevere beyond a certain point, is, therefore, by no means decisive. There is no meaning to a merely general improbability in such a case, except on the not very likely assumption that our present knowledge is fairly exhaustive of the universe. The argument is, therefore, an argument from ignorance. Of course, once again, it is not shown that there *is* such a continuance of life. But if we should have any evidence at all for believing that there is, the fact of our ignorance of its conditions furnishes no positive ground for refusing to give ear to this evidence. We should be constrained to this *only* in case we were to accept a certain crude and altogether indefensible form of materialistic theory—the assumption that matter, as we know it, is the ultimate reality, and that consciousness has its wholly sufficient cause and explanation in the particular group of atoms whose combination forms our body. Such a materialism is at present entirely discredited. As opposed, on the one hand, to its carrying back reality to independent material particles, the unessential product of whose arbitrary combination all higher facts of the conscious life are, philosophy lays stress on the reality of the whole as the supreme fact, by reference to which each minor fact has to be explained, and with which it stands inherently and vitally connected. As opposed, again, to the assignment of the phenomenal qualities of matter to this reality as its innermost structure, most modern thought is agreed, either to find this nature in that which is spiritual and akin to man, or else to hold that it is unknowable, and that what we call mind and matter are both illusory aspects.

Now in either case the *possibility* of immortality is secured. It lies, not in an individual soul substance, but in the unitary world ground on which all things alike, material processes as well as conscious, depend. That consciousness exists at all is

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enough to show that it is not an arbitrary product, but is somehow essentially related to reality. The only question is, whether the nature of reality really calls for its continued existence; if so, it is wholly gratuitous for us to find difficulty about the possibility. At present consciousness exists in connection with one particular expression of reality which we call a body. But if the body is not an independent whole, and so is not the sole efficient agent in the production of consciousness; if the source of this is rather reality at large; what is to hinder the relationship of my consciousness to reality from being such that it should still go on, with only its point of connection shifted? There is the whole wide universe to furnish such a point of connection. Why should this particular relationship which now holds, necessarily be the only possible one, so that its severance will annihilate one of the related terms? Certainly if we are agnostics, and hold to an ultimate ignorance about things, our ignorance will prevent our pronouncing dogmatically against such a possibility. And if we accept a conscious world ground—God—there will be still less reason to deny it. To the nature, then, of God, or of the world whole, on whom our lives in some sense depend, we are to look, I think, for the possibility of permanence which immortality requires, instead of to a hypothetical soul, conceived as a separate and independent substance. For since God is still necessary to uphold the soul, we lose nothing by going back to him directly; and we avoid the difficulty that comes from interpolating a fact that is unthinkable.

But this, once more, is a purely negative result. Suppose that the bare possibility has been found; are there any positive grounds for believing that it is more than a possibility? Now such evidence, if it is forthcoming, will have to be looked for, I think, in what, in one form or another, we are familiar with as the moral argument; and we need, accordingly, to ask in what the essential character of this consists.

THE MORAL ARGUMENT.

In the earlier discussions about immortality, there was a disposition to make the question center about the matter of

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rewards and punishments. Since men do not get their deserts in this world, it is found necessary to postulate another in which to even matters up. This undoubtedly falls in with, and appeals to a certain natural instinct in us. The plain man is apt to find a real force to the argument. But, also, there is no doubt that we are disposed to insist less upon this statement of it than we once were. It has the disadvantage that whereas it is intended to be the expression of an ethical need, it can too readily be turned in a way which leaves the appearance of superior ethical disinterestedness on the other side. Is it necessary, we are asked, that men should require a bribe to do well? Is not that a higher attitude which says: I will do right because it is right, and I will get a satisfaction from the doing which is higher than any extraneous reward could give? Is our love for goodness so flimsy that we should throw it all aside if we were convinced that certain future consequences were not to flow from it? Is not that a doing of good just for the sake of the reward? And if the good act is here and now the worthier and more soul-satisfying act, why insist upon what would weaken, if not destroy, its moral character, and make it simply a matter of expediency? So of evil. Evil loses here and inevitably the true satisfaction of life, just because it is evil. To insist that it should meet also with certain external consequences, which sometimes fail in this world—may not this be simply the spirit of personal vindictiveness and revenge?

Undoubtedly there is an undersanding of the argument to which this is a real answer. But its upholder will be apt to go further, and make some such reply as this in turn: When I maintain the necessity of a future evening-up process, I do not mean that there is no value to goodness if it does not bring with it material rewards of happiness. And yet for all that, to constitute the perfect bloom of virtue, there is need of a triumphant belief in its correspondence with the heart of things, a conviction that righteousness rules the world, and that in following it I am putting myself in line with the deepest forces in the universe. Surely it is a short-sighted tendency which can suppose, for example with Maeterlinck, that human morality can dissever itself permanently from the background of

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reality, and still maintain its power in a universe which we are convinced is fundamentally unmoral. But how can this belief in the ultimateness of morality be maintained, unless I can convince myself that the world is such a world that in it righteousness, and well being in the widest sense, are ultimately identical? The inner testimony of my consciousness to the worth of virtue is of value, when confirmed by an outer harmony in the world at large. But can this inner testimony prevail if it comes in conflict with the outer course of events? Will not the contradiction inevitably affect our belief in virtue, or at any rate our joy in it? For can virtue stand justified to our minds, except as it does find that external confirmation which immortality tries to postulate, and which will enable us to think of it as bound up in the innermost constitution of the world?

But now again the query may be raised: Granted that the ethical life must be objectively vindicated, just what is it that the ethical postulate demands? Does, in other words, the validity of righteousness really stand or fall with the stability of the individual life; or may not that be irrelevant to the existence of a thoroughly ethical world? Is there not another alternative? Righteousness must conquer objectively if it is to be justified. But is it not enough that my act should help on the final victory, even if I do not live to see it and participate in its rewards? That good does not triumph with any particular man, that I do not reap the fruits of my virtue or my unjust deeds, does not, it is said, mean that virtue is not a reality, *provided* there is a gradual achievement of the right in the larger course of the world. Is not this where we should look for our proof? The world is a good world, not because any individual's rewards are exactly proportioned to his merits, but because in the world at large truth and righteousness are progressively realized, iniquity is irrevocably doomed. To this higher ideal the demand for a personal immortality seems low and selfish. Such immortality is a matter of complete indifference. Let us put ourselves at the standpoint of the whole, and see it as a grand process through which righteousness works itself out to a glorious consummation. What matters it from

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the height of this vantage ground whether I live to see the triumph of the cause for which I have toiled, *if* I am persuaded that the forces of the universe are on my side, and that my act is destined to have its place in the final victory of right? Is not this the only immortality that is worthy the name—an immortality of influence, purged of the grossness of individual longings and selfish desires? And so, too, of the evil deed. What greater punishment can it have than that it should stand eternally annulled and condemned; that it should be futile, worthless, impotent, and forever discredited in the economy of the universe?

It is here, I think, that the critical point of the question lies. In order to state it more clearly, let me distinguish two separate aspects or steps of the ethical argument. In the first place, the argument implies that there is something in life which makes it worth while, which gives it a value that is more than ephemeral, and compels us to seek a justification for this value by assigning it a permanent and enduring reality. This is not to any great degree a thing that can be proved by argument. It comes from life, not from logic; and unless to any particular man life has brought a sense of its own possible divineness, there is no basis for an argument that shall convince him. It is the vital contribution of Christianity to the problem, that it has been the great instrument for bringing home to men this feeling of the divineness of life. But now it is not the denial of this which is characteristic of recent discussions. On the contrary, there is a general disposition to admit, and even to emphasize the ethical ideal, and the attributes of worth which it involves. The main point at issue is the further question: Does the justification of this ethical worth require the permanence of the individual life, or is it satisfied with a preservation and triumph of ethical values in the large—in the race or in the universe?

I think it is unfortunate that, in the somewhat prevalent tendency to take the last of these alternatives, the real nature of the issue has been so often obscured. In fact, the word immortality has sometimes been taken as applying indifferently to both alternatives; and certain of the recent arguments

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are hardly more than arguments for the eternal significance of each act for the world whole, or God. In the interests of clear thinking, if for no other reason, such an indefinite use of the word is to be deprecated. The continuance of personal consciousness has always been the fundamental thing that immortality has meant, and there is at least a sufficient presumption of its being a problem of interest, not to give us the right to slur it over in this manner by a mere verbal identification with something quite different. Again we have to ask these modern exponents of the ethical constitution of the world: Is your ethical world a real possibility apart from just that continued participation in it of the connected individual life, which you set aside as an unessential detail?

And, first, there is a preliminary misunderstanding to be removed. The injunction to turn away from the question of a future life as possessing no real interest, often gets a force which does not rightly belong to it on its merits, as a reaction against an exaggerated and indefensible other-worldliness. It may be said, and it is said very commonly at the present day, that immortality has ceased to be a matter of real concern to men. What should occupy us is not the future life, but the present. Nothing will ever be any more real than the present now is. To empty the present of value except as a preparation for the future, is to place the end of living in something which never arrives. Now I have entire sympathy with this, in so far as it is merely a protest against that religious attitude which makes the future life somehow more real than the present, and which turns the interest away from the present world and the present moment, to center it upon a heavenly existence. By all means let us live in the present, and recognize that eternity lies round about us. Nevertheless, we should not make the obvious mistake of confounding such an admission with the implication that on this very present interest the future has no bearing. When in our educational ideals, for example, we sacrifice the child's enjoyment of his immediate activity in favor of a preparation for duties that are not yet arisen, we are making a very serious blunder. But it does not follow therefore that the child should live simply from moment to moment.

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In order to give consistency and weight to present life it is necessary that more far-reaching interests should center in it, and be served by it. Ideally it is quite possible so to relate the future to the present as not to displace it, but rather to enhance its value. And just as the future, represented by our larger and more permanent ends in this life, may be made to deepen the meaning of the present, not destroy it, so it is conceivable that the belief in a life to come should be brought to bear upon our activities in this world, and be necessary to the full realization of their present possibilities.

Allowing, then, for this relative truth, we come back again to the main question. Is a human life of value simply as it enters into and helps work out a process, or law, or scheme of development which is impersonal, or at least unipersonal? Or, on the contrary does the essence of the ethical world, and so of reality, lie in the relationship of persons, distinct individuals, who can find no meaning in terms of worth and value, except as the personal element is maintained. Let me give a suggestion of the answer which a defender of immortality might make to this question.

We talk a great deal about progress and development, such a one might say; but do we ever try to realize what such a concept means, and what content it could have, apart from personal relationships to individuals, and the personal feelings which these call forth? Are we not in danger of making a fetich of progress in a way that shall empty it of significance? In the philosopher whose gaze is so fixed upon the eternal Spirit realizing itself in the world that this realization of the whole seems the only important thing; in the evolutionist for whom the individual is a mere incident in the life of the race; in the literary æstheticism which glorifies the Idea while regardless of its personal setting; in the imperialism which in its zeal for civilization can without compunction trample under foot individuals and nations; in the deification of the strong man, the *Uebermensch*,—we have tendencies of which we may fairly ask whether they are not in danger of losing the very essence of the divine life. We may grant that they emphasize certain very real sides of experience, and that there is a senti-

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mentalism against which they represent a healthy reaction. But is not their emphasis dangerously misplaced? Is not our modern doctrine that God is progress likely to obscure the truth, perhaps a more inclusive truth, that God is love? For in its inmost heart love is a relationship which does not stop with those universal qualities of a man which make him simply an actor in the world history. It clings to the very core of individuality itself, and will be satisfied with just this as a living and continuous person, whose place no one else can wholly take. It is this human feeling, not the humanitarian, which gives value and validity to conduct and life. It is the spirit which does not make of men and women tools for working out a principle, or law, or impersonal right; it loves man because it loves men, and can never make this personal relationship, the relationship to particular persons, a secondary and non-essential thing. We all have practical acquaintance with the other type, the type, say, of the reformer or the religionist, who in their zeal for principles and movements lack the saving element of love for men, and who are constantly irritating us in consequence and defeating their own ends. This then, briefly, is the query on which an argument may be based: First, can righteousness, or progress, or whatever it may be termed, have any real content save as it is grounded in the personal relationship which on the side of feeling is love? Apart from this, are we not resting on a survival of the old deification of abstractions? Activity, strenuousness, combat—these are good; but will they not fail us in the end if divorced from fellowship? And, second, if this is so, can we accept the severance of the personal relationship, in which the whole gist of the matter lies, and still be able to justify the worth of life to ourselves in feeling or in calm reflection? The charge is made that the demand for immortality is a selfish demand, and that a true devotion would make us content to lose ourselves in the good of the whole, or of the race. But this is not the deepest source of our demand, and it does not truly represent the force of the argument, unless love can be reduced to selfishness. That which raises the most passionate protest against the extinction of personality is not the wish that I may continue.

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It is the thought that he my friend, with all his powers of mind and heart, the lover and benefactor of his fellow-men, should have come to be only to cease again to be; that he should have passed forever beyond the possibility of that personal contact and union which is the core of life.

Doubtless the question will come up once more: Does not humanity, the race, the universe, still afford a worthy field of endeavor, even though the individual man disappear? I am not unaware of the danger of meeting life too timidly, and of being too ready to throw away what is still a substantial good, because we cannot get all that we should like. It is well to be brave in the face of whatever life may bring. But there is some risk, too, that courage may pass into hardness and callousness, and that is not so well. Are we sure that resignation here does not mean a loss too serious to accept?

I have done all I can hope, if I have pointed out the issue involved; can the terms which stand for value to us avoid becoming an abstraction, except as they go back to the fact of personality; and can personality bear the weight of this responsibility without permanence? Do we try to find that permanence in humanity? But the race itself is mortal. The day will come when the world and all that it contains will pass away. And how can that which comes to an end be an eternal principle of justification? But even if the race were immortal, that would not meet the demands of love. It is not enough that an impersonal influence should continue, or that other friends should take the place of the one who is lost. It is here, if anywhere, that we shall find a value that will appeal to us as ultimate, and if we get no solid footing here, how can we hope to in those larger and abstracter terms—humanity, and the progress of the whole? And how can that be ultimate which is ever being passed over from one embodiment to another? Can love thus be cut loose from its object? The recognition of relativity and finiteness in love, as inherent in and necessary to it, is bound to destroy its divineness. To put our human relationships of the plane of the Epicurean friendship—something we are to utilize as a pleasant and important episode of life, but be ready to put aside with quiet acquiescence

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when it has served its turn—are we not right in feeling this to be less than the final meaning? Is the great love, the love which goes beyond the prudent needs of effective workmanship, really a mistake? and should we be wiser if we were to sink ourselves in our work, in an impersonal activity or process of life, and look upon men and women as just the temporary phases which this world activity assumes? We are not always true to such an insight, no doubt. We allow selfishness to break the ties that have been closest, and time to obliterate the strongest feelings. But in a question like this, it should be, not our ordinary self, but our best self, that forms the basis of our judgment; not what the average man practices, but what seems to be the goal of the highest and most truly human attainment. And do we not feel that this charge of inconstancy and forgetfulness in our human fellowships is a cause for shame; that it marks a failure to be what at our best we ought to be? And if this is true from the human side, it has an equal force from the divine. It is true that in God we should have what is eternal in existence, as opposed to the ephemeral existence which belongs to the human race. And the need we have of falling back on God, shows how necessary to the justification of value permanence is. Do away wholly with any such eternal conservator of values, and how long could they retain any touch or quality of the divine, and keep from sinking to the ranks of mere fleeting pleasures, to be snatched from the passing moments? But because God is eternal in existence, he need not for all that have a *value* that we should recognize as eternal. If values do have their root in the relationships of persons, there is the difficulty of imagining how they could persist and be transferred when their very source is gone. In relation to God, the same thing has another and more positive side. Could we really respect a God who found his felicity in an end which got its realization ultimately only in his own self-centered consciousness; for whom love, or fellowship, meant merely a temporary or passing phase of his experience, whose object was called into existence only to be dismissed again from the scene? We may be willing to give up our private claims in the permanent good of exist-

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ence, to be damned for the glory of God; but would a God who claimed the sacrifice be worthy of it? Does not love in God imply a personal relationship which, in its particularity, is not an incident of his purposes but fundamental in them?

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THE ETHICAL EDUCATION OF THE MERCHANT.

The mercantile profession is regarded with disfavor by a considerable portion of the public, and extreme and contradictory accusations are often brought against it. In order to stop the adverse criticism of this occupation it is essential that the rising generation of merchants receive such an education as will fit them to perform their mercantile duties in the most correct and scrupulous manner.

The problem is not a purely theoretical one but involves the application of ethics to practical affairs. Professor Friedrich Jodl has laid down the following principles to guide us in the solution of questions of this kind: "The science of ethics examines the premises and essence of the critical judgments which are constantly being passed in regard to character and action. It desires, not only to enlighten us as to the origin of the moral conceptions which we form of human conduct and character, but to examine whether the current ideas concerning good and evil are correct, and whether they tend to further human progress and the elevation of human motives. Whenever it discovers standards that are out of date, laws that are based on insufficient observation or which are no longer applicable to present conditions, and judgments which are in reality prejudices; whenever it finds one of the numerous half-truths which self-interest or passion tries to pass off as an absolute principle—then it is the duty of ethics to throw light on this confusion, to destroy such appearances and false conceptions, and set up the true, the ideal, as a standard of conduct."[1] Professor Harold Höffding, in his "Ethik," says:

[1] Fr. Jodl. "What is Ethical Culture?" Prague, 1894, p. 2.

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"Human action is derived from the inner life of the individual, his instincts, his desires, his thoughts and feelings. As soon as it is developed, it energizes into the external world as activity. What thoughts and what feelings then are those which give the impulse to moral action? What purpose must be kept constantly in mind in order that our actions may be favorably judged from the ethical point of view?" Rudolph von Ihering, in "Der Zweck im Recht," says: "The individual must realize that he is dependent upon society; that the laws which are binding upon him are derived from society. The individual is a part of the whole; the part, however, receives its laws from the whole. However strongly the individual may realize his unity with society, nevertheless it is society that holds up to him the standard of moral action. In contrast to that theory which endeavors to beguile the individual into the belief that he can maintain his own moral autonomy, I regard it as pertinent to repeat the sober truth that man is but one link in the chain, that he receives his laws from the whole of which he is a part. Let then this external law become thine own obligation, I feel impelled to say, let the outer law be thine own inner freedom; but do not imagine that restraints do not exist at all because thou dost not feel them subjectively, and that thou canst be thine own lawgiver."

In the struggle for existence, the merchant is only too prone to forget that beyond the duty of self-preservation, and beyond the welfare of his family, there lie social obligations which he may not overlook. While in other professions these social duties are early impressed as an obligation to society—the soldier, the official, the physician being taught that they must serve the state and humanity—and though even in large commercial enterprises the interests of the whole community are recognized, yet the major part of the mercantile world seems still to be unaware that only in so far as it performs a service to human society has it a right to exist.

To-day more than ever we need the kind of merchant who can assume this task. All attempts to do without the mer-

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chant as an intermediary between producer and consumer have failed. The need of a systematic division of goods according to time, place, and quantity, has not grown less but has increased in direct ratio to the increase and variety of production and consumption. When men used what they themselves produced; when the hunter lived on the game he slew and when the fur of the animal served him as a garment, then the merchant was superfluous. Later, when the peasant carried his produce to town, and received in exchange the wares of the mechanic, trade did not flourish. But now, when the industrial worker must devote himself exclusively to one specialty, and the consumer is in need of an ever-growing number of wares, the assistance of the merchant is becoming ever more necessary, and also more difficult. The merchant ought to be the confidential agent to whom the producer applies for counsel concerning the development of his production and the probable conditions of the market; but he should also advise the consumer (the term here being used in its widest sense) concerning such goods as he needs, the quality and price of which he cannot possibly know.

This may be a difficult task, but upon its attainment depends the future character of the mercantile profession. Professor Schmoller aptly says: "In my report on the Division of Labor (1889), I maintained that commerce is the organizer and arbiter of modern economics. I repeat this to-day, adding that it can only remain such if it succeeds in getting rid of its excrescences, if it is determined to hold fast to morality and decency, remorselessly cutting off its undesirable members. All those nations which have attained eminence in trade succeeded by insisting upon greater honesty than their rivals, and they came to ruin as soon as corruption and greed gained a footing amongst them. Law and order and morality, and all the powers in the mercantile world must combine to keep down evil practices, and to make ever higher demands on all their individual members." [2]

[2] *Die Woche*, 3 year, Vol. II, p. 480.

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But, it will be asked, are these demands attainable by all? Can we expect from the peddler—the small trader—that he should realize the importance of such ideals? Again to quote Professor Schmoller: "The highest kind of morality, that which accepts only the sanction of its own ideal aims, is now-a-days limited to the few. The mass of men depend upon tradition and custom for their economic standards. But we need these exceptional few in order that tradition and custom may be led to influence society in the direction of the ideal. Therefore pains should be taken to educate such men to be the authorized leaders of those groups of which the mercantile world is composed." [3]

Two points must be considered in establishing such an *élite* of the profession: On the one hand they must know what means are to be used to gain the desired end, and on the other hand they must be anxious to reach such an end. Moral education combined with special training for their profession is therefore needed. To be sure, the education which the family life gives the child takes no cognizance of its future profession; but if a boy is looking forward to becoming a merchant, the virtues to be especially insisted upon are honesty and truthfulness.

Lecky, in his "History of European Morals," has pointed out how the love of truth has been especially developed among the commercial nations, whereas among those whose interest in trade was meagre, a certain laxity and uncertainty of character, a tendency to exaggeration and lack of tenacity in keeping promises, can be observed. Von Ihering, too, insists that the law of truthfulness first received practical application in trade relations. In Rome it was the international system of law *(jus gentium)*, the exchange of wares between the unknown trader and the unknown customer which first brought home the principle of honesty *(bona fides)*, all contracts *bonæ fidei* belonging to the *jus gentium.*

Love of truth, which is of such vital importance for the merchant, should be inculcated in the home; and the school,

[3] "Ueber einige Frage des Rechts und der Volkswirtschaft," p. 45.

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by means of its general discipline, should aid in training the youth to a high standard of morals. In business schools and the commercial high schools the study of ethics in relation to business and economics should be insisted on; and hence the teachers should have previously had a special training in business ethics. Very little has been so far accomplished in this direction.

In the schools of Japan, a comparatively large amount of time is devoted to this department of study, and attention is paid to it in the Wharton School of Finance and Political Economy connected with the University of Pennsylvania. But in European schools the importance of such training is not yet appreciated. Professor Höffding's remark that "Healthy intellectual training consists in directing energy from lower to higher aims," goes unheeded. The heads of European business colleges do not seem to have studied these questions, whereas in England and the United States many economists have devoted attention to the need of reform in business morality. Herbert Spencer has written two essays on the subject. Ruskin refers in "Unto this Last" to the comparatively low esteem which merchants enjoy as compared to the professional man, owing to the fact that they are less devoted to the general good of society, and advises them to be less egoistic in their dealings. Professor J. Clark Murray, in an article published in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS (April, 1899), treats the subject in a masterly manner; and Professor Sidgwick says: "We cannot any longer decline—as Aristotle undoubtedly would have declined—to work out an ideal of good life for mechanics and tradesmen, on the ground that such persons are incapable of any high degree of virtue." [4]

Among German students, Schäffle especially has pointed out the baneful influence exerted by the demoralization of trade on many phases of public life. All the forces of social reform—jurists, ethicists, merchants and educators—should work hand in hand to plan a system of commercial morals,

[4] "Practical Ethics," p. 33.

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and prepare a course of ethical instruction in commercial schools that would make the young business man, before entering practical life, fully appreciate such sentiments as those that Professor Raydt addressed to the students at the inauguration of the Leipsic High School: "Show to the world that the merchant's profession, in its true spirit, is an ideal profession. For such it is when the merchant puts himself into the service of a spiritual, that is ethical, civilization. If you enter business life with such principles, the basis of which naturally must be the strictest honesty, then will you be kings of the merchant profession, and the more such kings there be, the greater the benefit to your country and the world."

Although education can materially influence a man, the shaping of his actions is more potently influenced in practical life by example and habit. Aristotle's axiom: "The lawgivers make good citizens by exercising them in good habits"—can be applied to all the virtues. By training man can be accustomed to courage or cowardice, to patience or violence; in other words, out of constant practice a habitual disposition arises.

It is therefore of vital importance to educate to right habits. The future merchant will act when he is independent just as he was taught to act during his apprenticeship. If the ethics of business have been scrupulously observed by his employer and his colleagues, then only extraordinary circumstances will cause him to act differently. On the other hand, the worst demoralization will ensue when employees are required to carry out dishonest methods. Such practices are described by Herbert Spencer in "Morals in Trade." He mentions the conditions that prevailed during the middle of the nineteenth century in a large number of English business houses—the heads of the separate departments being in the habit of giving rewards for dishonest but successful practices and dismissing those employees who were not willing to engage in such transactions. Even where such flagrant cases do not occur, the morals of employees are often seriously injured by the example of their employer. A low

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standard of business morality reacts disastrously upon the morals of the next generation.

The ethical education of the merchant is of the utmost importance. What is primarily needed is that the pupils be taught the importance of their profession and the duties toward society which it implies. This may be done by popular lectures fitted for the intelligence of the pupils. In higher institutions it may be possible to connect the history and ethics of trade with a survey of the historical development and social progress of human society. The fittest medium for this is sociology. But this study is still too incomplete, its limits too undefined, to be of much practical assistance. Economics, on the other hand, is unable to entirely solve our problems, if specialization in this science, as Professor Giddings says, is "at the expense of a broad outlook upon the world." [5] Yet the study of economics is of value to the merchant.

An objection to the consideration of ethics in connection with commercial questions which has frequently been urged is, that it might lead to reactionary social politics. Gustav Cohn has brilliantly refuted this argument in his pamphlet entitled "Ethics and Reaction." Social economics is the basis of social politics, and must include a study of the ethical, intellectual and æsthetic development of social classes.

The connection between the study of trade and economics is clearly set forth by Böhmert as follows: "It may be regarded as the special object of the study of the laws of trade to consider them, not from the technical point of view, but according to the economic point of view, and to see to it that in the division of goods, as well as in their production, the means and agencies be carefully taken into account, so that not only a net gain for the merchant be the result, but a benefit for the community be achieved." These words ought to be carefully weighed by all those who do not believe in the theoretical education of the merchant; and there are many such. They forget that they themselves are constantly

[5] Cf. "The Ethical Motive." International Jour. of Ethics, Vol. VIII. No. 326.

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making use of theories, but, instead of applying theories that are the result of long and carefully prepared observations, they base their actions on their own newly acquired experiences; to meet certain conditions of the market, they look for precedents derived from their own short career, instead of going to the annals of economic history; they disdain to make use of results attained by specialists who have devoted their entire lives to the study of economic problems. Hence, it is easily understood why the operations based on such individual deductions so often result disastrously. How many panics might have been averted if the leaders of great undertakings had been accustomed to base their calculations on thorough research, instead of blindly following the temporary state of the market. The ignorance of merchants leads to complaints such as Ruskin has set forth in his rather extravagant preface to "A Joy Forever" : "I might, with more appearance of justice, be blamed for thinking it necessary to enforce what everybody is supposed to know. But this fault will hardly be found with me, while the commercial events recorded daily in our journals, and still more the explanations attempted to be given of them, show that a large number of our so-called merchants are as ignorant of the nature of money as they are reckless, unjust, and unfortunate in its employment."

If, therefore, the study of Economics is to be regarded as one of the branches most needed in the course of a high school, it should not be given up after leaving school. The science is constantly being enriched and improved, and the business man can supplement his education by independent efforts, that is by reading and by recording his own personal experience. If he is privileged to associate with men of science, he will receive constant inspiration and suggestion for continued self-education; he will also feel impelled to use his knowledge for the benefit of the community. The greater the number of such well-informed merchants, the more they should be given a place of leading importance in the community.

When the young merchant, duly prepared for his profes-

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sion, enters the arena and conducts his own business, he will soon find by experience that it is not easy to succeed in his struggle, if one refuses to use the same weapons as his opponents. The corruptions in the business world are not all due to the character of the persons involved, but to conditions controlling their actions. The whole organization of business life must be modified in order to remove the evils which so seriously threaten the social welfare. An institution which is founded on an evil basis remains evil, even though good men are actively engaged in it. The business life, being the career easiest to enter, is open to all; and we find that one individual can actually compel others, by his own unprincipled doings, to act in opposition to their own better convictions. Thus the party who is morally inferior gains the ascendancy, and it is this class which prevents a merchant from carrying out his social mission of organizing commerce in such a manner as to enable the masses to take advantage of the improved methods of production.

To be sure, it is not alone the merchant class who is to blame. The majority of consumers are too much absorbed by their wage-earning duties to give sufficient attention to purchasing; and women, on whom this task has primarily devolved, are likewise too busy in increasing the earning capacity of the family to use proper judgment. It would be well if the movement for improving the education of women would devote more attention to this subject.

Every infraction of morality in business life should receive watchful attention, but we can here take into account only those special phenomena which directly inveigh against public morality. One group of such unlawful acts may be called "unjustifiable competition," comprising those methods of competition which attempt to injure rivals by misuse of their business labels, revealing of business secrets, untruthful representations to customers in regard to quantity or quality, or other acts likely to bring down the arm of the law. These transactions are not such as to admit of doubt, whereas in other cases there may be some uncertainty between what is legal and what is illegal. Who can, for in-

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stance, decide the rules for giving credit? It is understood that almost every merchant operates with borrowed capital. The rule may be laid down that borrowed capital should not be exposed to danger, but it is difficult to decide *when* such a case arises. An optimist judges very differently in such circumstances from a pessimist; and not only the proportion of borrowed capital must be taken into account, but the particular branch of business, the movements of markets, prices, and the kind of credit given. We cannot here enter into the complexity of these questions regarding credit, but we must point out such cases, because the misuse of credit produces another evil, namely, the underselling of competitors—one of the most frequent causes of ruin and uncercertainty in business life.[6] Mr. J. Carter quotes the following remarks of an old merchant: "I have never done this with my own hand, though my clerk does it. I do not like it, and hardly know what I should do if asked to do it myself. As it is, I leave it to their own consciences, feeling I must live somehow, and knowing I cannot afford to lose a good customer." And such cases are not rare.

This example illustrates how difficult is the path of the merchant who determines to remain true to his ethical principles. Indeed, he would be utterly powerless, if two ethical factors did not assist and uplift him, namely, law and custom. But even these cannot prove helpful unless they are modified and adapted to present conditions. They have not yet been developed to their legitimate extent, and hence have not been able to render that assistance to the merchant which they might afford. To this end an improved education of the merchant would be of immense importance. Mercantile law could be best interpreted and appreciated by those merchants who have taken a course in this subject in a commercial high school. The merchant's acquaintance with the law and its foundations will strengthen his respect for law, and he will less frequently practice wrong or submit to wrong himself.

Unfortunately, one may read, even in the writings of recog-

[6] "Zeitschrift für Volkswirthschaft und Sozialpolitik."

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nized authorities, that the leniency of a merchant toward unjustifiable demands is to be commended. Thus in a monograph by Bussmann on commerce and ethics is the following: "The increase of the original term of credit generally takes place without added interest, and is taken for granted—for instance, between wholesalers and retailers—as an act of kindness. Likewise, the usual expense of stamps and of interest is generally quietly borne by the larger firm." Professor Schmoller mentions as one of the benefits of the liberal minded merchant that he is always ready to serve his clients with little favors and kindnesses.

With all this, it is apt to be overlooked that a merchant always must be paid for such favors. The carrying of these costs must be appraised and added to the expense of production. And, as the dealer cannot always be sure in what instances he will be called upon to pay the increase, he will consider it called for in all cases and calculate accordingly, so that the customer who pays promptly and fully is obliged to pay a higher price than is justifiable. The material loss in such cases, however, is insignificant in comparison with the moral injury which results. Merchants become uncertain as to their rights and duties wherever the rendering of such mutual favors is not determined in accordance with fixed principles. The individual is often defrauded of his rights, and must submit to injustice; hence he loses his sense of fairness and justice. *Enfin tout dupe suppose un fripon.*

Von Ihering has devoted one of his best known essays to the endeavor to prove that the *Kampf um's Recht* (struggle for justice) is not only a duty towards one's self, but also a duty to the community. The catchword "mercantile favors" is not the only one that is used to defend unlawful practices; there is also the phrase termed "freedom to carry on one's business in one's own way." Many merchants are apt to ask for special indulgence toward their profession, and to protest against any limitations of freedom, declaring that one must accept the evils as well as the benefits of his calling. They forget that the demand for freedom is justified only when it does not endanger the interests of the community,

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and that freedom can only be entrusted to men when their sense of justice and strong moral integrity prevents its abuse. So true is this that merchants themselves are demanding legal protection. It is much to be desired that this demand should not be treated as a reactionary measure but judged objectively on its merits. The London Chamber of Commerce, which certainly does not favor reaction, has said in one of its reports: "Many persons who allow themselves to be parties to an illegal transaction would shrink with fear from the same transaction when made criminal." This point of view certainly deserves attention.

This applies particularly to the subject of speculation, for this is the form of temptation most apt to beset the young merchant—the Stock Exchange and gambling in stocks. Pains are often taken to call this kind of speculation a legitimate business transaction; and the most pronounced stock manipulators generally desire to be known as honest business men. But the actual difference, though not easily legally defined, is clear. As such it is set forth by Schmoller: "The genius for business, in contrast to the mere craze for speculation, is distinguished by the ability to divine and seize upon the deeper and especially the moral laws underlying this mercantile collective movement, by the ability to study all the possible combinations, and subject them to careful examination; whereas the speculative mania depends upon chance, or a fortunate streak of luck."

Somewhat similar are the remarks of W. Douglas Mackenzie,[7] who calls buying and selling speculation, whenever it does not facilitate distribution of goods, or the solution of legitimate commercial problems, but merely acquires stock for a few days or hours in the hope of having the price raised during the interval between buying and selling.

Next to legal restrictions, we must depend upon the assistance of public opinion in order to correct the abuses of the mercantile world and to raise the standard of mercantile honor. But this can be accomplished only by a clear understanding and demonstration of the ends to be attained, the

[7] "The Ethics of Gambling." London, 1896, p. 51.

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principles underlying them, and the means to be used. It is to be regretted that as a rule the attempts to introduce moral ideas into the standards of business life are so ineffectively done—general vague phrases about "moral demands," "moral laws," are used but no concrete examples are given, and the connection between theory and practice is not sufficiently emphasized. It is of course as impossible to lay down principles that will fit every case as to give rules for every individual need. The desired end can be attained only if every individual realizes that his profession must be made to serve the interests of the entire community. This continual appeal to serve the interests of society is the more urgently needed as every special profession is apt to work toward the formulation of a special code of ethics for its own particular problems. "The moral evaluation of a profession depends upon two factors: in the first place, on that which the profession does objectively for the needs of the whole, and secondly, on what it does objectively for the worker in the profession by reason of the moral influence it exerts." [8]

Of all the professions, it is in the merchant's life that there exists the greatest uncertainty as to what is contrary to the moral code and what is not. One other element, too, is lacking nowadays which in former times restrained the business man from unscrupulous practices. He was limited in his operations and personally acquainted with most of his customers, and therefore anxious to win their esteem and retain it. Nowadays buyer and seller are unknown to each other; the trusts have no personal relations with their clients, and thus the considerations of personal respect have fallen away. There is all the more need, therefore, of perfectly clear and well-defined rules regulating the relations of the merchant to the community.

The kind of esteem and consideration which the community accords to the successful merchant will influence the young business man. But if the esteem and admiration is accorded to the man who, by unscrupulous means has made the amassing of wealth his sole end and aim and in later life

[8] Wundt, "Ethik," p. 515.

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is able to reach the highest political office by means of his money, then indeed the young man will not learn to look upon such a life as an unworthy one. Wealth should be regarded as undesirable unless a noble use of it makes it a means to social esteem.

John Davidson[9] tells us that: "Only labor, physical or mental, can produce wealth, and no man has a right to feel superior to the mass of men because he is able to consume this product." But a man who, as Leslie Stephen says: "helps to open and increase the productive power of his country, who introduces new industries, is a benefactor to his fellow-men. He can perform his highest duty as a producer and also as a consumer, not by making a show of his money and expending it in all kinds of useless luxury, but by doing his utmost to encourage art and science and to increase the sum of social benefits."

The greatest amount of wealth is centralized in the hands of land-owners, manufacturers, and merchants. The land-owner ought to consider it his duty to assist the social and economic progress of the farm laborer, to provide schools, churches, hospitals, etc. The factory owner should feel it an obligation to make the life of his operatives an endurable one, and to this end introduce improvements in dwellings, machinery, etc. The capitalist ought to make it his duty to use his capital for the benefit of the population of commercial centers, by helping to improve the education and elevate the moral tone of his associates, and also by assisting those institutions which nurture art and science. Not only his money, but his leisure time and his mental powers should be devoted to the service of the community. The highest benefit of wealth consists in its giving us freedom from purely material cares, and permitting us to cultivate the moral and social side of our being. This is the only valid reason for making a great exertion for the acquisition of riches.[10]

Aided by home education and early training, may all these

[9] "Luxury and Extravagance." INTER. JOUR. OF ETHICS, Vol. IX, p. 54.

[10] Chevalier, "La richesse consideé au point de vue morale politique." *Journal des Economists,* Paris, 1863.

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factors that go toward making the best kind of a business man be so combined that wherever merchants are found, the old motto may be justified which, in the days of the greatest splendor of Venetian commerce, was carved on the façade of the church of San Giacomo di Rialta:

> Hoc circa Templum situs mercantibus æquum
> Pondera nec vergant nec sit conventio prava.

GUSTAV BUNZEL.

GRATZ, AUSTRIA.

MUSIC AND RELIGION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL RIVALRY.

The recent movement in the Catholic Church, initiated by the attitude of the late Pope, and made definite by the present one, which has for its object a widespread and radical reform of church music, forces this part of the service into a prominent place in the attention of the psychological analyst. Is this movement merely an attempt on the part of the church to combat a dangerous modern tendency by entrenching itself more thoroughly in that mediævalism where its most precious traditions lie? Or is there a real reason in the nature of religion that forces to an issue the question of Gregorian chant versus modern mass? To put the question in another way, is there a field of distinctively religious music, and what differentiates this field from that of music in general?

The popular mind has a certain comprehension of the situation but it is based upon little real understanding of the conditions. The large majority of people will readily admit that they attend church primarily for the purpose of hearing music, and that without this feature the service would offer little attraction. The church, for its part, recognizes the situation in the popular mind, and always desirous of securing churchgoers, makes the attempt, as to the legitimacy of which it must be its own best judge, to give the public what is wanted. Witness the extensive provisions made in all churches in the way of musical committees and trained

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choirs, the large proportion of the ordinary service given over to music, and the immense number of purely musical programs of the vespers order, which differ from ordinary dignified musical entertainments only in the fact that they are given in churches, and that the words deal with religious themes. The public readily sees that this is highly entertaining, and, to a certain extent edifying, but not altogether religious. Very few, however, seem inclined to question the matter, and to find the difference between the religious and artistic elements involved. And this vagueness is not difficult to understand, when we see that the most searching analysis finds itself confronted with serious difficulties, and that final conclusions are to a large extent determined by points of departure.

When the search for differentiæ of religious music is fairly opened, one judgment that will readily occur to us is that of Huysmans in his "En Route." Durtal in his tiresome spiritual wanderings and battles with the flesh, occasionally refreshes the desert with the deliverances of an informed taste on the subjects of church music and church architecture. There is a certain incongruity in the fact that while the artistic and religious elements in his own nature seem hopelessly confused, he is still able to point out clearly some differences in the religious character of mediæval and modern music. In hearing the modern mass, he tells us, the chief impression which the listener gets, and which is definitely antagonistic to the religious feeling, is that of the individual artist showing himself throughout his handiwork. This would mean, of course, that one of the chief elements in the artistic production, namely character, must of necessity be lacking in true religious music. On the other hand, according to Huysmans, the Gregorian chant bears with it in an essential way the mode of its origin, being the spontaneous expression of the pure religion of the monasteries, a growth, and not referable to any particular author. While these expressions might imply a rather strict limitation of the term religion, yet, on the basis of the personal, mystical attitude, Huysmans gives a corroboration of popular opinion

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in finding a barrier in the individuality and concrete self-sufficiency of the work of art.

If we grant the conclusion of the general consciousness that there is a real difference between the attitudes which characterize music and religion, it becomes highly necessary to account for the constant confusion and intermixture in practice. We may say in general that this results from their exceedingly close kinship, as both find their psychological origin in that part of human nature which we denominate the mystical. No distinct meaning of the term mysticism has ever been formulated, and attempts usually end in all the vagueness which the word implies. At the same time, the method of its application in current usage is tolerably clear. It is certain that we cannot refer to mysticism in the sense of a simple germinal impulse, but rather as a general term which covers a whole group of attitudes, supposed to be marked off, rather indefinitely, from the so-called discursive or rational. This means that the predominating element is feeling rather than thought, if we care to follow the general method of defining a thing by making it a composition of abstractions. Psychology is not yet free from the traditional method of dividing human nature into compartments. We may say that mysticism is a matter of the emotions, but this does not tell the whole truth unless we extend the meaning of the latter term. This is not the place to criticise the current theories of the emotions, but merely to refer to the fact that they are generally unsatisfactory when carried beyond the field of psychological theorizing and made to do service as explanatory principles. The difficulty is largely a matter of the division we have referred to, a neglect of the question how the emotions have come to be. There are, to be sure, approximately pure states of feeling and thinking, but these are extreme conditions rather than separate mental elements. Again, we certainly lose the significance of the emotions if we fail to take into account their evolutionary history. When approached in this way, what are the emotions? They may be spoken of generally as those primal elements in human nature which represent the broadest adap-

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tations in organic development, and mark out the environment into situations, to which human life, as all life, is a series of reactions. There may be under certain conditions an abstract, dry, impersonal contemplation of the world, but only a moment's consideration is necessary to show us what a small part is played in real life by abstract intellectual processes, and how much of our experience has that personal flavor, that estimate of value, which is the mark of an emotional attitude. There is a sense in which prejudice is more to be trusted than clear thinking, in spite of our logics. Even in science, once in a long while, insight plays a part as well as scales and weighing pans. Feeling is not so much the enemy of the best though as its motive power, and, if we dare to say it, its guide. What, then, is mysticism? It is the intuitive judgment in which no attempt is made to clarify the terms. It is not a pure feeling state, but a feeling attitude, or feeling comprehension. So far our account covers what takes place in normal everyday experience. There is one step further, namely that in which the state of mind becomes a source of satisfaction and therefore an object of realization in itself. This need or inclination is probably the common source of both artistic and religious mysticism.

When we look for the special kind of mysticism that dwells in the world of art, we are liable to be confounded by the supposition prevalent among laymen that artistic production and appreciation lie apart from the general order of things, and require, like religion, an initiation into the mysteries, before they can be understood. This belief unfortunately detracts from the value of art by making it a mere side issue, the indulgence of a generally worthless class of people called connoisseurs. As a matter of fact, close study of the subject fails to reveal any comprehension different in kind from that of ordinary life. The artistic "schein" deserves to be so called only by reason of the fact that its situations are not sufficiently commonplace to be found in real life, but, like Plato's ideas, none the less present the meaning of life in terms of these situations. This discussion is, of course, trite now-a-days, but is presented for the purpose of

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showing that the ideal situations created by the imagination call out the same mystical reactions as those of ordinary life, and involve, though to be sure in cathartic quantities, the same emotions. Very few would be inclined to deny our conclusions so far, but when we come to the special application necessary for our purpose, progress may not be so easy. Strangely enough, the views of theorists concerning music stand at the extremes of opposition, and seem disinclined to take any middle ground. There are the old estimates of Hegel and Schopenhauer which place music at the highest point in the hierarchy of arts because the medium calls least attention to itself, and consequently gives the least obstructed contemplation of the absolute. These terms remind one of religious mysticism. Then come the views of the formalists who insist upon the entirely contentless character of music, and make its finest appreciation an intellectual exercise in harmony and counterpoint. Then comes an important movement in music itself, which tends to prove that it can be representative, and with it the opinions of the expressionists who also seem afflicted with a mania for extremes. There appears to be a prospect of settlement along one line, and as this falls within his field, the psychologist may presume to offer one or two considerations. It is possible that there is no work of art which can be called representative in the sense of being imitative, and that the only expression is that of the emotional attitude common to the situation presented by the work of art and that in life which it is supposed to represent. What is the difference between the prelude to the "Creation" and "A Morning in the Barnyard?" Clearly one of emotional values. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that the contemplation of formal features is on the same emotional plane as a mathematical computation. There is much to show that the simplest combinations of tones, and even separate tones have a distinct emotional significance. As to the element of rhythm both in music and the dance, a number of important studies tend to prove that its close connection with the emotions lies at the basis of all art development. At what point, then, have we

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arrived? The old estimate of music seems correct if we translate the contemplation of the absolute into terms of the psychology of satisfaction. It is that form of art in which the conditions are so arranged as to place the emotional attitude at its best, with a minimum of the thinking process. It is then the most mystical of all the arts because its limitations are the least.

In religious mysticism we find to a large extent a parallel of the conditions we have been studying. Whatever the general system may be, the essence of religion is taken to be a matter of personal experience, of emotional attitude. The importance of this aspect is clearly indicated by Professor James in his recent study. He first gives a general account of the phenomena of mysticism, especially that produced by anæsthesia, and then shows that religious mysticism is of the same kind. The chief difficulty is that Professor James seems to take religious mysticism in a limited though, to be sure, the highest sense, that of the feeling of complete absorption into the absolute. Why the feeling of nothingness in the presence of nothingness should be the final aim of religious contemplation is a problem psychology is not yet ready to solve, but it is possibly an extension of the same attitude which is produced by contemplation of the vast and seemingly unlimited. The same reaction in many of its features can be obtained experimentally by the layman in an attempt to comprehend infinite empty space. But most of the examples, at least in Christianity, show the high state of religious fervor attended by a vivid concrete realization, as of the presence of some saint, the Holy Mother, or Christ. There can be little doubt that such hallucinatory experiences lie at the basis of all that is included under the term revelation. It must be admitted then that religion falls psychologically largely within the field of ideal contemplation, or, in other words, of the imagination. So far we have nothing to differentiate the religious from the artistic feeling. The relation is so close and they involve so many common elements that Professor Santayana is able to bring forward all but conclusive evidence to support the thesis of his "Inter-

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pretations" that religion and poetry are identical. The argument is true as far as it goes, but it fails to give a complete account of the religious consciousness. The appreciation of poetry never involves one in the difficulties incident to religious conviction. Belief in the existence of Hamlet is entirely different from belief in the existence of Christ in the mind of the religious man. The first is ideal, the second ideal *and* actual. The future world of Virgil, Dante or Milton never raises a doubt, but the future world of the Christian is always seeking to establish itself by vulgar evidence. The difference then, as we see it, is that while the religious consciousness involves the same mystical attitude, and the same creation of ideal situations, as we find in the artistic consciousness, it goes a step further and requires assent to some body of doctrine. The poet is always conscious that his vision lies within the limits of his imagination, the religious man is never so. The artistic conception is quite of the earth, earthy; the religious conception is of the supernatural. We might raise the question how emotional attitudes can be called out by situations which are supposed by their very nature to negate the set of conditions under which these attitudes have grown up. Careful attention to the facts, however, will show that the goods and ills of the spiritual life are largely the same as those provided by nature, and that the negation is chiefly a matter of the screen upon which they are projected.

Besides trusts and rapid transit, the nineteenth century is notable for achievements in two great directions, science and music. It may not occur to us, perhaps on account of our lack of perspective, that this is a paradox of the most pronounced kind. It presents a double ideal, of extreme rationalism in the case of its thinking, of extreme mysticism in the case of its art. And stranger still the two can easily exist without conflict in the same individual. With the devotion to clear and distinct thinking so characteristic of our day, it is natural that there should be the sense of a large gap in the environmental contacts which human nature normally requires, a sense of atrophied emotions, and lessened real life. The deification of science leaves a feeling of the neglect

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which the shrines of other divinities must suffer. Abstract impersonal thinking is seen to be but half the story and creates the desire for a more intense personal life. This seems to be the reason for the paradox and the extreme form which it takes in our day. The same fact is illustrated in the permanent characteristics of certain peoples. The British mind, for example, has been notoriously averse to any kind of problem which cannot be stated in the clearest common sense terms. And yet it is a nation of great poets.

Our rationalism and our dissatisfaction with it furnish the prime condition for a revival in religion, as the past well shows, and the question arises why history does not repeat itself in our day. One can hardly fail to be impressed by the close parallelism between the conditions at present and those which prevailed in the Roman world at the time of the pagan reaction. There is the same appeal to reason as the arbiter of all problems, and to a large extent the same appeal to cut-and-dried systems of ethics for motives of conduct. In other words, there is the same surrender of life to thought, and what is of most importance for our purpose, the same feeling that this surrender ultimately entails not freedom but galling bonds. There was a revulsion of human nature, and its consequences every one knows. The finest, most consistent theories were discarded, and adherence given to all kinds of mystical oriental cults. Christianity prevailed over Greek philosophy, martyrdom prevailed over stoicism, nature prevailed over logic. Other examples of this dialectic of human nature are the succession of Methodism to Deism in England, and of Pietism to the Illumination in Germany. There is a fine irony in the fact which Brandes points out that many of the most important Romanticists who began their careers as exponents of illumination principles, found their ultimate end in the Catholic Church.

Why is there little probability of a religious revival at present? We are in a position to answer the question at least partially, if we put together some of the results of our analysis. We have seen that there are two chief factors in the religious consciousness, the personal, mystical attitude

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coupled with the element of belief. In spite of the fact that so many believe that faith must be supported by doctrine, the history of religion shows exactly the opposite. Just as artistic feeling inspires the imagination to create appropriate situations in the various forms of art, so the religious feeling is the one necessary motive in the creation of religious systems. Given a sufficiently strong faith, intellectual difficulties fall into the background, and assent to doctrine comes as a matter of course. Logical proof of the existence of God is for the intensely religious nature a needless procedure. If, however, the religious feeling fails to reach the proper degree of intensity, a body of doctrine must justify itself as a philosophy. This is just the difficulty at present. Rationalistic investigation makes belief at the best a difficult matter, and the necessary element of faith is lacking. Why? Because music, the great modern art, can satisfy the mystical need, and indulge the cosmic emotion without asking assent to anything or putting the slightest strain upon purely thinking processes.

The reaction against rationalism is now on. All kinds of small mystical "isms" arise, make for a time absurd exhibitions of themselves, and then die out. Even the more respectable ones like Christian Science, Spiritualism and Theosophy are not remarkable for the educated intelligence of their adherents. The scientifically trained mind which is unable to play its mystical inclinations out in any kind of crude occultism, is willing enough to be religious, but its faith is not sufficiently strong to overcome the difficulties, so it follows the line of least resistance and listens to music, and this still more dulls the edge of faith. It might be answered that music, like the rest of the service, is a kind of "yoga," or preparation for the religious attitude. But it must be admitted that the true preparation provides a series of means which do not satisfy in themselves but create a larger demand. In so far as any part of the service is a work of art, it fails of its purpose. Our conclusion then is that the movement referred to at the beginning is based upon sound principles, but has probably undertaken a hopeless task.

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Music and religion are rivals for the same claim in human nature, and so long as music occupies its present place in the general consciousness, we can look for no widespread revival in religion.

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THE SCOTTISH CHURCH CASE AND ITS ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

The first day of August, 1904, is a day which will never be forgotten in the history of religion in the British Islands. On that day the highest legal tribunal of the nation, after searching investigation, arrived at a decision which has had practical results that are serious indeed, while its moral consequences are immeasurably great. By that decision, eleven hundred churches in Scotland were at one stroke dispossessed of the whole of their property, valued at more than two millions sterling. Their congregations were left without meeting-houses, their ministers without manses, their students without colleges, and they were deprived of the whole of their invested funds. And all these things have been found legally to belong to a very small body of churches in the outlying districts of the north and west of Scotland—a body so small that it could not possibly make use of more than a fraction of the property now declared by law to belong to it. Extraordinary as this may be, it is, I repeat, the moral consequences of this declaration which are so great as to merit the attention of every intelligent man.

In dwelling on the circumstances which have brought about such a state of things, I speak from personal knowledge of the ecclesiastical situation in Scotland, and also with constant reference to the official report of the statements on both sides as presented before the law courts in Edinburgh and London.[1] My object is, to discuss the essential principle involved in this famous case, and not to dwell on its merely ephemeral aspects.

[1] "The Free Church of Scotland Appeals, 1903-4:" Authorized Report. Edinburgh: Macniven and Wallace; London: Hodder and Stoughton.

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We are aware that there is, and has been for more than two centuries, an Established Church in Scotland, which is also an Orthodox Presbyterian Church. These names require special notice. It is a Presbyterian Church: this means that its various constituent congregations are organized into "Presbyteries," for the term "Presbyterian" in its proper meaning has no doctrinal reference. But the Church of Scotland is also an Orthodox Presbyterian Church: this means that—whatever its ministers may publicly teach—the standard according to which it is supposed to interpret the Scriptures is strictly fixed. That standard as we know is called the Westminster Confession of Faith. It is not likely that many readers of these pages will ever have looked into that document. The fact is well known that many of the ministers and elders who sign it at their ordination have no proper acquaintance with its contents. It contains a complex and elaborate system of metaphysical theology; and among the chief of its declarations is the doctrine of "Predestination," which is stated as follows: "By the decree of God, and for the manifestation of His glory, some men and angels are predestinated to everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be increased or diminished" (Ch. iii, 3). The original and real meaning of this doctrine is that we know not how many human beings are condemned to never-ending torments in hell, irrespective of any earthly deeds, good or bad, of their own. This latter doctrine was the great question agitating the Christian Church throughout the world when (1647) the Westminster Confession was adopted by the Scottish Church; and in adopting the Confession, that Church consciously and deliberately adopted the fatalist doctrine in an unqualified form.

Once more, the Church of Scotland is an Established Church: and this means that its standards of belief are fixed by law, and cannot be altered save by consent of Parliament.

Sixty years ago, grave abuses prevailed in the Church of Scotland, and of these the chief was "Patronage." Local land-

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lords claimed, and exercised, the right of appointing ministers, and if necessary of forcing them on the congregations without the least regard to the wishes of the people. This was no new thing sixty years ago; it had gone on for long periods previously; and it had led to several secessions, when small bodies of ministers found that they could endure such a state of things no longer, and left the Church, taking their people with them, and formed separate bodies based on the principle that any special connection between Church and State is mischievous and intolerable. But apart from these secessions, within the Church itself a Reform party came into existence, and grew stronger year by year. In the words of one of the Judges—Lord Macnaghten—"They were the party of progress, of reform, and church extension. They planted religion in remote half-civilized districts of Scotland. They founded missions in all parts of the world. Their zeal and fervor were, as their adherents boasted, in striking contrast to the lukewarmness and apathy of the 'Moderates' (their opponents). And when they became the dominant party they carried matters with a high hand." They took measures which were altogether beyond the power of the Church as established by law; and the State refused to admit their claims. Very soon it became evident to all thinking men that "the leaders of Reform and those who adhered to them would have to retract their pretensions and own themselves defeated, or quit the establishment"; and no one who knew the temper of Chalmers and the other leaders of the Progressives could doubt what the issue would be. The disruption took place. On a memorable day in May, 1843, four hundred and seventy clergymen withdrew from the General Assembly and the Church—nearly half the entire number on the roll. In doing this, they gave up their incomes, their churches, their homes; and in this act of heroism, they founded what until the end of last century was called the Free Church of Scotland. This movement has been well described as "one of the noblest protests for religious liberty in modern times." We can form little idea of the hardships and sufferings through which the Church so founded rose to be an organized and working institution. But it did rise; and soon large funds

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were raised and placed in trust for the maintenance of the principles for which the Free Church stood. The property acquired—now, as stated, valued at upwards of two millions sterling—was, as regards the greater part of it, vested in trustees and applied to the general purposes of the Church; the remainder of it, belonging to individual congregations, was vested in trustees appointed by those congregations, who held it under trust deeds drawn up, generally speaking, upon a model framed by the Free Church in the year following the disruption.

Amid all their heroic sacrifices and magnificent enthusiasm, the founders of the Free Church were blind to one thing. There was much talk in those days of the Eternal Decrees of God, as they affected man's destiny in the world to come. But there is an Eternal Decree whose foundations are as deeply laid as those of intelligence itself. It is that rational beings shall be *free to think,* to search for new light, and to mould their convictions according to the light that is given them, asking no other leave; and the possibility of that kind of freedom never entered into the minds of Chalmers and his friends. It is one of the smaller but very real ironies of history, that these men, full of earnestness and zeal, should almost unconsciously have forged fetters and laid them with a heavy hand on the vigorous life of the young new Church. The weight of the dead hand has led to the result which has astounded the public to-day. The Free Church went out only to seek liberty from the unjust encroachments of the State control. They believed, and declared again and again, that it was still the duty of the State to legalize and support the true religion. They said: "Though we quit the Establishment, we go out on the Establishment principle; we quit a vitiated Establishment, but would rejoice in returning to a pure one." They distinguished their position from that of the voluntary dissenters of whom we spoke, who had left the Church of Scotland in earlier days. "The theory of the Free Church," said Lord Robertson, "was that amid right-hand and left-hand defections she was the true Church of Scotland—the burning bush never consumed." She pledged herself to the Westminster Confession as being the very truth of God. She proclaimed these things upon the housetops and

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in the most solemn and deliberate of her testimonies; and it was in support of these testimonies that funds were raised and placed in trust. What has been the result?

The sixty years that have elapsed since the disruption are the period of greatest change in the whole spiritual outlook of man. The application of evolutionary science to every department of human activity, and the comparative study of religions, have made it impossible for the Free Church, or any other Church, to stand still. Calvinism is dead, save in a few places where thought remains stagnant like the backwaters of a river. The Westminster Confession is a creed outworn. And the views of Chalmers on the connection between Church and State—views that were sincere, even noble, but utterly visionary and impracticable—had to be abandoned. The Free Church began to assume her freedom.

She moved, but moved slowly and reluctantly. With regard to Calvinism, a "Declaratory Act" was passed, in 1892, to the following effect: "That this Church also holds that all who hear the Gospel are warranted and required to believe to the saving of their souls; and that in the case of such as do not believe, but perish in their sins, the issue is due to their own rejection of the Gospel call. That this Church does not teach, and does not regard the Confession as teaching, the foreordination of men to death irrespective of their own sins." Notwithstanding the last sentence, it is evident that the essential point of this declaration is not an interpretation, but a contradiction of the Westminster doctrine of Predestination. It marks the extreme point to which the Free Church was prepared to go. The Confession, thus dubiously qualified, was still regarded as binding on the Church; and by her attitude towards "heretics" —such as the late W. Robertson Smith, the Rev. W. Knight (afterwards Professor at St. Andrews), and others—she showed how she was prepared to suppress and punish broader thought.

In another respect also the Free Church began to move. There is an evil fate that dogs the steps of every successful Church: to make of herself a sect, eager for worldly power and advancement, jealous of all such power won by other

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bodies, arrogating to herself the preposterous claim that she alone is worthy to be trusted with the worldly influence which she desires. To that temptation the Free Church began to yield. She grew jealous of the privileges of the Established Church (now long purified of the old abuses). So far had she departed from the position of her first founders, that she devoted much of her time and energy to bring about the Disestablishment of the Church of Scotland.

We mentioned the existence of other bodies which had left the Church before the great disruption. These had already (1847) amalgamated under the name of the United Presbyterian Church. They were "Voluntaries," and all along had openly renounced all idea of a connection between Church and State. Their position was the same as that to which the Free Church had moved, and at the close of the last century, these two joined forces under the name of the United Free Church. This result was chiefly due to the indefatigable zeal, ambition, and church statesmanship of one man—Dr. Robert Rainy, Principal of the Free Church College in Edinburgh. One motive for this union was to strengthen the hands of the churches which were rivals to the Establishment; another, and we may hope the principal, motive, was to heal useless divisions. For this reason the union was welcomed throughout the Christian world. In consummating this union, the United Church adopted its formula of subscription in the terms of a "Declaratory Act" which had been passed by its smaller constituent branch (the United Presbyterians) in 1879, and which professed only to interpret the Confession of Faith, but which was even more emphatic than the corresponding Free Church Act in repudiating the Calvinistic doctrine, in affirming the "evangelical" view that in the Gospel salvation is freely offered to all who will accept it, and in affirming the possibility of salvation even for those who are without the pale of the ordinary Gospel ordinances. Years of controversy were necessary to secure this modest concession to morality and reason! It is a curious specimen of the logic of the ecclesiastical mind, that this doctrine should be regarded as not inconsistent with the Westminster Confession. In the immediate context of the passage

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quoted above, the Confession declares that all men, in virtue of their descent from Adam, inherit an original and essential corruption of nature; from this corruption all actual transgressions proceed; this *inherited nature* is *inherited guilt,* meriting "all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal"; from this state, no man is capable of saving himself; a certain number are rescued by divine decree alone.

There was a minority in the Free Church, few in number but very earnest and very stubborn, who would have none of all the changes that we have mentioned. They stood still where their fathers stood, and kept all the old views unchanged —Predestination, Eternal Punishment, the Verbal Inspiration of the Scriptures, and in short the whole of the Westminster doctrine in the form and spirit of its framers. Its members are the lineal descendants of the original Covenanters, and its position, held with unquestionable sincerity, is purely reactionary. It is probable that if the leaders of the unionist party had endeavored to come to terms with the minority, and had offered to give into their charge a just proportion of the property that the Free Church had possessed, an arrangement might have been effected. Instead of that, Dr. Rainy and his friends took measures to have the dissentients dispossessed. If it were only in self-defence, they were compelled to take action. They claimed before the law that they alone were the rightful possessors of all the property that the Free Church had taken into the union, for they alone stood by the principles that Chalmers and his friends had held; they claimed that the funds raised after the disruption were raised for the maintenance of those original principles, and that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for that object, their successors have no right to change the object. The official utterances of the dissentient minority in support of their claim were characterized to a remarkable extent by masterful determination, legal acumen, and calm dignity. They were, however, compelled finally to appeal to the highest court, consisting of those Judges who are members of the House of Lords; and that court justified their claim. There is no firmer principle of British law than this, that money subscribed for one purpose

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shall not be diverted to another. The result is, that some twenty-five congregations in the outlying districts of Scotland became the legal possessors of all the funds, lands, colleges, and churches previously belonging to the majority who had gone into the union.

From the practical point of view, the situation was found to be absurd and indeed impossible, and many methods of compromise were discussed, until at the beginning of the present year the Government, as had been expected, intervened with the appointment of a Royal Commission to consider the application of the judgment. This is of vast importance to the persons whose property is concerned; and the attention of the public and the press has been almost exclusively occupied with this aspect of the case. There has also been much criticism of the spirit in which the victors and the vanquished have met the situation. But all this does not touch the principle which is the real cause of the difficulty. The founders of the Free Church tied down their successors to a creed; and *because man is rational, no fixed creed can be binding on him;* hence the property held on that impossible basis has been lost. It is indeed hard that able and intelligent men should be reduced to penury for trying to escape from the fetters of the past; but those fetters never ought to have been made. The law of the United Kingdom says that money left for one purpose shall not be diverted to another, and in this the law is just; the Free Church claimed her right to grow, and she was not wrong to move towards the Light; but what was radically wrong, and hopelessly vain, was the attempt to bind and fix men's thought concerning the supreme problems of life, duty, and destiny; and this is what the founders of the Free Church tried to do. The decision of the House of Lords, though outwardly it only binds again the fetters of the past, is in reality a powerful blow struck on behalf of progress and enlightenment. An acute observer has thus stated its inward meaning: "The constitution—doctrinal and general—of a Church is an obligation or bond which the Church places permanently upon itself. Unless there is express provision for altering the constitution, or for affording discretionary powers to its administrators, it must

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be held as continuously determining the use to which the property and means of the Church must be put. A constitution is held to be in the nature of a permanent instruction; it may be whatever its framers intend and devise, but, being adopted, it has all the force of a standing decree. By being a religious body, a Church is not raised above this law." The constitution may, of course, be altered; but any property held on the basis of the principles departed from in virtue of the alteration is forfeited. It is for this reason that I spoke of the moral consequences of this decision. These consequences, let it be noted, are already beginning to be felt. The London *Daily News* has said that "if the House of Lords is right, there is not a single Nonconformist body in England which can look at the truth without fear of ruin." If this were true, it would be nothing less than a shameful confession. If it were true, it would mean that the standards of the churches are so false that a glance at the truth would betray them. This is a gross exaggeration. None the less, all churches are now being made to see that, in view of the inevitability of progress, their constitutions must needs make open and explicit allowance for alteration. The message of science and philosophy to the ecclesiastics of this country is now enforced by "the strong arm of the law." The question is all the more pressing, because the creed-bound churches have gone beyond their creeds; the Confessions they profess to hold by are all dying or dead, are standards of belief only in name; and yet these standards, in virtue of their nominal maintenance, work more mischief and hindrance to truth and progress than can easily be told. It is for this reason that the official spokesmen of our churches do not know where they stand, and on many great intellectual, moral, and spiritual issues of the present time have no message to give, or a message uttered in uncertain, halting tones. A better day will dawn for the world when all churches shall have cast aside the last remnants of their broken-down dogmas, and shall be free to become the world's pioneers of Truth and Light, and not be dragged reluctantly behind the wheels of progress, as they have been hitherto.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS: An Advocacy of the Spiritual Principle in Ethics from the Point of View of Personal Idealism. By W. R. Boyce Gibson, M. A., Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of London. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. viii, 223.

The main objects of this book are, it appears, two: to advocate "the spiritual principle in Ethics," and to advocate "the point of view of Personal Idealism." Mr. Gibson apparently desires to convince us chiefly of the two propositions: (1) that there is a "spiritual principle in morality" (p. 71), and (2) that "the individual's own inviolate spiritual experience is the central fact in Moral Philosophy" (p. v). We may, then, hope to do justice to his book, if we endeavor to discover, first, precisely what it is that he means by these two vague phrases, and secondly, how far he is successful in showing that what he means is true.

What, then, does he mean when he says that there is a "spiritual principle in morality"? He tells us that by showing this, he will establish the existence of Moral Philosophy, as distinguished from what he calls "Ethical Science." In general, he says, there are two ways of considering facts: we may either "identify" a fact with "the object known through an experience" (p. 49); and it is only with such facts as these that "Science" deals: or we may take a fact "concretely as including the relation between ourselves, who experience, and the objects experienced" p. 50); and it is with facts so taken that Philosophy deals. To take a fact in the latter way is apparently to recognize the "spiritual element present in it" (p. vi); and that all facts may be so taken—that there is a spiritual element present in them all—Mr. Gibson apparently takes to be proved by that argument of Green's, in which he tries to show that "the fact known necessarily implies the knowing subject" (p. 70). In short, in order to prove the "presence of a spiritual principle in all facts," it is, it appears, only necessary to establish the well-known idealistic position, that nothing can exist at any time, unless it is simultaneously known by a knowing subject.

It would appear to follow at once that there is a spiritual element in moral facts, since, if Green's argument is correct, they too, being facts, cannot exist unless they are known. But at this point we first meet with a perplexity; for it appears, from the

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author's words, that the presence of a spiritual principle in morality is, after all, *not* proved by the above argument of Green's, but only by an argument of "precisely the same kind" (pp. 71, 82). This new argument is apparently directed to showing that a "motive" is "*toto genere* different" from a mere "want," since it is "*first constituted* by the reaction of the man's self upon [such a want], and its identification of itself" with the object of such a want (p. 84).

It seems plain that this argument is supposed to be analogous to the former one, owing to the fact that, whereas the former tried to show that all facts have a certain relation to the knowing subject, this tries to show that, where we speak of "motives," a "want" has also a relation (though quite a different one) to the knowing subject. But it seems also plain that the two arguments are far from "precisely similar." For whereas the first tries to show that *every* fact is related to the knowing subject, in the manner described by saying that it is known by it; this only maintains that *some* wants are related to the knowing subject in the manner described by saying that the knowing subject identifies itself with their object.

We find, then, that when Mr. Gibson tells us that there is "a spiritual principle" in a fact, he may be expressing his belief in either of two very different propositions. He may mean (1) that the fact in question is simultaneously known by a knowing subject; or he may mean (2) that the fact in question is a "want" and that a knowing subject "identifies" itself with the object of this want. We find moreover, that whereas in the first view there is a spiritual principle in all facts, in the second there is a spiritual principle only in "wants," and not even in all wants, but only in those which are called by certain names.

But this is not all that he means by the phrase; for to say that there is a "spiritual principle in facts" is also, it appears, to say that there is "purpose" in them—that they are "snatched from the realm of mechanism into that of teleology" (p. vi). "We have," Mr. Gibson says, "in the spiritual factor in an experience, the very presence of purposive activity, so that to take experience in its integrity necessitates our treating it teleologically" (p. 50). And accordingly, as we were before told that philosophy is distinguished from science by recognizing the spiritual elements in facts, so we are told, again and again, that it is distinguished by its "teleological method" (p. 49). We

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have it, then, that part of what Mr. Gibson desires to advocate is the view that "purposive activity is present in every fact," and that, consequently, every fact may be "treated teleologically." What precisely does he mean by this?

In the first place, we are told that "the teleological point of view, characteristic of true moral philosophy, is well represented by its dominant question: How do facts express . . . spiritual purpose"? (p. 29). And we are further told that "to explain a thing, in the most fundamental sense of the term, is to point out the purpose which it serves" (p. 52). I think, then, that when Mr. Gibson tells us that "purposive activity is present" in every fact, and that consequently every fact can be treated by the teleological method, which is characteristic of philosophy, he does at least mean us to understand that every fact both "expresses" and "serves" a "purpose."

But what precisely does Mr. Gibson mean by a "purpose"? For any definite answer to this question we must turn to Lecture IX, in which Mr. Gibson maintains that Prof. Stout's psychology is "teleological." "All consciousness, with Prof. Stout," he says, "is conative consciousness" (p. 199); and "Prof. Stout's theory of Conation is essentially teleological in character." Of this "teleological" theory of conation Mr. Gibson gives us an account, from which we may elicit the following information:

All conation, we are told, "tends invariably towards an end in one or both of the two senses of that word, 'aim' or 'ending'" (p. 199). But all conation, which tends towards an end in the sense of "aim," also, we find tends towards an "ending" (ib.); and hence we may infer that such conation, as tends towards an end in *one only* of the two senses, does not tend towards an "aim." We have, therefore, two kinds of conation—one which tends *only* towards an "ending" and not towards an "aim," and one which tends towards both; and these two kinds are apparently those spoken of on the next page (p. 200), the first as "directed blindly," the second as "directed deliberately," "to an end." In both cases, Mr. Gibson tells us, the conation "is manifestly purposive," though "only in the latter case" can we "strictly speak of its being teleological" (ib.).

We find, then, that Mr. Gibson does not always use the word "purpose" in that common sense in which it is equivalent to "aim"; since he tells us that even those conations, which are characterized by the absence of any "aim," are yet "manifestly

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purposive." In what sense, then, does he use the word? We can, I think, form some positive idea of his meaning by considering two other passages which occur in the same connection. On p. 201 he quotes from Prof. Stout the sentence: "The process would not be a process towards an end, if it could persist without variation in an unsuccessful course"; and he himself, on p. 198, expresses the same view by saying that all process which is directed to an end must vary "such tentative efforts as fail to prove purposive." It is plain that Mr. Gibson here uses the word "purposive" in the same sense as that in which Prof. Stout uses "successful"; and we seem justified in inferring that, whatever else he may mean by "purpose," he does, at least, mean that "to serve a purpose" is to produce a successful result. In short, it appears that, though "aim" and "ending" are *the* two senses of the word "end," yet no process which tended towards an "ending" would be tending towards an end, unless it also tended towards a "successful ending."

It appears, then, that when Mr. Gibson tells us that "there is a spiritual principle" in a fact, he may mean at least three different things. We have indeed, by no means exhausted the richness of meaning which he attaches to the phrase; but to show that there is a "spiritual principle" in moral facts, in at least these three senses, appears to be essential to his purpose. How far is he successful in showing it?

(1) In the first sense, as we have seen, he maintains that there is a spiritual element in *all* facts, and he gives no separate argument to prove it of moral facts. But in order to prove that all facts are simultaneously known, his only argument seems to consist in emphasizing the tautology that whatever we know is known (pp. 76, 77). And from this indisputable truth, it does not seem to follow either that all facts are known at any time, or that what is known at one time cannot exist without being known at the time when it exists. I think, therefore, that Mr. Gibson's demonstration of his first point can hardly be regarded as successful.

(2) As for his second point, it is, as has been said, of quite a different nature from the last. We must assume that Mr. Gibson identifies "moral facts" with "motives" or "acts of will"; and he is then merely maintaining that "moral facts," understood in this sense, differ in an important respect from another class of mental facts, which may be called mere "wants." Now it may,

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I think, be admitted that there are important differences between the two kinds of mental fact which Mr. Gibson means by "motives" and "wants"; and also that some well-known psychologists and moral philosophers have sometimes assumed that there was no difference. If so, then Mr. Gibson does here call attention to a distinction of some phychological and ethical importance; and it even seems possible that in a "motive," the subject does, in some sense, "identify himself with an object," whereas in a "want" he does not. But Mr. Gibson does not help us to discover what that sense is.

(3) In his third sense, Mr. Gibson again maintains that there is a spiritual element in *all* facts: and, so far as I can see, he offers no arguments whatever in support of this contention. He seems to regard it as following directly from his first thesis that "all facts are known"; and if we accept this first thesis; if, further, we accept the view, attributed to Prof. Stout, that all consciousness is conative consciousness; if we also take conative to imply "purposive" in the sense above explained; and if, finally, we identify a fact with the consciousness of a fact (as Mr. Gibson appears to do), the conclusion seems to follow. But we may take it, I think, that there must be at least one mistake in these premises, since Mr. Gibson himself appears to admit the very obvious fact that the conclusion is untrue. He admits, we have seen, that some "tentative efforts" may "fail to prove purposive" (p. 188), whence it would seem to follow that some facts, at all events, do not lead to success.

Mr. Gibson's success in showing that there is "a spiritual principle in moral facts" does not, then, appear to be very striking. We have examined three of the theses, which he advances in support of this conclusion, and our result is as follows: His first thesis is a highly disputable conclusion, which seems to be totally unsupported by the reason he gives for it. His second asserts a difference between two kinds of mental fact, which undoubtedly do differ, and of which the difference has sometimes been neglected; and gives a very vague, metaphorical description of the nature of this difference. His third appears to be obviously false; is admitted by Mr. Gibson himself to be so; and no attempt is made to prove it.

But although Mr. Gibson has failed to prove it, it may perhaps be the case that, in all these three senses, a "spiritual principle" is present in all *moral* facts; and that unless this is so, there can

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be no such thing as Moral Philosophy. Mr. Gibson has told us that in advocating these three propositions about moral facts, he is advocating the existence of Moral Philosophy; and it is, therefore, pertinent to inquire whether, if true, these three propositions would establish that conclusion.

What bearing, then, upon Moral Philosophy have the three theses (1) that all moral facts are known, (2) that "will" differs from "want" in a peculiar way, (3) that all moral facts serve a purpose?

"Ethical Science," Mr. Gibson tells us, is a purely "inductive" inquiry; and by this he seems plainly to mean that it merely seeks to discover, by observation, what are the causes or effects of certain facts. Now certainly the object of Ethics, as commonly understood, is to discover something quite other than this: part, at least, of its object is to show that some actions "ought" and others "ought not" to be done, and that some of the objects, at which men may aim, are better than others. We may, then, I think, assume that since Mr. Gibson does not include these questions in the sphere of "Ethical Science," he does intend to include them in that of "Moral Philosophy"; and that, therefore, when he tells us that his three theses will establish the existence of Moral Philosophy, he must regard them as sufficient to show that some actions are right and others wrong, and some objects of pursuit better than others.

But do they show this?

The first merely informs us that all moral facts (whatever these may be) are alike in respect of the fact that they are known; and how it will follow from this that they or some other facts are unlike in a totally different respect—how, because all "moral facts" are known, it follows that some things are right and others wrong, or that some things are better than others, I cannot conceive.

With regard to the second thesis, it has been already admitted that it is of some ethical importance; but its importance certainly does not consist in its having any tendency to establish the existence of a Moral Philosophy. From the mere fact that "will" exists, it will not follow that anything is good, and still less that some things are better than others, or that some are right and others wrong. The adherent of "Ethical Science" might perfectly well admit Mr. Gibson's distinction between "will" and "want," and yet, with entire consistency, deny that

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there is such a thing as Moral Philosophy. It is true that Mr. Gibson, following Green, supposes that in will there is always present "some idea of the man's personal good" (p. 83). This may, perhaps, be true, in some sense; and if so, from the fact that will exists, it will follow that some things are *regarded* as good; but that anything is so will again not follow.

It is only the third thesis which seems to have any possible connection with the establishment of Moral Philosophy. We have seen that by "purposive" Mr. Gibson sometimes means "conducive to success"; and if he uses the word "success" in one of the senses which it may have, namely, in the sense of a "good result," then from the thesis that all moral facts have good results it will follow that some results are good. If this is what Mr. Gibson means, that we may admit that he here enunciated a principle which is essential to the existence of Moral Philosophy; though it is by no means sufficient to establish that existence. Moral Philosophy does differ from "Ethical Science" by recognizing that some things are good; but it must also recognize that some are better than others, and Mr. Gibson gives us no hint as to how this further conclusion is to be established.

But there is grave reason to doubt whether, after all, Mr. Gibson does understand "purposive" in this, the only sense which will give to any of his theses even the slightest connection with the establishment of Moral Philosophy. For in spite of his explicit declaration that, even where conations have no "aim," they are yet "purposive," yet it is only from those doctrines of Prof. Stout, which deal with "purposes" in the sense of "aims," that Mr. Gibson professes to see "that the transition to Moral Philosophy proper is not only not difficult but inevitable" (p. 207). That, indeed, it is with "purposes" in this sense, and not in any other, that he connects Moral Philosophy, might have been inferred from that perplexing passage in which he told us that blind conations, though "purposive," are yet not strictly "teleological." It is then, not from any connection of "moral facts" with good results, but only from their connection with results that have been aimed at, that Mr. Gibson hopes to establish the existence of Moral Philosophy. It is from doctrines of Prof. Stout's, which consists solely in generalizations about the causes and effects of "aims," that he finds the transition to Moral Philosophy inevitable. In short, it appears that Mr. Gibson is entirely at one with the adherents of "Ethical Science," in hold-

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ing that what "ought" to be can be inferred from what regularly does happen. The "teleological" method, which he is recommending as essential to Moral Philosophy, differs in no respect from that which he regards as characteristic of mere "Ethical Science." Both will merely give us causal laws; but Mr. Gibson's will give us laws about the causes and effects of "purposes," whereas, we presume, "Ethical Science" merely discovers the causes and effects of other things. We may certainly agree with Mr. Gibson that purposes have causes and effects; and that if "Ethical Science" denies this, "Ethical Science" is wrong. But that to recognize this, or to recognize any particular causal law whatever, is to establish the existence of Moral Philosophy, we certainly cannot agree.

So much for Mr. Gibson's advocacy of "the spiritual principle in Ethics." Is he a more successful advocate of "the point of view of Personal Idealism"?

And, first of all, what precisely does he mean by this point of view?

As we have already seen, to advocate this point of view in Ethics is to advocate the view that "the individual's own inviolate spiritual experience is the central fact in Moral Philosophy." And elsewhere Mr. Gibson gives us other phrases which seem to be intended to express the same meaning. We are told that Personal Idealism "adopts as its starting-point the human soul's immediate self-consciousness" (p. 159); and again, that "it starts from the individual's immediate experience"—takes this as its "datum" (p. 212); and again that "the characteristically philosophical datum is the fact of experience *as it is for the experient*" (p. 220).

We presume, then, that in advocating this point of view, Mr. Gibson is, at least, advocating the view that " the individual's immediate experience" (to choose one phrase out of many) is a correct and sufficient starting-point for philosophy generally, and for Moral Philosophy in particular; and by this again we presume he means that from this "experience," we can infer all truths, both moral and philosophical, which can be inferred at all. It only, then, remains to discover precisely what Mr. Gibson means by "the individual's immediate experience"; and here, too, we have data for forming an opinion which seems to leave little room for error. "To start from God's own immediate experience," it appears, would be to start from "what God is for himself" (p.

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219); and our own spiritual experience is apparently "inviolate," in the sense that what we are for ourselves is something which nobody else can ever know (pp. 139, 140).

Mr. Gibson is then maintaining that from "what we are for ourselves," all other truths, both moral and philosophical, which can be inferred at all, can be inferred. But we must notice still one other point, in order to define his meaning quite precisely. Plainly no one can take as his starting-point what *all* of us are for ourselves, since what any other is for himself is just what no man can ever know. Mr. Gibson is then maintaining that from what *each* of us is for himself, all other truths can be inferred: he can infer them from what he is for himself, and I can infer them from what I am for myself.

So much for Mr. Gibson's meaning. By way of argument for this extraordinary proposition, I cannot find that he offers anything whatever. It only remains, then, to consider whether the mere statement of it is sufficient to advocate it successfully.

Surely it must be plain that, on the contrary, it refutes itself, since, if this proposition were true, there would be at least one proposition, namely, itself, which could not possibly be inferred from what anyone is for himself. What I am for myself is, by hypothesis, totally unknown to Mr. Gibson; and this being so, surely, from what he is for himself, he cannot infer that from this totally unknown thing, which I am for myself, all truths can be inferred? Surely it is plain that from what I am for myself, if that is my only premise, I cannot infer even that there are any other selves. From *what* I experience, as it is for me who experience it, much can no doubt be inferred; and this is sometimes all that Mr. Gibson seems to mean. But even from this, if it were all "inviolate," in the sense of unknown to anyone else, I certainly could not infer that anything which I know could be inferred from what any one else experiences. It is, therefore, only if we understand the starting-point, which Mr. Gibson recommends, to be "*what* the individual experiences, as it is for the experient," that there seems anything to be said for that starting-point; and though his experience of what he experiences may, no doubt, be inviolate in the two senses that it is a different thing from anybody else's experience of the same thing, and that nobody else knows it in precisely the same manner as he knows it, we must be careful to insist that not even his experience of what he experiences is totally unknown to others. But, if this be all that Mr. Gibson

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means, then he has given us very little light upon the question what his starting-point is. What he tells us amounts to little more than a boast that, whatever he does take as his starting-point is true and is immediately known to some individual. This may be so; but we cannot judge whether it is so, until we are told what it is that he takes to be true and immediately known.

Mr. Gibson expresses opinions on a great many other topics beside those mentioned. And almost everywhere he shows the same defects as have appeared in his treatment of his two main theses. He embraces under a single vague expression propositions of the most divers content and importance, without any apparent consciousness of their diversity; and, consequently, propositions of the most extravagant or doubtful character are presented to us as if they must stand or fall with truisms, with which, in fact, they have no closer connection than that the same words may be used to cover both. The book is a very poor book indeed.

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Edinburgh.

Moral Education. By Edward Howard Griggs, Author of "The New Humanism," etc. B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1904. Pp. 352.

The fruit of much practical educational experience, and of large contact, not only with the extensive literature of the subject, but also, what is more important, with the best that is to-day being thought and undertaken in the progressive educational world, this book by Mr. Griggs is one of the significant indications of the trend of education in the present time, while in itself it is a decided contribution to the philosophy and method of education.

The first seven chapters deal with fundamental principles of education, laying the foundation in the nature of the child. Here Mr. Griggs follows closely the methods and results of the child-study movement; and his treatment culminates in the consideration of the type of character to be fostered by moral education, which is described as "a strong and effective moral personality, reverently obedient to the laws of life and controlled by clear-sighted reason; seeing, loving, and willing the best on the plane of life that has been reached, strong in moral initiation, and able to grow independently ever toward loftier vision and nobler

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action" (p. 66). In connection with this ideal of character, it will be well to cite the author's conception of a moral life, which is that of "happy and helpful living": and this is to be attained, on the whole, by the kind of culture which initiates one into the best life of the race, but which tends to strengthen the individual to independent living in all the ranges of thought and conduct.

The aim of moral education as thus defined will seem to many somewhat vague, or applicable to intellectual rather than to moral culture. The breadth of interest which it indicates, though good in itself, may make difficult the practical work of fostering guiding principles, without which the moral life lacks definiteness and oftentimes virility. It is true that "the problem of moral education is the problem of the whole of education in relation to its moral centre and aim," and that "moral culture cannot be the function of any single influence or institution" (p. 55). But it is also a question if the best results can be gained without some specialization of function in home, school, or church, for the inculcation of distinctive moral principles, which, while related to all culture, are effective only in their separate realization. "Thou shalt not lie," surely has application in the teaching of mathematics and science, and in the largest range of culture; but the counsel lacks full effectiveness in the life of child or man until it comes to stand out as a principle of the moral life.

Even with this modification of the conception of the end of moral culture, the methods considered by Mr. Griggs in the remaining chapters of the book are suggestive and helpful. Unlike much of current educational discussion, the parent is not here made subservient to the teacher or entirely ignored.

Especially helpful to parents is Chapter XIII, on Principles of Government in Home and School, and Chapter XIV, which discusses The Progressive Application of Democracy in Home and School Government. Scarcely less profitable are the succeeding chapters on corrective discipline and personal influence. Even those chapters which deal distinctly with the use of the educational material of the school-room, although they are of especial interest to the teacher, will be found quite as suggestive to many thoughtful parents; for one could wish that parents, even in these preoccupied days, could find the occasion to read and discuss the great biographies and masterpieces of literature with their children, for the sake of that higher companionship

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so needful to any true influence over the child's thought and life.

Likewise, one can but wish that the suggestions to parents in Chapter XIX—Direct Ethical Instruction—might bear fruit in the hours of intercourse between parent and child, when both are conscious of the purpose in hand. Mr. Griggs says, "The average parent will be much more sure to carry out his part in the work of ethical instruction if he assigns some regular time daily for it. . . . Thus, if the parent can consecrate even a few minutes each evening to quiet talks with his children, sometimes with all together, sometimes with each alone, over the events and action of the day, the work of ethical instruction will grow apace and the results at the end of a year will amaze one who has not previously tried the plan" (p. 216).

The first need of many, if not all, parents is for some wisely selected and well arranged book of materials for moral training. Lacking such help, much assistance may be had from a careful study of the chapters of this book that deal with the use of mythology, literature, history, and the various references to biography as material for moral instruction. To the teacher of literature or history these discussions will be especially significant; and to such teachers is open the first door into the new school which shall aim not simply at mental culture, but more at the development of character in the young.

The motive for moral nurture which animates Mr. Griggs is largely an interest in personal life, the desire that every child shall come to "happy and helpful living": the larger motive—that of democracy—which lies in the imperative social need has not been brought out in this discussion, but from the point of view of personal need, it is not difficult to find one's way to the larger social need, which when realized, must make such books as this valuable as guides in a new educational endeavor, the end of which shall be not only intellectual equipment, but inspiration for the tasks of social life in the growing democracy.

MONTCLAIR, N. J. LESLIE WILLIS SPRAGUE.

THE PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF IMMORTALITY AND ITS CONNEXION WITH THE THEORY OF IDEAS. By R. K. Gaye. Cambridge University Press. 1904.

Mr. Gaye's object in this book is to investigate the connection between the theory of ideas and the theory of the im-

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mortality of the soul as held by Plato, and in this way to make clear the nature of Plato's conception of immortality and to determine in what sense he believed in the continued existence of the individual soul: this subject has involved the consideration of the Platonic conception of the soul and of the relation of soul and body.

Mr. Gaye follows Dr. Jackson in his interpretation of Plato's philosophical development. Indeed, this book is mainly an attempt to prove that those who accept Dr. Jackson's views of the later Platonism must admit that Plato believed the individual soul to be immortal, and in this Mr. Gaye is successful. Indeed, it is plain that whether we accept Dr. Jackson's views or not, Plato did to the last believe in the immortality of individual souls. But Mr. Gaye's attempt to establish his interpretation of this immortality and of the relation of soul to body cannot be regarded as successful.

Mr. Gaye first explains Plato's advance on the earlier views of immortality as regards greater clearness of conception, as shown especally in the "Phædo," which insists upon the immateriality of the soul just as upon the immateriality of the ideas. At this period of his life Plato believed that just as the ideas are immaterial and imperishable and exist in a world apart from particulars, so the soul is immortal and separable from the body and may when existing apart from the body have direct knowledge of the ideas. According to Mr. Gaye, Plato, both at this period and later, did not think that he could prove anything more than that soul is immortal, but that he held it reasonable to suppose that soul is always distributed into the same personalities, and that therefore a belief in individual immortality is not unreasonable. But Mr. Gaye has not explained what personal identity is, nor what Plato thought it was.

Plato, however, in Mr. Gaye's view, became dissatisfied with this earlier position: he found that while insisting upon the immateriality of the ideas and of the soul, he was really materializing both in his doctrine that ideas are immanent in particulars and that the soul is related to body; and that if he was to save the immateriality of the soul and the ideas he must revise his doctrine of the relation of ideas to particulars and of soul to body. It is at this point that Mr. Gaye seems to us to begin to seriously misinterpret Plato. Mr. Gaye attributes Plato's supposed dissatisfaction to the realization of the difficulties urged

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in the early chapters of the Parmenides, difficulties, the point of which Mr. Gaye interprets to be that relation to space and to things in space necessitates that the entity, idea or soul, so related be itself material. But there is no reason to suppose that this is true; and no reason to suppose that Plato held it to be true: and as regards the difficulties urged in the "Parmenides," they are not insoluble; and it is doubtful whether Plato urged them, as Mr. Gaye assumes, as final and irrefutable criticisms of his earlier doctrine and not rather as criticisms the answer to which depends on a clearer conception of what that doctrine is.

However, Mr. Gaye, following Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer Hind in supposing a revolutionary change in Plato's philosophy, proceeds to elicit from the "Timaeus" in the interpretation of which he follows Mr. Archer Hind, Plato's later theory of immortality. It is difficult to explain what this is. Briefly put, it appears to be this: Infinite or absolute mind thinks and thinks according to the ideas which are now only of natural kinds: the product of its thinking are certain finite minds of a high order, which as many are necessarily differentiated in space,—why necessarily?—and certain lower minds, which by the thinking of the higher finite minds are attached to bodies and thus become the living animals of the world, the instances of the natural kinds. Matter, on this theory, is the necessary product of the "pluralization" of infinite mind, since this pluralization necessitates the differentiation of the objects thought by infinite mind in space, which is Plato's matter. Thus, while according to Mr. Gaye and Dr. Jackson, the later Platonism saves the immateriality of the ideas, which are now limited to the ideas of natural kinds, and permanent modes of the operation of supreme mind, it teaches that souls are always necessarily attached to body and can never have full knowledge of the ideas: souls are immortal and by metempsychosis can all attain to the highest state, namely that of man, but can never be freed, as Plato had hoped in his younger days, from the trammels of matter.

The criticism of Mr. Gaye's views involves a criticism of those of Dr. Jackson and Mr. Archer Hind, a difficult and lengthy task, involving detailed discussion of minute points of interpretation, which is here impossible. A few points may, however, be touched upon. First, there seems to be no adequate authority for supposing that Plato held that finite minds can never have

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full knowledge of the ideas. Secondly, Dr. Jackson's view of the paradeigmatic ideas of the natural kinds, and of the relation of resemblance which particulars have to them, neglects Plato's doctrine that resemblance implies the possession of a common element; and thus does not get over the difficulty of the third man. Thirdly, Dr. Jackson has not explained what is meant by a natural kind. And as regards Mr. Gaye's pursuit of this theory into the question of immortality, it may be pointed out that in lack of a definition of natural kind, Mr. Gaye seems to nullify Dr. Jackson's views that there are ideas of natural kinds. For Mr. Gaye's arguments seem to lead to the conclusion that there is only one idea, the highest, *i. e.*, that of man: for since a natural kind is apparently a kind which is perpetuated by nature, that is one which is always actually represented by instances,—for how else distinguish between man and sophist?—and since Mr. Gaye's view, as he himself realizes, allows of the attainment by all souls to the highest state, namely that of man, it follows that the other kinds are not always represented by instances and are not, therefore, natural kinds any more than is, *e. g.*, sophist a natural kind. Further, Mr. Gaye seems to have failed to realize as clearly as is necessary the outcome of his views that the soul of Plato's later theory is not immaterial. Mr. Gaye's words imply that this materiality is different from the materiality which he asserts, for very questionable reasons, to be involved in Plato's earlier doctrine. But his statement that the later theory is a relative dualism dependent on an ultimate monism does not fully explain the difference between the earlier and later doctrines. Indeed, the whole of the metaphysical interpretation of the "Timaeus," which Mr. Gaye accepts from Mr. Archer Hind, needs a far clearer statement than it has so far received. At present it is impossible to discover whether the finite minds which are differentiated in space and so perceived under the conditions of time and space, are parts of the infinite mind, or are objects of the thinking of infinite mind. They might, of course, be both in the sense that one part might have another part as the object of its thinking: but Mr. Gaye seems to imply that the part which thinks is itself the object which it thinks,—a view which is in itself indefensible and which we have no reason to attribute to Plato. The acceptance, moreover, of one alternative only leads to difficulties. If the finite souls are parts of infinite mind, they are not, as Mr. Gaye says, necessarily

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material, since matter only arises as the phenomena of the perception of differentiated souls: and is not necessarily related to souls—unless absolute mind is itself necessarily material, as having parts. And if the souls are objects of the thinking of infinite mind, then the spiritual part of them is different from the material part, and both, if real at all, are equally real: and thus the criticism which Mr. Gaye urges against Plato's earlier conception of the relation of soul to body is as valid against his supposed later view.

It is impossible to criticize this book adequately without a much more minute and lengthy discussion, which is here impossible. The task of criticism is rendered all the more difficult by the fact that to show that Mr. Gaye's interpretation of Plato is inconsistent is not to show that it is wrong: for Plato was not necessarily consistent. The main criticism of the book, however, is that though it makes its points clearly and is for that reason of considerable value for all students of Plato, it has failed to establish satisfactorily that the interpretation of Plato which it adopts is the only possible interpretation, or that Plato was really influenced by the difficulties and arguments by which Mr. Gaye assumes him to have been influenced.

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FAITH AND KNOWLEDGE. Sermons by W. R. Inge, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford; Examining Chaplain to the Bishop of Lichfield. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1904. Pp. x, 292.

These sermons are thoughtful, scholarly, finely spiritual. I should not think of calling them great or powerful. But they are good—at times quite suggestive, though in places tolerably commonplace. I am more struck with the presence of theological elements than with distinctively ethical appeals, which are by no means wanting. These latter chiefly concern us in this JOURNAL. In one place, for example (p. 60), we find "the truth and reality of the *ought to be*" affirmed, and this latter declared to be "the supreme category of the mind." In another instance (p. 100), the author insists that "everywhere in Christian ethics, the direction of the *will* is fundamental."

These sermons have a Preface, and an interesting one—an unusual thing for volumes of sermons. Their author frankly says

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he "has not much sympathy with the *Wünsch-philosophie* which is now so popular among Christian apologists." He regrets the tendency to "degrade the reflective reason to the position of a mere advocate retained by the will," and he disagrees with Lotze's dictum that "we strive to know only in order that we may learn to do." In all which, I confess myself in hearty agreement with him. Depreciation of the speculative reason has always seemed to me a disastrous mistake, and a no less imperious obligation seems to rest on man to use his powers of knowing than to exercise his powers of doing. There is more of interest in the Preface. But it does not seem to have occurred to the author that it is a serious thing to write so good a Preface in such a connection, because it is apt to raise dangerously high expectations of the sermons that follow. When all has been said, I think one may rightfully ask for a larger ethical appeal in Christian teaching than still obtains—I mean, not so much in the way of displacing doctrinal elements as in emphasizing the fact that such elements have not served their purpose until they land us in actual practice of ethical virtue. This virtue—at once Christian and human—it is their high and sufficient merit to help us attain.

After four sermons—all good, and all rich in theological elements, though the theology is not in the first quite so strong as it well might be—we come to a sermon on "Justice," with marked ethical elements in its appeal. In it we are told that "we are so constituted that we cannot believe in an *ought to be* which is merely the antithesis or the complement of what *is*," and that "we must look for justice rather by the transformation of our personality than of our circumstances." Further, "that nothing but a bad will can separate us wholly from God," and that "we must work out our salvation, and work off our perdition, day by day. We are always sowing our future; we are always reaping our past; and our past began long before we were born." It is open to question, however, whether insistences like these have been quite satisfactorily related to theological doctrines which this same sermon shows the author to hold. That seems to me one of the most commonly neglected things in writers who in one breath make theological insistences, and in the next give you ethical appeals. Both may be true, but at least their harmonious relation should be shown, and the ethical virtue flowing from Christianity properly adjusted to its theological

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sources or supports. "Truth in Love" is another sermon in which ethical elements are finely prominent. After emphasis on the will's fundamental place, the author goes on to discuss why we are least judicial in subjects where it is "most important that we should know the exact truth." Manifestly, this is due, in the view of our author, "to the interference of the *will* with the calm processes of the intellect. The will is the disturbing influence," and he goes on, in an interesting passage which is too long to quote, to show that there is a way of maintaining the truth in our willing, as in our thinking. But why does the author, who has in the Preface shown his dislike to "mere" retained advocates, say so contentedly that "we cannot promise to be impartial"? Can we not say at least that superiority to prejudice, uprightness in judging, and impartiality in estimate and inquiry, are indeed the goal in all our striving? The one and only thing we have a right to promise is, discontent with our own imperfectly attained impartiality: we have no greater need than a spirit of reverence for Truth so supreme that we hold ourselves in readiness to drop every prejudice and prepossession before the Truth as laid open to us or discoverable by us. What is Reason for—on which he so finely and truly insists—but to guide the purified and rectified will to this exquisite poise and balance in judging of the truth? What is Religion for but to open the mind to Truth, so that we shall welcome light from whatever quarter it may come? I am, of course, aware of the high authority for so speaking, but none the less should we shrink from adopting it, or acquiescing in it.

"Humility" is the theme of the sermon that follows, and the treatment is here ethical rather than theological. Indeed, the sermon, which is a good one, is interesting as developing, historically and ethically, what Canon Liddon developed theologically, in his strong University Sermon on the same text. It is altogether needful to vindicate the character of Christian humility as Mr. Inge has done, but the greatness of humility wants showing on every side. The religious greatness of humility has been set forth by no one more impressively than the late Bersier, of Paris, but if we want the more human and ethical aspects of the greatness of humility, we have certainly to look less to preachers than to writers like Emerson. The greatness of humility is not known till we have touched it on all these sides, and found its ever-deepening greatness.

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Some interesting ethical insistences are found in the sermon on "The Inspiration of the Individual." "In religion the *will* must never be passive." "The way to strengthen the will and direct it in the right way, is to *interest* ourselves in the things that really matter. A man's rank in the scale of living beings is determined entirely by the objects in which he is really *interested.* I commend this as one of the most vital truths of practical philosophy." So in the sermon on the "Religious Consciousness," it is said, "the religion of the *will* makes conduct not three-fourths of life, with Matthew Arnold, but the whole"; and in that on "Eternal Life," that "it is this latter conviction which is at the root of all religious faith,—the belief in the reality of the *ought to be.*" Amid a good deal of purely theological matter, we have, in the sermon on the "Theologica Germanica"—one of the most interesting in the book—the following of ethical import: "Virtue in the highest sense *is* its own reward, and sin its own punishment. There is nothing arbitrary or external about God's judgments. Whatsoever a man soweth, that, and nothing else, shall he reap." "The doctrine that goodness is its own reward and badness its own punishment, in no way forbids us to believe that both reward and punishment are infinite."

Two remarks may be made as to this volume in closing, one, that the author is not merely preacher and rhetorician but, one is pleased to find, a capable spiritual thinker, and the other, that the style is always clear and good. The publisher's work is perfect.

James Lindsay.

Kilmarnock, Scotland.

Principles of Justice in Taxation. By Stephen F. Weston, Ph. D., Dean of Antioch College. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XVII, No. 2.) New York: The Columbia University Press, 1903. Pp. 299.

Dr. Weston approaches the subject of justice in taxation from the three-fold standpoint of political science, economics, and ethics. For, as he says, the whole problem grows out of the relation of the individual to the state; but economic goods and economic relations are necessarily involved, and the taxable subject, man, has an ethical character. Hence, there are separate chapters on the political, economic, and ethical bases and principles of taxation.

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Thus the "protection theory" of taxation is treated first in the political chapter, and reappears in the economic and ethical chapters as the "benefit theory." An attempt is made to distinguish the political and economic theories, though it is admitted that they are inseparable phases of a single problem. This apparent excess of analysis necessitates some repetition and is at first somewhat confusing to the reader, but it serves a useful purpose in emphasizing that he who would solve the problem of justice in taxation must be master of all three of the sciences named.

Dr. Weston rejects the protection or benefit theory from all three standpoints, and follows the orthodox economists in their preference for the "ability" theory—that taxes should be proportioned to the ability of individuals to pay them, rather than to the benefits received from government. It might, perhaps, be objected that the ability theory seems more appropriate to voluntary contributions than to legally compulsory exactions; but the author forestalls any possible criticism on this score by ascribing to taxation a semi-voluntary character: "The people first voluntarily agree, directly or indirectly, to tax themselves; . . . and only here and there the self-seeking individual endeavors to make himself an exception to the general rule, and upon such it is agreed, individually and collectively, that compulsion shall be applied, the voluntary and compulsory character of a tax thus implying each other."

Ability is measured primarily by income, but this does not lead necessarily to an income tax. The author finds it more practicable to reach income indirectly through the medium of taxes on certain kinds of property which produce or are produced by income, or which may be taken as indices of income. But the general property tax as it exists in America is condemned in the strongest terms, particularly from an ethical standpoint because it punishes honesty and puts a premium upon perjury.

The book is not easy reading, and it is not to be recommended to elementary students, but it is one scholars cannot afford to neglect. Not the least part of its value lies in its exposition of the theories of German, Italian, and other foreign writers, giving evidence of a wide familiarity with economic and philosophical literature. An index of names and subjects would have greatly increased its value for purposes of reference.

MAX WEST.

BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, CONCERNING THE AIM AND METHOD OF EDUCATION. By William Harrison Woodward, Professor of Education in University of Liverpool. Cambridge: The University Press, 1904. Pp. 262.

To inquirers into the origins of modern culture, and to students of the history of education generally, this book will prove invaluable. Professor Woodward has already made students of education his debtors, by his learned and lucid study of the influence and work of Vittorino da Feltre and his associates in the Renaissance of European culture. This study of the life work of Erasmus as an educator is characterized by the same thoroughness, lucidity, and sympathy that made his earlier study so attractive and interesting.

Erasmus as sketched here is not an altogether attractive personality. "As all his biographers have admitted, the correspondence of Erasmus with his ally who had the ear of the lady—who yielded not very adequately to persuasion—leaves an unpleasant savor. Irritable self-conceit, shameless importunity, perfect indifference to the person importuned, are all in evidence: it is hard to banish a sense of contempt for a scholar who could play so sordid a part." And the self-centered, self-sufficing nature of the man is seen in his irresponsiveness to beautiful surroundings, whether of nature or of art.

Yet much can be forgiven one who holds that "The father who neglects the training of his son is guilty of offence against the fatherland"; "Children are born for the state and for God"; "not *where*, but *how nobly* we spend our lives." And another saying of his was, "When I have money, I will first buy Greek books, and then clothes." How curiously modern all this sounds! And indeed, this whole book of Professor Woodward's prompts the thought which Compayré formulates: "The theory (*i. e.*, of education) we must look for in the works of Erasmus, Rabelais, and Montaigne, of whom it may be said, that before pretending to surpass them, even at this day, we should rather attempt to overtake them, and to equal them in the most of their pedagogical precepts." Let me enumerate some of these "modern notions" of Erasmus. He held that the first step to be taken in educational reform was to obtain a new type of teacher; he asserted strenuously that before any reform in national education is possible we must have a better public opinion; the school cannot make opinion but opinion can make the school. Again, he advocated that the study of Latin

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should be conducted on the principle that it is a "living" language, in other words that a foreign language should be taught on just those lines now approved by our latest reformers. His ideas on the moral training of the young are precisely those of our most modern educators. He warns the master against turning moral teaching into teaching *about* morals, and bases his whole system of moral training upon personal religion, home example, and intercourse; the value of the law of interest in education he fully appreciates; liberal note-taking he very rightly condemns; while the use and abuse of grammar teaching in the language exercises he clearly formulates. Science teaching he, like not a few modern humanists, appreciates only as a means of pointing a moral, or perhaps, adorning a tale.

Lastly, must a word be said in appreciation of the attitude of Erasmus towards the school discipline of his time. At a period when the normal attitude of not only teacher, but parent also, toward the child was one of uncouth tyranny and unsympathetic treatment, it required not only knowledge, but courage also to advocate kindness, sympathy, and love in the treatment and instruction of children. When corporal punishment was universal it required courage to declare that "the boy who is not influenced by the fear of God, by regard for his parents, by shame, by conscience, is not likely to be molded aright by mere physical pain."

Lastly, what shall be said of the life-work and general attitude of these early humanist writers towards education and life, except to express our indebtedness to them? Whether we be realists or humanists (and shall I say, realistic humanists), our debt to the men who rekindled the torch of culture in Europe and kept it burning amid a gloom of ignorance and intolerance is incalculable; and to such students as the writer of this book our debt is not small for placing before us, in all their native imperfection, these leaders of light and molders of thought.

R. E. HUGHES.

NEWPORT, ENGLAND.

HOBBES. By Sir Leslie Stephen. In the English Men of Letters Series. Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1904. Pp. 243.

Professor Maitland tells us that Sir Leslie Stephen was engaged upon this book during the last months of his life. It makes a very bright conclusion to a varied list of works of

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learning. That it does not attempt to trace, even in outline, the influence of Hobbes on subsequent thought is owing to the interruption of the author's labors by his last illness. But one cannot read Sir Leslie Stephen's book without appreciating that, apart altogether from the circumstance that English moral philosophy shaped itself—and, for the most part, frankly—as an answer to Hobbes' daring system, Hobbes for his own sake makes a charming study. The reference to Croom Robertson's book in Professor Maitland's note will disarm comparison: the student will miss much unless he reads both. Never have we seen better done the task of writing *about* philosophy: sometimes there is the air of the blunt, intelligent outsider, but the substance is masterly and it is a true and even great philosopher who is speaking. One notices very early the effect of Hobbes' bewitching English style upon his expositor. To write or lecture upon Hobbes is to find one's self always slipping into quotations, but Sir Leslie Stephen finds for his readers the gratification of many sentences pointed and turned after Hobbes' own manner, with judgments of the same shrewd sort. We have to remind ourselves, of what the author makes us almost forget, that if it was not possible in Hobbes' day to live a life entirely uneventful, yet Hobbes must have come as near to quiet as most among contemporary Englishmen. Very few of the many things which caused him apprehension can be made to appear so imminent or terrible as to evoke pity enough or fear enough to purge the passions of the reader of to-day. Yet there is not a dull ten minutes in the book.

In the exposition of Hobbes' philosophy we would point first to the suggestive, though unfortunately scattered, remarks in reference to Hobbes' relation to Spinoza. Of the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," Hobbes said to Aubrey, "He has cut through me a bar's length, for I durst not write so boldly." Their "naturalism" is the same and their views on the meaning of good and evil (p. 140); they have the same physiological theory of desire and the same determinism; the same doubts of the evidence of established creeds. When Hobbes plays mathematician, Sir Leslie Stephen is usually jocose; the quarrel with Descartes is touched on lightly; but one unlearns here what one collects (quite wrongly) from other quarters as to Hobbes' isolation. In the young stream of the "mechanical philosophy" Hobbes' rivulet may not be counted for much, but it is not wasted in windings of its own.

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Hobbes' attitude to the ancients might be reprehended more severely. It is right, perhaps, not to take too seriously (what Hobbes meant in the utmost seriousness) the view that classical republicanism was a wholly corrupting influence. But when Hobbes argues that there is no such thing as the *felicity* of the ancient philosophers, "and no way to it more than to Utopia," because "there can be no contentment but in proceeding," it is not conscionable that he should be left unrebuked. "We cannot sit down," says Sir Leslie Stephen, reproving the scholastics (p. 124), "upon a solid lump of pleasure outside of time and change." Yes, but the poor ancient philosophers are led off to condemnation meanwhile for not knowing what they taught the world.

Locke's well-known statement that we cannot know the essence of a pebble or a fly seems to have been echoed from Hobbes. The principles of natural science "are so far from teaching us anything of God's nature, as they cannot teach us our own nature, nor the nature of the smallest creature living" (p. 151).

Seldom, among the many parodies of the faculty psychology, have we come across a better than is given on p. 166: "Bramhall talks," says Hobbes, "as if the will and the other faculties 'were men, or spirits in men's bellies.'"

Those who know the history of English thought upon jurisprudence will not require to be reminded that all the principles of the "analytical" school are taken straight out of Hobbes. Hobbes' attitude toward Coke and the party of parliamentary privilege is well described (p. 206): he became law student at seventy-six and attacked Coke in a "Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England,"—a work noticed by Maine as showing that Hobbes anticipated many of the legal reforms afterwards advocated by Bentham (p. 61).

Much of the savagery of Hobbes' absolutism, his contempt of Hampden, his aversion to Coke, his hatred of the Presbyterians, arises from the fact that Hobbes was hoisting Whiggery with its own petard, and took care accordingly that the materials should not grow cool. The conflict between Empire and Papacy had given rise to "the divine right of kings," and in Hobbes' day the problem was still Church and State. Not the same great Church, "no other than the ghost of the deceased Roman Empire sitting crowned upon the grave thereof," but "every man, nay, every boy and woman" who "thought they spoke with God

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Almighty and understood what He said, when by a certain number of chapters a day they had read the Scriptures once or twice over" (p. 30). It is not too much to say that Hobbes' greatest interest in absolutism was that it carried Erastianism in its bosom and the contract theory could be made its fostermother. It was not enough that the social compact should become a treacherous defence for Hampdens: it had itself to be the title of King Charles for shipmoney because it had to yield—what the "right of kings" had not professed to yield till the time came when it had to serve for everything—a ground for holding that the sovereign was the judge "when it comes to the confession" of a man's religious faith. The greatest of all the powers of sovereignty was the one most axiomatic.

G. C. RANKIN.

LONDON.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO. By William Boyd, M. A., B. Sc. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Pp. v, 196.

The aim of this modest volume is, firstly, to help "the beginner in philosophy who finds Plato difficult"; secondly, to be of assistance to "readers who, though not especially interested in philosophy, wish to know something of one of the great classics of thought." The contents were first given to the world as a course of lectures delivered as Ewing Fellow at Glasgow; these have been recast and some new sections added.

In its present form the book consists of an introductory section followed by ten short chapters corresponding roughly, though not exactly, to the usual divisions of the *Republic*. The exposition is excellent for the kind of reader intended. The analysis is clear, the explanations and criticisms are marked by a sound common sense not always found in commentators upon Plato. In one respect only does the writer unwittingly mislead his readers, viz.: his language throughout implies (if it does not directly assert) that the "Guardians" were, from the first, a small select body for whom alone the "education" was intended; that they formed a class by themselves apart from the subject workers between whom and themselves "a great gulf was fixed"—"Plato does not trouble himself about the education of his workers," etc. Surely no English reader could gather from language of this kind that Plato intended his ladder of education

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for all his citizens, each of whom was to climb as far as he could, the point beyond which any individual failed to get marking, *eo ipso,* the kind of work (the station in life) for which he was fitted. The "rulers" were merely exceptionally gifted individuals, impossible to discover except by the process itself, who were able to reach the top.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

POLITICS IN NEW ZEALAND: Being the Chief Portions of the Political Parts of the Book Entitled "The Story of New Zealand." By Frank Parsons and C. F. Taylor. Selections arranged by C. F. Taylor. Equity Series: 1520 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, 1904. Pp. 108.

These careful selections from the large work on New Zealand, by Professor Parsons and Dr. Taylor, will put the gist of the bulky volume into the hands of a far larger number of people. The editor, Dr. C. F. Taylor, says in explanation, "My purpose has been to place the enlightening and inspiring facts of New Zealand's government and institutions before the people of our country. 'The Story of New Zealand,' was prepared with great labor and published at great expense, with that purpose in view, but it is a large and heavy book, selling at three dollars. Its size and cost prevent it from reaching the masses of our people, and the political facts, particularly, of that progressive country should reach the mind and thought of our voters. It is with a view of placing these political facts within the easy reach of the masses of our people, that I have selected the most important of these facts from the large book and arranged them as you see them in this unpretentious pamphlet. I hope that this little book will lead the reader to further studies along the line of progressive government, and particularly do I hope that our people may be inspired to emulate the example of New Zealand, and bring our government as close to the people as that of New Zealand is, and make it serve the interests of the common people."

The idea was excellent to bring the contents of a three-dollar book into the hands of the humblest reader.

The larger work published last year is perhaps the amplest and most practical statement yet made of the whole body of social legislation in that pioneer of fearless social experiment. It should be in every library and in the hand of every student. It was most

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generously and intelligently conceived as well as admirably carried out. It contains a mass of documentary evidence of the highest value.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

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A TEACHER'S HANDBOOK OF MORAL LESSONS. Arranged by A. J. Waldegrave. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. viii, 154.

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A SHORT HISTORY OF CITIZENSHIP AND INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY. By H. Osman Newland, Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, etc. London: Elliot Stock, 1904. Pp. xii, 89.

THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. By P. A. Wadia, Professor of History and Political Economy, Gujarat College, Allahabad. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. 131.

THE BIOLOGY OF BRITISH POLITICS. By Charles H. Harvey. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. viii, 172.

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THE MODERN PILGRIMAGE FROM THEOLOGY TO RELIGION. (Being some Essays in that Direction.) By Robert Locke Bremner. London: A. Constable & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. 296.

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THEISM FOUND WANTING. By W. S. Godfrey. Watts & Co., 17 Johnson's Court, Fleet Street, London, E. C., 1903. Pp. 40.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Pendene, Llanishen, Cardiff, Wales.

Books to be reviewed, published in the United States, should be sent to Mr. Percival Chubb, 33 Central Park, West, New York.

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OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1905.

MORAL CAUSATION AND ARTISTIC PRODUCTION.

The freedom of the will is not now for philosophy the burning question that it has been in the past. Philosophy has come to recognize that the opposition between Determinism and Indeterminism is to a large extent unreal. Neither of these theories now receive much serious support in their extreme form. We know that the liberty of bare indifference is not freedom, but caprice; that it is not what the moral consciousness really demands, but, on the contrary, would make morality impossible. On the other hand, Determinism in its old mechanical form is as obsolete as the rival theory. We may dispute what the relation between moral and mechanical causation is, but we have no doubt that there is a distinction between them: that the will cannot be completely explained by mechanical categories. The Kantian conception of autonomy, which makes freedom consist in obedience to a self-imposed law, has to a large extent satisfied the demands of both theories. No doubt, the conception of the autonomy of the will as stated by Kant involved serious difficulties. It regarded freedom as an ideal to which only the good will is adequate rather than as a characteristic of all will. The rigidity of Kant's statements and his attitude towards feeling and desire made autonomy of the will an ideal which almost no action ever attains. But his conception of the will as legislative has been fruitful and has finally settled the old controversy. We agree with Determinism that

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the will is not an unmotived, unintelligible agent, but that it is determined and conditioned by law, and with Indeterminism that the will is not determined by mechanical causation: that although it is ruled by law, it is self-legislative.

We no longer feel then that the existence of Ethics depends on the answer we give to the question of freedom. For whatever view of moral causation we adopt, we recognize that our theory must account, or at least leave room for, the facts of moral judgment and responsibility. The facts upon which Ethics depends rest on a firm basis of experience. They may be explained in very different ways, but they cannot be explained away. Freedom as applied to the will is not, we now recognize, a negative conception, implying that the will is independent of and apart from the rest of experience. It is the word by which we characterize all moral action. There is no doubt that moral actions do involve feelings of responsibility, the attribution of praise or blame to the agent, etc. That is all that the moral consciousness demands, and that is just what freedom means. "Will without freedom," as Hegel says, "is an empty word." The question is not whether the will is free or not, but what freedom of the will, which we recognize as a fact, implies as to the relation of moral causation to the rest of experience.

The reconciliation of Determinism and Indeterminism is satisfactory, as an answer to the question whether the will is free. But is it, as ordinarily stated, a satisfactory explanation of what the freedom of the will means or implies? The ordinary explanation of moral causation, which is usually based more or less upon Hegel, takes the freedom of the will for granted and assumes that in some way moral causation involves both law and spontaneity. But in the form in which it is ordinarily stated, this Freewill Determinism, as it has been called, seems to insist so much upon law that it leaves little room for spontaneity. "Freedom is obedience to a self-imposed law." "Man is free to obey the law of his being." These and similar statements represent the reconciliation between Determinism and Indeterminism. They profess to do justice to both sides of the controversy. But do they? Do

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they really satisfy the legitimate demands of the moral consciousness? The objection that is naturally provoked by the theory may be put thus: "We are told that we find freedom only in obedience to law or only in voluntarily imposing on ourselves the true law of our being: that if we prefer vice to virtue, then we necessarily become the slaves of caprice and passion, our wills are heteronomous and not free, we are told, that is, that we can originally choose between either A or B. (A representing obedience, B disobedience to the moral law.) But if we follow B, our will is enslaved. Therefore, if we wish to be free, there is only one way, A, by which our end can be attained. But if freedom is an end that can only be attained by following one course, A, how can the will be free, before it follows that course, while it is still deliberating between A and B?"

This may be a misunderstanding of the ordinary theory. I do not pretend that it applies to Hegel's explanation of freedom, if that be properly understood. But it certainly does apply to the way in which Freewill Determinism is often stated. Spontaneity and obedience to law are in some way combined in moral causation, but law is an ambiguous and dangerous word, and the ordinary statement of the theory gives an interpretation to it which makes spontaneity impossible. Freewill Determinism is bound to explain of what nature that law must be, which is to be consistent with spontaneity. So long as it simply says emphatically that freedom is obedience to law and uses the phrase "moral law" in its current meaning, so long will this objection apply to it. The explanation of moral causation will be felt to conflict with the claims of the moral consciousness to freedom.

Why does the moral consciousness object to any one-sided emphasis on the presence of law in moral causation? It objects, I think, to any contention that actions can be foretold. The theory that actions can be explained by mechanical categories involved the claim that, granted a knowledge of all the physical circumstances preceding an act, that act could be foretold. To that the moral consciousness offered strenuous objections. That claim has been on the whole withdrawn.

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But Freewill Determinism seems to put forward the same claim in a more subtle way. In place of prediction by mechanical, it offers prediction by psychological categories. The theory that freedom is obedience to a self-imposed law seems to imply this. Such sayings as "Character is destiny" assert it. But the claim to prediction from knowledge of the psychical facts is as repellant to the ordinary consciousness as the claim of the physical sciences. The difficulty is seen in a curious paradox. The better a man is, the more surely will his action be regulated by the moral law, and the more certain we can be that he will in any action choose the good and avoid the evil. As, therefore, man attains to freedom, the more will we be able to predict his actions, the less will they correspond to what the ordinary consciousness means by "freedom."

There is surely something wrong in this result. The moral consciousness revolts against it. This revolt in its more simple form is represented by Professor James, who, when confronted with Freewill Determinism, boldly stands up for chance. In his essay on "The Will to Believe" he accepts the assumption that the question of freedom concerns the choice between two alternative causes of action, and simply denies in the name of the moral consciousness the claim of Determinism that it is decided beforehand, whether by physical or psychical causes, what course will be followed. His contention is that the moral point of view is as important as the scientific and as true, and that is apparently an end of the matter.

With the spirit that inspires this protest we must have great sympathy, but it does not seem to offer what can be regarded as a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. This paper is an attempt to throw some light on the question from consideration of another aspect of human action—artistic production.

It may be well, first, to offer some considerations on the relevancy of this reference to artistic production when we are dealing with moral causation. There are several reasons which justify our drawing analogies between these two kinds of action.

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1. In the first place, artistic production is a mode of man's activities. It is bound, therefore, to offer much closer analogies to moral causation than can be found in the study of scientific phenomena. If human activity differs from other forms of causation, has some peculiar characteristics due to the nature of man and personality, as most people would admit, then we may expect to find these characteristics displayed in artistic production as well as in man's other activities. The uniqueness of personality is displayed as much in art as in morality.

2. In the second place, a consideration of man's artistic activity tends to correct the tendency to view moral action and causation in an abstract way. This tendency is constantly found in Ethical theory. We know, if we think of it, that there is no special and separate part of man's life with which morality deals. Plato has shown in the first book of the "Republic" that if we treat justice as one among the other acts, we reduce it to an absurdity. There is nothing for it to do. Justice becomes the art of keeping things where they are not wanted. There is no special sphere of man's activities in which morality is found. Moral causation is not any part of our actions. It is all our actions viewed from a particular aspect. We know this. It is a commonplace of moral philosophy. But in spite of our knowledge we constantly speak of moral causation as something quite apart from the rest of life, as if there were a peculiar moral world in which man says, not "What shall I do?" but "Shall I or shall I not be good?"; a world of Sundays and sermons and moral laws with a lurid background of Adelphic melodrama. Morality is manifested as much in man's artistic activities as in the rest of his life, and artistic production, from a certain point of view, *is* moral causation.

3. Thirdly, Art, like knowledge, stands in intimate relation to reality. It is man's reflection on or reproduction of experience. We say of the greatest art that it is true to reality. It must not for that reason be confounded with knowledge. The highest knowledge is not true *to* but *of* reality. The function of art is very different. We would not go to art for a theory

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of moral causation, but we may for a supremely good representation of it. It is not the function of art to know the world. Viewed as an account or explanation of reality, it is inferior to knowledge. It is not so systematic, so complete, or so reasoned. It reproduces to some extent the defects which characterize feeling as distinguished from thought as different ways of apprehending truth. But, on the other hand, it is a freer and more spontaneous reproduction of reality. It is not influenced by preconceived theories. Good art is not produced for a purpose in the narrow sense of that word. If, as may be urged, it represents reality in the light of man's emotions and feelings, it gives for that reason all the better picture of what man, with his emotions, thoughts, and feelings, is. Both art and knowledge are selective. Both choose and discriminate in dealing with experience, but the selective function in knowledge is governed by a hypothesis or a concept while that of art is not. It is governed by the personality of the artist. Knowledge may give us a truer account of the world. Art, simply because it is the interpretation of the world in the light of the artist's personality, because it is spontaneous, purposive, but governed by no purpose, will tell us more about the artist. The mirror that it holds up to nature is then a personality. Therefore, art can never serve the purpose of knowledge, because that personality is individual, and art's account of nature is colored by the light of the artist's thoughts and emotions; but for that very reason it is a true and clear reproduction of personality and character. In art we can see man's activities in an intenser, clearer light than we can in ordinary experience, because the artist has shown them to us better than we could see them ourselves. We can see "the singer's manifest heart." Therefore, if we are examining man's activities with a philosophical purpose, art offers us supremely good data.

4. Lastly, art, just because of its close connection with feeling, gives prominence and fixity to certain elements in all manifestations of personality that are apt to elude knowledge. Knowledge must lose what it cannot comprehend in its concepts or categories, and therefore if it come to the task of

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examining man's actions with inadequate categories, it must either neglect certain elements in its data or do violence to them. This is perhaps especially true of Ethical theory. Ethics, in too many cases, comes to the examination of moral causation with rigid, superficial categories and its account strips moral action of all its bloom and beauty and reduces it to a sorry skeleton. Art emphasizes and throws into bold relief those very features that knowledge finds most difficult to comprehend. Therefore, by considering artistic production we can reconsider our Ethical theories and see whether we have done justice to all the elements in our problem.

Now if we examine artistic production from this standpoint, we are struck at once by a resemblance between it and moral causation as described by Freewill Determinism. We find the one controlled and regulated by law or, rather, manifesting law as much as the other. Art is not the capricious expression of emotion. It is indeed spontaneous. Without spontaneity it cannot live. Any external compulsion or force is fatal to it. Yet it manifests law throughout. We may prefer to call form what in moral action we call law, but this form or law seems to play much the same part in both. If spontaneity or freedom is essential to art, the greatest art will be the most free and spontaneous. Yet it is the most rational, the most intelligible, the most governed by law. Here we have exactly the same paradox which is found in moral causation. The greater art is, the less does it seem to answer to what is ordinarily understood by freedom. Hegel illustrates his account of moral causation, and his distinction between abstract and real freedom, by pointing to the same characteristic of obedience to law in art. "Philosophy of Right," § 15: "The rational is the highway on which everyone travels and none is specially marked. When a great artist finishes a work, we say, 'It must be so.' The particularity of the artist has wholly disappeared and the work shows no mannerism. Pheidias shows us mannerism. The work itself lives and moves. But the poorer is the artist, the more easily we discern himself, his particularity and caprice."

This statement may seem to exaggerate the rationality of art

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at the expense of its individuality, but it certainly does express a characteristic of all great art. It expresses the feeling of perfect satisfaction that a great work of art produces in us, a feeling that is closely connected with perfection of artistic form. The more we understand and study art, the more we perceive the laws by which it has been guided. Apprehension of art means to a large extent apprehension of form. The greater a work of art is, the more does it manifest law: the more does an adequate apprehension of it depend upon an understanding of its form. We find the same phenomenon in artistic production as we did in moral causation.

But could we, therefore, describe artistic production as obedience to a self-imposed law? Is this in any way a satisfactory description of the relation in which art stands to its own canons? Does Hegel's remark on Phidias do justice to the impression produced by art? We may assume that the highest appreciation of a symphony of Beethoven's will involve understanding of and insight into the symphonic form as Beethoven employed it. The greater that insight is, the more will the listener come to understand why Beethoven did particular things in his composition, the more intelligible and rational will the symphony become to him. It will always produce that feeling of entire satisfaction. But will the symphony ever produce in him merely the feeling of inevitability expressed in "It must be so"? That feeling may be induced to some extent by the apprehension of artistic form, but it is never the only or the most characteristic feeling. As we look at the statues of the Three Fates in the Elgin Marbles, or listen to the fifth symphony of Beethoven, the natural expression of our thoughts is surely not "It must be so," but, rather, "How wonderful and marvelous that it should be so!" Our feeling is not one of inevitability, but one of wonder that such a thing has been produced.

Now this wonder is not in any way conditioned by ignorance. It does not disappear as we study and come to understand a great work of art. It rather grows greater. We may come to comprehend the law governing that particular work; we may know how certain effects are produced; we may appreciate

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more and more the artist's technique; may learn, in short, "how the thing is done"; but this fuller appreciation of the technique does not diminish but, rather, increases our feelings of wonder at the artist's power. To give an example from a recent book of criticism—Professor Bradley in his "Shakespearian Tragedy," tells us a great deal as to how Shakespeare produced his effects and gives us a greater comprehension of the form governing Shakespearian tragedy: but the effect produced is not a feeling of inevitability, but one that finds expression in a remark of the author's on a passage in King Lear: "This is one of those things that make us worship Shakespeare." The more we understand great art, the less do we feel that we could have produced it. However intelligible art becomes to us, however much its form is seen to follow regular laws, which we can understand and formulate, we never think that we could devise a work of art from those laws. There is no need to labor this point. It is a commonplace that criticism does not produce art. It has no creative function. If, as Hegel says, "when a great artist finishes his work, we say it must be so," we could never say that *before* the work is finished. Criticism may detect law: it can never prescribe it. Whatever may be the case in moral causation, we know that no understanding or insight would enable us to prophesy beforehand what a particular work of art will be. However great and deep our understanding of the artist, our knowledge of all the circumstances would never enable us to predict his work of art. We could only do that by being the artist. There is not the slightest danger that science will ever be able to predict in the case of artistic production.

Now if we ask why, although moral causation and artistic production are both governed by law, the claims of Determinism have so much plausibility in the one case and so little in the other, our answer must be that we have a much better conception of the real relation between form and matter in art than in morality. We have in art such a conception of form or law as is consistent with spontaneity. We know that there must be in moral causation the same combination of

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spontaneity and law, but we regard law in morality in an abstract and false way that makes it incompatible with spontaneity.

Art we regard as creative, and our view of its relation to the laws of art is governed by that consideration. Three points in the relation of art to its form may be selected as important for the consideration of the problem of freedom.

1. In the first place, we do not think that a work of art consists in a choice between two alternatives. When speaking of moral causation we frequently assume that the agent has two alternatives set before him, and his act, from the moral point of view, consists in his choosing one and rejecting the other; in saying "Yes" or "No" to the dictates of conscience or the suggestions of temptation. We recognize that this would be an altogether inadequate way of describing artistic production. However true it may be that art involves obedience to certain laws, it does not simply consist in such obedience. The artist may accept a prescribed form. He may make up his mind, *e. g.,* to write a sonnet. But the choice between sonnet or lyrical form, or between different forms of the sonnet, does not make a poem. It is not whether he uses this or that form that matters; but what he manages to express by means of the form. Art is always more than its form.

It is interesting also to notice that so far as we do regard artistic production as consisting in a choice between alternative forms, we can make precisely the same claims to predict which of the two alternatives an artist will follow as we can in the case of morality. The better a man is, the more certain we can be that if he is presented with the alternative of doing right or wrong, he will do right. The better a writer is, the more certain we can be that he will write good grammar. Not only so, but we may claim that, given a knowledge of the artist's environment, training, and particular circumstances, we might predict whether he would choose lyrical rather than sonnet form; we might be able to say whether a composer would choose to write a symphony or symphonic poem. But in neither case would our knowledge of the external form

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tell us what the moral action or the artistic composition would be.

2. Secondly, not only does the artist's choice between two alternative forms not constitute his action, but to speak of the choice between two alternatives gives an altogether misleading account of the artist's attitude towards form. The alternative forms or ways of expressing his matter are not *given* to the artist to choose from. His artistic production does not begin with choosing this or that form which is presented from elsewhere. A large part of his artistic power consists simply in seeing what alternative forms are possible. The artist gives himself his own alternatives. Wide perception of the possibilities of form is one of the elements that go to make a great artist. Here again we can see how far knowledge gives us power of prediction. To take an example from style: if we assume that a writer has before him five alternative words or phrases to express a certain meaning, we may know which of those five he will select. But this is to make the work of the stylist to begin where it almost leaves off. His power is not shown in being able to select the best out of alternatives presented to him. That can be done by the critic. It is his power to find, to invent, practically to create the phrase that will best express his meaning.

3. The third point is an extension of this. To say that the artist possesses the alternative forms of art which are possible, or selects that form which is most adequate to what he wants to express, still implies a false distinction between form and matter. Artistic form is not made somewhere else and thus accepted or used by art. Art does not take form as a ready-made instrument. Artistic form is created by the artist. No absolute distinction can be made between the form and matter of a work of art. It is impossible to say exactly what is form and what matter. But so far as there are certain forms or canons of art that can be viewed apart from individual works in which they are manifested, the forms do not come into existence anywhere outside of art. They are derived from an analysis of artistic production. They were originally created by art. Art does not impose a law upon itself.

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It makes or creates its own law. This creation of form is characteristic in some degree of all art. The artist may copy the form of others. He may use artistic forms that he has not himself created. Progress in art is impossible unless this is done. But just because the distinction between form and matter is only an abstraction, the form will in the artist's hands become to some extent new. This is the case even with elaborate and conventional form. Wordsworth and Rossetti both obey the rules of the sonnet, but the sonnet form is not the same thing in their different hands. This is true to some extent of all art, but it is seen most strikingly in the case of great artists. Art is always creating and modifying form. The great artist does this in a preëminent degree. Simply because he has something new to express; because the old forms are inadequate to the new matter. The greatest artists preëminently create their own form, though they are often enabled to do so by an intimate knowledge of previous form.

It is true that we see most strikingly the distinction between law in its legal and in its artistic sense. For the great artist, in creating new form, will supersede the old artistic canons, will break the old laws, and yet in so doing will be far more faithful to the laws of art than if he had attempted to confine and cramp his genius in forms that were inadequate to it. Beethoven developed and changed the form of the symphony because the older form was not so capable of fulfilling his purposes. In so doing he broke the laws that had regulated earlier music. His artistic production involved disobedience to law, but in this disobedience it created a new law. There is not less intellect and rationality in his art because it superseded the old laws, but more. The laws or art are formulated by criticism from an examination of the works of the great artists, and inside these canons lesser men work. They need not for that reason simply imitate, and they must to a certain extent modify the form which they use. But there are certain broad general rules to which they are faithful. But in time a great artist arises who creates new form that is adequate to the new matter that it has to express, and criticism has to change or widen its canons. He does not simply break the

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old canons. His work is not negative but constructive. The new forms which he creates, probably, express more adequately the purpose of the older forms. But there are always critics who have come to regard form as a rigid code that rules art and who, therefore, condemn any innovations as being, *eo ipso,* bad art. Men who devote themselves simply to an examination of the technical side of art are sometimes apt to think that art does not simply consist in obeying or disobeying the artistic canons that have been already formulated. They make exactly the same mistake as those moralists who think that morality consists simply in obeying or disobeying a fixed code of law; and for the same reason.

If we consider the application of these considerations to morality, we shall find that the relation between form and matter in moral causation is in many ways the same. To take first the more general impression produced by a good action: The good action of a good man is always rational and intelligible. The more we understand the circumstances and the better the action is, the more do we see that it was precisely the thing to be done. We can give the action universality and say, "That was just what ought to be done under those circumstances." We can thus make a law out of it. But this does not produce a feeling of inevitability any more than a great work of art does. This understanding does not decrease our admiration for the deed. The more we understand, the more we wonder. For we feel a preëminently good action to be as much above us as a great work of art. The more we see that the artist offers the one right solution of the difficulty with which it had to deal, the more do we feel wonder and admiration that it should have been done. This wonder is not simply admiration of character as such. We do not simply feel "That is just what a man of such a noble character would do and what we could have predicted of him." It is not simply an admiration for one who has resolutely chosen the right and refuses the wrong. I do not deny that a good action does not call forth this kind of admiration in a way in which a work of art does not. The reasons for that concern the differences between art and

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morality and cannot be discussed here. But this is not the only feeling. We have a feeling of wonder that anyone could ever have thought of such a splendid thing to do. The more we understand the action the more do we realize that however much we know the individual's character we could not have foretold his action. We, in similar circumstances, would not have been able to conceive or do anything so fine. We admire in a good action not only its rectitude but its creative power.

In its creative capacity, moral causation will be found to stand in much the same relation to law as art does to its form.

1. There is no doubt that moral causation may be represented as a choice between two alternatives, but this representation is far from adequate. The choice is only a very small part of an action. We tend to speak as though the individual were asked, "Will you be good or bad?" and his action consisted simply in his choosing one of the two alternatives. But the action does not consist in the choice. That a man did the right or the wrong, chose the good alternative or the bad, tells us almost nothing about the action. We may feel that we could have foretold which of two alternatives a man would choose, but we could never have told just how he would pursue his choice, how he would use this particular mode of action as an expression of himself. We feel that if we had been in his place we would have chosen with him, but not that we would have been able to do what he chose to do with the same graciousness and power. The choice does not constitute the action. Two men may have before them the same alternatives of action, may both obey the same law, and yet their actions will be utterly different and of different moral value. They will be the expressions of different personalities through the same form, and need be no more alike than two sonnets. The external form bulks more largely in morality than in art, but it is not, therefore, a more essential element. Psychological knowledge, then, may tell us which of two given alternatives a man will follow, whether he will or will not be obedient to law; but it will not, therefore, tell us what the man will do, what he will use the law to express.

2. It is almost as misleading in morality as in art to speak

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of action as a choice between two *given* alternatives that may be assumed beforehand. Moral causation does not come into play after the possible alternatives are presented in consciousness. Our hypostasization of conscience and of temptation make us speak as if the individual worked on while impulses which are within him and yet are not him, drag up the alternatives for judgment.

"My conscience says, 'Launcelot, budge not.' 'Budge,' says the fiend. 'Budge not,' says my conscience. 'Conscience,' say I, 'you counsel well'; 'Fiend,' say I, 'you counsel well.' "

That is the way in which we often speak of moral action, as though the agent waited in suspense until the champions of good and evil had brought forward their chosen representatives. But the choice of alternatives, this discernment of what actions are possible in the circumstances, is the work of the individual agent and is a part of moral causation in all normal actions. There are wider occasions when two alternatives are offered to an indivdual from without and he is compelled to choose one or the other. But we would all acknowledge that this involved a certain constraint on the individual's freedom, and by this very acknowledgment would admit that we do not consider that freedom normally consists in the choice of one of two given alternatives. Moral causation is something very different. The individual is presented, not with alternatives, but with bare circumstances, with moral problems to solve and opportunities in which to express character. These are his artistic mediums. He has not just got to do right or wrong. His duties are not two alternatives marked in large letters. one "Evil" and the other "Good." He has a purpose to effect, a difficulty to solve, and his first step towards solving his problem is to envisage the various alternative ways in which a solution is possible. As perception of the possibilities of form is one of the elements that go to constitute a great artist, so perception of the possibilities of action distinguishes a good man from a bad one. A good man will do what would not be even a possible alternative to a bad man in similar circumstances. The bad man would never think of such a thing. The possibilities will be altogether different for him. And so,

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one man can never know exactly what alternative will be before another man's mind or what he will choose. He may know what alternatives would be present to himself in similar circumstances and know, possibly, which of those his friend would choose. He may say, "He must do either A or B, and from my knowledge of his character I am sure that he will choose B." A and B. may be the two alternatives which custom or current morality or authority recognizes. But it is just as likely that he will do neither A nor B, but C, and that none could have foretold the action simply because it was the perception of C as a possible cause of action in the circumstances that gave the whole action its essential character. None could have foreseen that C would be done without being the man himself; or, if anyone had done so, it would have been due to an equal creative faculty in himself. Customary morality, for example, may recognize a choice of alternative methods of taking revenge on an enemy. But it could never foresee that someone would arise and offer the solution of loving him. The perception of that was purely a creation. Instead of two alternatives being offered to the agent, he himself perceives possible alternatives and selects among them.

It is interesting to note that this is true in Logic, also. So long as the syllogism is supposed to consist simply in the drawing of the conclusion from two given premises, it is possible to show that it is a mechanical and useless process. But a more careful examination shows that the requisites of reasoning consist simply in the bringing together of the two premises in inference. Reasoning, too, is creative and not mechanical.

3. As in art, so in morality it is impossible to make an exact distinction between form and matter. I have said that two men might choose the same alternatives and yet do very different actions. Yet it would involve an abstraction to call the alternatives or the forms of their action the same. They may obey the same moral law or the same external formulation of it, but if they infuse it with different contents or are inspired by a different spirit, the law itself will be different from being so differently used. For moral law, like artistic form,

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is not something found or discovered outside and offered to morality as an instrument. Moral law is derived from the examples of good men. Moral law, as we know it, is a more or less codified form of the ways that good men have shown us in the past of solving the problems of life. The code has not been constructed *in vacuo* on theoretical principles. It has been exemplified in men's lives. Moral law is not simply accepted by the good man. He creates it. Like the great artist, it is essential that he should first be in harmony with the law as it is known. But he does not rest there. He is always devising new ways of dealing with circumstances, new modes of expressing good character, of making better his relations with his fellows. This creation is characteristic to some extent of all action. We express this when we say that there are many circumstances in which it is impossible to say what ought to be done; we can only leave it to a man's conscience. It is the consciousness of this that underlies our objections to a system of casuistry, to all attempts to prescribe what is the right action in every conceivable circumstance of life. To do that, we feel, is to take away his best element in action, to treat men as if they were children. It has the effect of stereotyping the form of actions, of making impossible further creations of new and better ways of dealing with the problems of life and the relations of men to one another.

But while freedom is generally welcomed in small details of action and complex situations, the general form of morality is supposed to be fixed, to be something to be either accepted or rejected. This form has itself been created in the past in moral actions, and certain of those external forms of action are accepted by society as indispensable to right conduct. Some of them, no doubt, may be. There are certain elementary relations of men to one another which involve the fulfilment of certain indispensable conditions if men are to live together at all. But there are other forms of action or moral laws which were once, perhaps, adequate answers to the problems with which they deal, or as adequate as was possible at the time, but which in time became inadequate. All forms alike are sanctioned by customary morality, by the ordinary current

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moral opinion, as universally binding. In place of these inadequate laws new ways of action must be created, and the man who creates them must, in so doing, transgress what have been formerly regarded as binding laws. He has a new conception of what the relation of men to one another should be, and he cannot put his new wine into old bottles. He must reconstruct and recreate the moral law and yet he will not, therefore, be unfaithful to it. Christ said, "I come not to destroy but to fulfil," and yet he said, "It has been said unto you of old time . . . but I say unto you . . ."

Moral causation, then, involves both spontaneity and law, for morality does not consist simply in the acceptance of an outside law. Morality accepts a law that it itself creates. There are, of course, degrees of this creation in moral action. Custom and convention and external authority play a large part in our creations. We are content too often to accept the alternatives that custom thrusts upon us, to do things because everybody else does them. But all moral causation involves creation to some degree. Even the simplest performance of customary duty involves, as we have seen, more than the mere obedience to law. Moral law has all been created in moral causation, and the process of modifying and correcting it is always going on. For Moral Law is simply the form in which man has found himself best able to express the ideal of character, and both the form and matter are his creation.

In emphasizing the analogies between artistic production and moral causation, I have dealt very little with their differences. I do not, therefore, mean to imply that there are no differences between art and morality, or that they are unimportant. They are, perhaps, as interesting as the analogies, but they have not such an immediate bearing on the question of the compatibility of law and spontaneity in action, and I have been content simply to call attention to the analogies.

Now this is the mark which at once distinguishes the philosophers from every other legislator, they will have nothing to do either with individual or state, and will inscribe no laws until they have either found or themselves made a clean surface. And in the course of their work they will often turn their eyes

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towards one, then towards the other. I mean that they will look at justice and beauty and temperance as they are in nature, and again at the corresponding quality in mankind, and they will inlay the true human image, molding and selecting out of the various forms of life; and this they will conceive according to that other image which, when existing among men, Homer calls the form and likeness of God.

A. D. LINDSAY.

VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, MANCHESTER.

THE MORAL TRAINING OF THE YOUNG IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.*

There is a familiar story of a husband and a wife in Paris, who, being unable to live happily together, separated. No doubt, there were times when a longing for the bliss of their early married life entered their hearts, but neither expressed to the other a wish for the reunion. Finally, death claimed their only child, who was interred in the beautiful cemetery of Père la Chaise. On a certain day when it was customary to decorate the graves of the beloved dead with flowers, the father of the child selected an hour at which he presumed his wife would not be present. But it happened that, though coming from opposite directions, they met at the grave, and laid their floral tributes upon it. As they turned their eyes, wet with tears, met. In that moment all anger and resentment left their hearts. Their early love revived. They embraced, and over the grave of their dead child, renewed their plighted love, and returned home once more happy and united.

I trust I may be pardoned for discovering in this touching incident a similarity to this assembly, faithful in its attendance at these weekly lectures. The speakers and their auditors entertain divers opinions on all subjects, but particularly so on matters appertaining to religious belief. In this latter respect,

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* An address in the Saturday Afternoon Course on the "Moral Training of the Young in Ancient and Modern Times," under the auspices of The Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia.

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they perhaps stand as far apart as pole from pole, but as the husband and wife were drawn together by the memory of their departed one, so also in the present case is there one dominating influence—not a dead, but a living child, whose welfare and highest interests are the subject of discussion. A happy opportunity is offered to all, irrespective of belief or opinion, without bias or feeling, to hear and to learn what has been done, what is being done, and what may be done by every educational agency for the moral training of the child.

The occasion is an inspiring one. The subject under consideration is important beyond exaggeration. Our country's best interests are concentrated about it; for, as the family is the basic unit of the state, so is the child the basic unit of the family; consequently, his moral training commands the most serious thought of the human mind, since the firmness, solidity and strength of the superstructure are determined by the foundation.

I shall endeavor to contribute a little to the sum of information on this vital topic by making known what the Catholic Church to-day, in the United States, is doing for this moral training. I shall enunciate the principles that underlie the work and shall outline the methods and means which flow logically from the immovable conviction of the truth of those principles.

Perhaps an argumentative, partisan, and dogmatic tone may be noted in my remarks, and the position the Church assumes may be considered exclusive and intolerant; but I beg to assure the assembly that there is not the least intention on my part to contend for the merits of one system of moral training over another. There will be, as I have already said, a simple statement of the pertinent facts and conditions that are found in the Catholic Church of to-day. To describe what takes place in the diocese of Philadelphia for the training of youth, is to tell what is being done in all parts of the United States, although the organized work may perhaps be more effective in one diocese than in another.

All men recognize the necessity of moral training for the young. This is evident by the utterances of men of all ages.

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Be a man's personal life what it may, he is anxious to see youth trained to virtue and upright living. Youth is the seed time of virtuous habits, and seldom is a permanent hold kept of any virtue the foundations of which were not laid in early years. Holy Scripture teaches: "It is a proverb: A young man according to his way, even when he is old he will not depart from it." (Proverbs xxii, 6.) Pagan philosophy no less than the Bible emphasizes this truth. Seneca says: "It is necessary to guide tender minds, but very difficult to root up vices which have grown up with us." Quintilian wrote: "The young must be trained and educated, for once evil has taken root, one can easier break than bend."

While there is an agreement as to the necessity and importance of this moral training, there is a difference of opinion as to the time, place, manner, and methods that must be determined. Outside of the Catholic Church it is almost universally agreed that morality is distinct from and independent of religion, and the well-known French philosopher, Alfred Fouillée, does not hesitate to affirm that "the assertion that morality is independent of religion is a point on which nearly all philosophers that deserve the name agree." Positive, sweeping statements are always hazardous—*latet dolus in generalibus.* It may well be questioned whether "*all* philosophers that deserve the name" hold such an opinion; nevertheless there can be little doubt that many do.

It is also widely believed by those who distinguish between morality and religion, that morality should be left to the day school, while religion should be the concern of the church and family.

The Catholic Church contends that morality and religion are not independent, but that religion is the basis of morality, and that consequently religion and morality are inseparable. She holds that as ever and always the child's soul and his duties to God are the highest and greatest, so there is no place, time, or method from which the teaching of morals and religion may be eliminated. She holds that as the knowledge of the relations of the creature to his Creator is the most sacred and essential of all subjects, the most imperative of all obligations,

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these relations should receive at least as much attention as is given to any secular branch; that as a child cannot become proficient in reading, writing, or arithmetic without daily instructions therein, so neither can he require the necessary knowledge of God, His rewards, His punishments, without the daily presentation of these truths.

The principal, though not the exclusive agencies employed in our educational work are: First, the Church; second, the family; third, the Sunday school; lastly, the parish school.

The first and greatest power is the Church, which through her teaching body, the bishops and priests, gives vitality, structure, and support to the whole educational organization. Other agencies may come and go, may be effective or otherwise, but surviving them all, and always at work, is the Church with the divine commission which she claims to teach the Way and the Truth and to manifest the Light. She proclaims through her ministry the existence of God, the principles of right conduct, the responsibility and accountability of man to a higher infinite Power, the existence of heaven and hell, and the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice. She summons to her aid other agencies to render these saving truths the more effective. Hence she emphasizes the obligations of parents to care for the child, declaring that first and before all other teachers come the father and mother, for as they are the willing instruments of bringing children into the world, the duty devolves upon them of looking to the material, mental, and moral well-being of their young charges. She recalls that they have received a divine command to teach and guide their offspring, reminding them in the words of Chrysostom, that they should be apostles to their children, that their house should be a church; and insisting that children's education should be effected by example as well as by precept.

The first Plenary Council of Baltimore, consisting of archbishops and bishops and forming the highest legislative body of the Church in the United States, uses strong language to impress upon Catholic parents their great responsibility: "To you, Christian parents," it proclaims, "God has committed his children, whom He permits you to regard as yours; and your

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natural affection towards them must ever be subordinate to the will of Him from Whom all paternity in heaven and in earth is named.

"Remember that if for them you are the representatives of God, the source of their existence, you are to be for them depositories of His authority, teachers of His law, and models, by imitating which they may be perfect, even as their Father in heaven is perfect. You are to watch over the purity of their faith and morals with zealous vigilance, and to install into their young hearts principles of virtue and perfection."

Mighty, indeed, is the influence of a true father and a true mother. That the memory of such is a helpful, restraining power in the time of trial and temptation has been publicly acknowledged by many a youth. Sad experience has often demonstrated that where the parents fail in their duty, the efforts of other agencies are ofttimes futile and unsuccessful. Incidentally, I may remark that in many of our Catholic parishes there are organized societies, associations of "Christian Parents," at whose regular meetings special instruction is given in regard to parental obligations, and thereby, indirectly, the moral training of the young is looked after; for there can be no question as to the immense advance secured for the welfare of our boys and girls when parents possess a right understanding of their duties and responsibilities. Ignorance of how to train their children rather than malicious neglect is the most common cause of children wandering in the ways of iniquity.

To supplement the work of the Church and the home, comes the Sunday school, the primary function of which is the teaching of the "catechism"—an elementary, concise, and systematic presentation of the doctrines of faith and morals.

The Catholic Church has always emphasized the work of the Sunday school. "Several Synods in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in Hungary, France, and Italy, ordain that on Sundays and feast-days parents shall bring their children from seven to fourteen years of age to Church in order to be instructed in the Catholic faith." ("Introduction to Spirago's Method of Chris. Doc.," p. 8.) The Council of Trent, St. Charles Borromeo, Popes Clement VIII, Benedict

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XIII and Benedict XIV, the numerous sodalities of Christian doctrine, and the many Provincial Councils, East and West, unanimously proclaim the traditional rule of teaching the children the Christian doctrine on Sundays and feast days. (Ibidem, p. 9.)

The Council of Trent is very explicit in the matter. It ordained "that not only shall the people in church be taught the Sacred Scripture and the Divine Law on all Sundays and feast days, and during Lent and Advent on every day (or at least on three week days), but pastors 'shall also, at least on Sundays and holy days, teach the children of every parish the rudiments of faith, obedience to God and their parents.'" ("Spirago's Method of Chris. Doc.," p. 38.)

There was a period, however, in the history of the Church in the United States when priests were few and Catholics widely scattered, so that the work of religious and moral training was of necessity done almost entirely by the Church and the home. As the Church grew the organized Sunday school came into existence. The Provincial Council of Baltimore (1829) decreed N. 29: "Let parents see to it according to the decree of the same synod (Trent) that on the same days (Sundays and feasts), or at other opportune times, the untaught children be instructed in the rudiments of faith."

The Sunday school, where it exists at present, is conducted after the following manner: It includes the children from the ages of five and six to the ages of fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen. The teachers are usually lay persons organized into what is termed a Christian Doctrine Society. The supervision of the school is by the priest. The time of meeting is Sunday morning or Sunday afternoon. The session is about an hour's duration.

The study of the catechism is the principal purpose of the Sunday school. For the older children classes may be formed for the study of a higher catechism of the Bible, or of a summary thereof known as "Bible History." A portion of the allotted time for Sunday school may be set aside for a simple instruction by the priest on some commandment of God, or on some doctrinal practice of the Church.

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The next most important agency in the moral training of the young is the parish school, a factor that has somewhat minimized the necessity of the Sunday school. Although splendid service is being done and was done by the latter institution—more so in the past, perhaps, than in the present—the Church realized as time went on that something more was necessary in order to provide adequately for the moral and religious training of the children. She recognized that the home did not always fulfil its responsibilities; and actual experience showed that the Sunday school, as ordinarily conducted, was ofttimes inefficient by reason of the want of knowledge and training on the part of the teacher, the little time allotted for the work, the indifference of the children in regard to regular attendance, the inability of the priest by reason of other pressing duties to superintend properly. These and other difficulties rendered the work unsatisfactory.

A non-Catholic publication, the *Biblical World* (October, 1902), in speaking of the prevailing conditions, expressed clearly and accurately the state of affairs that confronted the Catholic Church in times gone by: "Is this primary mission (of teaching religion and morality) being adequately performed through the Sunday school and the home? It has been so assumed, but each passing year shows more clearly that this is not the case. Further, there is a growing judgment of Christian people that adequate instruction in religion and morality cannot be given in the Sunday school and the home alone. .... Since only a limited number of children attend Sunday school, or live in homes where real religion and morality are found, it has resulted that the *great majority* of children have been growing up without essential religious and ethical education."

Hence, as far back as 1829, the Church, in the first Provincial Council of Baltimore, enunciated her policy in regard to the need and establishment of parish schools, where by the aid of trained teachers, secular, religious, and moral education should go hand in hand for the perfecting of soul and mind. Each succeeding Plenary Council, that of 1852, of 1866, and of 1884, reaffirmed and emphasized the doctrine of the first Council,

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and each has developed on broader lines the legislation of its predecessors in regard to this important subject of the moral training of the young. There is no mistaking the explicit and mandatory character of the law enacted by the last Plenary Council, that parish schools must be everywhere established.

By reason of this conciliar legislation, the parish school has become an integral, I had almost said a vital part of the Catholic Church organization in the United States; for, excepting where local conditions render it impossible, every parish has its school. To summarize the latest statistics of parish school education, there are about 4,000 parish schools, and about 1,000,000 children receiving their religious, moral, and secular knowledge under strictly Catholic influence.

The diocesan schools of Philadelphia, according to the latest report, number 113, and contain almost 50,000 children. The course of study is uniform, and practically the same as that of the schools of all our large cities. The governing body of the system is the Diocesan School Board, composed of clergymen who have been chosen for their practical interest in educational work. The president is Archbishop Ryan, whose intellectual attainments and broad educational views are universally recognized. Coming into personal contact with the working of the schools, is the superintendent, aided by inspectors. These latter, twelve in number, are appointed by the various religious teaching orders. The teachers of our schools have been trained for their work in the normal schools of the different communities. These teachers are, generally, men and women who, dominated by the conviction that the Providence which shapes their destiny has adapted them to this special work, consecrate their property, talents, and lives to its pursuance as to a labor of love, with no thought of personal compensation, or any intention of ever turning from their chosen work, save when declining years or loss of health will remove them from the field.

It will be obvious to every thinking person that the very presence of these teachers in the school room must have a wholesome influence upon the lives and morals of the young. For there is scarcely a more practical illustration of self-sacri-

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fice than that exhibited by these religious teachers. Many of them, reared in comfort, leave home, relatives and friends, and, renouncing the legitimate pleasures of the world, hide under an assumed name all traces of their family—and all this without hope of earthly honor or reward. Aside from the view that any one might hold concerning the wisdom of such a life, no one, I think, can fail to recognize the sincerely earnest effort to reach the sublime ideal taught by the Saviour: "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Hence it would seem impossible for any thinker to deny or to seek to minimize the fact that a system of education under such influences and as widespread as the country itself and ever keeping pace with each phase of its development, could not but be productive of the best results, and must necessarily be an important factor in the life, civilization, and progress of the United States.

Perhaps a brief summary of the manner in which religious and moral instruction is imparted in our parish schools may be of some interest.

Every session is opened and closed with a brief prayer; every hour, at a given signal, the work of the school is momentarily interrupted and the children are taught to raise their hearts to God in silent aspiration.

The catechism of Christian Doctrine in its elementary form in the lower classes, in its more extended form in the upper, is an integral part of the daily curriculum, unless where it gives place to the lessons in the Bible History or the Bible itself. Church History is added to the course in the higher classes.

In the primary grades, both the catechism and Bible History are taught orally; in many schools, objectively, for we are aiming to make this most essential part of the religious training as attractive at least as are the other branches. This we try to do by the use of sandboard, blackboard objects, and illustrations, so that in the hands of efficient teachers the abstract truths of religion and morality are brought within the more easily apprehended domain of the concrete.

The elementary catechism and the oral Bible lessons are completed in four years; the text-book of Bible History is taken

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up in the fifth and continued to the eighth year. In this last year of the ordinary school course and in the senior department also, we use a tabulated scheme or outline, which the pupils follow by using the Bible itself, mainly the New Testament.

Throughout all the classes, the Liturgy of the Church is taught systematically; in the primary grades by oral instruction, by pictures, and objects; later, by use of a text-book. The object of this is to give the children an intelligent appreciation of those external ceremonies of the Church which, to the well-instructed, are so deeply significant of interior worship, and so helpful to spiritual culture.

Hand in hand with this religious instruction goes the scheme of moral training, in which the moral and civic virtues are taught in their relation to our fellow-men, as based not only on justice, honesty, and general probity, but also on the firmer and more assured dictates of divine law, so that the pupils may become imbued with the feeling that while it is dishonorable and disgraceful to lie, to cheat, to defraud their neighbor, to give way to the passions that degrade them in the sight of their fellows, it is far more criminal to act thus in the sight of the Lord their God, whose image in themselves they by their evil acts deform and disgrace. We teach them, too, that such violations of the divine law will entail misery and unhappiness not only in the present life, but if unrepented of and unatoned for, eternal misery in the life to come hereafter. We teach that while there is a heaven to reward the good, there is also a hell for the deliberate evil-doer. "The fear of God is the beginning of wisdom"; but we inculcate filial and not servile fear, though indeed it cannot be denied that in many cases the dread of future punishment is the only influence that can quell the turbulence of passion. It is, therefore, on motives both natural and supernatural—not either alone, but both together and inseparable—that we base our whole scheme of moral training for the young.

In addition to the means already indicated, we gather the children, according to their ages, into various religious societies, in which, while the social element is also included, we hold

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before them ideals on which they may perfect their moral life. The young children we form into an association known as the "Sodality of the Infant Jesus," to induce them to think of and to imitate the virtue of the Child-God, who went down to Nazareth with His parents and "was subject to them."

Children somewhat older enter into what is called the "Angels' Sodality," that they may seek the protection of "their angels who always see the face of their Father who is in heaven," and under the influence of this spiritual presence may be urged to innocence and candor of conduct.

For the children of thirteen or fourteen there are two other societies; that for the boys being called (from the patron of youth) the "Saint Aloysius," that for the girls the "Sodality of the Children of Mary," the Virgin Mother, "our tainted nature's solitary boast." The aim is here to impress on the children of both sexes at the most critical period of their lives ideals and examples of self-restraint and moral purity.

These different societies assemble together at regular intervals, and there is a consecutive and systematic order of promotion from one to the other.

One of the first and strongest forces for the development of character, for the uprooting of vice and the preservation of virtue in our children, is the Sacrament of Penance, better known by the term "Confession." While from the pulpit on Sunday, as well as in the class-room, the priest and teacher may enunciate the precepts of right living, may warn the child against vice, may point out the path of virtue, may appeal to all the motives, natural and supernatural, of moral conduct, yet it is clear that all such instruction must needs be of a somewhat general nature, and that the individual may or may not apply the lesson to himself. But when the child (after being properly instructed as to the nature of "Confession," the manner of making it, and its sacred character) comes to manifest the sins of which he is guilty, and reveals his heart as on due scrutiny it is known to himself—then comes the favorable moment for the priest to give specific advice. He and the individual are alone; and the admonitions, the exhortations, the warnings, the instructions, reach the very soul that stands in

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need of them, with the result that habits of sin are prevented, and the seeds of virtue planted.

The practice of Confession is begun as soon as the child is able to distinguish between right and wrong; and four times a year he presents himself until he reaches the age of eleven or twelve, when it becomes a monthly practice, and as years go on, very frequently a fortnightly or a weekly practice. At this age there comes, in conjunction with the Confession, the reception of the Holy Eucharist, when the child, according to Catholic teaching, enters into an actual personal union with God. The visible, tangible fruits of public preaching are often far from encouraging, but the effects of Confession and Sacramental Communion upon the hearts of children are manifested daily in the strengthening of the conscience and the upbuilding of character.

After a personal experience of twenty years in dealing with children in this most sacred and intimate relation, I can testify to the wholesome, elevating and preventive influence of this practice—its potency in deterring from vice and in fostering virtue. Parents, even should they be negligent themselves in this respect, manifest the greatest solicitude when preparing their little ones for the reception of these two Sacraments, and their deepest concern is that their children shall go regularly and frequently to Confession and Communion.

Those in charge of our institutions notice an immediate change in the conduct of the inmates as soon as the practice of Confession is begun. Invaluable testimony on this point is offered by Reverend Mother Katharine Drexel. As you probably know, this lady, a daughter of the late Francis Drexel, is devoting her fortune and life to the education of the negro and Indian. At her invitation, many earnest and self-sacrificing women have joined in this high endeavor. The quaint architectural style of the buildings at Cornwells, in which she and her associates are pursuing their noble work, attracts the attention of the traveler on the New York branch of the Pennsylvania Railroad. These ladies are unreserved in their statement that Confession renders the children more obedient, more docile, more earnest in the correction of their faults and in the

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acquisition of good habits. That such effects should follow might be anticipated in view of the continuous insistence which we place upon the fact that Confession is no mere external ceremony, no mere lip service, but a sincere acknowledgment of evil-doing accompanied by sorrow for the wrong, and a determination to do better, together with a firm resolve to repair any injury done to another in his property or character.

Those who view the Catholic system from the outside are likely to be impressed by what may seem to them three inherent weaknesses. My position here as expositor rather than apologist forbids my paying more than a passing attention to these objections.

It may seem to some that instruction in the special doctrines and practices of the Catholic Church dominate and control our religious and moral training. On the other hand, it should be remembered that our work in religious and moral training is not mere doctrinal instruction. It is Christian *practice.* It is the Christian *life,* moral as well as mental, of the child that is sought as the end and object of doctrinal teaching. Doctrinal instruction lays the foundation; and it is, therefore, necessary to impart a knowledge of the Christian system. But practice holds no less essential a place, being the material art by which the whole structure of Christian virtue is erected. We aim to keep before the youth the important truth that the practice of religion, the obedience and respect for authority, human and divine, kindliness in speech and conduct, a polite deportment, are not solely for the school room or when under the eye of the teacher, but for all times and all places without distinction.

It may also be said that the system makes overmuch of sanctions, and appeals excessively to the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. We by no means deny that there are many persons who lead noble lives without being dominated by either of these so-called hedonistic motives, and that the consciousness of duty fulfilled seems to be the animating principle of their lives. Blessed are such men and women! Mighty and strong, they remind us of the rock-bound coast that neither the frowns nor the smiles of the ocean disturb. On the other hand, we contend that a moral code, to be effective,

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must be suited to the highest and lowest, the cultured and the rude, the educated and the illiterate. It must view man as he is—not in the ideal only. It must stimulate to virtue not only those who are responsive to high influences, whose environment is happy and healthful, but also and above all, it must be able to restrain those who are frenzied by passion and the buffets of fortune. We admit that the motive of fear is an inferior motive. But neither does the Catholic Church urge it as the primary motive for virtue. But we claim, taking human nature as it is, that it will hold a man from crime when higher motives fail; and that when the onslaught of passion is over, it predisposes him to rise to higher things.

While the special tenets and practices of the Catholic Church are taught in our school, yet our system rests on the principle that the more faithful a Catholic is to his religion, the more loyal he will be to the laws of the land. The God-fearing man must necessarily be the upright law-abiding citizen. God and Fatherland are the dominant notes of Catholic teaching. If any one bearing the name of Catholic be found a law-breaker or a traitor, he is Catholic but in name; and as he breaks the laws of the land, so does he ruthlessly defy the teaching of the Church whose name he bears.

It is sometimes said that our system makes good churchmen, but not good Christians. The accusation points out a danger that we are not unwilling to recognize. There is little doubt that often the achievement falls short of the effort. The Church laments that more gratifying results do not flow from her teaching. But it should be remembered that every system depends upon its agents to make it effective. These human means may not fulfil at times the measure of their responsibility; nor should it be forgotten that universal success is not necessary to prove the soundness of principles and methods. Indeed, the merit of any principle is rarely determined by tangible results.

In conclusion, I might say that it has come to pass to-day in the United States that the moral training of the young in the Catholic Church is being concentrated in the parish school. It is the most highly organized, and consequently the most

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potent educational agency to make up for the deficiency of the home and the Sunday school. No sinister, selfish motive, however, has brought it into existence, with its curriculum of secular knowledge and a definite place in that curriculum for religious instruction. We are convinced that the salvation and true welfare of the Catholic child depend upon his being well-grounded in the principles of religion and the laws of right living. As Brother Azarias, one of our ablest educators, has said:

"We do not hold that religion can be imparted as is the knowledge of history or grammar. The repetition of the catechism or the reading of the Gospel is not religion. Religion is something more subtle, more intimate, more all-pervading; it speaks to the heart and the head; it is an ever-living presence in the school room; it is reflected from the pages of our reading books. It is nourished by the prayers with which our daily exercises are opened and closed; it is brought in to control the affections; to keep watch over the imagination; it forbids to the mind any but useful, holy, and innocent thoughts; it enables the soul to resist temptation, it guides the conscience, inspires horror for sin, and love of virtue. It must be an essential element of our lives, the very atmosphere of our breathing, the soul of every action.

"This is religion as the Catholic Church understands it, and this is why she seeks to foster the religious spirit in every soul confided to her, at all times, under all circumstances, without rest, without break, from the cradle to the grave."

PHILIP R. MCDEVITT.

ST. JOHN THE EVANGELIST, PHILADELPHIA.

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XENOPHON'S MEMORABILIA OF SOCRATES.

This article is an attempt to put together the thoughts which it appears to me that Xenophon intended to attribute to Socrates on the central theme of Wisdom or Science in relation to Life and Goodness. There is at least a certain interest in trying to trace in some detail the impression which Socrates had made on the mind of a disciple who, although no philosopher, was not destitute of sagacity, and I do not conceal my belief that the slightness of the consideration usually accorded to the Memorabilia[1] arises from a deep-seated prejudice against the truth which appears to me to be the main thesis of that work. I should like to combat this prejudice by a simple statement of what it appears to me that Wisdom or Knowledge meant for Socrates, or for Xenophon, or for the Athenian mind before Plato—whichever it may be held that we shall really have been discussing.

For I am not going to be highly critical. It does not seem to me indeed a dangerous assumption that on the whole the best ideas in the Memorabilia belong substantially to Socrates, just as it is easy to see that the details and arguments throughout belong in great measure to Xenophon. Let the views and ideas, of which I am to speak, be credited, if anyone thinks it more critical, to Xenophon himself. The important point is that, as I understand, it is not suggested that Xenophon could have borrowed from Plato. For the interest is to see how near we get to Plato, not by reading philosophy into Xenophon, but by rectifying the current conception of Socrates' simple point of departure. Perhaps it is not merely Socrates, but the Greek mind common to Socrates, Xenophon, and Plato, that we are really trying to reëstimate.

I will set out the theory of so-called Wisdom and Knowledge as I find it in Xenophon with as little commentary as possible.

Wisdom or Science involves from the earliest Greek times

[1] I have Gomperz particularly in mind.

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what we should call the two sides of theory and practice in the closest fusion with one another. When Xenophon's Socrates begins to define its nature, we are inclined to separate these aspects, and to say that some of his tests apply to theory or science, and others to practice or conduct. But this is just what I urge that we must not do. His tests for thinking, namely, discrimination, right preference, and true classification, apply no less to conduct, and the conditions for mastery of conduct apply equally to thinking. Understanding this to be so, and that we are distinguishing the two sides of an indivisible energy, by which mind deals with the World, we may say that Xenophon's Socrates or the Socratic Xenophon has distinct tests or definitions both applicable to the same energy called Wisdom or Science, some from the theoretical and some from the practical point of view.

As a mastery of the theory of anything, knowledge must fulfil the condition of ability to expound or define; or as I suggest we ought more strictly to say, as the mastery of anything, knowledge or wisdom must fulfil on the one side the theoretical condition of ability to expound or define. This gives us definition and the recognized Socratic concept, and runs us into Dialectic with all its implications, which, however, belong in part to the practical side. But again, as the mastery of anything, knowledge (if it is to be called so) must fulfil the condition that one must have power to do, one must not make mistakes in action; a condition which is explained to demand continued training or ascêsis, of which the elements are "learning" and "practice" or "rehearsal," elements equally applicable to violin playing and to geometrical reasoning. It is therefore to be observed that our narrow terms Knowledge or Wisdom, though they are current renderings of the Greek noun in question, are really unfitted to be the subject of the predicates thus developed, which apply equally and alike to what we call knowledge and to creative action or conduct. The craftsman's or artist's infallible mind, eye, and hand are, I imagine, the original conditions of the conception with which we are

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dealing, and even "skill," or, as I prefer, "mastery"—the mind of the master—would really give us a far truer point of departure than does our own depreciated terminology—depreciated not by so-called "intellectual" idealism, but by the views of cognition which have accompanied empiricism. This training or ascêsis, which gives the power to do, and involves infallibility in act, the preference that never misses the right, and is tested by "right" or "fine" dealing whether with situations or with arguments, implies further the care of one's self, the not letting one's self run down, like an athlete getting out of training, the not being ignorant of one's self, but continuously attending to one's powers and their application. Thus, too, wisdom or mastery is one with temperance and continence, and is incompatible with want of self-control, though this perhaps is compatible with a certain transient perception of the good, unconfirmed we are to suppose by study and by training.

And thus completed Knowledge or Mastery is possession of the art or craft of "living." This we are emphatically told —we are pointed to the *science*, the trained skill or professional infallibility, whose object matter, on one side (1), is "living." And this to begin with, as the reaction of the individual mastery or capacity to a test at once theoretical and practical, consists in the power and habit of "dialectic." Dialectic involves, as throughout Greek philosophy, the intercommunion of friends, and the discrimination of good and bad things. Intercommunion of friends, we may observe, is itself a form of ascêsis or practical training, showing how inseparable are the sides of the conception we are analyzing. And, on the other hand, serious study of the most important things in life is what Socrates' man of mastery possesses, by contrast with the man of no mastery, the incontinent. The latter does not and the former does study or pay attention to "the most important things." I confess that before this simple and fundamental expression of what wisdom or mastery connoted in the Socratic circle, the controversies of intellectualism and pragmatism seem to me extremely trivial and shadowy. With this discrimination of good and bad

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things we may compare Herodotus' brief summary of the speech of Themistocles before Salamis. "Now his argument was a review and a contrast of the better and the worse in all that is possible for man's nature and situation; and of these having exhorted them in every case to choose the better, he told them to go on board their ships." The nature of the object matter of this mastery and discrimination, above designated by the simple verb "to live," is often set out at greater length. For example, "All learning whereby one may cause to live well a household or a city-state and may deal rightly with human affairs"; and in everything it confers the *power*—not as I understand, the chance or liberty or potentiality but the positive ability—of the disciplined mind to choose the right and abstain from the wrong. Thus, in general, wisdom, knowledge, or mastery is the attribute by which all splendid and profitable things are done, and morality is included among these.

I interpolate that the distinction, sometimes insisted on in later thought, between the craftsman's ability as a capacity of alternatives, and moral disposition as habituated in a single direction, was not strongly present to Xenophon's Socrates. "So much the worse for his theory," it may be replied. "It is just this neglect by which he omits, from the comparison of wisdom and virtue, the essential feature of the one-sided moral choice." But it must be remembered that we are certainly falsifying the facts if we make this distinction absolute, as, also, perhaps, if we maintain a *complete identification* in principle. It seems clear to me that the craftsman's ability is not really a bare capacity of alternatives, and the instances which we are apt to allege confuse the issue. If the doctor can poison as skilfully as he can cure, even this would not mean that he can wholly lay his habitual art aside—the contrast to prove this should be between skill and want of skill, not between different applications of his usual skill, which presuppose its retention. There is here no capacity of opposites so far as the employment of the art is concerned. If, however, such an argument were taken to mean that to help and to injure were to the physician, as such, indifferent

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ends, and if we at the same time were to define his art as the art of healing, then no doubt it would be shown, on condition our illustration stood, that the craftsman's ability can dissociate itself from his habit in a way which would be a bad model to take for the theory of morals. But surely, if we thus appeal to the whole scope of the art of healing, we lie open to the answer that the facts are otherwise, and the physician, thus understood in his full connotation, has not the alleged moral versatility. The art, as we learn from Plato, is a whole, and involves as its end a conception of the good of its object. The instinct of the healer is as normal to the physician as his skill, and I believe it to be absolutely beyond question that in every art and craft the possessor is in some degree moralized by its possession. Its difference from what we call morality is merely that of part from whole. It may in certain cases be found capable of being subordinated to bad aims, because there lie outside it unmoralized regions of the man's nature which play their part in a total decision of the will. But so far as it goes it is of the nature of a moral habit, and the idealization of it by the Xenophontic Socrates is at least *as* true to human nature as the later attempt to relegate it to a lower level.

I repeat, then—wisdom or mastery is the quality by which all splendid and profitable things are done, and morality is counted among these. Wisdom is a masterly dealing with life and the important things. Its main applications, objects, and effects are first such as happiness, welfare, or well-being, distinguished from good fortune by the essential condition of wisdom, viz., study and practice; next the "royal" or "sovereign" art, the art of producing happiness for communities, which subsequently figures so splendidly in Plato and Aristotle as the architectonic art of life—further, Dialectic as the discrimination of good and evil; finally *the* "good" *par excellence*—the advantageous as such—the organization or totality which raises relative advantageousness to the inclusive or positive advantageousness which is one with the end. For this is really, I think, the relation of the partial, external, ambiguous, or relative good to the single self-sufficing whole

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or balance of life, which is true satisfaction and involves the end of living. This contrast between relative and positive—not to say absolute—good is hardly, I think, admitted as a rule to be present in the Memorabilia, and the reiterated argument from the relativity of particular or external goods is set down as a mere negative criticism, implying that for Socrates there was no good beyond "the conducive" as a means to partial ends, which a change of circumstances might of course turn to evil. It seems to me that this is a failure of identification. The argument in question, which infers that all particular ends and means are capable of being not-good equally as of being good, is surely just the familiar doctrine of Plato (or Aristotle) that all particular goods are relative, liable to turn to evil, and not stable nor self-sufficing, while the true good alone can contain its own context, that is, be positive or self-sufficing; that is to say, can possess the character of a self-subsistent whole. Socrates' contention is just the familiar introduction to this argument. All particular goods are "ambiguous." Even happiness, *if you misconstrue it* as an aggregate of "ambiguous" goods, "health, wealth, strength, glory," and the like, is itself an ambiguous good. It is plain that misconstructions of this nature are meant to be opposed throughout Socrates' discussion to the unity and mastery involved in wisdom or the professional science of life. The broken conversations which insist on the mere relativity of good, as the conducive or expedient for the individual, are plainly, to my reading, arguments of which the conclusion is omitted; their conclusion being obvious from the whole spirit and tone of the conversations, as importing that, in wisdom and mastery, absolute relativity or the unambiguous and self-sufficing good or happiness is presented as the only complete and adequate end. The depth of Socrates' insight into the antithesis thus involved between the point of view of character and the point of view of circumstance—the main principle of the unambiguous and ambiguous goods respectively—is illustrated by the fact that he actually points out the distinction and connection of which modern statisticians show but a feeble grasp, between

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primary and secondary poverty. The jesting proposal, in determining for social purposes the meaning of the term poor, to rank extravagant monarchs below the poverty line and good managers of small incomes above it, shows an appreciation of the unimportance of income as compared with character which would throw quite a new light on our most notorious recent statistics of poverty. Plato, of course, is sensitive enough to the wretchedness of the ideal tyrant; but the particular deduction which Socrates so shrewdly makes in applying the principle of the relativity of poverty to the problem of social classification, I hardly know if we find again either in Plato or in Aristotle. That no sharp line can be drawn between rich or poor is really a social fact of the very first truth and importance. There can be little doubt, I think, that the conception of the effective, unambiguous, and self-sufficing good was present, as involving the power of character over circumstance, to the mind of whoever wrote or talked in this strain. Finally and definitely, in contrast with ignorance, the object matter of wisdom appears to consist in the beautiful, the good, and the just. Its mastery of "the important things" of life, that is to say, gives it a content which is mainly ethical, but perhaps rather more truly defined than the content of Ethics in the modern sense.

So far we have been dealing with one side of the object matter of the mastery, skill, or knowledge which we may call the science of life, understanding that science is for Socrates required to answer at every moment to practical as well as to theoretical tests. It is, we have said, the architectonic science, the science by which we know and practice "to live," to deal successfully with all situations, and to set before us self-sufficing ends adequate to this organization of life.

But our ethical aspirations, trained upon Kantianism, are hardly satisfied with so "objective" an account, much as it really involves of the good will, of character as opposed to circumstance, and of the adequate conception of the self.

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Let us turn to what Xenophon has to tell us of the relation of Wisdom or mastery to the Perfection of the Self.

It is indeed (2) a commonplace that the self was the object of Socratic science. Our only question is in what form the problem was raised and considered.

To know one's self, then, is primarily to attend to one's self—both in body and in mind; to care for one's self or keep in training, not to let one's self run down—the phrase is applied to men who, like Alcibiades, deteriorated in character after parting company with Socrates. More particularly one is to know—to consider—what good there is in one for human service; and the whole conception of training or discipline, with its components of learning and rehearsal or practice, applies to the mastery of the self as to mastery of life.

This metaphor of the athlete and his training is one of the great spiritual metaphors of the western world. We know it in Plato's champions—the Knights of the Spirit in the Commonwealth—who are athletes, competitors, prize winners in the greatest of all contests; whose carnal weapon is but a type of their spiritual watch and ward. We know it again in the New Testament: "Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown, but we an incorruptible." "We wrestle not with flesh and blood, but with principalities—with spiritual wickedness in high places." And last and best of all, for those who delight to recognize the meeting of extremes in the spiritual world, the same idea has been impressed upon us all from boyhood in the figure of Mr. Greatheart of the Pilgrim's Progress. This, then, was Socrates' primary view of Wisdom and Mastery in relation to the Self. If men would take care of themselves—attend to themselves—Socrates seems to have insisted, in the simple, direct Greek phrases which to my mind are so extraordinarily impressive, there was hope that they might turn out good. "Those have lived best who have best given attention to becoming perfect." And distinct as is the note of discipline and self-culture and attention to the aim of goodness, we have yet no individualism, if individualism means separation from the

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common life. The warning, "Do not be uncritical of yourself," goes hand in hand, in a remarkable parallelism, with the exhortation, "Do not neglect the service of your commonwealth."

And so we have here the distinct basis of perhaps the greatest thought in Greek Philosophy, the thought which connects the intercourse of souls in friendship at once with the attainment of truth in discussion and with the realization of the highest life. It is reported to us in simple and prosaic words; the "becoming better" is constantly viewed as a social activity; we have seen that ascêsis itself has intercourse with the good for one of its forms. And we naturally connect with this the well-known account, already referred to, of the meaning which in Socrates' circle attached itself to the term "dialectic." On the one hand it was spiritual "discernment"—the discrimination of "the most important things in life," steady attention to which is the mark and condition of the attainment of self-mastery. On the other hand it was "conversation," the meeting together to take counsel, an activity characteristic of the better mind, and all-important for the promotion of the better mind.

In appreciating Socrates' idea of the self, we must bear in mind that his attention had been caught by the nature of the invisible. He is aware of the general facts of symbolism, and notes that mind, itself invisible, is something which becomes real for us in the look and action of the body. As a first contribution alike to the theory of expression in art, and to the analysis of what Hegel would call "the actual soul," his ideas on this point are significant. And further, he is aware of soul or mind not only as itself invisible, but as a link with the invisible world, and a testimony to its value. "Do not despise the invisible," Xenophon makes him say, with naïve earnestness. The mind, invisible as it is, is our bosom's lord, our monarch. I do not know if we have an earlier expression in Greek thought for the conception of the royal or sovereign reason, which was to be so fateful in Platonic and later philosophy; again surely one of the great metaphors of the world. And it is to be remem-

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bered that this link with the invisible, this sovereignty of mind, does not stop at itself. Here, as with Plato, the kinship of the whole invisible world has attracted the thinker's attention; and we are pointed from the soul to the worship of the gods, and brought back again from the gods to the law of our State, which is the sanctioned and wholesome link between the deity and ourselves. We seem in this to catch the voice of Plato when he tells us that matters of religion are best settled by the Delphic oracle, to whose sanction it was that Socrates appealed, or when again he warned the world that the establishment of a religious service is no trivial matter, and should not be left open to the personal caprice of women and invalids. There is something strange, of course, in reading the reiteration of Xenophon's strong impression that the City's use and wont was the guide which Socrates recommended in religious matters. We recall the non-natural warning, the private relation to God, which was part at least of the innovation that drew hostility upon Socrates. I could fancy that I detect, throughout Xenophon's jottings, the note so common with great reformers, "*I* come not to destroy but to fulfil," with its undertone, "*you* have not the right to claim the new privilege; for you have not exhausted the old formula." The non-natural sign, Socrates is always desirous to impress upon us, is not a thing that is likely to happen to anyone else.

The saying that the body is to be trained as a servant to the mind, the root of Plato's application of gymnastics, is given to Prodicus, but to Prodicus as repeated by Socrates. It is indeed a thought which follows in a completer form from the whole of Socrates' conception of training; for in the apologue of Prodicus it is mainly a direction for the attainment of success in bodily tasks, though, especially in this connection, a very shrewd piece of advice.

With this side of wisdom or mastery, the care of one's self, the aspiration to better life, the sovereignty of mind, we may connect the striking application of the notion of "slave" to the man who finds himself devoid of the principle of "mastery." Especially "slavery" is the term for the conviction

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of sin—we can call it no less—produced in a man not without promise and good meaning, and having great possessions in the way of books and study, by the dialectic of Socrates. "He went away grieved, and despising himself, and convinced that in good truth he was a slave." "He went away grieved, for he had great possessions." In both cases, the possessions were inadequate to the spiritual need. Is it possible not to recognize here, as so often in the shrewd and simple home-truths of Greek thought, the logical framework and substantive anticipation of the more intense and passionate utterance of the New Testament? Just so, surely, we have the logical framework of the story of the Temptation in the legend of how Crœsus the rich claimed admiration from Solon the wise for the contents of his treasure houses, and how the admiration was refused.

We have had already the metaphor of the athlete and ascetic of the spiritual life, and the metaphor of the royalty of reason; have we not here the third of the great metaphors which in all subsequent ages have appealed to the higher self-consciousness of man? Man is born for freedom, says Rousseau; to renounce one's freedom is to renounce the quality of humanity, to repudiate even its duties. Freedom is to think, says Hegel; he who rejects thinking and speaks of freedom knows not what he says. To think, I suppose, is to break down barriers, to exhibit this and the other as a unity in spite of their difference, to let the mind feel itself in the world, and remodel the world as an unobstructed expression of the mind. This is why thinking is freedom, and why the instinct of ages has followed Socrates in holding that essentially and in principle to be reasonable is to be free, and be irrational is to be a slave.

By what right, it may be asked in conclusion, does Xenophon or his master, whichever it may have been, couple the science and method of life with the science and method of ethical perfection? The answer lies close at hand in the very meaning for a Greek of such words as life and goodness; and we hardly need Plato to draw it out for us, and to exhibit the mind as the centre and focus of all things, such

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that contradictions in our environment are also of necessity contradictions within ourselves.

I suppose it might very naturally be said that I have merely taken commonplaces out of Platonic or later thought, and read them into Xenophon by help of the common Greek phrases and notions through which Greek Philosophy is intimately rooted in the every-day mind and life of Greece. And I submit, if that were all, the process is still not altogether without its interest. If we were reading Plutarch, indeed, it would be of less importance, because then we should be dealing with the *débris* of the great systems, and the only question would be how much the Greek language, and the popular philosopher availing himself of it, had succeeded in preserving. But here, as I understand, we are before the great written systems, and things which became commonplaces after them are of considerable interest and value when hinted before them with any degree of definiteness, whether owing to Socrates himself or to Xenophon's shrewdness and the high level of Athenian culture in general; or not improbably, in part to Socrates, and in part to that extraordinary inspiration by which even average disciples seem to push forward from the position bequeathed them by their master. Great ideas almost apply themselves, and very likely much of Xenophon's suggestiveness was due to a communication of the Socratic ferment of which Xenophon himself could not have told the origin. At any rate, I have made my protest, and tried to show that the Memorabilia deserves better treatment than of late it has received, and that the connection of virtue with knowledge, so far from being an obsolete platitude, means something to which our age is blind because thought and knowledge have lost for us the depth and sting of meaning which they had for Xenophon's Socrates.

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VICARIOUS SACRIFICE.

We may safely assume, in the absence of positive information, that when any sentiment or feeling, whether of a transient or permanent character, moves either transiently or permanently large masses of men, it is grounded on some innate disposition of human nature. It is either a response to a long-felt want, to employ a much-abused phrase, or the exciting cause awakens emotions that have long lain dormant for lack of such a cause. There are psychological forces in all men that remain quiescent at times and in some men all the time except under extraordinary stimuli, but which when aroused set in motion waves of feeling that are almost co-extensive with the human race. Researches into anthropological and ethnological psychology are making it more and more clear every day that even in the most civilized communities very few men are governed in all or in fact in any considerable proportion of their actions by their reasoning faculties, and that as you go downward in the scale, to use the common mode of speech, you find a constantly increasing number who are swayed by all sorts of irrational impulses. In other words, one finds in the most enlightened society lower strata whose modes of thought, so far as they think at all, are on the same level with savages. This might be demonstrated in a week, or even in a day, if any given community could be turned upside down socially and those put into power who are at present of no account whatever in the body politic, because the process of evolution has never carried them beyond the point where their entire intellectual energy is consumed in the effort to obtain what they shall eat and what they shall drink and wherewithal they shall be clothed. Though most men are swayed by irrational motives, that is by motives they have never analyzed and can give no reason for, it does not follow that there is no philosophical basis for their existence. Patriotism, for example, is intrinsically an irrational motive, yet without it government would be wholly out of the question; and experience abundantly proves that the worst sort of government is better than none. Mankind has made progress only

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where some kind of control over the individual by the body politic has been established.

Yet men never become patriotic after reflecting upon the benefits of a fervent national feeling; it is only when they are moved by this sentiment that they frequently seek by processes of reasoning to demonstrate the benefits and the glory of patriotism. Many men are influenced by moral motives who have never given moral problems a single thought. Not only is this true of the present time, but it has always been so. The Hebrews had reached a certain moral elevation before such a code as the Decalogue could find acceptance among them. Some of them at least practiced its precepts before anybody thought of putting them in writing. This much is confirmed by analogy, for at what period of their history this code was first promulgated and made the basis of their legislation is uncertain.

Among all peoples that have attained a certain plane of progress a high value is placed upon human life. Nevertheless a still higher value is set upon unswerving devotion to a principle or a set of principles. If Socrates had not placed the seal upon his doctrines by his death for them, there is no doubt that his disciples would have transmitted them to posterity just the same. But the master would occupy a very different place in the eyes of posterity from that which he now occupies. Perhaps one person in a thousand is to some extent interested in the philosopher and his system where nine hundred and ninety-nine read the story of his trial and death with mingled feelings of pity and admiration and indignation—pity for the man because of the injustice done him; admiration of his calmness and courage in his last hours; and indignation at his accusers and unjust judges. The most convincing evidence that a man can give of his faith in his doctrines or of a cause he champions is his willingness to sacrifice his life for them.

Rome had her heroes and heroines like Cocles and Cloelia and Regulus who threw their lives into the scale for their country; but no Roman ever felt a call to sacrifice himself for anybody outside of the circle of his fellow-citizens, least of all for a universal principle. Seneca probably came nearest to

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doing so; and while we may admire him and sympathize with him in the extraordinarily trying position in which he was placed in his later years, we cannot help but feel that, compared with a man like Socrates, he cuts but a sorry figure. Do what you believe to be right and consider everything else of subordinate importance, was the rule of life followed by Socrates. Do as nearly right as you can under the circumstances in which you are placed; in any event give the circumstances due consideration, was the motto of Seneca. His country so completely bounded the moral vision of the Roman, even of the noblest among them, that he could scarcely conceive of genuine worth beyond its pale.

The Greeks saw farther. Antigone was one of their most cherished national heroines because she chose to obey God rather than man, though at the sacrifice of her life. Alkestis was moved by a somewhat different sentiment, but there was in it more of the *allgemein Menschliche,* more of genuine altruism than is displayed by any Roman hero or heroine. To the highest height Socrates alone attained. That the Athenians deemed no one worthy to reign after Kodrus is, of course, mythical in the form in which the story has been transmitted to us; and it partakes more of the Roman than the Greek; that is, it represents the national feeling at a stage beyond which the Roman never passed. Still such traditions are interesting landmarks along the road which the most advanced nations have traveled and the value they placed popularly upon self-sacrifice.

There is no doubt that Christ felt himself divinely called to the mission he ended on the cross; yet there is equally little doubt that St. Paul gave it a currency which it might not at all, or at least not so rapidly, have gained but for his zeal.

When after the breaking-up of the Roman empire the clergy gradually deepened the main channel of their theological system and turned into it all thought that rose above the mere routine of daily life, it was inevitable that the only meritorious sacrifice that men could make would be in behalf of religion, whether by a life of renunciation or by the renunciation of life. Fidelity to a universal empire was now diverted into fidelity to a universal

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church. Necessarily the martyr became the highest type of the Christian and even of man, the one who most nearly approached the divine prototype. No doubt many became martyrs from motives that could hardly be called meritorious. They preferred to leave this world as ostentatiously as possible. It was in the life, and especially in the death, of the martyrs that the mediæval church found its most nutritious spiritual pabulum. One of the most widely current, perhaps the most widely current, of all mediæval legends is the story of Prince Henry and Elsie, as told in verse by the poet Longfellow. Speaking of it he says: "It seems to me to surpass all other legends in beauty and significance. It exhibits, amid the corruption of the Middle Ages, the virtues of disinterestedness and self-sacrifice." Much of this sacrifice was misdirected, probably most of it was, because it was selfish rather than altruistic; but it fell in with a state of feeling that was far deeper and wider than the church. Moreover, it is often easier to die for a cause or a principle than to live for it, especially when death comes to the victim under spectacular conditions, while the alternative life of service and sacrifice is as the light hid under a bushel.

"The Golden Legend" took such a hold upon the masses because the chief actor in it was peculiarly fitted to excite their sympathy. Young, beautiful, devout, with the promise of a long career of useful service before her, she, like Christ her prototype, foregoes all and offers her life a voluntary sacrifice for her sovereign. It affected the common people the more deeply by bringing home to them the reflection that one of their number was accounted worthy to accomplish so great a deliverance.

In mediæval times the necessity of sacrifice for any other object or even of sincere devotion to any other cause than the church could hardly arise. Alfred the Great was probably the only sovereign that Europe produced in half a dozen centuries whose patriotism had nothing spectacular in it, and but the smallest modicum of selfishness. For, important as was the work of Charlemagne in advancing civilization, he showed quite as much eagerness to add new domains to his realm as

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to win converts to the Christian faith or to civilize what he already possessed.

It is easy to vilipend or ridicule the principle involved in vicarious sacrifice. The late Colonel Ingersoll never lost an opportunity to sneer at the doctrine of the atonement because it implied the punishment of the wrong man. He declared it to "be the enemy of morality" since "it teaches that the innocent can justly suffer for the guilty." It is certain that they often do so suffer. They are doing it every day; if they did not society could not exist for a day.

Much, however, depends on the meaning you give to "suffer"; for if the voluntary performance of a disagreeable duty entails suffering then the good suffer more than the bad, much more. Still it ought to be said that Ingersoll's hostility to the doctrine of the atonement was directed against its theological interpretation in that it permitted the man who had led a long and vicious life to enter upon the joys of paradise on exactly the same terms and conditions with him who had spent his days in doing good. Vicarious sacrifice in a temporal sense does punish the wrong man, if one man is just as good naturally as another and just as capable of meeting his responsibilities. But he is not. Two persons may look exactly alike physically yet be widely different. If all the effort of one man for forty or fifty years is expended in making a bare living and another with no greater effort amasses a fortune in the same time, is there any injustice involved if the community requires the latter to contribute to the maintenance of the former, if he comes to want? Often a small part of one man's intellectual energy is sufficient to keep him in comfort while the entire output of another will not do the same for him. All governments compel the rich man to contribute more for his protection than the poor man because such protection means more to him, seeing he has more to protect. The men and women who devote a part or the whole of their time and means and labor to bettering the condition of the morally degraded are plainly making a voluntary vicarious sacrifice of themselves for the redemption of others. Many a man cannot save himself morally who can do so by the help of another.

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When the chief priests and rabbis mockingly said of Christ that he saved others they uttered a great truth, if the rest of the sneer that he could not save himself did not necessarily follow. Yet it is true of many persons who are endowed with strong moral feelings that they cannot, in a sociological sense, save others and themselves likewise; if they would save others, they dare not, before the forum of conscience they cannot, save themselves. The mocking Jews understood by *save* life only: in this sense Socrates or St. Paul and many others could no more save themselves than could Christ.

Where the instinct or, at its highest, the half-conscious feeling of the solidarity of the citizens composing a state, is the strongest, there the moral conditions are the best. When a state demands military service it selects the strong to bear the burdens of the weak; it demands of the former a vicarious sacrifice. He who pays taxes makes of himself, in a sense, a more or less voluntary vicarious victim for those who cannot do likewise. He does the same thing in a still higher sense who performs voluntary service for the amelioration of the condition of the "submerged tenth." Usually he does not stop to calculate the exact amount of personal benefit he shall receive from such service: he simply obeys a conviction or a call to duty, a duty which, in the growth of the feeling of the solidarity of society or even of the human race, is being felt by a constantly increasing number of persons. To this extent he is Christlike, the more so when this voluntary obedience to the call of duty entails the loss of health or even of life.

The doctrine of supererogation as taught by the Romish church grew up out of the same instinct and typifies the same widespread conviction. It has shifted into the domain of theology, where it is probably of comparatively little value to any one, a principle of the utmost importance in the realm of sociology. The philanthropist and altruist saves his fellowmen in this life by doing more than is necessary for his own temporal salvation, provided his efforts are wisely directed to a rational end.

Gaius on Justinian says: "Justice is the continual desire of always rendering to each one that which is his due." Here

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it is to be noted that justice is the *desire* not the *act.* Aristotle has much to say on the same subject, and it engaged the attention of thinkers before the time of Hammurabi. Theoretically it is clear enough that in the affairs of life every one ought to have his due. But how shall this be determined and who shall apportion it? Organized society is such a complex entity and the machinery of justice such a clumsy device it can take little account of capacity or motive, and we may be sure that this same problem will attract the attention and exercise the ingenuity of men some thousands of years hence. Meanwhile one class will always get more than they deserve and another class less than they are justly entitled to before the forum of abstract right. Vicarious voluntary service and sacrifice will be increasingly in demand, because it deals largely with the individual, and thus compensates in some measure for the inequalities that the administration of law, according to general principles, must in the nature of the case produce.

I have thus far dealt only with instances of voluntary sacrifice. These are, however, comparatively few when placed alongside of those recorded in authentic history and traditional lore, where the human victim is offered against his own will to propitiate an offended deity. Besides, we are rarely in a position to decide between voluntary and involuntary victims; or at least between those who sought death and those who submitted passively to their fate. When the victims were children or slaves there is no reason to suppose that they resisted, although non-resistance in such cases and under such circumstances is not equivalent to voluntary submission. The general proposition, however, is that the ministrant offers a victim to an offended deity as an expiation or atonement for some deed committed or omitted, either intentionally or inadvertently. A typical instance for the Greeks is the sacrifice of Iphigenia at Aulis as a propitiation to Diana whom her father had unwittingly incensed. The goddess, however, relented before the consummation. It may be said that the Greeks and Romans of historic times looked upon offerings of this kind with horror, or at least with aversion. The case of Chryses and Achilles set forth at the opening of the Iliad is nothing more nor less than

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one of typical priestcraft. The confidant of Apollo used his opportunity, as many priests have since done, to enhance his importance by a skillful interpretation of the plague in the Greek camp as an insult to himself personally.

On the other hand, the sacrifice of human beings was common among the Semites, or at least among some of its tribes. In the second Book of Kings it is said that the King of Moab "took his oldest son that should have reigned in his stead and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall."

Probably the most noteworthy event bearing upon the theme here under consideration is that recorded by Diodorus as having occurred when Carthage was in imminent danger of falling into the hands of Agathocles. This instance is particularly remarkable because of its comparatively late date—about B. C. 300—when one might assume that a comparatively civilized people like the Carthaginians would have advanced beyond the barbarous point of view that it brings into such bold relief. The gravity of the crisis explains the abnormal proceeding. The Greek historian gives a graphic account of the consternation that seized the city when the famous bandit was drawing near. He says the Carthaginians imagined that in some way they had incurred the ill-will of the gods, but particularly that of Heracles the chief god of the city whence they had migrated. They accordingly sent vast sums of money and other valuables to Tyre in the hope that they might thus appease his anger and win back his favor. In former times it had been their custom to contribute a tenth of their revenues to the divinities of the mother-city. As they became opulent they also became negligent and sent but little. The omission having now been brought to their attention, they began to feel the stings of repentance, and accordingly sent gifts to all the gods, hoping in this way to win back the favor they had forfeited. But they felt that above every other god their disasters were now due to Kronos. To him they had formerly sacrificed sons of the leading citizens; but in the course of time, wishing to spare their own, they had surreptitiously bought children and brought them up for the customary oblation. This state of things became known as

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the result of an investigation, for no stone had been left unturned to ascertain where the fault lay. They hesitated long before making the sacrifice; but when they beheld the enemy encamped before their walls they were seized with a panic or frenzy of superstitious fear lest their failure to perform their obligations to the gods would lead to the capture and destruction of the city. With a view to making an atonement for their sins and their former remissness they selected two hundred of the noblest youths and immolated them in behalf of the city. Three hundred others who had for some reason become objects of suspicion voluntarily offered themselves. There was in the city a brazen statue of Kronos with arms extended downward, and the boy laid upon them rolled into a pit filled with fire.

After the slaughter at Cannæ the Romans were in like manner thrown into the wildest consternation, and like the Carthaginians they began to look for a cause. It was found that two of the Vestals had proved untrue to their vows. One of them was accordingly buried under the Colline gate; the other escaped the same fate by committing suicide. The guilty paramour was scourged to death. Two Gauls and two Greeks were sacrificed in the cattle market, also without the shedding of blood. Livy remarks in this connection that such sacrifices had been made before, but that the rite was un-Roman. Here, too, disaster had led to heart-searchings as it had done among the Greeks, among the Carthaginians, and in the case of Achan among the Hebrews, and as it still continues to do among the Christians.

The question has often been asked and answered whether ethnic religions, those religions that have been engendered among a people as distinguished from those imposed from without, have any moral influence on conduct for the better. From my study of the subject I have become convinced that it may be truthfully answered both in the affirmative and the negative. The creeds of those tribes that are still, as they have been from time immemorial, on the lowest rungs of civilization have not elevated them in the least. On the other hand, the religious beliefs of those peoples that have made

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considerable advances along the highway of progress have had a moralizing influence. This is true of the Greeks, of the Romans, of the Jews and Egyptians, and probably of other nations. That God sometimes commanded the Jews to kill did not make them more bloodthirsty. Such typical occurrences as the following did not invalidate the command, "Thou shalt not kill." The Lord commanded Moses to say unto Pharaoh: "If thou refuse to let him (my son) go, behold I will slay thy son, even thy first-born." When the Israelites were at Shittim and had fallen into idolatry the Lord waxed angry with them and slew twenty and four thousand. So by the command of the Lord given through Moses all were put to death that had joined themselves to Baal-peor. Similarly Samuel, by command of the Lord, sent Saul against Amalek with orders "to slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." One cannot read the Greek poets, particularly Æschylus and Pindar, without reaching the conviction that they sought to make the current mythological conceptions a support to the moral order of the world. That Zeus sometimes lied and deceived did not furnish any thoughtful Greek or Roman with an excuse for doing likewise. Neither did the thefts of Hermes or the unchastity of Aphrodite provide such a person with a reason for thievery or lewdness in conduct. The God of the Jews, just like the gods of the heathen, were supposed to be a law unto themselves, and might therefore do or command to be done what mortals should neither do nor command.

It is often said that the Greeks had no consciousness of sin; that their sense of human dignity and worth precluded the rise of such a feeling in their breasts. It may be that they were not conscious of guilt in the significance the Jews gave to the term. Yet it is hard to see much difference between the feelings of a Greek who realized that he had been intentionally guilty of an offense against a god, or the moral law as represented in him, and the state of mind expressed by the Psalmist when he exclaims: "I acknowledged my sin unto thee and my iniquity have I not hid. I said, I will confess my transgression unto the Lord." It is interesting to compare this and similar

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passages with the story of Glaucus and others of similar import. The striking difference in this case lies in the conviction of the Psalmist that the Lord had pardoned his sins, while the Pythia told the custodian of the treasure who had been guilty in thought only that there was no pardon for him. On the other hand, it must be said that not all transgression produced like dolorous results. The Greeks were in possession of means for recovering the lost favor of a god, and they frequently resorted to them. When their affairs went wrong they often found the guilty cause. If the searching party was not willing to admit its own transgression it was usually successful in discovering a sinner somewhere in the camp.

Many of the Romans were certainly conscious of sin in almost the exact sense that Paul gave to this state of mind. When he says: "For the good which I would I do not, but the evil which I would not that I practice," he uses the language of Ovid when he confesses that he sees and approves the better, but follows the worse. The writings of Seneca are permeated with the struggle between the moral sentiments and the weak will which is so often under the sway of base desires.

It seems to me we may find here an explanation of the belief in the necessity of expiatory sacrifices. The consciousness of guilt arises out of the dissonance between the moral sentiments and the will; or we may perhaps better say, between the unequal development of the moral perceptions and the volitions. Where there is no law there is no transgression, is a truth of universal validity. The consciousness of an innate moral law is attested by the whole course of human history. Nor is it by any means always the fear of temporal punishment that makes men conscious of guilt. Such a feeling is characteristic of the child rather than of the fully developed man. Intelligent Greeks held the belief that the gods were the avengers of wrong-doing. Therefore he who transgressed an ethical statute sinned against them and laid himself liable to such a penalty as they might inflict. This penalty had to be paid unless it could be canceled by a pardon. The philosopher who does a wrong inconsiderately, restores his peace of mind by admitting to himself and to no other person, it may be, his

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fault, and by guarding against similar conduct in the future. But in the earlier ages comparatively few persons had reached this high plane: the great majority were simply conscious of having failed in the fulfillment of their obligations. The case would necessarily be envisaged from the anthropomorphic viewpoint. This was a recognition of the necessity of a quid pro quo. We say that Socrates was endowed with exceptionally keen ethical perceptions. He had what we might call a "tender conscience." Yet it is very doubtful if he was himself aware of this fact. He did not clearly understand his inward parts. He thought he was under the guardianship of a more or less external tutelary divinity.

It is a commentary on conduct painful to read when we find in the Psalms, in Isaiah, in Proverbs and elsewhere in the Old Testament, as well as among the early Greeks, so clear a recognition of the principle that our duty towards the Creator does not consist in the performance of ceremonies, but in a life; not in isolated ceremonial acts, but in a course of conduct based on the permanent desire to do right. "Sacrifices and offerings thou hast no delight in." "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit." "The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord." "To do justice and judgment is more acceptable to the Lord than sacrifice." "For I desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than burnt offerings." This quotation from Hosea Christ uses twice in the Gospel according to Matthew. Yet the great majority of mankind still attach far more importance to the performance of rites than to living aright!

The mode of sacrifice is determined by the current opinion as to the dwelling-place of God among the Hebrews, and of the ethical gods among the Greeks: these are preëminently Zeus and Apollo. When Noah offered a burnt sacrifice the "Lord smelled a sweet savor." This was the only way the gods of the upper air could be regaled with meat, the favorite diet of men. If they always received their share of the feast they would most likely remain in a favorable attitude towards their mortal subjects. All attainable evidence tends to confirm the theory that those tribes whose entire energy is consumed in the

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effort to sustain life have only the faintest conception of a moral law. Yet the germ of such a law exists in their minds. Their untoward circumstances effectually prohibit its development. The acorn is not the oak except dynamically; and it will never become an oak unless it be placed in a favorable environment. Human society everywhere, the most advanced no less than the most retarded, furnishes parallel cases. The only difference is that in the latter the entire community is unmoral; in the former it is only a certain class. Here, too, the tendency is constantly upward while in the rudest tribes there is no upper or lower, ethically considered.

Hence there arises in civilized communities and under exceptional conditions that consciousness of guilt which is so often exhibited in conversion, sometimes in very dramatic forms. We have here an effort put forth by the repentant sinner to close the rift, now subjectively plain, made by a weak or perverse will, between his better nature, his moral sensibilities, his God. We have here waves of emotion beating upon the psychic shores of our own time that were started by our ancestors in the remotest ages. Or, to change the figure, we may say that the initial impulse is the same; the sentiments are the same; the attitude toward moral delinquency is the same; the language spoken is the same. The only difference between our most distant ancestors and our contemporaries is the manner in which this language finds expression, whether in words or in rites.

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THE MORALS OF GUYAU.

A young Frenchman, thirty years ago, undertook the task of criticising the English utilitarian philosophy. While fully acknowledging their merits, he accused the ethics of Bentham, Mill, Bain, Darwin, and Spencer, alike, of turning in a circle which they were unable to avoid, break, or pass out from, each time they sought either "a principle of obligation or constraint to compel us to accomplish good, an interest leading us to disinterestedness, an egoism tending to altruism, or a force capable of making us rise higher than ourselves." His criticisms, though temperate, were penetrating and they immediately brought him into notice both in France and England. And as, in the former country, the English school of morals was provoking much discussion and tending to supplant the intuitional, a writer who showed himself able to deal with it successfully was gladly welcomed. Guyau was that writer, and it was in order to reply to the rejoinders which his criticisms provoked and to develop more fully than he had hitherto done his own view of the moral problem, that he wrote a book [1] which established his reputation as a moralist. Now, although he himself only called this work a sketch, and an earnest of the lengthier treatise which he meant to write, and which he, doubtless, would have written had not his death supervened at the early age of thirty-three, the work presented the problem in so new an aspect that it attracted immediate attention, and it has been largely owing to the influence which it has continued to exercise in France to the present day, that French moralists have abstained from constructing arbitrary systems of conduct, and that they have inclined rather to a particular form of sociological inquiry. Guyau's first contention is that an ethical system founded on facts cannot present to the individual as a primary motive of action the good or the happiness of society, for the reason that the happiness of society is in opposition to the happiness of the individual. And without pausing to consider the instances where this is not

[1] "Esquisse d'une Morale sans Obligation ni Sanction."

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the case, he concludes that ethics must be firstly individualistic and secondarily social, and that neither good, duty, nor happiness, in the fullest acceptations of the words, are the ends of men.

What then, he asks, is the natural end of human acts? What is the target constantly aimed at by all living creatures? What is the center of the universal effort of beings? Or from another point of view, what is the constant cause of action?

How does Guyau answer these all-important questions? It must be confessed that his answer scarcely fulfils the expectations which the questions raise, for in reality he only offers us a term—"instinctive effort." The end of our acts is an instinctive effort to maintain and to increase life, of which pleasure is the consequence. We live, therefore, to make this effort which is the end determining every conscious action and also the cause "which produces every unconscious action."

Thus, although pleasure has appeared to some of the acutest minds as the only aim for which men strive, we are to believe that the prime motive of our actions is not pleasure, but "life." According to this view, we act to live, and pleasure is, as it were, the corollary of action. The cause of every act of living creatures is life *en son évolution.* But this cause itself, from another point of view, becomes effect and end. In other words, life causes action and action causes life. We have here, evidently, the evolutionary principle applied to morals in a manner which removes all obligation, except in a sense so universal that it may scarcely be so called. There is an impulsion proceeding from an unknown source, a tendency, as Guyau puts it, to persevere in life, and this tendency is the law of life itself. In conformity with this view, moral science is defined as that science which has for object the conservation and increase of material and intellectual life. Now as between what we are naturally impelled to do and what we ought to do, there is in reality little difference in such conditions, it appears that we must and should live primarily to carry out the principle of life, and not for the stimulation of the pleasure sense as so much evidence would lead us to suppose. We are

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to improve this principle, Guyau tells us, by increasing its "intensity," or, in other words, by augmenting the sphere of every kind of activity as far as we may, in the measure of the reparation of force. *"Agir, c'est vivre, agir davantage, c'est augmenter le foyer de la vie intérieure."* Yes, but the criminal acts, and when committing a crime, must be held, according to this theory, to be enlarging the hearth of his inner life!

After founding what he calls an ethics of life, Guyau, influenced, in spite of himself, by the utilitarian school, proceeds to inquire what share in those ethics may be allowed to the ethics of pleasure, and he arrives at the conclusion that since pleasure is a state of consciousness allied to an increment of life, intensity of life may be identified with intensity of pleasure, and on these terms he grants to hedonism a right of citizenship—"but in the second rank." There are, however, he contends, two sorts of pleasure, that which corresponds to a particular and superficial form of activity (pleasure of eating, drinking, etc.), and that which is allied to the groundwork of this activity (pleasure of living, willing, thinking, etc.) The one is purely sensitive, the other is more purely vital. Evidently, the latter comes within the Guyauian theory of life. The former is to be considered as that form of pleasurable incentive which the utilitarians mistook for the sole purpose of existence. The distinction is ingenious and important. It is the pleasure of living, not well recognized until life is menaced, that binds us to life, and that pleasure would seem to be of a somewhat different nature from that which we experience during any specific stimulation of the sensory nerves. From a psychological point of view, however, Guyau grants to the hedonists that since there can be no consciousness without a vague pleasure or a pain, pleasure may be regarded as the principle of consciousness itself, and that as consciousness produces action, all voluntary action, needing to pass through the conscience becomes impregnated with an agreeable or disagreeable character which, however, only suffices to explain it partially. Finally, like a cannon ball projected into space and ignoring whither it is going, life becomes desire or fear,

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pain or pleasure, by virtue of its acquired velocity. We are, therefore, as it were, blown before the wind of life.

Thus Guyau presents himself as the apostle of a morality of energy in which sloth is the greatest vice and fecundity in every sense the highest virtue. Life must create and spend; there is no escape from that fatality. The work done for others is not loss but necessary gain. Cellule must form cellule and the principle of expansion wills that man should be a social animal. Life must be accepted with its pleasures and its pains because it *is* life, and because thus it must evolve. There is a moral fecundity underlying all its acts.

After the enunciation of this very broad theory of human aims, we are informed that the motive of activity may create "a sort of obligation," and now Guyau appears to endeavor to partially reconstruct what he has attempted to destroy. There exists, he states, a certain impersonal duty created by the power of acting itself. What we have the power to do, is in some sort our duty to perform. The superfluity of life requires to exercise itself. Life can only manifest itself on condition that it expands. A positive science of morals can only speak of obligation in this general and biological connection.

Guyau was fond of examining a question from many points of view. He examines this diffused sentiment of obligation from the point of view of "mental dynamics," of science, as a force of tension, as an instinct. He also considers both the optimistic and the pessimistic attitude towards life. The former he calls immoral, for the reason that it is the enemy of betterment and is naturally opposed to the principle of expansion. Its refuge is personal immortality which, in the light of modern science is inadmissible. The latter is equally erroneous, because it is impossible to establish a mathematical balance whereby pain is seen to outweigh pleasure, and, moreover, pessimism does not take into account the permanent pleasure of living. There is also a kind of psychological illusion which causes the happy days of life to seem shorter than the unhappy ones. There is pleasure in action, and if human beings continue to exist, it must be that life is not too bad for them. A same reason renders existence possible and desirable.

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The indifference of nature towards good and evil seems to Guyau to possess moral significance. It tends to weaken all theories of ethics. Possibly, in time, good and evil neutralize themselves, and it is doubtful whether a good action committed a hundred thousand years ago by a man of the tertiary age can have any modifying influence upon the world. In any case it is a chimera to bid men conform themselves to nature as a certain school would have them do, since we do not know what nature is.

The point of view of the practical certitude or of the categorical imperative is unsound, for the reason that duty, as Darwin showed, is variable in its applications. The point of view of faith is unsafe; it is irrational to affirm as true that which is doubtful. The ethics of doubt, or agnosticism, contain a great share of truth, but the exact place of agnositic morals remains to be made.

All sanctions or consecrations are defective. Justice is merely social defence. Remorse is but a natural resistance of the most profound *penchants* of our being. All the conceptions of duty are tested and found wanting. The first equivalent for duty that scientific ethics can offer is the injunction to each individual to develop his life in all directions, to be as rich as possible in intensive and extensive energy, to be the most social and the most sociable being. Duty is only a detached expression of power which tends to pass necessarily to the act.

The second equivalent Guyau finds in a theory of M. Fouillée which attracted much attention at the time, the theory of the *idée-force*. The *idée-force* is, according to this philosopher, an indissoluable unity of thinking and acting constituting a psychological law according to which every state of conscience is idea inasmuch as it envelops a perception, and force inasmuch as it envelops a preference. From this we are to learn that the idea itself of an action is a force tending to realize it. Thus, we have only to conceive good and the force is at hand to carry it out. Whoever refuses to do this is at war with himself.

A third equivalent of duty is found in the "sensibility"

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which inclines us naturally to sociability. This is in reality another term for sympathy which is admitted as being inherent in human nature, and on which the social qualities depend for their manifestation. We can no more be happy, Guyau says, out of human society that we can breathe in the absence of air. All these equivalents form an impulse which is duty, although it is true that the spontaneity of this impulsion may be checked by the reflective faculty.

But without an imperative of a more definite or dogmatic kind, how is the individual to be led to the definitive disinterestedness, often to the sacrifice of self? This is obviously the question which presents itself, and the way in which Guyau answers it is characteristic of his system. There exists in man, he says, a love of physical and moral risk, of speculation, proceeding from a superabundance of force which urges him to action. The more power a man has, the greater is his duty, and even the sacrifice of life may be in some cases an expansion of life. A life may be concentrated in a moment of love and sacrifice. "De même que la vie fait son obligation d'agir par sa puissance d'agir, elle se fait aussi sa sanction par son action même. Car en agissant elle jouit de soi, en agissant davantage, elle jouit davantage."

Work, according to this evangel, is the true piety, the true human providence. The real difference between supernatural providence and the natural hope is that the one claims to modify nature by supernatural methods, the other first modifies ourselves. "C'est une force qui ne nous est pas supérieure mais intérieure."

The ethics of Guyau, it will be seen, are more destructive than they are constructive. They seek to overturn all sanctions and imperatives of the dogmatic kind, hitherto offered, and to substitute in their place an invitation to work for the sake of work, trusting to the power of work to evolve efficient conduct. The invitation, we conclude, proceeds from life itself, or primarily from whatever principle there may be behind life, and it is one which the race may not refuse if it wishes to endure. Both animate and inanimate nature are constantly performing work. The sun is constantly emitting heat which

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is converted into energy. Work must be performed, for stagnation is death. In course of evolution all things improve. So conduct improves by reason of human activity itself, which has given hospitals for the poor, made crime more difficult, and increased hygiene. But, from a moral point of view, this principle of work presupposes a line of social conduct from which individuals may not diverge. In practice, however, many of the active do diverge, and if the latter are in the minority, as they are assumed to be, then it would seem that, if the Guyauian theory be true, there must be some directing agency tending in the main towards good. This, however, Guyau does not tacitly admit. According to his view, there is a kind of self-perfecting automatism which makes for good. General progress is the result of the working of this automatism, and moral progress is included in it. We may console ourselves with the reflection that the main share of our activity tends to racial good, and that the more we act, the more we increase that good. But the difficulty lies in the application of this principle of activity and expansion. For, as before observed, in individual instances, the greatest energy may be displayed in deflections from the normal line. Must we assume that these deflections are of small importance in the general scheme, and that evil tends to disappear, or are we to suppose that they play some necessary part which, though relatively small, increases in a constant ratio as life develops?

Evidently, the *nature* of heredity, environment, education, and employment goes far to determine which direction the activity will take, and Guyau himself admits the possibility and force of a moral suggestion derived from these sources. When all these factors are good they make for general improvement, but when they are bad, that is to say, contrary to the rules which experience has taught, then there must necessarily be a check to that improvement proportionate to the extent of the manifested evil. Guyau is very reticent regarding evil. Is it because he believed that evil as a part of general action may be a form of good according to a principle by which all activity promotes the scheme of life? In this

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way Napoleon, sapping the life-blood of his country, spreading devastation and misery upon his path, trampling upon general justice, was pursuing his necessary course of extensive energy, and opening new eras in the world's history which could not have been opened in any other way. Contemporary opinion, however, in the countries he oppressed, or endeavored to oppress, considered him as the incarnation of all human wrong.

Guyau considers that the right direction may be derived from the moral suggestion above alluded to, but in view of the uncertainty as to what constitutes right in a system which recognizes activity in general as moral, it is difficult to see how the moral suggestion is to be made. It may be impossible to propound any rigid doctrine of right and wrong, but in the absence of any such doctrine, the danger of so diffused a system as that which permits of the assimilation of both principles as factors of social weal is obvious.

To be moral, according to Guyau,[2] is, primarily, to feel the force of one's will and the multiplicity of the powers which one carries in him, and, secondarily, to conceive "the superiority of possible things having universal things as objects over those things which have only particular objects."

Here again we are lifted out of the region of individual conduct into a more extended sphere, the tendency to which life itself is supposed to develop in us. We are, as it were, carried along by a sense of the varied powers we possess, the possession of which creates the duty to use them in the best interests of ourselves and of our fellow-men. We can experience a certain sense of superiority whenever we are performing such acts as are of universal application or usefulness. According to this latter view, a politician would be essentially a more moral person than a tradesman, because of the more extended field in which he works.

But this sense of force, of achievement, of success, this life zest, as it may be called, proceeds chiefly from hygienic and from physical causes. The healthy and the strong possess it

[2] "Education et Hérédité."

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most, and yet they are not invariably the most moral. It is true that the infirm, having no power, have also no duty, according to the principle by which the power creates the duty. Such an assumption, however, leads us to the doctrine of the *Uebermensch,* which Nietzsche appears to have derived from Guyau. If the most forceful alone is moral, in this new sense of the term, then all the injustice which he displays and which he can hardly help displaying in the exercise of his force, is moral, and the word moral changes the sense it has hitherto possessed and becomes synonymous with superiority, a superiority acquired no matter by what means. Again, the most forceful is generally the most acquisitive and obtains the greatest share of sustenance and the superior benefits which it provides, but the presence of too many acquisitive men may be held responsible for some of the antinomies from which our society is suffering, perhaps more acutely than any which has preceded it. There is undoubtedly an instinct which bids us rise higher than ourselves whatever stage we may have reached; but so far as we can see, and without constructing unverifiable hypotheses, that instinct partakes of the nature of an illusion, since our ideals are never satisfied. It may be that it is the spirit of the race speaking to our minds and urging us to greater efforts, prompting us to transmit to our descendants what we have received from our ascendants in an improved condition. If so, the fact that we are still in an intermediate stage of our development while our desire is to have reached the summit in one lifetime, is sufficient to account for the disappointment which we experience at being able to rise no higher than a certain level. The center of the target of which Guyau speaks is ever missed; our bullets continue to strike an outer ring till death ensues. If we say that this center is the utmost pleasure that the world and its life can give and our sensory nerves experience, we may form some definite conception of what that center is, but Guyau will not admit that pleasure is primarily what the bull's eye represents. As we have seen, he labels the inner circle, "instinctive effort." The end of life is the making of this effort. We must continue to strive with this object instinctively and presumably more or

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less consciously before us: the display of the greatest energy of which our organisms are capable. Experience certainly teaches us that energy is needful to existence, and we may deduce from that experience, if we are so minded, that the greatest energy is needful to procure the best existence. If we live upon the principle of the greatest effort, happiness may accompany our acts.

In constructing this theory, however, Guyau had apparently some misgivings as to the sufficiency of the inducement to strive extensively in the presence of danger. But he soon discovered in the love of risk and sacrifice inherent in mankind the source of the incentive. Men must and will confront dangers to achieve an end. In this natural proclivity or tendency he found a positive assurance that the effort will be continued at all costs. In this way he completed his system of extensive ethics.

The chief defects of this system are the vagueness of its main proposition, which may be translated into the formula, "We live to live," a proposition which, in spite of the reasons offered in its support, must tend to be paradoxical, and the failure above alluded to, to show why evil—let us say, remorseless competition—should be a part of the general activity which it is held moral to promote. The principal merits of the system may be held to be its unrestricted acceptation of the inevitable in the process of existence in view of the need of perpetuation and the extension of the principle of evolution in the moral field.

Now if the merits and demerits of the system be placed side by side and the total argumentation be considered, there stands out a theory of existence and of conduct in existence which is more social in its character and probably more harmonious in its parts than any which the utilitarian school produced. Continually bordering upon the metaphysical, as having its mainspring in a kind of human infinitude, it nevertheless endeavors to remain faithful to reality in observable phenomena. In spite of its main defect, it is a courageous and masterly attempt to provide us with a reason for our acts, in accordance with verifiable facts of life, an endeavor to replace the void

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left by the failure of all dogma, by a kind of stoicism in activity, a remarkable effort to universalize our motives and to bring them more into conformity with a clock-work, the parts of which may exist in nature, but which require to be pieced and to be combined.

A certain reluctance has always been evinced to admit the quest of pleasure as the real aim of life, and Guyau, sharing this reluctance, which is instinctive in some individuals, finds a middle term. Men do not primarily live, he says in substance, to procure pleasure, but to increase the total value of the human state, and pleasure in one or other of its forms is the resultant of that aim. The human aspiration, that which is deeply seated in our conscience but which we are unable to define, is not fruition but expansion, and thus, though men may appear to strive to gain the greatest share of sense gratification and to strive for no other object, the appearance is deceptive. They struggle to perfect the scheme of life, and they have a task which they must, because they can, perform. The injunction no longer is "I ought, therefore I can," but "I can, therefore I ought," and in this distinction, according to its author, consists the difference between the old and the new philosophy.

And it is not only our conscious acts which are held to lead us to this end, but also our unconscious acts, so that we are impelled upon our course both by the working of our instincts and by that of our reflective faculty. Hence we are controlled by a determinism which we may only escape, apparently, by a refusal to exert energy, and such a refusal results sooner or later in our elimination from a world in which inertia has no meaning and no place.

To those who think that this view of duty and of destiny affords no solace, Guyau replies that nature has ordained things so, and that men, as forming part of nature, must accept them as they have resulted from a first cause of which they have no knowledge. We must have courage, he tells us, we must ever remain *debout,* and he himself exemplified his maxim by continuing his labors long after he had grown aware that an incurable disease was pitilessly undermining him and leading

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him to that extinction which, in the last pages that he wrote, he contemplated with so much serenity. It has been said of him that no philosopher since Kant has penetrated further into the infinite. His works certainly display a realization of and identification with nature such as have not often been displayed. There is cause for much regret that a mind so gifted should have been destroyed before it had had time to give its fullest measure. Guyau, as a moralist, appears somewhat as a prism through which, in passing, a ray of light has been dispersed. In France, at all events, it has been considered that if the prism be a true one, moral science must abandon dogmatism and must, rather, seek the fittest methods whereby human conduct may be brought into increasing harmony with social needs; the most efficient manner in which the principle of expansion may be socially applied. Morals and sociology, viewed in this light, are seen to coalesce, and out of the union an improved conception of society appears to dawn. The groundwork of the new principle will be that of evolution pure and simple, unencumbered by the moral fabrics of pre-scientific times. And certainly the tendencies of moral and social philosophy during the last thirty years, have been mainly in accordance with Guyau's views, for the conviction has continued to acquire strength that the developmental process that biology has shown to be at work in nature is equally at work in morals which can, therefore, never be enclosed in a ring-fence of purely logical construction.

In a last analysis, the philosophy of Guyau is one of hope. The hope is not that which most religions have persistently held out, the hope of a posthumous reward; but it is a less personal and perhaps more altruistic hope of furthering, while taking part in it, the progress of the race, of being the ancestors of a perfected humanity in which suffering will be non-existent and death will have no sting. For those to whom this hope seems insufficient, there may be added the anticipation of a foretaste, even in a single lifetime, of the benefits which are the objects of attainment. Life is imposed upon each generation. Each generation in its turn imposes life, and in doing so accepts the obligations which are attached

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to the life-state. If it accepts them hopefully, courageously, it will progress more surely than if it recriminates against them, and it may be that it is hastening towards a goal of greater magnitude than any that we can as yet discern.

LONDON. F. CARREL.

THE OPTIMISM OF THOMAS HARDY.

Two kinds of optimism exist in this world: the one I will call docile optimism, the other heroic optimism. We in America have long enjoyed the blessings of the first variety. Docile optimism assumes without question the ultimate worth of the social order in which we live; it assumes, in most cases, the preëminent value of human happiness and believes that to this end should be subordinated reflection and investigation; it loves order, system, uniformity, and, at least in its most exalted form, fixes its steadfast gaze in submissive adoration of the Supreme Perfection in whose clear light the discolorings of incompleteness or even actual evil are quite lost to view. Thus by assuming at the outset the existence of an all-wise and all-loving power present in every part of nature one is able to prove with Alexander Pope that every circumstance is good, and that

> "In spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
> One truth is clear, whatever is, is right."

All that happens, happens for the best, thus saith the docile optimist. No cataclysms of nature can disturb him. He does not worry over social "disharmonies." Surely, he says, it is better to know good than evil; why should we sully our skirts by contact with filth, or our minds by contemplation of squalor? Rather let us look upon Beauty pure and undefiled, let us think upon the nobility of Truth, and the graciousness of Goodness. If existing social conditions have some slight defects let us forget these and, thinking of our enormous progress since the age of apes, be happy.

Such is the point of view of the docile optimist, and it is a point of view with which in its various forms we in America

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are thoroughly familiar. Sometimes it has appeared among us arrayed in the gaudy garments of materialism, sometimes it has robed itself in the beautiful white drapery of transcendentalism. Ralph Waldo Emerson taught us the doctrine in such winning form as raised our souls to the Heaven of his own belief; Sidney Lanier sang in lyric strains of triumph the same faith when he told how wandering over the whole world Love seeks in vain for Hell; Walt Whitman taught us in his franker fashion that every human motive or emotion is a motive or emotion for good; and, finally, our greatest literary force of the day, Mr. William D. Howells, in his complete creed of the conventional and commonplace, stands for docile optimism without limit. Surely I would not deny great value to this literature. Emerson is inspiring and Lanier is comforting, Whitman invigorates and Mr. Howells pacifies. Nevertheless in its appeal to us at the present time does there not seem to be something lacking in this type of American work?

The conventionality and conservatism and self-satisfaction of much of our American writing is becoming apparent. The truth is evident that docile optimism purchases its vigor at the price of abstraction. Its courage is largely due to ignorance. Beauty pure and undefiled is not the beauty which is found in this world; it is not the beauty which shall be significant to lives of spiritual toil and struggle; like Owen Warland's artificial butterfly in Hawthorne's story it is useless to mankind. So the nobility of truth is not a real nobility if it merely fondles the accepted children of thought and rejects those outcast ideas that are wrestling in the vulgar arena with hard-to-be-worsted doubts and questionings. And the graciousness of goodness is not precisely the same thing as the precaution of prudence. It would be more gracious to answer one actual question of the sin-stained seeker for right conduct than to solve a hundred fanciful dilemmas of deportment. But in American literature of the day one who is earnestly seeking light upon social or ethical or artistic problems finds it not. He finds not even seriousness or courage or that open-mindedness dependent upon courage. He must seek elsewhere.

Across the ocean docile optimism is less appreciated. Russia

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and France and Germany and England all have reason to know that neither national nor social life is entirely a rose-bed existence, and their literature shows a resultant seriousness of purpose. Here is not found the shunning of vital problems, or the enthusiasm that sees for these problems definite solutions nigh at hand, but rather that grim determination which strives to learn thoroughly the hazards and the real possibilities in life, and then meets them as best it can. This is that fighting-for-optimism which is earnest in its search for truth and faith and holiness,—so earnest that it dare not pass by any scene of suffering and death or overlook one act of sin or evil in the world; for it seeks not a surface peace of repose or of tranquillity or of consolation but that abiding peace which dwells in the ultimate deeps of truth; a peace in which the murderer and the prostitute shall share and in whose light the world shall be redeemed. Nothing less than this will the fighter-for-optimism accept. He must wrest his hope from the darkest places where its very opposite seems to be enthroned; honor and purity must be found based firm as eternal nature in the very character of humanity. Such is the quest. Not every fighter-for-optimism succeeds; few as are the bands of seekers, fewer yet are they that find; along the wayside lie many bodies of those warriors who have fallen in despair. These men we honor, but to them we cannot give the highest praise. But those, however, who have fought their way across the darkness to the dawning sun, and who through all the conflict have borne the banner of the quest unbent and at the last bring tidings of a victory, even though these tidings be in a cipher half unread, surely the work of these men may be called "heroic optimism." The works of the fighter-for-optimism are not always "pleasant" reading. Ibsen, Zola, Tolstoi, and Hardy rarely overflow with the milk-and-honey of traditional cheerfulness. Moral cowards and mental invalids in search of easy-going consolation will find little here to soothe their troubled breasts. On the other hand, those who wish to face life as it is, to be aroused to its real problems, and to shrink from none, those to whom a tale of woe is sufficient incentive to activity, and the realization of human love suffi-

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cient reward even as it was to the men of old, these may find in our bravest modern writers leaders in the struggle of life. And among the foremost of the brave, among the most heroic of heroic optimists must be numbered Thomas Hardy.

A heroic optimist is not at all a docile optimist. One of the very first dogmas of the latter is a religious veneration of the Universe. This veneration may take the form of Lanier's orthodox worship of God, or Whitman's very unorthodox admiration of the "Square Deific," or Emerson's philosophical adoration of the "Over-Soul," but in all forms of docile optimism it is present, usually based, to give it its due, upon that idealistic philosophy which is the greatest achievement of modern metaphysics. From this idealism which looks upon the world and all that is therein as expressions of a Universal Mind, docile optimism too often leaps at once without proof to the conclusion that the Universal Mind is a God of justice, truth, and love. In the main, the docile optimist takes his religion for granted. Now it is upon this same idealistic metaphysics that Thomas Hardy builds his semi-philosophic structure of thought but it gives him no basis for religious veneration. He sees that idealism may bear a negative as well as a positive interpretation, and under the influence partly of concrete events and partly of philosophers such as Plato and Spinoza he reaches a conclusion to some extent in harmony with F. H. Bradley's latest development of Hegelianism in his great work, "Appearance and Reality." For Hardy the Supreme Reality is to be found in a Universal Mind which is above the inconsistence of Self-consciousness with its self-contradictory functions of volition and moral agency. His Ultimate, though he calls it Immanent Will, is not Will in any very meaningful sense of the word. It might more accurately be called Tendency, for it acts without either emotion or conscious design. This God Hardy thus describes in "The Dynasts":

> "In that immense unweeting Mind is shown
> One far above forethinking; purposive,
> Yet superconscious; a Clairvoyancy
> That knows not what it knows, yet works therewith."

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In bringing Hardy to this conclusion concrete events seem to have been more influential than pure reflective reasoning. Throughout his works, from "Desperate Remedies" in 1870, to "The Dynasts" in 1903, there runs an ever-increasing emphasis upon the sorrow and suffering of life, and an ever-increasing passion in the doubt or denial of the goodness of God. Hardy's deepest misery is forced upon him by the apparent lack of justice in the soulless Order of Things absolutely careless of human happiness. He finds that heredity and environment inevitably drive many men to deeds of unintended evil and final self-destruction. Then how can heredity and environment, the most tangible representatives of the Ultimate, be considered in any real sense to be good? In vain Hardy seeks in Nature to find justice; all the evidence he can accumulate tends to disprove the hypothesis.

Thus alike by deductive metaphysics and by inductive examination of the facts of human life Hardy is led to the one conclusion of religious pessimism. So far as God is concerned the world is without hope, for He responds to no human appeal. Within this radical religious pessimism can there still be developed any kind of optimism?

At this point, however, some reader may exclaim that as Hardy's religious pessimism is all wrong there is no need to trace his thought further. But the significance of Hardy's thought does not depend upon the truth or falsity of his theology. He himself disclaims any attempt at philosophic completeness in his work, while nevertheless he claims to be in harmony with philosophic views. Both claims seem justifiable. It is plain that Hardy proves nothing; it is equally plain that he gives a very vital expression to a philosophic temper which appeared again and again in ninteteenth century writings. On this latter fact rests a part, though in my judgment not the most important part, of Hardy's significance. He gives powerful utterance to a widely prevalent mood. One who has never in his lifetime experienced that mood has simply not come in vital contact with all the phases of modern thought. It is a very unpleasant mood I shall be told. I quite believe it, but that is not the point. The point is that

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the questionings of Hardy are not peculiar to him alone, but are such as must be reckoned with to-day by any man who wishes to construct for himself a rational religion. The complacency of docile optimism will not do. To its unproved assumptions and easy acceptance of that which it desires to accept we must prefer even the unsatisfying denial of Hardy. For Hardy's denial is at least based upon real facts of life and is sincere and earnest and soul-stirring. He is at least awake to the problem. The goal he finally attains is not one wreathed with flowers but the race leading to it is run fairly. Whatever we may think of his results we must bow in reverence to the spirit of his search, for it is the only right and really religious spirit. The Bread and Wine of Truth is granted to none but those who have prepared themselves by intellectual vigil and by fasting from the cheap delights of emotional beliefs. The Celestial City of Faith is not to be reached but through the Valley of the Shadow of Doubt.

Into this valley we must ride boldly if we seek to follow Thomas Hardy. In its gloom lurk more hideous enemies than mere religious foes. Monsters of social ignorance and social crime, monsters of man's sin and woman's shame crouch there. For most of us the need is that we ride fast through the grim vale and glance but scantily at the fearful shapes along the way. But in the very midst of their horror Thomas Hardy has built his hut, and during thirty years has lingered among them, scanning in their lair these monsters of crag and cavern that none have dared to track since the greatest of the Elizabethans died three centuries ago. Whoso denies the worth of Thomas Hardy let him likewise dare to explore the Valley of the Shadow and bring us a truer report of its meaning!

This meaning Hardy always seeks in relation to the Immanent Will, the Ultimate. In his "Dynasts" we caught a glimpse of the Will in its nakedness; let us now look upon it properly clothed in the garments of Nature. Egdon Heath in "The Return of the Native" stands as Hardy's supreme personification of the Infinite in terms of natural phenomena. The influence of nature is here presented at its utmost height.

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The heath is absolute monarch of its territory and those few human beings who live about it seem but its helpless subjects. Terrible is Egdon Heath in its lonely desolation; far more terrible is it in its soulless activity. Vast, dark, imperturbable, eternal, slowly it crushes out alike indifferently the lives of heroes and dastards, and punishes with despotic irony all their efforts to escape their doom. Nowhere else in literature, so far as I know, is the overwhelming power of natural environment so adequately portrayed. The man into whose soul the spirit of Hardy's Heath has once entered cannot forget it to his dying day. Its real significance is not local but universal. Every land has its Egdon in one or many forms.

Nevertheless this is but one side of the shield. True, Nature in her beauty is often indifferent to the special needs of man, and in her sublimity she is often terrible, but we must never forget that she is actually beautiful and actually sublime. It is related that the painter Turner in a terrible storm at sea caused himself to be fastened to a mast and there proceeded to sketch the tempest that was likely at any moment to destroy the ship. Hardy's love for Nature is of the same type. He repines at her destructiveness but at the same moment he thrills us with the sense of her power and majesty and eternal dignity. For him the life-giving and life-destroying earth is also life-beautifying.

The significance of Nature for Hardy is not only found in the spirit of the whole, but in every part as well. Note how carefully he cherishes each slightest detail of Nature's life. Call to mind his discrimination of the three sounds of the heath in "The Return of the Native" or his differentiation of the voices of the fir-tree, the holly, the ash, and the beech in the opening paragraph of "Under the Greenwood Tree." Remember the part played by the apple-blossoms in "Tess," and the mourning flowers planted by Troy upon the grave of Fanny Robin in "Far From the Madding Crowd," or poor Marty South's tribute to her dead hero in "The Woodlanders." Think how important is the animal world to Hardy: think of the meaning of that death of the horse in "Tess of the D'Urbervilles": think how the over-enthusiasm of a dog changes

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Gabriel Oak from a prosperous sheep-farmer to a common laborer, and how it is Jude Fawley's ill-timed compassion for the rooks that starts him on his career of life-long suffering. Nor are the larger aspects of Nature forgotten: witness the power of sun and stars over the soul of Swithin St. Cleeve in "Two on a Tower," or the influence of Night again and again in "The Return of the Native" and "The Woodlanders." Every mood of Nature is significant; every object in Nature is alive. The shoemaker in "Under the Greenwood Tree" personifies his last, the village choir personify the very hymn they sing. Hardy is a true immanentalist. In reflective moments he sorrows over Nature's purposelessness, but none the less he watches her least movement with an ever-insistent love. Have we not here a first vague step away from the darkness of his religious pessimism? Nature may be soulless and terrible, but yet in whole and in part she is to us full of beauty and interest and meaning. Such a view of nature is not radically optimistic, perhaps, but neither is it radically pessimistic. Certainly the Immanent Will is less forbidding than at first it seemed to be.

Just as for Hardy there is a hidden meaning in the slightest objects of that Nature which surrounds us, so there is also a vital significance in our most trivial deeds. He lets us see again and again that far-reaching results may ensue from actions of mere thoughtless folly. In "Far from the Madding Crowd" Bathsheba Everdene sends a silly valentine to a neighboring farmer and thereby indirectly causes the murder of one man and the madness of another. In "The Mayor of Casterbridge" the sentimental letters scribbled by Lucette Le Sueur inevitably combine with other causes eventually to slay their writer. In "Tess of the D'Urbervilles" the information carelessly tossed to an ignorant peasant that he belongs by ancestry to an ancient noble family leads by no unnatural steps to the violation of that peasant's daughter. In no one of these cases was the act mentioned the sole cause of the result. Hardy knows full well that in any given result many combined causes are always operative, but in each case relatively slight causes had their part in the tragic outcome.

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Theoretically, as a cardinal principle of our philosophic faith, I suppose we must all believe that no action is ever really irrelevant but that each one is a necessary link in the great chain of circumstance. This faith Thomas Hardy has wrought out in terms of common experience. Everyday life he renders meaningful. We are shown that the commonplace is not really commonplace if we have but the insight to pierce below the surface. The daily events of eating and drinking become in Hardy's hands invested with new dignity. Aught that we do or leave undone is tallied in the total reckoning. Let not Hardy's characters exclaim, "To-day we may be thoughtless and merry, for it is a holiday, and a day of no account!" Such a day there never was, when human lives remained absolutely unchanged from morn to twilight, or when the causes of joy and misery remained inactive. A day of no account! It is an impossible hypothesis! Let us look to it that we be not deceived in this matter, for our slightest words and deeds may have effects that can never be recalled or remedied. The responsibility that Hardy's view puts upon us is indeed so great as to be almost unbearable at times, but in our stronger moods we must feel its stimulating influence. The man who shows life to be earnest and intense, our deeds to be vital and effective, and our world to be one in which most meaningful events occur is a real optimist. Just as the power of Nature renders possible her sublimity, so the law of cause and effect renders possible all ethical activity.

Nevertheless the power of Nature is frequently hostile to man, and the chain of circumstance is often beyond his control. Whatever hope he may possess must be based ultimately upon his own character. Let us turn definitely to Hardy's views of the possibilities in human life. Here is the real problem. What value are we to ascribe to human character and human aims? Is man's nature essentially trivial and worthless? Is he, as Byron and his school would have us believe, actually little better than the average dog? Or is his nature intrinsically noble and worthy, and is the term "manliness" still to retain its honorable meaning?

In the first place we note that Hardy usually presents a

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type of character that is unaided by intellectual development or artistic culture. When he does introduce men of education, such as Dr. Fitzpiers and Angel Clare, it is usually to contrast them to their disadvantage with the entirely unlettered peasant. Nor are his people strengthened by religious faith and conviction. Sue Bridehead, alone of Hardy's characters, has any pronounced religious belief, and over her soul it obtains sway only when intense suffering has destroyed her mental balance. It is the unlearned, unreligious peasant in all his crude simplicity whom Hardy delighteth to honor. This favorite character he first brought on the stage in a comic rôle in "Under the Greenwood Tree," his second work, published in 1872. At this early point in his writing Hardy also adopted as a basis for his novel that same contrast between hero and heroine which he was later to develop so completely—the contrast between a peasant-lover, determined, rude, uneducated, thoroughly capable, true to his heart's core, and a heroine charmingly vacillating, sensitive to beauty, full of social ambition, vanity, and a kind-heartedness which shrinks from giving the slightest hurt to any living being; a man who forces our admiration, a woman who compels our love. This woman's personality is well illustrated by Fancy Day's sotto-voce remark when her lover comes a mile in the rain to see her, "I like Dick, and I love him; but how plain and sorry a man looks in the rain, with no umbrella and wet through."

Dick Dewey and Fancy Day may well have served as outline sketches for the completed portraits of Gabriel Oak and Bathsheba Everdene in "Far From the Madding Crowd," Hardy's next work. The humorous contrast of the earlier novel now becomes tragic, through the introduction of a complicating third character, a man without moral stamina but with that physical grace, social charm, and ardent temperament likely to appeal to the æsthetic and passionate qualities of the heroine. A part of Bathsheba Everdene's nature, and that, too, the deepest part, recognizes the worth of the peasant Gabriel Oak, but in the first instance this recognition is overborne by the attraction of her other lover, Sergeant Troy, a

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dashing, fickle soldier whose light-hearted speech and brilliant sword-play almost make amends to us for his frailty and falsehood. Before such a rival Gabriel Oak can only retire, and express his love thenceforward by a constant self-ignoring devotion which watches every opportunity to be of service. But at the end Bathsheba is by her own sorrows chastened to accept the long sunset of life gladdened by the unfaltering affection of this real lover. Gabriel Oak is the first of Hardy's lovers-till-death: no idle sentimentalists, however, but strong-handed laborers who perform their daily tasks and duties regardless of emotion, and yet always cherish in their souls the vision of higher hopes and loftier happiness.

There is a tragic intensity in "Far From the Madding Crowd" which the critics of that day failed to comprehend. The peasant, they said, is a fit person for comedy but he intrinsically lacks the dignity and importance necessary to melodrama or tragedy. One would have supposed that Dickens and George Eliot and Balzac would already have taught the critics that tragic dignity was a matter of the soul and not of social position, but it was left for Thomas Hardy in his remaining work to prove the thesis beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Four years after "Far From the Madding Crowd," "The Return of the Native," by many considered Hardy's greatest work, was published. These years of added mental growth are evident in the increased strenuousness of the action and the greater idealism of the characters. This is seen in the fact that Gabriel Oak's prototype, Diggory Venn, the reddleman, who flashes like some wandering star in and out of the darkness lying across Egdon Heath, nevertheless moves as a satellite in the orbit of beings of far greater magnitude. Clym Yeobright, the real hero of the story, is as close an heir of the soil as any other of Hardy's heroic peasants, but in addition to their sturdy sense of fact and passive sympathy of self-effacing affection, he has a loftiness of definite altruistic purpose which is in them undeveloped. It is this altruistic purpose that brings him back from a prosperous position in Paris to the life of a rude toiler on the heath so that

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thus he may be an evangelist to his own people, and it is this altruistic purpose which persists unchanged through all the loss of health and happiness and hope, and which remains the guiding motive to the very end. Clym loves humanity, and this love is his leading characteristic. The words of Carlyle in "Sartor Resartus" are applicable: "Two men I honor and no third. First, the toil-worn craftsman that with earth-made implement laboriously conquers the earth and makes her man's. . . . A second man I honor and still more highly. Him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable: not daily bread, but the bread of life. . . . Unspeakably touching is it, however, when I find both dignities united; and he that must toil outwardly for the lowest of man's wants is also toiling inwardly for the highest. Sublimer in this world know I nothing than a pleasant saint, could such now anywhere be met with." Such a man we have met with on Egdon Heath when we have met Clym Yeobright. To overthrow a hero of this type a counterforce of more than ordinary power would be needed. A counterforce of more than ordinary power arises in the person of Eustacia Vye. A younger sister of Bathsheba Everdene she is, in many ways, but a sister incalculably greater in her power of passion and burning demand for self-assertion. In her is emphasized to the furthest point all the modern insistence that the faculties of human nature are in themselves good, and that they shall not be narrowed and cramped by hostile circumstance. In her we see the same love of power that has found expression in Rudyard Kipling for England, or Nietzsche and Sudermann for Germany; in her we see the same craving for material influence that to-day throbs in every pulse beat of our great industrial organism, the American nation. Hardy rightly calls Eustacia Vye the raw material of a divinity; she is the deification of pure experience, a goddess of pure will. These two characters, Clym Yeobright and Eustacia Vye, bound together by Clym's self-effacing love, held apart by Eustacia's self-asserting ambition, must sooner or later clash in tragic conflict. In the presentation of that conflict Hardy is merciless. He grimly leads Eustacia to her self-

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caused death and as grimly appoints the path of the desolate and ineffective future of Clym Yeobright. But in the course of the tragic struggle what a tremendous spiritual puissance makes its appearance! What deeps within deeps of emotion! What altogether heroic possibilities of joy and suffering! We seem to be watching a warfare of Titans, whose mighty figures stalk across the scene in solemn grandeur; and whose purpose the very utmost forces of the earth can neither bend nor break! And this among obscure peasants on a back-country heath. Has not Hardy shown us the capacity of the naked, untrained soul for emotional experience in a way to vindicate the dignity and power of manhood? He makes known unto us that the son of a peasant may cherish a righteousness equal to that of priest or prophet, and that the daughter of a peasant may cherish an ambition intense as that of the proudest monarch. And this, too, without deception, for we are ever conscious of the entire social bankruptcy of these heroes—plain, ordinary, common folk as they are, unaffected by culture or education.

Another phase of Hardy's conception of character is brought out in "The Mayor of Casterbridge," published in 1887, and the next really great work to follow "The Return of the Native." Here he takes up explicitly the conflict between the man of passion and the man of tact. Donald Farfrae, the tactful, is keen, shrewd, self-complaisant, and amiable. Henchard, the passionate, is dull, ignorant, dissatisfied, and haughty. At the outset Farfrae is penniless and unknown. Henchard is rich and influential. But from the moment that Farfrae enters Henchard's employ the end of the latter's preëminence is assured. The employee proves so greatly the business and social superior of the employer that a quarrel inevitably ensues. Farfrae is discharged from Henchard's service only to open a rival enterprise which eventually drives his former master out of business. Next the mayoralty passes into Farfrae's hands, for the people of Casterbridge grow to love him for his good-nature and continual geniality. Finally even the one woman who has loved Henchard deserts him for his rival. Thus in all things Farfrae is successful, in all things Henchard

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fails, and we see that it is necessary that it should so be. Farfrae is accepted by society; Henchard is rejected. The survival of the fittest has prevailed. Nevertheless we are led to see that the intrinsic soul-value of the two men is in inverse ratio. Farfrae's goodness is of that negative type that neither loves nor hates intensely, but is amiable to all. Poor, passion-tossed Henchard on the other hand knows not the meaning of moderation either in devotion to his friends or in wrathful indignation against his enemies. His emotions both of good and evil have a boundless sweep and power beside which the becalmed feelings of Farfrae seem those of a comparatively little man. Henchard's dauntless courage as he meets his fate, and the magnanimity with which he spares his rival when by a reversal of fortune he holds that rival's happiness in the hollow of his hand, lead us to accept for him Hardy's title of respect: "The Mayor of Casterbridge: a Man of Character." And when we stand by this man's lonely deathbed in the hovel out on Egdon Heath, and listen to the account of his last days from the rude oaf who attended him, we hear with a shudder Farfrae's accents of sympathy, "Dear me—is that so!" Like Jorgen Tesman's famous "Fancy that!" in the climax scene of Ibsen's "Hedda Gabler" the words mark the speaker's spiritual insensibility.

In "The Mayor of Casterbridge" Hardy's ethics are wrought out with clearness. The lowlier virtues, such as tact and amiability and honesty, which go far toward making the daily life of any man a blessing to his kind, receive due recognition and are granted their usual reward of earthly prosperity and happiness, but behind these everyday virtues, Hardy insists, there lie the far more meaningful depths of intense feeling which give life its ultimate reality. One moment of real living is worth more to Hardy than days and years of mere existence, and these moments of real living, of vital essential experience, are for no ulterior purpose. They carry their credentials upon their face; they need no others.

With this thought in mind we may fittingly pass to Hardy's master-character, "Tess of the D'Urbervilles, A Pure Woman Faithfully Presented." The question of the title-adjective has

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been discussed in writing again and again, with hostility and with acceptance, in moods of bigotry and in moods of toleration. The important matter would seem to be an understanding sympathy rather than an exact ethical definition. The felicity of Hardy's terminology may still be an open question, but the essential humanity and essential moral goodness of the character to whom he applies the term "pure" can hardly be an open question. A woman deeply wronged by others and expiating in agony their sin, striving in self-forgetfulness for their good until the day when she must choose between her mother's life and her own derided chastity, and so sells her seemingly worthless body to do the last act of love within her power,—the man who does not in deepest sympathy feel the soul-innocence of this woman is himself beyond compassion. Those who accept the earlier part of Tess's life but condemn the later part forget not only the actual conditions of the story and the fact of Tess's self-sacrifice to family needs,—which, whatever else it may have been, was at least eminently Christian, and could be paralleled from the self-sacrifice to their religion of many a sainted virgin in the holy army of martyrs,—but also forget the compelling ruthlessness of our social decrees which deny the imputation of any virtue to that woman who has ever seemed to fail in "the one." Those who wish that Hardy should have given another conclusion to his "Tess of the D'Urbervilles" are really insisting that he should have shut his eyes to the actual conditions in Anglo-Saxon society at the close of the nineteenth century, and have placed his scene in some sweet fairy-land where nothing good is unattainable. Still blinder is that criticism which brings the charge of materialism against Hardy's conception. For the weakness to be found in his view, if there be weakness anywhere, lies in his extreme idealism, in his assertion of purity of purpose as the sole criterion of purity of deed, and in his intense faith in the existence of this spiritual purity in spite of bodily defilement. In this instance as so often elsewhere, had we but the wit to see it, Thomas Hardy is not too pessimistic, but too optimistic for us all to follow him.

Here I shall rest my case. There are, to be sure, others of

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Hardy's characters that almost equally merit our attention; Jude the Obscure, in the novel of that name, mason, student, lover, and drinker, cut off from his happiness forever by social and religious laws; Giles Winterbourne in "The Woodlanders," who dies of fever unprotected in storm and rain sooner than suffer the reputation of his beloved to be smirched; Viviette Constantine in "Two on a Tower," and Farmer Boldwood in "Far From the Madding Crowd," and Diggory Venn in "The Return of the Native"; but all of these emphasize the same fundamental conception of human character and destiny that is seen in Tess. None are perfect;—Hardy is not so childish as to believe in any possibilities of human perfection,—and even Tess, the saintliest of them all, feels the force of sensual temptation. Nonetheless I think a fair reader will realize that human nature, as seen through Hardy's eyes, is redeemed by its power of human love. To be sure, this love even when exalted to its highest form of self-sacrifice seldom seems to produce the conventionally expected results in mitigating human sorrow. On the contrary we must grant that the world for Hardy is not a world where permanent happiness and tranquillity are generally attainable. Misery is all about us, and increase of love inevitably brings increase of suffering. Does this view make Hardy after all a pessimist? In his own eyes, I grant, he is probably a pessimist, for in his metaphysical side-remarks the note of despair is beyond question often sounded. The deeper Hardy, however, whose manhood speaks to us through his spontaneous pictures of life more entirely than in his reflective remarks, I certainly call not a pessimist but an optimist, for he shows a worthy humanity, true to itself, unconquered by destiny, sanctified by love. This love, you say, brings no reward? How could it bring ulterior reward, a good beyond itself, when it is itself the final good? Even though it be gained at the cost of every lesser enjoyment as in the case of Giles Winterbourne;—yea, even though it be gained at the cost of every accepted virtue as in the case of Tess, yet if it really be won at last, then Life has not refused to grant its loftiest blessing. Those who look upon love as both the supreme end in itself

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and also as a means to some other end, and hence demand that "true love shall be rewarded," are reasoners in a circle; they would justify other goods as leading to the final goal of love, and yet would insist that this final goal should itself be made a direction-post to the lesser goods along the way. As I have said, Hardy himself in his rebellious moments does not always avoid this perilous path of ill logic, but the inner truth of his work surely refutes his own pessimism, and shows us an optimism that may be ours—if in heroism we will rise unto it!

ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

THE TYRANT OF THE MIND.

"False in thy glass all objects are,
Some sett too near, and some too far:
Thou art the fire of endless night,
The fire that burns, and gives no light,
All torments of the damn'd we find
In only thee,
O Jealousie!
Thou tyrant, tyrant of the mind."'

—*Dryden.*

At an ante-prandial 'gathering in a drawing-room there entered mine host's two little daughters and two pet dogs. The master happening to single out one of the latter for caresses, the other by surly looks and growls displayed poignant jealously. The attitude of host and guests was not merely one of amusement; they appeared even to accord the animal a certain respect for what they regarded a distinctly human quality. When, however, a guest presented to one of the little girls a new toy and her sister in an infantile thunder-cloud of screams and tears exactly paralleled the jealous dog, mine host and his good wife were greatly chagrined. Their daughter's "humanness" was viewed as lamentable precocity of human vice. As a matter of fact, the judges had been overgenerous to the dog and unjust to the

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girl. Both animal and child had merely acted out an organic trait of their beings.

In Bacon's essay on "Envy" there is considerable shrewd observation of the manifestations and effects of that passion, but no scientific inquiry into its origin is attempted. Bacon, indeed, seems not entirely incredulous of certain superstitious notions entertained in his day concerning a connection between envy and the "evil eye."

Montaigne refers to jealousy only incidentally and merely in connection with its single phase of sexual jealousy. Burton, in the "Anatomy of Melancholy," has much more to say on the subject which characteristically, however, consists largely of a collation of illustrative anecdotes and quotations. What little philosophizing he does attempt, as with Montaigne, turns largely on the sexual motive. More surprising than inadequate treatment by moralizers of the old school is the fact that Herbert Spencer's elaborate work on Ethics contains no analysis or direct consideration of jealousy or envy, though he does discuss most of the virtues and vices. A treatise on Evolutionary Ethics is of all places the one in which the recognition of jealousy as a serious factor would naturally be expected. The very simple explanation of the prevalence of jealousy is that it is an inevitable concomitant of the evolution of such forms of life as are capable of thought and emotion. Betterment in living, whether material, mental or social, is the fruit of competition and represents the triumph of the fittest. In the stress over the most important thing in the creature's life emotion is stimulated and the striver tends to hate rather than love his rivals. The higher forms of animal life are heirs not only of generations of struggle but of generations of its emotional concomitant. It is only natural that the young child, like the young animal, should manifest jealousy as early as it is capable of the most rudimentary thought. While a definite and frank manifestation of jealousy in a person of mature years, or even in a child, causes something of a shock and excites reprobation, the general phenomenon of jealousy is reckoned with in practice, almost as universally as the converse law that love engenders favorable prejudice.

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The generation of the sentiment of jealousy, indeed its deliberate fostering up to a certain point, enters integrally into the scheme of evolutionary morals. Probably the most important and significant generalization of Herbert Spencer on Ethics, is that social as well as personal well-being must result from a harmonious adjustment between egoism and altruism, that excess of either is equally detrimental to general progress and individual happiness. In insisting upon the necessary or just rights of self, jealousy of others who encroach upon them is legitimate. An illustration of wide scope is furnished by the international principle of balance of power. "One power cannot extend its territory, or increase its strength, or largely add to its resources, without giving umbrage to neighboring powers. If its growth assumes alarming proportions, the spur of interest suffices to induce other nations to unite, in order to oppose its impending domination over them. This very simple fact, which has appeared at all times and in all places, was the first germ of the theory of the balance of power." Useful and beneficent as this theory in the main has been, "it may be easily perverted if, by deviating from the limits of right, it serves as a pretext and an instrument of every kind of jealousy and political greed; if it is directed to invasion in common, to partition of foreign territory, agreed upon between several; to the subjection of the weak; to the league of the strong; to opposition to legitimate acts of the various national sovereignties; and to repression of the essential rights which belong to each nation." In the internal affairs of a nation, the jealousies of parties and factions moderately indulged, have an analagous justification and utility. A strong opposition is always desirable as a check upon excesses of the dominant party and a minority is rightfully jealous of the power of the majority that ever tends to pass into tyranny. But the jealousy of domestic factions is even more prone than that of nations "by deviating from the limits of right" to promote purely selfish advantage and unpatriotic abuses. It has not been uncommon under present forms of government for one party to checkmate measures of unquestionable public benefit so

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that their opponents might not have the political credit of passing them. English history presents many instances of the vicious effects of factional jealousy but none more momentous and far-reaching than the enforced celibacy of Queen Elizabeth. In the language of Mr. J. R. Green, "whatever womanly tenderness she had, wrapped itself around Leicester; but a marriage with Leicester was impossible; and every other union, could she even have been bent to one, was denied to her by the political difficulties of her position." It would, of course, be idle to speculate in detail as to what English politics and life would have been during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries if Elizabeth could have married and borne an heir to the throne, and the long incubus of the Stuart kings and Stuart Pretenders had been avoided. But it is at least safe to assume that the development toward liberal institutions would have been easier and smoother and much bloodshed and misery would have been spared.

It may be conceded that in the attitude of the individual towards public affairs and in his social and family relations, a certain amount of jealousy is legitimate, but the egoistic principle as a rule gains undue ascendancy, warping the reason and souring the heart. Extended illustration of the subversion of the patriotic spirit by overgrown self-love, is, of course, unnecesary. How large a part of the history of universal politics is a narrative of machination for personal aggrandizement! It may be of interest to recall a single modern instance in our country—the jealous attitude manifested by Salmon P. Chase while a member of Lincoln's cabinet. Intelligent men of the present day readily sympathize with the dismay of the trained Northern statesmen upon first encountering the man of imperfect education, slender public experience, uncouth exterior, and unpolished language. Among the highest claims of William H. Seward to fame and lasting gratitude is the fact that he promptly realized that he had come in contact with a great natural genius and that thenceforth appreciation and cordial coöperation never halted. The record of Chase's great public services, on the

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other hand, is seriously sullied by envious personal aspiration that prevented him from taking anything approaching Lincoln's just measure. Chase's sparsely disguised contempt for his chief, his attitude of personal disloyalty finally passing into actual intrigue for the presidential succession, severely taxed even Lincoln's wonderful magnanimity and materially impaired his own usefulness.

In the parental-filial relation the element of competition is commonly absent; indeed there is usually community, if not identity, of interest. But wherever rivalry does arise between a parent and child, we may look for its ordinary emotional concomitant, sicklying over or absolutely extinguishing "natural love and affection." The garrulous and pedantic Anatomist of Melancholy remarks that "the jealousy of some fathers is very eminent to their sons and heirs; for though they love them dearly, being children, yet now coming towards man's estate they may not well abide them; the son and heir is commonly sick of the father, and the father again may not brook his eldest son, *inde simultates, plerumque contentiones et inimicitiae.* . . . How jealous was our Henry the Fourth of King Richard the Second, so long as he lived, after he was deposed? and of his own son Henry in his latter days? which the prince well perceiving, came to visit his father in his sickness in a watchet velvet gown, full of eyelet holes, and with needles sticking in them (as an emblem of jealousy), and so pacified his suspicious father, after some speeches and protestations, which he had used to that purpose."

As to jealousy between brothers and sisters and friend and friend, there is a world of significance in the saying of Rochefoucault: "In our friends' misfortunes there is something secretly pleasant to us." This attitude of mind is founded not at all upon resentment of injustice to ourselves, but it involves injustice to others. The great instinct of competition has bred a propensity, in proportion as one covets success, to hate those who succeed better and to rejoice in their calamity, if eventually they fall. It is interesting that this element supplies the first touch of genuine

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human nature in the Hebrew Scriptures: "And the Lord had respect unto Abel, and to his offering; but unto Cain, and to his offering he had not respect: and Cain was very wroth, and his countenance fell." The Cain and Abel legend has been practically paralleled in countless instances in all phases of life. Nowhere has inter-fraternal jealousy been more marked than under democratic institutions where brothers and sisters start with equal artificial opportunity and one outstrips the other either because of superior talent or better luck.

In democracies social standing roughly indicates and measures general success in life, and is the object of a stress of competition in which the number of rivals is limited only by the broadest lines of class. Marriages between children of men who had the luck to "strike pay gravel in drifting on Poverty Flat," and descendants of members of the Order of Cincinnati have become too common to excite serious comment. The daughter of an American shopkeeper is the wife of the Viceroy of India. Whether we consider the strife of millionaire hostesses to entertain an emperor's brother, or a lesser nobleman, on his travels, or the pitifully petty bickerings of suburban hostesses at a golf club, it is obvious that American life is characterized by constant struggle for social predominance that, underneath a veneer of civility, makes the attitude of heart suggestive of the amenities between the big fishes and the little fishes in the sea. This essentially un-Christian spirit invades even what has been called the House of God. Without going to the cynical extreme of saying that churches of to-day are merely social clubs, one must recognize that they are influential social centres and effective instrumentalities for social advancement, as well as organizations for moral betterment and philanthropic work. This unlovely passion, the concomitant of evolution, very appreciably infuses the element of hatred into an institution that should be ruled solely by the law of love.

In speaking of jealousy in a child our language was exonerative of the manifestation of a natural passion. This is not at all inconsistent with moral condemnation of the same

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sentiment in persons of sufficient maturity for introspection and self-mastery. In his essay on "Nature" John Stuart Mill says: "The truth is that there is hardly a single point of excellence belonging to human character, which is not decidedly repugnant to the untutored feelings of human nature. . . . Allowing everything to be an instinct which anybody has ever asserted to be one, it remains true that nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct; and that there is hardly anything valuable in the natural man except capacities—a whole world of possibilities, all of them dependent upon eminently artificial discipline for being realized."

All of the so-called "virtues" are artificial products—veracity, respect for other peoples' lives and for the rights of property, monogamy, etc. Rules of conduct, both positive and negative, which gradually have come to be denoted by abstract names and the observance of which has been ingrained in human character, are generalizations of experience of what is for the common good. One of the most instructive examples is furnished by the present sentiment towards gambling. Less than a century ago devout doctors of divinity did not scruple to conduct lotteries for the endowment of enterprises of religion, morality, and education. The practice of gambling has been found so practically demoralizing and disastrous that nowadays private gambling ranks as a vice and public gambling as a crime. The vice of intemperate egoism with its inevitable tendency towards hatred and mental beclouding, the vice which Dryden has not extravagantly termed "the tyrant of the mind," has never received adequate treatment by moralists. It is of course regarded as an unlovely trait and a weakness of character; but, judged by its effect both upon the subject and upon social and public life, jealousy should be taken very seriously, and its indulgence rendered disgraceful in like manner as stealing or lying. This general attitude, of course, could not be produced in a day or by a few sermons; it could, however, be gradually cultivated as has been the view now prevailing towards other sentiments and practices which pass as vicious.

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As shallow and false as the saying that love is impossible without jealousy, would be the contention that jealousy could not be uprooted from the average soul without impairing its zeal in the competitions of life. Its extirpation would not dwarf, but would promote the growth of the sturdy virtues. The greatest encouragement for the hope of general reformation is furnished by the substantial number of persons whose disposition renders them exceptions to the prevailing rule. In the humblest and in average walks of life will occasionally be found men and women who sincerely rejoice in others' success. Most frequently non-jealous persons are of neutral and unambitious temperament; sometimes they are gifted with positive traits, and through unusual qualities of heart are capable of generous rivalry. Other men are exempt from jealousy or control jealousy through superior mental endowment. It is a significant fact that of the very greatest men of all time—the men whose greatness was not specialized but many-sided—two, at least, Julius Cæsar and Benjamin Franklin, were notably free from jealousy and its sequent tendency towards resentment and revenge. It is not sufficient or satisfactory to say that such men could not have been jealous because there was nobody worthy of their jealousy. Other men, not as great but still extraordinarily able and clever, have manifested jealousy of the bitterest type; witness Pope's "Dunciad" directed principally against men whom he should only have despised; witness Disraeli's characterization of Gladstone as a declaimer "intoxicated with the exuberance of his own verbosity." The jealousies of great men and able men have been altogether too notorious; but it is believed that jealousy has been subdued by persons of that class oftener and in greater proportion than by men of slender mental equipment. To men of many-sided, broadly philosophical temperament jealousy should appear the most contemptible, because it is the most wantonly inconsequential of vices. To become angry with a man when he has not harmed you, when, on the contrary, he may have befriended and aided you, because nature or fortune has favored him more than you, is Bedlam logic. The

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higher in the intellectual scale a man is, the better is his chance of self-conquest over our congenital passion through pure reason. Moreover, instances of generous rivalry are more than ordinarily common among men whose profession is directly that of fighting. The personal relations between opposing military captains and between lawyers are noted not merely for skin-deep courtesy, but for cordial appreciation and even affectionate regard. Their comparative immunity from the bitterness of jealousy is not entirely explainable on the theory of abstract professional loyalty or the absence of the personal equation in the discharge of perfunctory duty. With the military commander there is not only the sentiment of patriotism but the stake of his honor and reputation—his dream of a halo of glory, his whole pride of life. It is erroneous to regard the attitude of advocates at the bar as that of mere soldiers of fortune. To a greater or less degree they personally espouse their clients' causes and feel with them and for them. Men of the bar fight, as it were, hand to hand, and suffer the poignant chagrin of being outwitted by a cleverer, out-manœuvered by a more resourceful foe. Here again the whole pride of life is bound up in winning and continuing to win. Yet in these essentially puissant callings there is a high average degree of magnanimity, not alone towards defeated adversaries, which is not difficult of attainment, but, what is contrary to unregenerate human nature, towards one's own vanquishers. The regeneration which often comes of itself to larger men may be brought about in smaller men—the vast ruck of elbowing, envious humanity—by first evoking sufficient power of introspection to realize that their hearts are sour, and then bringing them to see that their real grievance is against Nature, which, while it implanted in every man the instinct to surpass in so far as in him lies, endowed each man with more ability and less ability than many others.

In the moral education of youth the suppression of jealousy may well be undertaken as systematically as, and only less seriously than, the cultivation of the virtue of veracity which has been pursued for many generations. Jealousy is em-

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inently unchristian; to discourage and minimize it is indeed one of the most appropriate tasks which enlightened Christianity could essay. Within the past few years, there has been in this country a deliberate movement to stimulate the emotion of patriotism. School children have been encouraged to uncover before the flag and to kindle with the pride of nationality. While the feature may have been overdone, and sometimes degenerated into mere fetichism, it contains a germ of sound educative policy. In the training of the young the general disposition has been to overlook the vast influence emotionality always will have upon character and conduct, no matter how assiduously the intellect be cultivated. It is part of the legitimate province of the secular—*a fortiori* of the religious teacher to address himself directly to the chastening of emotion, to the inspiring of just feeling. Although the socialist's dream of staying the competitive forces that have made civilization what it is never can be realized, the millenial felicity that Socialism promises might in large measure be attained by deliberately training children for several generations to overcome their congenital tendency to hate as they strive.

WILBUR LARREMORE.

NEW YORK.

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DISCUSSION.

THE VIVISECTION PROBLEM: A REJOINDER.

I have neither the desire nor the time to reply at length to Dr. Leffingwell's criticism in the January number of this JOURNAL (Vol. XV, pp. 221-231) to my paper in the April number, 1904 (Vol. XIV, pp. 312-321).

Dr. Leffingwell asks, "What . . . has the value of vaccination in small-pox . . . to do with the vivisection of animals?" Is he unaware that the supply of lymph for the purpose of vaccination in civilized communities is derived from calves who are expressly inoculated for the purpose?

He asks, "Where are the proofs that the mortality from typhoid fever in any country has been reduced by the general use of the 'appropriate antitoxin'?" He will find them in Dr. G. E. Wright's data derived from the Boer War, which are gaining general acceptance.

Then he inquires, "What has this [the fact that Havana is practically rid of yellow fever] to do with experiments on animals?" I will tell him. Yellow fever has been vanquished by the destruction of mosquitoes; the relation of mosquitoes to yellow fever was suggested by their already proven relation to malaria; our knowledge of the life-history of the malarial parasite was in great measure due to experiments on birds.

He suggests that the reason why there is no record of failure in the use of antivenene as a remedy against snake-bite is that this remedy has never been tried. I refer him to the list of cases of snake-bite successfully treated by antivenene in the "Twentieth Century Practice of Medicine," Vol. XX, pp. 527-528.

Surely then, Dr. Leffingwell is very right when he says, "It seems to us that first of all there must be the general creation of public sentiment which shall be eager . . . *to know with certainty the facts.*"

He accuses English physicians of experimenting with poisons on patients of a London hospital. He gives no details, but I unhesitatingly declare such abominable accusations to be false. He charges his fellow-countrymen with experimenting on the incurably insane. But in the *Journal of the American Medical Association,* 1901, Professor Keen has already proved the "garbled and inaccurate" nature of this charge. The recent English libel action of Bayler *v.* Coleridge has shown us how such anti-vivisectionist

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methods may be satisfactorily dealt with. I will merely express my surprise that a scientifically educated man can be found who ventures to make capital out of the popular aversion to "experiment," who ignores the fact that every advance in the art of healing must necessarily be "experimental" at the outset.

Dr. Leffingwell tries to convict me of sympathy with Dr. Klein's attitude towards vivisection generally, because I presumably interpreted one of his answers before the Royal Commission. Dr. Leffingwell has omitted to state that Dr. Klein vainly begged the Commissioners to amend his evidence, as "when under *viva voce* examination the fact of my being a foreigner made me often not able to appreciate all the purport of the questions which were asked of me and that therefore my answers were not always such as I would have desired to give if I had quite understood the question." This letter and the amended evidence could hardly escape the careful reader's notice, as they are referrd to in the first page of the Report and are published at length in an Appendix. The Appendix throws an altogether different light on Dr. Klein's real attitude. Suffice it to say that my personal acquaintance with this eminent pathologist assures me that he is incapable of unnecessary cruelty.

But what is Dr. Leffingwell's attitude in regard to vivisection? He must be well aware that there is not a physician of eminence at the present day who believes that animals "are tortured to little or no purpose" for scientific objects. Yet he attributes unverifiable quotations to the editor of the *Lancet,* which after special inquiry I have good reasons for doubting, and he mixes up modern with past opinions, thus successfully confusing the ignorant. But although he uses all the methods of the anti-vivisectionists, he has not the courage to decry vivisection "in certain phases." He does not choose to tell us what particular "phases" are to be condemned. He pretends that vivisections are shrouded in mystery and suggests that under present arrangements physiologists are in the habit of keeping secret the experiments so cruelly made by them on animals!

CHARLES S. MYERS.

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

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COMMENTS ON MR. MYERS' REJOINDER.

Mr. Myers refers to certain "quotations," (there was but one,) "attributed to the Editor of the *Lancet,* which, *after special inquiry,* I have good reasons for doubting." The leading editorial in the *Lancet* of August 22, 1863, is a vigorous arraignment of vivisection as a method of teaching well-known facts. Said the Editor of the *Lancet:* "The entire picture of vivisectional illustration of ordinary lectures is to us, personally *repulsive in the extreme.* Look, for example at the animal before us, stolen (to begin with) from his master;" and then follow the words which Mr. Myers imagined it was safe to doubt. "We repudiate the whole of this class of procedure," adds the writer of the *Lancet* editorial. And while Mr. Myers is verifying the accuracy of this quotation, if he will also take the trouble to look up the editorials on vivisection which appeared in the *Lancet* of August 11, 1860, October 20, 1860, February 6, 1875, and August 21, 1875; in the *Medical Times and Gazette* (London) of March 2, 1861, and August 16, 1862; in the *British Medical Journal* of May 11, 1861, October 19, 1861, September 6, 1862, August 22, 1863, September 19, 1863, January 16, 1864, and June 11, 1864, he will see how the horrible cruelties that sometimes pertain to scientific experimentation upon animals were regarded by the medical profession of England a generation ago. Mr. Myers calls these "past opinions." Since they relate to ethics, how do they cease to be of value because forty years old?

In my paper there was a line referring in the briefest way possible to Ringer's experiments in a London hospital, upon his unfortunate patients. Apparently Mr. Myers never heard of them; but he says, "I unhesitatingly declare such abominable accusations to be false," with a fervor that certainly does credit to his heart. But suppose the abominable accusations are proven true, in what position does Mr. Myers then find himself? Nothing is more certain than that Dr. Ringer in his work on "Therapeutics" and in medical journals like the *Lancet,* stated that he had made such "experiments"; among other poisons thus experimented with, and duly described, were muscarin, gelsemium and ethyl-atropium. In the *Medical Times* (London) for November 10, 1883, the editor thus refers to certain of Dr. Ringer's experiments:

"In publishing—and, indeed, in instituting *their reckless experiments* on the effect of nitrite of sodium on the human subject, Professor Ringer and Dr. Murrell have made a deplorably false

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move. . . . It is impossible to read the paper in last week's *Lancet* without distress. Of the eighteen adults to whom Drs. Ringer and Murrell administered the drug in ten-grain doses all but one averred that they would expect to drop down dead if they ever took another dose. One woman fell to the ground and lay with throbbing head and nausea for three hours. The next series of experiments was with five-grain doses. The same results followed in ten out of sixteen cases. . . . Whatever credit may be given to Drs. Ringer and Murrell for scientific enthusiasm, it is impossible to acquit them of grave indiscretion. There will be a howl throughout the country if it comes out that officers of a public charity are in the habit of trying such useless and cruel experiments on the patients committed to their care."

"Useless and cruel experiments on patients"—that is the charge made against Dr. Ringer by a leading medical journal of his own city. I did not stigmatize these experiments in any way; that was done by his own countrymen.

In bringing forward the fact that the Royal Commission declined to permit Dr. Klein to substitute his amended remarks for his actual statements, I cannot see that Mr. Myers renders any great service to his physiological friend. A writer takes accepted testimony, not rejected and discredited inventions. The inquiring reader should procure a copy of Dr. Klein's testimony, so far as it related to his personal practices, and see if in Dr. Klein's replies to the questions asked him, he can discern the slightest evidence of inadequate comprehension.

If Mr. Myers thinks that reference to some army surgeon's experience during the Boer War supplies the statistics of a country, for which I asked; if he does not know that vaccination was carried on for nearly seventy years, independently of calf-lymph, and that the vivisection of animals contributed nothing to Jenner's discovery; if he fancies that the freedom of Havana from yellow fever,—by no means so assured as when he wrote,—may be attributed to experiments on birds; if he believes that reference to certain alleged cures of snake-bite by antivenene furnish me with evidence of decreased mortality in a nation like that of India, where 20,000 deaths from this cause annually occur,—then I fear that no amount of reasoning, within space available here, would convince him of errors,—which indeed are quite excusable in one neither a physician nor a vivisector.

If this discussion must close here, let it be on my part with an

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appreciation. Of Mr. Myers' sincerity and intellectual honesty I can have no doubt. Concerning vivisection, he writes from what he has been told; I write from what I have personally seen. Thirty five years ago, I should have written as he writes to-day, inspired by the delusion that science can make ethical laws for herself. And yet it is possible that were ours the opportunity of an extended contrast of views, we should find not a few points of agreement. He would certainly discover that I am not an anti-vivisectionist; and that everything in the way of painless experimentation seems to me as unobjectionable as to himself. On the other hand, I think I should be able to point out to him lines of vivisection, the cruelty and wickedness of which are so manifest, that, convinced of their existence, he could not fail to condemn them as severely as did the Editors of the *British Medical Journal* and the *Lancet* forty years ago.

ALBERT LEFFINGWELL.

AURORA, NEW YORK.

BOOK REVIEWS.

DEMOCRACY AND REACTION. By L. T. Hobhouse. London: Fisher Unwin, 1904. Pp. 244.

Mr. Hobhouse's most recent book opens with a sentence that announces the standpoint adopted in the pages that follow and at the same time offers a direct challenge to a school of thought that has lately been dominant and is still exceedingly powerful. "During some twenty or thirty years a wave of reaction has spread over the civilized world and invaded one department after another of thought and action." Those who, like the present reviewer, are convinced of the truth of these words will be eager to learn Mr. Hobhouse's opinion as to the causes of this reaction and to discover in which direction to look for remedies. Those who deny that a reaction has taken place will make acquaintance with the reasons which this earnest and eloquent advocate advances in proof of his contention. Both classes alike will find not only a singularly incisive criticism of current ideas but also a substantial contribution to sociological discussion. The work arrests attention both as a prononuncement on the outstanding controversies of the time and as an analysis of the complex ethical and scientific problems which lie at the back of all serious political thinking. Its place is with Maine's "Essays on Popular

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Government" and Lecky's "Democracy and Liberty" rather than with the more theoretical dissertations of Green, Sidgwick, and Bosanquet; but it rebukes democracy for other reasons than those which aroused their suspicion and indignation, and holds out a prospect of ultimate deliverance by a loyal return to principles in which they had little faith.

The opening chapter recapitulates the teaching of Cobden, and points out how its component parts,—peace, arbitration, reduction of armaments, free trade, colonial self-government, democratic reform,—formed an organic and interdependent whole, connected with one another by the principle of liberty which is common to them all. Though a later chapter explains the manner in which it has been supplemented by the best liberal thought of our day, Mr. Hobhouse is deeply convinced of the general soundness of this system. It is in the discarding of these principles one after the other by great masses of men in recent years and the adoption of diametrically opposite views that he finds the reaction referred to in the words quoted above. These rival ideals, no less than those of Cobden, form an organic and interconnected whole and may be conveniently designated by the word Imperialism. Mr. Hobhouse shows how the success of the colonial system introduced by the mid-century liberals formed the starting point of a new imperial sentiment; but he points out how the principle of liberty with which the liberals had stamped their work was alloyed and overlaid by base metal. The contrast between the profession and practice of modern imperialism is brought out in pages of sustained irony. With the proud boast of liberty and civilization floating from her banners, England has marched along through war, aggrandizement, lavish expenditure, arbitrary government, class legislation, shelving of domestic reforms, and is now confronted with their natural corollary, Protection, while compulsory service is openly demanded as the coping-stone of the reconstructed edifice of our national life. Here, however, Mr. Hobhouse believes that the rhythmic law of action and reaction will come to our rescue, and that as the nation awakens to the causal connection of these malign phenomena it will discover that imperialism stands "not for the love but for the lust of empire, for the dream of conquest, the vanity of racial domination, the greed of commercial gain."

This ugly transformation is traced to an intellectual reaction, the causes of which are examined in one of the most interesting

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chapters in the book. The early half of the nineteenth century was a period when the "ideas of '89" took shape in every kind of reform and when the thought of the time was predominantly humanitarian. Our attitude towards the colored races is typical of the change that has taken place. Mr. Hobhouse contrasts Palmerston's declaration that of all his achievements the forcing of Brazil to give up its slave trade had given him greatest satisfaction, with Sir A. Hardinge's contemptuous references to the "anti-slavery faction" and to the revival of servile labor in the mines of the Transvaal under the British flag. This blunting of the moral sensibility of the nation is in part due to the very success with which liberalism has done its work. It is notorious that a class which itself suffers under serious disabilities is more alive to the existence of injustice elsewhere than if it already possesses all or nearly all that it demands. Our middle class is no longer outside the charmed circle, and recent years have in consequence witnessed an enormous transfer of material interests from the reforming to the conservative ranks. Satisfied in the main with its situation at home, it has naturally yielded to the allurements of imperialism. "We applaud it in its capacity of respectable parent with sons to put out into the world, of merchant with trade to develop, of missionary with religion to push, above all, of investor with capital to seek higher interest than can be gained at home." This shifting of interest from domestic to foreign affairs, unaccompanied by a disposition to study the complex problems they present, has immensely increased the power of press, and called into existence the popular sheet, the shouting newsboy, and the sensational headline. The days when Horace Walpole found it necessary to ask every morning where the latest victory had been won are revived when the man in the street daily scans the posters for some new tale of slaughter and aggrandizement.

Mr. Hobhouse is of course fully aware that the love of domination and the instinct of pugnacity are as old as human nature, and that these manifestations during the Boer war simply reproduced the evil passions of the Crimean struggle; but he believes that the general adoption of the conception of the struggle for existence has been the chief factor in discrediting the ideals of right and wrong in international affairs which at least tended to keep the bellicose instincts of the natural man in check. The late Professor Ritchie wrote an interesting essay to establish the resemblance of Darwin and Hegel; and Mr. Hobhouse finds in the

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Hegelian deification of the state the political counterpart of the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest. It is perfectly true that the Hegelian influence may be traced not only in Bismarck but also in the school of Prussian historians of whom Bismarck was the hero; but I think Mr. Hobhouse exaggerates the influence of this department of Hegelian thought in England, where its revival has been almost exclusively witnessed in the more theoretical branches of thought, and where some of its most distinguished representatives have throughout opposed imperialism both in theory and practice. On the other hand he has done valuable service in calling attention to the disastrous effect of the application of the crudest Darwinian biology to the science of society and the life of nations. Readers of Prince Kropotkin will not have forgotten his proof that mutual aid is a factor in evolution no less important and universal than blind competition, and Mr. Hobhouse resumes and extends the argument of that memorable book. The biologists, he declares, have no standard of value; their test of efficiency is existence, not progress, and existence for them is an end, not a means. The sociologist, on the other hand, applies ethical standards, traces the growing domination of reason, the widening recognition of individual and national right. His concern is with orthogenic evolution, with the development of social justice; his eye is on the intellectual and spiritual possibilities of humanity. To the biologist's objection that the struggle for existence is the sole law of life and method of progress we reply that the struggle is keenest in the lower reaches and steadily diminishes as we ascend to the higher types. History is the record of the gradual transition from instinctive to reflective action, of the progressive adoption of the idea of right as the governing principle of conduct. The conception of right may be somewhat vague, and certainly defies definition; but for Mr. Hobhouse it means the opportunity for full development as a moral being. If the State finds itself driven to courses which involve a suspension of these conditions, it may be sure that it has entered on a wrong path.

After vindicating the conception of right as the fundamental idea of civilization, the author proceeds to discuss the dangers which it runs under a democratic régime. Though it is in the long run correct to say that a self-governing community will not tyrannize over itself, the enjoyment of self-government in no way prevents one people from tyrannizing over another. The greatest disappointment to the well-wishers of democracy has been its

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readiness thus to carry on the worst traditions of despotic governments, and its greatest danger to-day lies in the temptations to aggrandizement which beset every powerful community. The idea of international right can only triumph when it comes to be regarded as a moral axiom that what is wrong for an individual or a firm or a party or a church or a trade union cannot be right for a government. This fundamental principle has been adopted by the noblest thinkers and statesmen from Grotius to Gladstone, and is slowly making way; but it has many enemies, and it can only triumph by the coöperation of all who recognize its paramount importance to humanity. The possibility no less than the necessity of such coöperation between liberals and socialists against the dominion of wealth, the spirit of aggrandizement, and the neglect of reform is the theme of the closing chapter. The best thought of to-day adopts a more positive view of the function of the state than that which was held by Cobden, and while retaining its belief in the unimpeded development of human faculty as the mainspring of progress, fully realizes the solidarity of society and the essential oneness of the race.

No summary, however, can do justice to the wealth of thought that this little book contains, to the freshness and power with which familiar themes are handled, and to the width of outlook which every page reveals. To some it will no doubt seem that the colors of the picture are too dark; but those who believe that the ideas which it attacks are full of menace to the highest interests of England and of humanity will hail it as a timely and convincing protest, and rank it with Mr. Hobson's "Imperialism" as a classical exposition of the moral basis of politics.

G. P. Gooch.

London.

The Principles of Relief. By Edward T. Devine, Ph.D., LL. D., General Secretary of the Charity Organization Society of the City of New York. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. vi, 495.

There are several ways in which a useful book about the relief of distress in families might be written. One would be to treat the subject historically and, by a re-examination of those documents in which actual practice rather than charitable theory were recorded, to give a picture of what really happened to needy families in communities ancient and modern. Another would

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be to examine, in the three or four American cities in which careful records of the treatment of individual families have been kept for at least ten years, several thousands of these records with great care and no preoccupations; to supplement this study, whenever possible, by interviews with those who did the work; and to record the total experience quite fully, either with or without conclusions. Still another would be to start boldly with a statement of fundamental principles derived from one's study and experience, to apply these to the conditions with which we are at the moment confronted, and to relate the whole question of material relief to those current measures of social reform in which it is more or less involved. This last method presupposes, for its successful use, a wealth of personal experience and first-hand observation, and Dr. Devine commands these in overflowing measure.

He has little to say about the usual book authorities—there are less than 60 citations in the volume, but his paragraphs are packed with rapid reference to illustrative incidents, to conditions exceptional and conditions confirmatory. In the first and strongest division of the book, this is his method, but another deals with 75 illustrative cases, though in too sketchy a way to be very enlightening; another contains a brief but good historical survey of public and private out-door relief in America; and a last describes relief measures employed in certain disasters from fire and flood.

We have reason to be very grateful for what he gives us, since it is no less than the most original contribution to the subject in this generation, but one cannot help wondering whether the book would not have gained in unity and power if he had abandoned the "disasters" altogether, and had devoted the same space to a detailed and accurate description of the best everyday methods now employed. In such a re-arrangement of material, the "historical survey" would have come first, beginning, as it now does, with his challenge of the significance of the English Poor Law experience. His next chapters would have shown how we in America have wavered between a practice shaped by the English theories of poor-relief and a practice shaped by no theories at all, and then from this naturally would have followed his very interesting and suggestive chapters on "the essentials of a relief policy" and "the standard of living." Next, but more descriptively and in detail, would have come the application of

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these theoretical statements to the elimination of disease, child-labor, the housing problem, family desertion, intemperance, industrial displacement, and immigration. The "typical relief problems," reduced in number, perhaps, but more adequately stated, would have closed the book. The truth is here, in the book that we have, for those who know enough to find it, but the inexperienced are in danger of being misled by a not too happy arrangement and by an occasional obscurity of phrase.

Dr. Devine's fundamental relief principle is stated and restated in several forms, the clearest of which, perhaps, is that "there is in each community a definite standard of living, and that charitable relief is concerned, not with raising or lowering it, but rather with eliminating the obstacles which particular individuals and families have in realizing the standard, and in securing the withdrawal from the industrial class of those who are unfit for a place in it. . . ." In one of the strongest chapters in the book he describes the elements that go to make up a standard of living, many of which are too often overlooked by relief-givers. He estimates that, in New York city, $600 is the absolute minimum below which the earnings of a family of five "cannot fall without either constituting a just claim upon the consideration of the charitable, or at least arousing the apprehension of those who look forward to the effect upon the rising generation of a meagre supply of the necessities and decencies of living."

This idea of the relation of relief, not to existence alone but to the kind of existence, once fully accepted, our author makes it clear that old notions about relief funds as "sums forever set apart to be expended in meeting an annually recurring number of cases of destitution of particular kinds" must be abandoned. "A larger expenditure, comprehensively planned and made with courage and determination, thus takes the place of a bungling and inadequate expenditure which reaches results rather than causes, and which must be continued indefinitely because the sources of distress remain untouched. . . . The large expenditure to which reference has been made necessarily includes a very considerable outlay for the personal oversight and intelligent direction through which alone the fund becomes in any genuine sense a relief fund." This is the constructive relief policy developed so interestingly in succeeding chapters—a policy of large and well-planned expenditures that shall de-pauperize, but Dr.

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Devine might have added that the success or failure of these larger plans will depend upon the ability of their administrators to keep a true balance between disbursements for raw materials and disbursements for the brains and devotion that make the finished product.

PHILADELPHIA. MARY E. RICHMOND.

POVERTY. By Robert Hunter. New York: The Macmillan Company; London: Macmillan & Co., Lim., 1904. Pp. xi, 382.

No better tribute could be paid to the power of Mr. Hunter's presentation of "Poverty" than the hesitation with which one attacks his method. Many of the things that he says with such emphasis have needed to be said, many that he drives home have needed to be driven, and yet it is impossible to be other than impatient with his twelve pages of "Authorities" at the end, after experience of the irresponsible way in which both figures and authorities are treated throughout the volume. Mr. Hunter's estimates of the extent of poverty in Boston and New York have already been challenged. It is true that accurate data concerning the extent of poverty do not exist, but this does not make unwarrantable inferences from inaccurate data any the less irritating.

The book's main fault, however, lies not here but deeper. The preface states, though quite incidentally and as one of a number of limitations, that the author has purposely ignored the personal causes of poverty. This is as he will, but he devotes a large part of his book to a discussion of causes, nevertheless, and in such a way as to give the impression that he is dwelling upon those causes that are fundamental and important. The single clause in his preface, and the occasional word here and there in the body of the book do not sufficiently safeguard him. It would not safeguard an author who chose "The Earth's Atmosphere" for the title of a book about nitrogen to state somewhere in the preface that he "purposely ignored" the properties of oxygen. The personal and social causes of poverty are as intimately associated as the elements of the air, and the author who proposes to discuss only one of these elements should make this fact clear on his title page.

The industrial causes of poverty are quite important enough to deserve separate consideration in not one book but in a hundred. Here they are strikingly though not always fairly presented. Every observant worker among the poor must have realized that

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an organization of industry which demands and is assured a large unemployed margin of labor contains within it the seeds of social and industrial degeneration. The long seasons of no work or of intermittent work in our great manufacturing cities cause a form of distress that is only aggravated by charitable relief, and social reformers must more and more turn their attention to devising ways of meeting this difficulty. Mr. Hunter makes the evil plain, but he suggests no remedies. Even where remedies might be pointed out, as, for instance, in the treatment of the immigration question, for which a constructive programme is already shaping itself in the minds of the more thoughtful, he refrains from suggesting the hopeful side, and here as elsewhere dips his brush in midnight. The method is a legitimate one, if the whole book were avowedly no more than a bundle of personal impressions, but, as has been suggested, impressions are quite elaborately reinforced throughout by statistics and authorities, and, to this extent, they are calculated to mislead the unwary.

PHILADELPHIA. MARY E. RICHMOND.

SOCIOLOGICAL PAPERS. By Francis Galton, E. Westermarck, P. Geddes, E. Durkheim, Harold H. Mann and V. V. Brandford. With an introductory Address by James Bryce. Published for the Sociological Society. London: Macmillan & Co., 1905.

This series of sociological papers may be described as the first volume of the transactions of the recently established Sociological Society. The first paper is an Introductory Address delivered at a meeting of the Sociological Society in April, 1904, by its President, the Right Hon. James Bryce, on the "Use and Purpose of a Sociological Society." Mr. Bryce's opening address is an admirable summary of the objects which the Sociological Society has set before itself. According to Mr. Bryce one of the first objects of a Sociological society should be to keep its eyes open over the whole field of human activity and to be ready to lend a helping hand to every new development of social study until such study creates an interest and assumes proportions which will enable it to stand on its own feet. In order to illustrate the need of a society for such a purpose as this Mr. Bryce tells us that when he was recently making inquiries into the results of the intermarriage of white and colored races he found that no society of any kind had examined this question;

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that few data of any accurate kind were to be had relating to it, and that all our current ideas as to the supposed evil effects of the intermarriage of civilized with uncivilized races were matters of conjecture. Mr. Bryce also points out that a Sociological Society which has as its fundamental object the study of social phenomena as a whole is in an excellent position for exhibiting the co-relation which exists between the various social sciences. Many of these sciences at the present time take little or insufficient cognizance of what is being done in other branches of social study outside their immediate sphere. The result of this comparative isolation is that we get detached studies of certain social facts and processes, but these studies are seldom pursued or presented as part of a greater whole. "A single society," says Mr. Bryce, "surveying the whole field of human phenomena ought to be able to bring all these diverse and formally unconnected yet interlacing branches into systematic coöperation." Coöperation of this character, it is believed, will lead to a more rapid advance towards the correlation and unification of all forms of knowledge bearing on man.

In Great Britain during the past century an immense amount of practical work has been done in the domain of what may be comprehensively described as philanthropy. But philanthropic effort has been to a large extent conducted without any clearly defined general aims, and sufficient account has not been taken of the fact that in the process of remedying or palliating certain admitted and glaring evils in our social system it is easy to create fresh evils of an almost equally disastrous character. Mr. Bryce considers that the best remedy for this defective state of things is to possess a sound theoretical basis for practical effort, and he considers that a Sociological Society is the most appropriate instrument for providing such a basis. In short, the sum and substance of Mr. Bryce's address is a plea for the application of the same careful rigorous scientific method in the human sciences as has been applied with such conspicuous success in the physical sciences. The fundamental presupposition is that the whole structure and development of human society is just as much under the dominion of law as the processes of inanimate nature and that the supreme task of Sociology is to discover the sociological laws which preside over the collective evolution of humanity. This it must be confessed is a task of gigantic magnitude. It is infinitely more complex and difficult than anything we meet with in the sciences of

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nature. The multiplicity of conditions which determine the growth and development of human society is so ramified and obscure that the task of discovering these conditions differentiating them, analysizing them, assigning them their proper order of importance is nothing less than stupendous. Yet this is a task which the human mind must grapple with if our knowledge of human society is to advance from an empirical to a scientific stage.

These observations on Mr. Bryce's paper have left little space for dealing with some of the excellent papers in the body of the volume. These papers, we are told in the preface, may be grouped under three heads. The first group is devoted to a consideration of the History and Methodology of Sociology and includes papers on the "Origin and Use of the Word Sociology" by Mr. Victor Brandford; on the "Relation of Sociology to the Social Sciences and to Philosophy," by Mr. Brandford and Professor Durkheim; and the translation of an article contributed to the *Revue Philosophique,* by Professor Durkheim and M. E. Fauconnet, on "Sociology and the Social Sciences." According to Mr. Durkheim and Mr. Fauconnet, it is no use discussing in the abstract what Sociology is; Sociology, they say, exists: it is the science of social facts, and the practical and fruitful thing to do is to make ourselves acquainted with the course of its development. In the study of Sociology it is not enough to show that social facts are governed by laws; we must point out in addition that these social facts are dominated by specific laws of their own. These laws are comparable to the laws which prevail in physics and biology, but they are not to be identified with them or reduced to them; they possess a character peculiar to themselves. In these circumstances the social sciences must pursue a method of their own, and the systematization of the social sciences must be effected by a method adapted to the facts of social life.

The second group of subjects in this volume is described in the preface as "Pioneer Researches in Borderland Problems," and comprises an excellent paper by Dr. Westermarck on the "Position of Women in Early Civilization," and a contribution of equal value by Mr. Harold H. Mann on "Life in an English Agricultural Village." These interesting researches relate to special phases of social life. It is in the field of specific social ideas and social institutions that the best work in sociology will be done for many a day to come. Until the whole domain of social development has been exhaustively covered by special studies in the historic growth and

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structure of social ideas and institutions it will be impossible to formulate sociological laws applicable to society as a whole. The third set of papers are termed by the editors "Applied Sociology," and consist of a paper by Mr. Francis Galton on "Eugenics," and another by Professor Geddes on "Civics." Mr. Galton's paper deals with the best methods of producing good citizens by means of a higher conception of the duty of sexual selection, and Professor Geddes's paper insists on the necessity of creating a higher type of city. Both papers are stimulating and suggestive and open up problems which the western world must face and solve if it is ultimately to produce a higher type of man and eliminate the decadent and degenerate classes which at present hamper the progress of civilization. The Sociological Society is to be congratulated on the appearance of its first volume, and it is to be hoped that a long career of usefulness and prosperity lies before it.

W. D. Morrison.

London.

Jugendlehre: ein Buch für Eltern, Lehrer und Geistliche. Von Dr. Fr. W. Foerster, Privatdozent für Philosophie am Eidgenössischen Polytechnikum und an der Universität Zürich. Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1904. Pp. xvi, 724.

In this book Dr. Foerster, a practical schoolman and professor at the University of Zürich, gives as the result of his personal experience and labors, a full exposition of his ideas on the Moral Training of the Young.

In doing so, Dr. Foerster wants it clearly understood that he in nowise desires to replace religion by mere moral culture in education and life. On the contrary, he willingly acknowledges that his own pedagogical practice has strengthened in him to the utmost the faith in the undying ethical and pedagogical importance of religion.

But, as the freedom of thought and the religious liberty enjoyed in America since the Declaration of Independence become more and more established in Europe, the public schools find themselves forced, on account of the diversity of religious convictions represented in their pupils, to restrict or entirely to abandon religious instruction in their class-rooms. The conscientious German mind, however, feels itself bound to offer to the children in the schools something more than the mere training

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of their intellectual faculties, and the only alternative possible seems to be a secular instruction in ethical culture.

Dr. Foerster contends that moral training can easily be given by combining it with the different branches of learning usually sought in public schools; and he shows in a separate chapter of his book, how this can be done. He nevertheless insists that such instruction is not sufficient, and pertinently asks: "Would you call it the right thing to teach history only by occasional interspersions in the lessons on geography or literature or languages?" But just as little ought we to restrict to mere incoherent flashlights that one branch which has above all others to represent and to cultivate the higher unity of all human endeavors. This is, no doubt, a weakness in our otherwise excellent American public school system; and well may we welcome any help which may be offered us to overcome this defect.

In explaining how the problem of giving moral training in the public schools can best be solved, Dr. Foerster calls attention to the fact, often overlooked, that each healthy child rebels by its very nature against subordination and self-sacrifice, and that it is therefore not sufficient either to tell the children what is demanded of them or to put lofty examples before them, but the teacher has to enlist the coöperation of the child. Dr. Foerster thinks that many mistakes of the former kind have been made and are continually being made in the religious instruction of the young, and he shows how the same mistake has been made in many attempts at promoting moral culture in the public school. He refers especially to a number of books used in France, in which the children are told what to do, as, *e. g.*, in a chapter on the duties toward parents: (1) You must love your parents; (2) you must honor your parents; (3) you must obey your parents; (4) you must not dispute with your parents; (5) you must trust your parents, etc. "Can such a collection of moral precepts," he asks, "really be called moral instruction?" Dr. Foerster correctly observes that mere knowledge of moral precepts never affects a deep ethical culture. You must not proceed from the precept, but from the child. Study the real world of the child and find in its character those tendencies which are related to that exertion of the will which you intend to call forth, and then the only thing necessary for you to do is to put these relations in the right light by a skilful and well-adapted presentation.

How this can be done is shown by Dr. Foerster in a number

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of chapters dealing with such problems as school life and moral pedagogy, the preparation of the teacher, ethical instruction in the school, the future of the moral training of the young, sexual pedagogy, objections and difficulties, the punishment of children, etc. But the manner in which this difficult problem of moral training can most effectively be accomplished is explained by the author by an abundance of striking examples from daily life, constituting by far the bulk of his book. The enumeration of the topics illustrated fills four pages of the index. It would be difficult to find any relation of man to man which has not been touched upon.

The character of the illustrations used may best be shown by citing one example under the topic Responsibility.

The Cudgel Boy. "I once read that it used to be the custom at the royal court in France, that whenever a young prince had committed a wrong or been lazy, he never was punished himself, but one of his companions was selected, and this boy received in the presence of the prince the punishment which the latter had deserved. The purpose evidently was to influence the young prince for good by letting him hear the piteous screams of his innocent companion.

"Shall I now call your attention to the fact that each one of you has such a cudgel boy or cudgel girl? The only real difference between you and the French prince is that he heard the screams, whereas most of you are so deaf that you do not hear, even if the thing occurs in your own room. Don't you believe me? Well, then, tell me, do you really believe that anyone can commit any wrong or be guilty of any carelessness in this world, without someone having to suffer for it, even if the wrongdoer himself escapes entirely unhurt?

"If you, *e. g.*, use a filthy word, you may depend upon it that someone catches it up and makes use of it at home and gets a 'thrashing' for it. Or he is impaired by the evil influence it has upon him, it lowers the moral tone of his character and becomes thus an obstacle in his life. You do not hear his screaming nor see his misfortune, and yet he is your cudgel boy. Or you are unclean and disorderly. It may be that you do not get the punishment for it; but others have been infected by your example and become negligent and have to suffer for it. And besides this, others will have to put in order what you have neglected to do, and will have to clean what you have soiled; and thus they

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become in reality your cudgel boys and cudgel girls, and will have to suffer for what wrong you committed. If all human beings who are injured by our wrongdoing could cry out at the same time, there would be such a screaming and a shrieking that you would think this was the last of the world. And, besides, there are all those who will suffer from our faults and misdoing, long after we have departed from this life, etc. Thus you clearly see how important it is for you to acquire good manners and to watch over your behavior."

Most of the examples may be used in the home as well as in the church. This is probably one of the reasons why, though the book deals for the main part with the moral training of the young in school, the author calls it a book for parents, teachers, and preachers. It is certainly well worth not only reading but meditating upon. It is a real storehouse of common-sense-knowledge and wisdom, and can be of great help to all those who have anything to do with the moral training of the young.

Fortunate is he who receives his moral training under the influence of such a master mind as the author shows; twice blessed is he who, endowed with such gifts, puts them to such a noble use.

CHARLES VUILLEUMIER.

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LEBENSKUNDE: EIN BUCH FÜR KNABEN UND MÄDCHEN. Von Dr. Fr. W. Foerster. Berlin: Druck and Verlag von Georg Reimer, 1904. Pp. vi, 375.

The title of this book is sufficient to indicate the nature of its contents. The author has here compiled a series of talks which were given in Zurich to classes of boys and girls ranging from eleven to fifteen years of age. These discourses are arranged under nineteen separate chapters, which comprise one hundred and twenty sub-heads. Among the subjects discussed are: Self-control, Habit, the Power of the Mite, Parents and Children, the Consequences of an Act, the Struggle with Misfortune, Humility, etc. Americans, especially, who feel the need of more literature of this kind to help to strengthen the moral side of the child's life, will find that this book generously supplies their want. The author does not attempt to teach virtue by insisting on the memorizing of moral maxims; these, however good in themselves, are ineffectual unless supplemented with concrete material.

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This is just what Dr. Foerster does. He invariably begins with familiar concrete examples, and by means of these proceeds to develop some important ethical truth. By his illustrations and examples he calls into activity the child's imagination. This gives rise to proper feelings which, in turn, affect the will and thus become the stimulus for right action. Not a single discourse is beyond the comprehension of the average boy or girl from eleven to fifteen years of age. The subjects are sufficiently numerous to present most of the human virtues. The method of approach varies with each topic in order to prevent monotony. The topics are so well chosen that it is difficult to mention any as more appropriate than the others. One need only mention that Dr. Foerster discusses such subjects; as, Reverence, How Theft Begins, How One Becomes a Slave, How One Recognizes Culture, Cleanliness as a Virtue, to impress even the casual reader with the practical importance of the book. It compares favorably with Edmonds De Amicis' "Heart." If it were translated into English, it would supply a most valuable and a much needed volume which should be in every boy's and in every girl's private library. The translator would experience little difficulty in adapting the stories to American life. The book is free of religious bias or prejudice. The author is not opposed to religion, but he realizes the danger that accompanies every attempt to unite ethical instruction with religious instruction. There is nothing in any of the examples used which would give offense to any particular creed or faith. "For all those who desire to increase their power of will and of love, may this book show the way. . . . Since some have not heard these talks, I have written them for their benefit," says Dr. Foerster in the preface.

S. E. Weber.

University of Pennsylvania.

The Art of Creation: Essays on the Self and its Powers. By Edward Carpenter, author of *Towards Democracy, Civilization,* etc., etc. London: George Allen, 56 Charing Cross Road, 1904. Pp. xi, 253.

It is rare nowadays in the realm of philosophy to meet with a book written in so beautiful a style as this, embodying a conception so freshly-felt and so far-reaching. This conception, outlined at once in the first and, to my mind, the most valuable part of the book, is indicated in its title, "The Art of Creation." Mr. Carpen-

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ter's concern is with the children's question, How is the world made? and his answer would seem to be as follows: There is an inner urge in every natural object which prompts it to attain a definite character. This urge is of the nature of desire, and its operations are manifested alike in the growth of the plant, the invention of the mechanician, the persistence of the martyr, the picture of the artist. So much of intelligence and even so much of "self" as is involved in such desire must therefore be granted to every natural thing.

"What is it that before all convinces us that there is an intelligent Self in our fellow-man? It is that he has a Will and Purpose, a *Character,* which, do what you will, tends to push outwards towards Expression. You put George Fox in prison, you flog and persecute him, but the moment he has a chance he goes and preaches just as before. And so with all of us. Our lives, despite all the blows of fortune and misfortune, spring again and again from a mental root which we recognize as our real selves, which we want to express, which we must express, and to express which is our very life. But take a Tree, and you notice exactly the same thing. A dominant idea informs the life of the tree; persisting, it *forms* the tree. You may snip the leaves as much as you like to a certain pattern, but they will only grow in their own shape. . . . You may cut the tree down root and branch, and burn it, but if there is left a single seed, within that seed in an almost invisible point lurks the formative ideal, which under proper conditions will again spring into life and expression" (pp. 28-29).

Readers of Aristotle will be struck with the close similiarity of this conception to his,—all the more striking because Mr. Carpenter is apparently unconscious of any resemblance. This unconsciousness has both advantages and drawbacks. Thought-out, as it were, quite independently, the idea comes with a sincerity that seems to give it new value for the modern world. On the other hand the study of Aristotle might have helped Mr. Carpenter to a clearer understanding of his own thought. For instance, he seems vaguely conscious that man as an artist and thinker cannot create with the same fullness as Nature (p. 32); but he does not in any way indicate the precise difference. Would not Aristotle help us here with his definition of "natural objects" as "those things that have a principle of motion in themselves?" Is it not a significant fact that man cannot produce such things existing apart from himself, things, namely,

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which possess this originating *nisus* in and for themselves, except only in the act which he shares with other animals, the act of begetting offspring? It may be perfectly true that there is a real analogy between the painter impressing his conception on the canvas and the tree expressing its conception of itself in boughs and leaves and fruit, but there is also a difference, and the difference is surely just here that the picture has no force in itself to make it persist *qua* picture and the tree has. If we planted a bed, Aristotle says, and if the wood could grow, it would come up, not a bed, but a tree. The character, in short, is imposed on an artificial thing from without and does not express its nature, but the nature of the man who was handling it. Mr. Carpenter himself has a quaintly suggestive account of the Platonic idea of Bed, every individual bed being a concrete manifestation of the human desire for sleep and rest, the human need of Bedness (pp. 113 and 114). The suggestion springs up: was Plato always feeling after a conception of "reality" as something in which the character, as it were, flowed out of the thing itself, something in which the "what" and the "that" of it were indissolubly united; and was this why he gave up ideas of artificial objects, (as Aristotle tells us he did and as the Timæus indicates,) because such objects could never be "real" in this full sense, depending as they did entirely on others for their character?

Another question is of far-reaching interest. Mr. Carpenter speaks of the indwelling urge as a formative *ideal;* would he be prepared to take "ideal" in its ethical sense and join hands with Plato and Aristotle in maintaining that what all things sought after was some form of the Absolute Good? The whole drift of his book suggests this, but I do not recall a passage in which the great assertion is explicitly made. Again if this "ideal" is what helps to make the world, must it not in some sense "exist" before the making; "be," as Plato said, "beyond and behind existence"?

To ask and follow up these questions might perhaps lead to something nearing the elucidation of the relation between the individual selves and the cosmic self. Like most poets and mystics, our author has a strong sense of such a universal self somehow uniting and embracing all the others. But how? "How can the great self also be millions of selves?" (p. 71). We get no satisfactory answer, as he would himself admit. He gives us once more the comparison, so often made, to the organism and its cells. Now certainly it is abundantly remarkable that we do have before our

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eyes, commoner than anything else in the world, instance after instance of such physical enlacement of organism within organism. Perhaps this is indeed a symbol of the psychical conception we want, still it remains a cryptic symbol, and there is no hint how to translate it into terms of spirit. But it does seem as though the relation of the struggling self to its ideal might be made intelligible in such terms. If so, and if this ideal which is the source of actuality must itself be in some sense real, it might be possible to discover along these lines one element at least that would help to satisfy those who are haunted by the desire for a valid conception of God. To such Mr. Carpenter's other suggestion that the gods are embodiments of the Race Memory will seem an excursion—irrelevant, if interesting—into the by-ways of psychology. The search for God is above all the search for a source of Perfection, more than ever yet appeared on sea or land. Perfection that draws us on further and further by the passion it implants in us to embody it in ourselves and to stamp its likeness on everything we can. It is not to be identified with the traces the desire for it has produced in our ancestors and reflected on to ourselves. This would be to offer us the cup when we are thirsty for the fountain. Very possibly, Mr. Carpenter would accept this statement (see pp. 160 and 161), but his language is not free from obscurity (*e. g.*, p. 137).

Again the desire for God has always seemed to involve a desire for something more than communion with individual human beings. In this connection the Wordsworthian sense of union with Nature (pp. 31, 216, and 251) opens a wide door to speculation. Nature, if it stands for anything, stands for something other than man.

That the book pricks and urges to such speculations is one of its great merits and outweighs much that seems haziness of expression and perhaps of thought. Its appearance, too, is timely in more ways than one; the doctrine of the formative urge is in the air, at the base, for instance, of what is valuable in Pragmatism and Christian Science, if pragmatists will allow the connection. Moreover it might form a bridge between the conceptions of physics and biology on one side and of metaphysics on the other. the physicist's fundamental idea of "matter" is that which tends to persist in its present state, and the biologist can only define "a living thing" as that which uses the environment for its own advantage.

LONDON. F. MELIAN STAWELL.

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THE NEGRO: The Southerner's Problem. By Thomas Nelson Page. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, November, 1904. Pp. xii, 315.

In his latest book Mr. Page's views upon the Negro are delivered with all the grace characteristic of his previous writings; but in a book on so serious a subject we shall not dwell upon literary style, but, as seems more fit, upon the author's point of view and his main arguments deduced from observation and statistics.

First, as to point of view, the spirit in which Mr. Page has penned his preface is such as to disarm hostile criticism, and to lead the reviewer to emulate the author's endeavor to be "plain, candid, and as far as possible, temperate," to "tell the truth absolutely as he sees it," and thus "do his part to help others find it." The sincerity of the author's desire cannot be questioned, but whether he has given a candid and impartial statement of the case let the reader judge.

Mr. Page endeavors to show (1) that the Negro Problem is the *Southerner's* problem, and does not concern the North; (2) that a race can be judged fairly by its rank and file plus its criminals and paupers, but minus its genius and virtue; (3) that the Negro is essentially inferior; has always been a slave and always will be; that he is not improvable and has accomplished nothing noteworthy. Let us consider these points separately.

1. Mr. Page's title claims the Negro problem as "the Southerner's Problem," but in view of the fact (cited in the early chapters) that both North and South were instrumental in bringing Negro slaves to America, and that North as well as South has helped to create the present situation, we hold the question to be a national one. Further, "it is a national problem in the sense that North and South are parties in interest," says Dr. Felix Adler, "and that being the case, it is, of course, our right as well as our duty to be heard; for whatever is done in the South is going to affect us in the North; if the solution is right it will help us; if wrong it will hurt us—more than that, it will hurt the Republic." Must we not agree that both North and South as parties in interest must contribute to the solution of the problem? Is it not true that all Americans, black as well as white, must contribute labor and insight, thought and devotion, to the solution? Who, save General Armstrong himself, has done more towards its peaceful solution than the man who is known through-

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out the civilized world as "the Negro Moses"? There can be little doubt that the intelligent men among the Negroes themselves will do incalculably more than any other class or race toward the solution of the problem. For these reasons we hold that the problem is *not* for the *Southern white man* alone, but for the Northern white man also, and for the Negro American, North and South. The question, "What shall we (Southern white men) do with the Negro?" should be changed to "What can the Negro be encouraged by both North and South to accomplish through his own efforts?" It is a national problem, not the Southerner's alone.

2. Again, Mr. Page entitles his book "The Negro," but explicitly states that "when the writer speaks of the Negroes he desires generally to be understood as referring to the great body of the race, and not as including what may be termed the upper fraction —that is, those who, by reason of intellect, education and character, form so clearly an exception that they must be considered as a separate class" (page 62), and in the preface: "In characterizing the Negroes generally, it is not meant to include the respectable element among them, except where this is plainly intended." We may be mistaken, but we believe that no American or Englishman would agree that any book upon the Anglo-Saxon which should omit Shakespeare, Browning, Emerson, Gladstone, Washington, Lincoln (and the rest who go to make up the Anglo-Saxon "upper fraction") and should judge us by our clerks, farmers, grocerymen, and our criminals could lay claim to be entitled "The Anglo-Saxon." In other words we hold that a race, like an individual, must be judged by all its fruits. In any fair judgment of a man's character his virtues must appear. We should object to having our character or our literature judged with the best excluded, but Mr. Page elects to judge the Negro race without considering Frederick Douglass, Booker Washington, Professor DuBois, or the other leading men.

3. Mr. Page holds that the Negro is essentially inferior; that he has always been a slave or menial and always will be. He argues at length to this effect (page 248, *et seq.*): "The earliest human records . . . the monuments of Egypt show him as a slave bearing burdens; after tens of centuries he is still a menial. Four thousand years have not served to whiten the pigments of the frame nor developed the force of the intellect. The leopard cannot change his spots to-day nor the Ethiopian his skin, any

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more than in the days of Jeremiah. *It is not argued that because the Negro is a Negro he is incapable of any intellectual development.* On the contrary under certain conditions of intellectual environment, careful training, sympathetic encouragement from the stronger races, he may individually attain a fair degree of mental development. . . . Where the Negro has thriven it has invariably been under the influence and by the assistance of the stronger races. Where these have been wanting, whatever other conditions have existed, he has invariably reverted toward the original (barbaric) type. Civilization has swept triumphant over a large part of the earth; only in Negro-Africa has barbarism held unbroken rule and savagery maintained perpetual domain. No faintest gleam has ever pierced the impenetrable gloom of the 'Dark Continent.' . . . But suppose that other observers may have found a well-to-do doctor or lawyer . . . it only proves that in individual instances they may rise to a fair level; it simply emphasises the fact that these are exceptions and does not in the least affect the argument, which is, *that the Negroes, as a race, have never exhibited much capacity to advance, that as a race they are inferior to other races.*"

The argument is that the Negro, because he belongs to the Negro race, does not advance, which is a direct contradiction of the statement quoted above that "it is not argued that the Negro because he is a Negro is incapable of intellectual development." Many other citations might be made of statements which similarly cannot bear analysis, but to give one only,—a particularly glaring self-contradiction, because the two statements occur within eight lines of each other,—on page 54 Mr. Page says, "A visit to the South will show any one that *in the main* the feeling of kindness and good will (existing between the Southern whites and their former slaves) has survived all the haranguing of the politician and all the teaching of the doctrinaire." Eight lines down he says, "*The rule* is a changed relation and a widening breach." (Italics ours.) Such contradictions would discredit the arguments of any writer, North or South.

Moreover, the main contentions of the above passage are not borne out by the facts: the Negro, without assistance, does not "invariably revert" to barbarism, nor has barbarism and savagery held unbroken sway in Negro-Africa. Mr. Page cannot have heard of the interesting work of distinguished German and other ethnologists who have devoted several years to the investigation

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of Negro race-history in Africa, with most encouraging results. Dr. Franz Boas, the distinguished ethnologist of the New York Museum of Natural History, is authority for the statement that "The Negro all over the African continent is either a tiller of the soil or the owner of large herds. . . . Arts and industries have developed to a great extent. . . . We may safely say, that at a time when our own ancestors still used stone implements or at best when bronze weapons were first introduced, the Negro had developed the art of smelting iron; it seems likely that their race has contributed more than any other to the early development of the iron industry. . . . The legal trend of mind of the people deserves especial mention. . . . Local trade is highly developed in all parts of Africa. . . . A relatively high degree of culture has been attained throughout the Sudan where the true Negro, the ancestor of our slave population, has achieved the very advances which the critics of the Negro would have us believe he cannot attain. He has a highly developed agriculture, and the industries connected with his daily life are complex and artistic. His power of organization has been such that for centuries large empires have existed which have proved their stability in wars with their neighbors, and which have left their records in the chronicles. . . . Barth, the discoverer of the chronicles, who knew the Sudanese Negro through long and intimate intercourse, says, "King Askia, perhaps the greatest sovereign that ever ruled over Negroland, was a native of the country. The dynasty of the Askia was entirely of native descent. . . . It is of no small interest to a person who endeavors to take a comprehensive view of the various races of mankind, to observe how a Negro king in the interior of the continent not only extended his conquests far and wide, but also governed his subjects with justice and equity, causing well-being and comfort to spring up everywhere within the borders of his extensive dominions, and introducing such of the institutions of Mohammedan civilization as he considered might be useful to his subjects." Finally Dr. Boas concludes that, "The achievements of the Negro in Africa justify us in maintaining that the race is capable of social and political achievements; that it will produce here, as it has done in Africa, its great men; and that it will contribute its part to the welfare of the community."

This should convince Mr. Page that his statements about reversion to barbarism and about the unbroken savagery of the Dark Continent are based on insufficient information, as is also his

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declaration that "nothing of value to the human race" has yet been produced—in art, in mechanical development, in literature, in science—by the Negro mind, or he perhaps forgets the paintings by Tanner, which have been exhibited "on the line" in Parisian galleries, the poems and charming southern stories of Paul Dunbar, the "lyric prose" of Professor DuBois, the writings of Alexandre Dumas, the patent brake device of a Negro which is in present use on the elevated roads of New York—one of numerous inventions by the same man—or the personal power and eloquence, the educational and administrative achievement of Mr. Booker Washington, just to mention a few things which come at once to mind. Also we think most people will agree with us in thinking that building, carpentry and similar skilled work is produced at least partly by mind and it is assuredly of value to the human race.

In view of these facts we must conclude that Mr. Page fails to live up to the aspirations of his preface. We do not doubt his wish to deal candidly with his subject, but we are forced to the conclusion that he lacks the unbiased mind which would enable him to do so. His statements are too sweeping and are not supported in all cases by the actual facts, as has, we believe, been shown. All this does not make Mr. Page's stories less delightful, but there can be no question that it completely discredits his book on "The Negro" and rules it out of the class of books which can be considered to contribute anything of value to the discussion of the Negro Problem.

Isabel Eaton.

New York City.

The United States and Porto Rico: With Special Reference to the Problems arising out of our Contact with the Spanish-American Civilization. By L. S. Rowe, Ph. D., Professor of Political Science in the University of Pennsylvania. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1904. Pp. 271.

There can be no question as to the honesty of the intention of the "Administration" and of the American people at large so to govern the dependent territories derived from Spain, as best to subserve the interests of their respective populations. Any benefit that this country is to receive from their possession, whether by way of increased commerce and new fields for the employment of capital, or by enhanced prestige in world politics.

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will be, and is desired to be, but incidental. Furthermore, urged on by its own peculiar political traditions, the United States has, from the beginning, taken the position that the welfare of these insular peoples may best be advanced by educating them as rapidly as possible in the art of self-government. In carrying out this purpose, admittedly a very difficult one because of the political characteristics and history of the peoples concerned, our country, by the exercise of what we must grant to be a very considerable amount of political self-restraint, has, to a degree, deliberately sacrificed immediate administrative efficiency in order to secure the politically educative effect of placing a certain amount of governmental responsibility upon the natives themselves. Thus in Porto Rico the inhabitants have, since the establishment of civil government there under the Foraker Act, been allowed to elect their own lower legislative chamber, and to have a minority representation in the council or upper house. In addition, they have retained in their own hands the entire administration of local affairs, subject only to the supervision of the central or "insular" government. Also, as is well known, steps are being taken as rapidly as possible to endow the Filipinos with substantially similar privileges. In carrying out this self-imposed task, it is, of course, in the highest degree necessary that the American people should have an accurate knowledge of the elements of the problem which they have to solve, and to meet this need, so far at least as Porto Rico is concerned, the work under review has been prepared, and excellently does it realize its aim. To the advanced student who is perhaps interested in the more technical and special details of our colonial problem, the work may prove disappointing; but for the general intelligent reading public, it does all that a work of its comparative brevity could do. Lucidly, concisely, and accurately it not only explains the steps by which the transition from military to civil government was effected, the constitutional relations between the island and the United States as defined by the Supreme Court, and the political machinery, insular and municipal, that has been established, but in so doing makes plain the conditions that have controlled the policies that have been pursued, and the difficulties that have been, and still have to be, met. One important fact the work makes especially plain, a fact that possibly the American people do not sufficiently recognize, and that is, that the very crux of the colonial problem lies not so much in the establishment

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of a central or "insular" government as in the provision of satisfactory local institutions. For it is after all the local governments which most often and most directly touch the people, and which therefore should be most closely adapted to their peculiar characteristics and needs. In Porto Rico the eminently wise policy has been pursued of placing the responsibility for good local administration primarily upon the Porto Ricans themselves. Only in cases of misuse or non-use of the powers thus granted does the insular government interpose with its veto or correcting command. Thus this very power which is reserved by the central government, which, through the governor and council, is under the control of the Americans, operates as an instrument to point out and compel the recognition of honest, efficient principles in the exercise of political powers. In conclusion, it should be said that Professor Rowe has enjoyed exceptional opportunities for obtaining an accurate knowledge of the subject with which he has dealt, having served as a member of the commission to revise and compile the laws of Porto Rico, and as chairman of the Porto Rican code commission.

W. W. Willoughby.

Johns Hopkins University.

An Unwritten Chapter in the History of Education: being the History of the Society for the Education of the Poor of Ireland, generally known as the Kildare Place Society, 1811-1831. By H. Kingsmill Moore, D. D. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxii, 350.

Dr. Moore is right in believing that his book deals with a movement which has been generally forgotten, and we are grateful to him for his appreciative and interesting account of this early attempt to provide elementary education in Ireland.

The Kildare Place Society was founded in 1811 on a very wide basis. "Members of the Irish Church, Roman Catholics, and Nonconformists joined hands, and labored zealously together for the common good." (P. 4.) The work undertaken had a wide scope, and touched every kind of school need. "Their books at the reduced rates, which barely covered the cost of production, were available everywhere. Their Training School was thrown open to properly recommended teachers, no matter what their schools, provided they or their patrons were willing to pay their share of the expense. Their inspectors were encouraged to visit

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any school upon their route which showed a willingness to receive them. Their office was made a bureau of educational enquiry and information, to which correspondents from all parts of Ireland were encouraged to apply." (P. 41.) For a time it seemed as if the problem of elementary instruction in Ireland was to be solved, and the government marked its appreciation of the work of the Society by grants of money which by 1824 amounted to £30,000 for the year.

But the Society contained in its constitution the germ of its own decay. Both by its wide basis and the scope of its activities it was bound to be undenominational in religion. Unfortunately it did not limit itself to that true undenominationalism which is necessarily negative, but insisted on the positive form of reading the Bible in schools "without note or comment." This was bitterly opposed by the Catholics, and the Commission on Irish Education of 1824 "endorsed the reasonableness of the hostility." (P. 97.) In practice it seems to have been not infrequently evaded, and when observed, its results were acknowledged by the Society's own inspectors to be absolutely worthless, even in the Model School itself. (Pp. 144-154.) That men so intelligent and liberal-minded as the leaders of the Society undoubtedly were should have thought it their duty to sacrifice their whole work rather than yield on this point, is a significant instance of how formulæ and prejudice blind the mind to facts. It is perhaps too much to hope that this object-lesson in the worthlessness of mere Bible reading, without interpretation, will be taken to heart, but it is the chief lesson the history of the Kildare Place Society has for the present day.

J. Welton.

The University, Leeds.

Thoughts on Ultimate Problems. By F. W. Frankland. Wellington, New Zealand: W. J. Lankshear, 1904. Pp. 19.

Theism Found Wanting. By W. S. Godfrey. London: Watts & Co., 1903. Pp. 40.

The Outlook Beautiful. By Lilian Whiting. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1905. Pp. 182.

From New Zealand, from London, and from Boston have come to us recently three answers to the ever-recurring question, Whither are we bound? Mr. Frankland, a metaphysician and mathematician of considerable repute, publishes in pamphlet form

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his speculations on the problem of the theodicy. He holds "as an indubitably proven fact that all existence is necessarily psychic," and on this fact as a basis he proceeds to elaborate a number of epistemological and theological theorems, the upshot of which is that an all-inclusive Personal Intellect, behind Time, is working itself out by a necessary, logical evolution, into pure moral goodness.

Another pamphlet comes from a pronounced atheist, formerly a clergyman—Mr. W. S. Godfrey. It bears the title "Theism Found Wanting," and is an honest denunciation of theistic beliefs as destitute of any philosophical support and positively warping to the soundest ethical sense.

In an entirely different mood is Miss Lilian Whiting's "Outlook Beautiful" conceived. It is a rhapsody, a carnival of spiritual joy. It would be invidious to point to flaws in Miss Whiting's logic or slips in her science. The book wishes to be neither logical nor scientific. Edification is its purpose, and it wll prove welcome, no doubt, to those who love to be swept along in the rapid serenity of Miss Whiting's spiritual confidence.

David Saville Muzzey.

New York.

The Supremacy of Jesus. By Joseph H. Crooker, author of "Religious Freedom in American Education." Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1904. Pp. 186.

Frankly accepting the most radical conclusions of modern New Testament criticism, the author of this essay attempts to vindicate a real and abiding authority for the great teacher whom so many centuries of orthodoxy have worshiped as "very God." The influence of Jesus, he contends, has been a more abiding and more vivifying influence on the world than that of Aristotle, Mohammed, Buddha, or Confucius, because it has been, not simply disciplinary, exemplary, or didactic, but rather an intensely *personal* influence. To call Jesus "inspired" or to name him "God" does not signify at all our appreciation of him; in fact, it may simply be an avowal of the renunciation of the effort to appreciate him. The only way to understand Jesus is to search for the secret of that personal, compelling force in him which is witnessed not only by the gospel records, but also much more by the doctrine of his followers to-day.

It is interesting, by the way, to notice that Mr. Crooker's view

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of the relation of the real Jesus to the gospels duplicates that of the greatest of living authorities on the historicity of the earliest Christian literature, Prof. Adolf Harnack, of Berlin, who in his lectures on "Die Glaubwürdigkeit der Evangelien," maintains just this thesis of an "original Jesus," distorted by the interpretations of the heirs of the messianic prophesies and the missionaries of Hellenic thought.

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

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PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF INDUSTRIAL PEACE. By A. C. Pigou, M. A., F. S. S., University Lecturer in Economics, Cambridge. London: MacMillan & Co., 1905.

A PECULIAR PEOPLE—THE DOUKHOBÓRS. By Aylmer Maude. With illustrations. London: Archibald Constable & Co., 1905.

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SHAKESPEAREAN TRAGEDY: Lectures on Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Macbeth. By A. C. Bradley, LL. D., Litt. D., Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford. London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1904. Pp. xi, 498.

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THE HOUSE OF CARDS: A Record. By John Heigh, Sometime Major, U. S. V. New York: The MacMillan Company; London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1905. Pp. vii, 370.

Articles by writers in Great Britain, and books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, University College, Cardiff, Wales.

Books to be reviewed, publisIted in the United States, should be sent to INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, 1415 Locust Street, Philadelphia.



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